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From a small policy issue in the 1990s, air quality suddenly became a hotly debated
public problem in the Netherlands from 2004 onwards. During the ensuing political
and legal clash over air quality in the years 2004 - 2010, Dutch infrastructure 
development and road expansion grinded to a halt on account of exceedance of 
the legal standards for air pollution. Tobias Arnoldussen analyses this sudden 
emergence of air pollution on the Dutch political agenda by reviewing court cases,
policy documents, European Environmental Law and the alarming research data 
on a new type of air pollution, Particulate Matter.
Using social constructivism and discourse analysis as methods of socio-legal 
inquiry, Arnoldussen relates the emergence of the clash to innovative legal 
strategies of the environmental movement, the concerns of epidemiologists, 
ambitious European policy makers and an activist judiciary wielding its substantial
political influence. On the level of law and policy he considers the clash to be the
result of the increased Europeanisation of Environmental Law, the failed ecological 
modernisation of mobility and the growing role of a precautionary approach in 
European and Dutch law and policy.
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 THE AIR QUALITY CLASH: INTRODUCTION
AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION: AN AIR QUALITY PROBLEM IN THE NETHERLANDS
When I relocated to my hometown of Amsterdam in 2007, I noticed something pecu-
liar. People were debating which street in Amsterdamwas the dirtiest. It had nothing
to dowith litter or garbage collection, but with air pollution. I quickly learned that the
Netherlands is a highly polluted country, and that therewere satellite images to prove
it. During ameal in the city, I was told that air pollutionwas a healthmenace, and that
it came mainly from car exhausts, although copying machines and printers also emit-
ted the dreaded ‘ParticulateMatter’ (PM10). Quite frankly, I had never before heard of
Particulate Matter or the Dutch equivalent ‘fijnstof’.
I was genuinely surprised, because I had just moved back from Istanbul, a city with
over 12 million inhabitants and about 2.5 million cars in an area that is approximately
ten times smaller than the Netherlands. It features heavily congested streets, coal-
fired steamboats, and little in the way of air quality regulation. Nonetheless, air qual-
ity was more hotly debated in Amsterdam cafés than in the coffee houses of Istanbul.
Apparently, in my four years of absence the Dutch had developed concerns about air
pollution. How could this be?
As a socio-legal scholar my interest was piqued further when I learned that there were
many court cases in which the issue of air pollution featured. Judges were apparently
annulling or postponing infrastructure projects on account of noncompliancewith the
air quality standards for Particulate Matter, referred to as PM10 and nitrogen dioxide
(NO2). I wondered about the emergence of these rules. As far as I could recall, air pol-
lution had not been considered a threat to health after perhaps the late 1980s.
At that time, I had no inkling that I would spend the next eight years researching the
emergence of the air quality clash in the Netherlands. The opportunity to research this
phenomenon meant that I had ample time to ask questions, investigate scientific
reports, delve into court cases, and examine policy documents. I became especially
interested in the social, political, and legal background of this problem, and the main
question was still the one that had me puzzled originally: namely, how and why did
air quality suddenly become an important social problem in the Netherlands?
In this book, the process by which bad air quality became a topic for concern will be
reconstructed. This first chapter serves as an introduction to the problem, and pre-
sents the research questions and methodology. In the following section, a short over-
view of the air quality clash is given in order to acquaint the reader with the issue.
Subsequently, the research questions, the research methods, the social constructivist
perspectives and the use of ideal types are elucidated. The chapter ends with a short
overview of the work.
. THE AIR QUALITY CLASH, DEL INEATION OF THE PER IOD UNDER
CONCERN
With the term ‘air quality clash’, I denote a period between September 2004 and April
2010. The clash started when the highest Dutch administrative Court, the Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division, annulled the decision to expand the high-
way between the Dutch villages Vught and Ekkerswijer on account of non-compli-
ance with the standards for air quality on the 15th of September 2004. This was the
second road expansion to be halted by the administrative court and it became clear
that the Government’s ambitious road expansion programme was in jeopardy. At
that time the environmental movement realised it had ‘dynamite’ in their hands
(Interview Joris Wijnhoven)
During the period of the clash, air quality featured strongly on the Dutch political
agenda. Air pollution due to PM10 and to a lesser extent NO2 received a distinctive
increase in media attention compared to the previous years. In addition, the subject
featuredmore strongly in ParliamentaryDocuments and in the verdicts by the highest
Dutch Administrative Court, as can be concluded from the table below.2
The period was marked by heightened anxiety regarding the health consequences
of air pollution, most notably PM10, but also by concerns over the possibilities of
developing infrastructural projects in the Netherlands. After the Vught Ekkerswijer
decision, the highest Dutch administrative court annulled a large number of
administrative decisions to realise infrastructural improvements.3 Newspapers ran
1. The term ‘air quality clash’ is based on the report ‘the Jellyfish clash’ (Van Raak, Van der Brugge, Van
der Krogt & Te Riele 2006).
2. See text box below. Figures presented in the text box come from various databases. Keyword is always
‘air quality’. 1. Website NRC, search term = luchtkwaliteit, 2. website rechtspraak: search term = lucht-
kwaliteit and instantie = Raad van State, 3. Website Dutch policy documents, search term =
luchtkwaliteit.
3. Between 2005 and the end of 2007 alone air quality was invoked as an argument in roughly 400 cases
against the administration. Of these cases, the appeal was granted in roughly one fourth to one fifth of
them (Janse 2008). Many cases however have started already in 2004 and these were not taken into
account in the investigation.
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headlines that indicated that infrastructure development in the Netherlands was
‘blocked’ due to the air quality regulations.
OnNovember 1st 2007, a new air quality law (Stb. 2007, 414) was enacted, aimed at solv-
ing the situation by way of a new legislative instrument, the so-called programmatic
approach. Afterwards air quality was still frequently discussed in the Dutch Parliament,
but consensus was reached on a way forward and concerns shifted from air quality in
general to specific measures included in the programmatic approach. The intensity of
the clash declined, but twomoremilestones had to be reached before the clashwas finally
laid to rest. On the 7th of April 2009 the European Commission extended the deadline for
compliance with the EUs’ Air Quality Directives. This postponement granted the Dutch
Government time to implement its novel approach. Finally, on the 31st ofMarch 2010 the
Council of State accepted the programmatic approach as a justification for projects with
bad consequences for air quality. This acceptance took away the remaining fears among
project developers and politicians that infrastructure development could be halted by
legal procedures because of impact on air quality.
Box 1: Air quality in the media, in court cases, and in Parliamentary documents
In the period between 2004 and 2008, air quality featured significantly more often in court
cases, newspaper reports, and Parliamentary documents.
A quick scan reveals that the keyword ‘air quality’ appeared almost 15 times more often in
the newspaper NRC between 2004 and 2010 than in the period 1994-2004. In cases before the
highest administrative court, air quality was mentioned almost 38 times more often during
this period than during 1994-2004 In Parliamentary discussions, mentions of air quality tri-
pled. Between 2004 and 2010, air qualitywasmentioned 3192 times, while between 1995 and
2004 it received 471 mentions. In a table, the figures look like this:
. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB QUESTIONS
The sudden emergence of air quality as a social problem in the Netherlands is puz-
zling because air quality has improved in the Netherlands, at least over the last 50
Source Period Mentionings
NRC (newspaper) 01-01-1994 – 31-12 2003 48
NRC (Newspaper) 01-01-2004 – 31-12-2010 689
Council of State (Administrative Court) 01-01-1994 – 31-12-2003 31
Council of State (Administrative Court) 01-01-2004 – 31-12-2010 1191
Parliamentary documents 01-01-1995 – 31-12-2003 471
Parliamentary documents 01-01-2004 – 31-12-2010 3192
(Staatsblad, Staatscourant, Tractatenblad, all Parliamentary documents)
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years. On 5 December 1962, for instance, pollution concentrations in the Rotterdam
Rijnmond area reached peaks of around 1500 mug/m3 for Sulphur Dioxide and
around 500 mug/m34 for smoke, an earlier indicator for particulate air pollution
(Buijsman 2003, p. 38). Currently, Sulphur Dioxide has almost disappeared from
the air in Dutch cities. Likewise, concentrations of black smoke have fallen dramati-
cally, and are now more or less one fifth of what they were in the 1960s (Buijsman
2009, p. 13).
Air pollution by particulate matter (PM10) is now regarded as the main health threat,
but figures show that this threat is also decreasing in the Netherlands. In the 10 years
preceding the air quality clash, PM10 concentrations declined (Buijsman 2007, p. 53;
Hoogerbrugge et al. 2010, p. 13). In regard to particulate pollution, the air quality now
in polluted Shanghai is roughly comparable to that of Rotterdam in 1970.5 It is clear
that the air in the Netherlands has improved spectacularly over the last 50 years
(Buijsman 2009, p. 15).
This situation leads to the question how air pollution became a social problem from
2004 onward. It presents a conundrum for several reasons. First, after being hotly
debated in the 1970s air pollution could hardly be registered on the attention scale
of public and political debate since the late 1980s. Second, looked at from the compar-
ative perspective I used in the introduction it seems unintelligible that air pollution is
considered a problem in the Netherlands and not in Istanbul. Third, all indicators
about air pollution show substantial improvements since the 1970s, and if we look
back to the first decades of the twentieth century the improvements are even more
impressive. How can we understand the rise to frantic prominence of the air quality
condition in the Netherlands as a major and disruptive problem at the beginning of
the twenty-first century?
As a socio-legal scholar I have used insights from both the legal and the social sciences
disciplines. The sociology of social problems knows two traditions, one employing an
objectivist and one employing a subjectivist perspective on social reality (Best 2008,
Loseke 2015). In the objectivist tradition some sort of objective standard of harm is
the reference point in the definition of social problems (Best 2004, p 14). With regard
to air pollution we shall see that medical experts did present serious adverse health
effects as grounds for demandingmore stringent air quality regulation. However, this
approach does not seem very useful considering the abovementioned reasons. In fact,
these reasons lead to the rather obvious conclusion that the objective facts cannot be
used as an explanation for the sudden eruption of concern. We have to look for an
4. Mug/m3 refers to micrograms per cubic meter of air.
5. This assertion is based on a comparison between the table for particle pollution presented in Buijsman
(2009, p. 14) and a ranking list compiled by Greenpeace (2012, p. 4).
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approach that allows us to understand the seemingly contradictory development of
growing concern and objective improvement.
The second, subjectivist, tradition in the sociology of social problems offers such an
approach. This tradition is known as social constructivism. It must be noted that
although social constructivism originated from dissatisfaction with the objectivist
perspective (Jamrozik & Nocella 1998, p. 30), it has firmly established itself and
many social constructivist ideas became widely accepted in the 1990s (Hajer
1995, p. 43). In its strictest form it holds that the way people agree to define situa-
tions determines whether a social problem exists or not, irrespective of any given
objective set of facts. If for instance a ‘star wars program’would be installed to fend
of the danger of ‘alien abduction’ this strict constructivist approach would allow us
to understand how and why this program came about, the improbability of alien
invasion notwithstanding.
In less strict versions of constructivism the ‘objective facts’ are awarded some impor-
tance in the analysis while the focus would still be very much on the ways relevant
social actors debated and defined those facts. This less strict version is known as con-
textual social constructivism (Loseke 2015, p. 8). Given the conundrum presented
above, in which the objective state of our air quality is awarded some importance,
I employ a contextual version of social constructivism to answer my research
question:
How and why did air quality become an urgent social problem in the Netherlands
in 2004-2010?
Scientific data on the ‘facts’ that medical experts present are considered in this
study, but predominantly as claims that are being put forward in order to promote
their goal of more stringent air quality regulation. In my research their status as
‘objective truth’ is to a large extent unimportant. However, related to the third
sub question regarding the legality of precaution, the issue of ‘scientific uncertainty’
is crucial. This led me to analyse the degree of ‘objective truth’ of the negative health
claims medical experts made concerning the impact of particulate matter to some
extent. In chapter 2 I present a social construction of particulate matter expert health
claims by describing them as qualified and contested by the participants in the rel-
evant medical debate. By doing this I am able to offer some insight in the level of
‘scientific uncertainty’ that is present in this debate. However, contrary to the objec-
tivist tradition, in my research scientific claims do not hold a privileged position
when defining social problems.
The preliminary investigation of the literature undertaken in preparation for this
research yielded three main aspects that could provide an explanation for the emer-
gence of the air quality clash: the Europeanisation of Dutch environmental policy, the
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ecological modernistic turn in Dutch environmental policies made in the 1980s and a
turn in the legal order to demand the prevention, even against very high costs, of envi-
ronmental and health threats. These three aspects each form the basis of three sub
questions.
Sub questions
This work is situated within the discipline of sociology of law. I am especially inter-
ested in how the regulatory context has influenced the emergence and eventual res-
olution of the air quality clash and vice versa. This concern comes to the fore in three
sub questions, one question concerning the interplay between national and European
regulation, a second question concerning the role of the then reigning policy discourse
and a third question concerning transformations within the Dutch legal order.
Sub question 1: Europeanisation
It is self-evident that European integration leaves its mark on the policies of Member
States. The increasing influence of European environmental policy on national policy
is a well-studied phenomenon (Héritier, Knill & Mingers 1996, Börzel 2002, Jordan et
al. 2003, Knill & Liefferink 2007). This process is known as Europeanisation. Europea-
nisation plays a role in the air quality clash too because the Dutch air quality stan-
dards cited by the Dutch courts as reasons for annulment of infrastructural
projected were based upon European air quality regulation. Therefore it is necessary
to consider the social construction of European air quality policy as well as the Dutch
implementation of these policies.
This is all the more pressing because, ‘Brussels’was frequently blamed by Dutch pol-
iticians for causing the block on infrastructure by promulgating too stringent and
badly worded air quality standards. However, the Dutch Government is represented
in the prime policy making institution of the European Union, the Council of Minis-
ters. The Dutch Government, especially the environmental Minister, is a European
policymaker. Therefore the question arises how the representatives of the Dutch Gov-
ernment acted in the European arena at the time the Air Quality Directives were being
conceived. Moreover, a solution to the clash was also sought in Brussels, because the
Dutch Government tried to persuade the European commission that the Netherlands
needed more time to meet the standards. Its wish was finally granted based on a new
Air Quality Directive promulgated in 2008.
Europeanisation has hitherto been a rather neglected field in the tradition of socio-
legal scholarship, but the afore mentioned developments show that the interplay
between European and national policy is of importance in understanding the air qual-
ity clash aswell as the role of the Dutch Government within the European policymak-
ing process. These considerations lead to the first sub question:
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How and to what extent has the interplay between Dutch and European regula-
tion and policy contributed to the emergence of the Dutch air quality clash in
2004?
Sub question 2: ecological modernisation discourse
Secondly, Dutch national political choices and the peculiar characteristics of its envi-
ronmental law have had an impact on the emergence of the air quality clash (SER
2006; Koeman 2010). In addition to documenting and analysing these choices, the
study will focus on the political and discursive context within which these choices
have been made in order to understand them.
I follow Hajer and various other authors in their opinion that the dominant way of
conceptualising and institutionalising environmental problems at the beginning of
the new millennium was a policy discourse referred to as ‘ecological modernisation’
(Weale 1992; Hajer 1995; Flynn & Bayliss 1996; Mol & Sonnenfeld 2000; Cohen 2000;
Fisher & Freudenburg 2001). Ecological modernisation can be characterised as an
optimistic view of the possibilities of solving environmental problems by innovation,
market mechanisms, shared responsibility, and sound management. Policy choices
that influenced the air quality clash are analysed in light of this environmental policy
discourse.
The second sub question is the following:
How and to what extent did national political choices, in light of the then reigning
policy discourse of ecological modernisation, influence the emergence and resolu-
tion of the air quality clash?
In order to investigate this question I will compare the events that took place in the
context of the air quality clash to an ideal typical construction of two policy dis-
courses, namely ecological modernisation and a policy discourse I termed ‘limits
to growth’, after the report for the Club of Rome. To be able to increase the precision
of my analysis, the policy discourse of ecological modernisation is divided in a
strong and weak variation. The use of ideal types as an analytical tool goes back
toMaxWeber and is used among sociologists of law to analyse concrete phenomena
against the backdrop of an idealised representation of a certain social condition. It is
impossible to grasp the whole of social reality within the confines of an ideal type,
but the abstraction from social reality that is obtained by its construction makes it
possible to point out different features of a certain phenomenon the researcher con-
siders important. Here the ideal type is used to situate the debates in the Nether-
lands and Europe concerning air quality within the environmental policy
discourse over time and to investigate which similarities and discrepancies come
to the fore.
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Sub question 3: the legality of precaution
Various authors such as Frank Furedi (1997), Francois Ewald (1999), Adam Burgess,
(2004), Roel Pieterman (2008) and Jaap Hanekamp (2015) describe a social transition
towards a culture of precaution. In this culture, a ‘paradigm of safety’ (Ewald 1999,
2002) holds sway that demands a reduction or even the disappearance of all forms of
technological and environmental risk. Environmental harm caused by human action
should be avoided in order to achieve the ideal of a safe and sustainable society
(Hanekamp 2015). Among a number of Dutch socio-legal scholars, the idea that a
legal transition took place towards an approach based on precaution gained ground
as well (Pieterman 2008, De Vries & Francot-Timmermans, 2013). I investigate
whether the emergence of the air quality clash can be attributed to this legal transition.
For this purpose I operationalise this perceived legal transition by proposing a new
type of legality, the legality of precaution. The term ‘legality’ is taken fromDutch soci-
ologists of law André Hoekema and Niels van Manen (2000). It is defined as a coher-
ent set of values, convictions, and attitudes that is dominant in the legal order at a
certain time, and is constitutive of social behaviour. Hoekema and Van Manen con-
sider that social arrangements are reflected in the legal order, and that the legal order
is dominated throughout history by certain types of legality. Even though throughout
history different types of legality dominate the characterisation of the legal order, this
does not imply that when a certain type takes over, the earlier types completely dis-
appear. Their characteristics live on within the legal order, but are not as prominently
present anymore.
I consider the legality of precaution as a legal discourse in which the occurrence of
damage is strongly morally condemned, prevention of damage is considered the
prime imperative of the legal order and the damaged person is perceived as a victim
of negligence by the relevant authorities. In order to characterise the legality of pre-
caution I again take recourse to the construction of aWeberian ideal type. In this ideal
type the characteristics of the legality of precaution that I consider relevant are listed.
By comparing the emergence of the air quality clash with the ideal typical legality of
precaution I answer the last sub question:
How and towhat extent is the emergence of the air quality clash an indication that a
shift towards a legality of precaution took place within the Dutch legal order?
In order to make a meaningful comparison possible the legality of precaution is con-
trasted with another ideal typical legality, the legality of risk and compensation.
Whereas in the legality of precaution damage prevention was the prime imperative,
in a legality of risk and compensation damage compensation is considered a para-
mount duty. Moreover the damaged person is not primarily seen as a victim of neg-
ligence but as a rights bearingmember of a risk collective, established through private
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and social insurance. Damage is not viewed as a disgrace, but as an inevitable, though
undesirable side effect of our modern way of life. The complete ideal types may be
found in table 2 below.
. RESEARCH METHODS AND SELECTION OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
This research is essentially historical in character. Even though the period ofmost con-
cern runs from September 2004 to April 2010, the roots if the air quality clash gomuch
further back in time, to the early 1980s. Moreover some features of the regulatory con-
text date from as far back as 1972. Therefore in this research almost 40 years of envi-
ronmental policy and law are under scrutiny. The lion’s share of relevant data has
been obtained through desk research. Scientific literature has been studied regarding
various disciplines and subjects such as law, sociology of law, policy analysis, epide-
miology and particulate matter. Relevant court cases brought before the Dutch Coun-
cil of State were reviewed as well. Moreover publically available policy documents
were studied, both Dutch and European in origin.
Within the scope of this research, policy documents are defined as all documentation
from Parliamentary sources in the Netherlands, such as acts of Parliament, minutes of
Parliamentary and Parliamentary committee meetings, legislation, and policy plans
and programmes. Such policy plans are referred to in the Netherlands as ‘memoran-
dums’. European policy documents reviewed include white papers, green papers,
policy proposals from the Commission, reports from debates in the European Parlia-
ment, and where available, minutes from meetings of the committees and sub-com-
mittees that are involved in the preparation of relevant Community proposals and
legislation.
It is impossible to scrutinise all relevant policy documents on 40 years of environmen-
tal policy making, therefore a selection had to be made. I zoomed in on the first three
years of the air quality clash in theNetherlands, from September 2004 until November
2007, when the Air Quality Lawwas enacted. All Dutch policy documents containing
the keyword ‘luchtkwaliteit’ were obtained from the website of the Dutch Govern-
ment and reviewed.6 By using the same key word policy documents from the period
of 1999 until September 2004 and December 2008 until April 2010 were also reviewed,
but only when they concerned key moments in the air quality clash, such as the air
quality scare in Overschie in 1999 and the derogation obtained on the basis of the pro-
grammatic approach in April 2009. The study concerns an investigation of the origins
of the general problem of air quality in the Netherlands, independent of its particular
manifestation in specific cases. Therefore, I narrowed this set down by excluding doc-
uments that related to individual projects, such as the expansion of military airports,
6. Website Dutch policy documents, last accessed 27-09 2015.
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Schiphol Airport, or the Rotterdam harbour, and anything related to aviation in gen-
eral. The discussions relating to individual road expansions were also skipped,
although the consequences for road expansions in general have been included. Also
the scientific and legal controversies over the effectiveness and obligatory nature of
soot filters have been considered too specific.
During the initial literature review the large influence of European rules on Dutch air
quality regulation became clear. The Dutch air quality regulation of the time was
based on two European Directives on urban air quality, ‘Framework’ Directive 96/
62/EC and ‘Daughter’ Directive 99/30/EC.7 Therefore European policy documents
related to these two directives have been examined. They were obtained through
the prelex system in which the political process of community proposals is detailed,
and which contains links to the applicable documents. The prelex pages of these two
Directives provided me with a starting point for searching documentation. If avail-
able, the documents listed on these two pages were reviewed. A broader perspective
on the European environmental policy making process was obtained through review
of articles of the UK based monthly journal ENDSreport and ENDSeurope.
European regulation contributed to the emergence of the air quality clash, but it also
contributed to a solution. On the basis of a new Air Quality Directive promulgated in
2008 in the context of the CAFE (clean air for Europe) programme, the Netherlands
obtained a postponement of the deadline to meet the air quality standards. The CAFE
strategy and the resulting directive is the subject of a separate chapter in the book, and
data for this chapter was gathered from the extensive EU website on CAFE (Website
CAFE). The website contains the minutes of committees and subcommittees and pro-
vided a comprehensive resource of documentation on the period between 2003 and
2008. Documents relating to particulate matter and to the implementation of the air
quality regulation by Member States have all been reviewed.
Since the EU Air Quality Directives were influenced by the UK clean air strategy pro-
mulgated in 1997, attention has been paid to the emergence of this strategy as well. I
used UK Parliamentary documents and the debates of the House of Commons and
Lords listed in Hansard to reconstruct its history. The data set consisted of the reports
of the debates in the House of Commons along with the written questions posed and
answered between 1988 and January the first 1996, in which the search term ‘air pol-
lution’ appeared. Debates between 1996 and 1999 in which the search terms ‘EU’ and
‘air pollution’ appear together were also reviewed.
7. Directive 96/62/EC, Council Directive on Air Quality Assessment and Management (Framework
Directive) and Directive 99/30/EC, Council Directive relating to limit values sulphur dioxide, oxides
of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air (Daughter directive).
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In addition to desk research, open interviews have been conducted with scientists,
civil servants, policy makers, and experts from the research institute RIVM, the Dutch
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM), and the European
Commission, along with a number of experts from the UK. These interviews func-
tioned mostly as a reality check, but they were sometimes used to fill in the gaps
where the data obtained contained hiatuses. I interviewed respondents who were
in key positions when Dutch and European environmental policy was being devel-
oped and they are privy to exclusive knowledge. Therefore these interviews have
at times been explorative in character as well, offering new avenues for research. Inci-
dentally a certain interview proved to be one of only a few sources available. The
interview with Kees Zoeteman for instance is one of only a small number of sources
available regarding the way the World Health Organisation became involved in air
quality policy in the early 1980s. Most interviews were conducted face to face, but
the interviews with the UK respondents have been conducted by telephone. A list
of participants is included as an annex at the end of this book.
As a sociologist of law I am interested in the history of the air quality clash, because it
sheds light on regulatory and legal transformations in coping with environmental
conflicts. This consideration informed my choice for policy documents and court
cases as research material. These documents provide insight into the arguments used
in debates between political actors representing various interests. New perspectives
on coping with environmental conflict and regulatory proposals are laid down in
memoranda and policy plans. For me as a socio legal researcher they are obvious pla-
ces to look for answers to my questions. In my research I did not primarily focus on
the decision making procedures within the bowels of bureaucracy, although civil ser-
vants are important actors when it comes to policy making. To answer my questions,
regulatory changes in themselves are of interest and not primarily the question who
exactly drafted a certain memorandum.
For the same reason the role of the media has not been paid the same attention as in
other social constructivist studies. The role of themedia as a vehicle for claimsmaking
is important to understand the social construction of the air quality clash, but my
study did not primarily concern the role of public opinion. In addition the selection
of material in which policy documents most strongly feature was not conducive to an
in depth media analysis. The role of the media should not be neglected altogether
though and therefore I have studied newspaper articles and television shows when
they were mentioned in policy documents. Media attention for key moments in the
air quality clash was investigated, such as the episode on political news show Den
Haag Vandaag recounting the important debates in April 2005 and the visit by Min-
ister Jan Pronk to air pollution stricken Overschie in 1999.
The study of policy documents has inherent limitations as well. The involvement of
policy makers generally occurs later in the construction process. A focus on policy
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documents tends to gravitate towards the decisive stages in the problem construction
process, and leaves out the activity of important actors mentioned above. Moreover, a
subject in Parliament is discussed within a specifically political setting. In this setting,
negotiations and conflicts are going on that outsidersmay not be aware ofwhen revie-
wing the documents. Politicians will discuss problemswithin the context of their own
political agenda, and instead of an ideological description they may well vie for per-
sonal gain and glory. Personal scores may be settled and deals concluded in the hall-
ways surrounding the Parliamentary arena, which are not laid down in the official
documents.
The first step to address these biaseswhen conducting this kind analysis is to be aware
of them. A critical and distanced attitude towards thematerial is imperative. A second
step involved analysing a significant amount of data from other sources, such as lit-
erature, grey literature and interviews in order to provide a counter weight to the
political sources. I am confident that I have amassed a sufficient amount of data
beside the policy documents that provide a counter weight to possible distortions.
My choice of focus on the first years of the air quality clash may mean I missed a cer-
tain development occurring early or late. However, in this case too I am confident that
this development will not have been major, because I would have learned it through
other sources than the policy documents. Developments after March 2010 though
have not been considered in this study.
. A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIV IST PERSPECT IVE
This study fits within the social constructivist tradition of socio-legal research, and
this perspective has a well-established track record in the study of social problems
(Hajer 1995; Peper 1998; Best 2008; O’Byrne 2011). The social constructivist method
was pioneered in the sociology of knowledge in the 1960s by Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann (1966). Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse (1977) applied this perspective
to social problems. Traditionally the social constructivist is concerned with the activ-
ity of so called claims makers. Claimsmakers define a certain situation as problematic
and when they are successful in convincing others of their view, the situation will be
considered as such irrespective of objective facts, as also explained in section 1.2. The
traditional version of social constructivism focusses on actors and the way they use
their claims to further their own interests. Therefore I refer to it as actor-centred social
constructivism.
In the 1990s a new social constructivist method gained ground, a perspective inspired
by among others the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault. The discourse ana-
lytic method of social constructivism focusses on the type of arguments with which
claims are brought forward. Discourse analyticians are not primarily concerned with
actors making claims but with the question what arguments are successful in debates
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about social problems and what this success tells us about the beliefs and values
embraced by the actors involved and the public at large (Weale 1992, pp. 58-60). In
the field of environmental problems the works of Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2005)
are examples of this tradition.
I am interested in the actors who make claims and their problem definitions,
because I am interested in the question how air quality became a pressing social
issue in the Netherlands. Contrary to indicators that air quality is improving, it
became a problem and I intend to find out which actors played a part in this shift.
However I am also interested in the arguments employed within the Dutch and
European debates, because they can tell me something about the changing political
and legal context in which they take place. I am a sociologist of law and not a his-
torian, my interest concerns the air quality clash as a possible result of, and catalyst
for, legal transformation. Therefore I have chosen to combine concepts from both
these social constructivist methods in my own research. The concepts I adopt from
actor centred social constructivism are mostly taken from the work of Joel Best
(2008). The discourse analytic concepts I use are mostly coined by Dutch scholar
Maarten Hajer (1995).
In the following two sections I present my adaption of the terminology of these two
authors. I make an eclectic use of their terminology and adapt them according to serve
this study. Moreover I supplement themwith a few concepts of my own or from other
authors.
1.4.1 Concepts taken from actor centred social constructivism
Below I describe a number of concepts taken from actor centred social constructivism
which will be used throughout the study. These concepts are the claims maker, the
counter-claims maker, policy maker, interest and arena.
Claims makers and counter-claims maker
Claims makers are actors that define a certain situation as problematic, and they
usually also provide a cause for this problem and a favoured solution. They act
as ambassadors of the problem, and try to bring their definition to the attention
of others. In order to make their claims heard claims makers often seek media atten-
tion. When a claims maker gains the attention of the media, he can be sure his def-
inition is widely disseminated. However, not all claims makers target the media.
‘Insider’ claimsmakers such as scientists or captains of industrymay try to influence
policy directly, without taking recourse to the media (Best 2008, p. 66). Another sub-
ject of interest is the counter-claim lodged by a so called counter-claims maker. A
claim that a certain situation is troubling is often opposed by groups that benefit
from the status quo, or by a group with diametrically opposite views. For instance,
the claim that abortion should be legal, inspired pro-life organisations to claim the
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exact opposite. Organisations are often considered the main candidates for the posi-
tion of claims maker. An organisation has more resources than an individual so
tends to be more successful at claims making than the individual. This is not neces-
sarily so however, powerful individuals may also be claims makers. Especially the
insider claims maker may well be an individual with special access to policy making
circles.
Policy makers
Policy makers are a second category of actors of importance in this study. Policy
makers regulate matters to address the situation considered as problematic by claims
makers, and their role determines the eventual success of the claims. The Dutch Gov-
ernment and the European Commission are prime examples of policy makers taken
into account in this study. Dutch political parties with seats in Parliament are policy
makers as well, but their influence is mostly indirect. Most policy is proposed and
drafted by the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers and is debated and amended in Parliament.
In this study I consider political parties to be claimsmakers in the Parliamentary arena
rather than policy makers. Civil servants within the Government bureaucracy should
be considered as claims makers as well, but their activities are seldom in the spotlight.
In this study too, their possibly substantial influence, is by and large left out because
of reasons mentioned in the previous section.
Since this is a socio-legal study I do focus on the policy making activities of the Dutch
Council of State, the Governments highest advisory body and the highest administra-
tive court. One of the outcomes of this study is that the Council of State should be seen
as a claimsmaker, albeit in a negative sense. By negatively commenting on policy pro-
posals issued by the Government in 2005 it forced the Government to introduce a
novel regulatory instrument to resolve the air quality clash. The Government feared
that not heeding negative advice on policy proposals could lead to more annulments
by the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division.
Interests
Actors will use their position as claims maker or policy maker to further their own
interests. I define an interest as a certain goal or benefit for which an actor is striving.
In this study, I distinguish between ecological, economic, and political interests. Inter-
ests that focus on immaterial goods that increase wellbeing such as protecting public
health, a clean environment, and nature conservation have been termed ecological
interests in the context of the study. Interests such as infrastructure development,
increased mobility, and technological innovation are considered economic interests.
Political interests include gaining the favour of voters, gaining seats in Parliament,
obtaining a favourable position for further negotiations, and so on. It is evident that
these three clusters of interests are far from exhaustive, given themany different inter-
ests actors may have. In the context of this study, however, ecological, economic, and
political interests play the most important part.
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Arenas
Claims-making and policy making activities take place in a number of different
venues. To distinguish the different venues in which the construction process of
the air quality clash has taken place I use the term ‘arena’.
Sociologists Hilgartner & Bosk (1988) use the term to emphasise that the features of
certain venues in which claims are put forward determine their success. They
apply the term to social problem research and describe how claims making activity
occurs within certain institutions in which these claims have to compete with other
problem definitions. The media is an arena of problem construction for instance,
because various claims compete with each other for media attention. The courts of
law are an important arena as well, because in court a certain claim may be con-
sidered and embraced by the judiciary. In the same vein national Parliaments and
European policy making institutions are arenas in which claims may be accepted
or rejected. During the air quality clash, some struggles took place in the Nether-
lands, some in Europe. Important struggles took place in the courthouse as well. In
this dissertation, therefore, the arenas of note are the Dutch Parliament, the Dutch
Courts, the European Committees and European political institutions like the
European Commission, Council of Ministers and Parliament. In chapter 4, the
UK Parliament features briefly. Attention is also paid to the emergence of the prob-
lem in the scientific arena especially in circles of epidemiologists and in Dutch
research institutes. The media arena received relatively less attention, for reasons
discussed above.
1.4.2 Concepts taken from the discourse analytic approach
For this study I find discourse analysis to be an attractive supplement to the actor cen-
tred approach because it builds a bridge between micro level interaction and macro
level cultural change. According to discourse analysis, an actor does not choose his
arguments freely, but is constrained in his argumentative action by the discourse
he is drawing upon. This discourse is tinged with the beliefs and values prevalent
in society. In fact, according to the discourse analytician they do not exist indepen-
dently outside of discourse, but are sublimated within it. However, a discourse needs
to be reproduced in concrete situations. Argumentative interaction is a keymoment in
discourse formation. Actors are actively engaged in the production and reproduction
of discourse and may at times introduce a novel argument within an existing dis-
course. Actors are constantly engaged in discursive interaction and therefore also
in discursive change. To paraphrase Karl Marx, the debates in which actors partici-
pate are both the product and the producer of discourse. By treating the history of
the air quality clash as a series of discursive moves, we uncover the cultural context
in which the air quality clash was able to play out. Discourse analysis provides me
with a different set of concepts with which to analyse texts. I will introduce these con-
cepts below.
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Discourse
As the name indicates, discourse analysis revolves around the analysis of discourse. A
discourse is defined as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations pro-
duced, reproduced and transformed into a certain set of practices throughwhichmean-
ing is given to social realities’ (Hajer 1995, p. 44). I will use the same definition of
discourse in this study. I favour this definition over other more language oriented def-
initions because it allows us to incorporate specific practices as belonging to certain dis-
courses. I also feel this definition remains truer to Foucault’s original use of the term.
Discourses are modes of speech and practices that belong to a whole field of activities.
For instance, physics has its own discourse; radical environmentalism has its own dis-
course, and so does law.
The legal discourse for instance is characterised by a number of practices; for example,
the ritual-like proceedings in court cases, or the Latin phrases used in discussing a
legal case. The legal discourse is also characterised by the prevalence of the law as
a central text, and by certain characteristic arguments that distinguish a legal proce-
dure from any other, such as the reference to jurisprudence, to earlier court decisions,
to the legal doctrine, along with the appeal to impartiality of judges and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary from the administration.
Discourses cover different fields, and diverse discourses hold sway within different sci-
entific disciplines and social groups. Just as law is guided by such routinizedmanners of
speech and practice, so is medicine, environmental science, sports, left-wing activism,
and so on. Discourses delineate the argumentative spacewithin a certain field, and deter-
mine what kinds of arguments are and are not appropriate in discussions within it.
Storylines
A storyline is a narrative that gives meaning to specific social and natural phenomena
by supplying amore or less coherent explanation for them. Actors use them in debates
to characterise certain phenomena, provide a reason for their emergence and if appli-
cable a solution as to how to get rid of them. They greatly reduce the complexities of
phenomena under discussion, and make the exchange of viewpoints more conve-
nient. All discourses contain storylines. The discourse on international safety and
security for instance frequently contains the storyline of the ‘war on terror’. Environ-
mental discourse features many storylines, such as the fear of acid rain caused by
industrial pollution or climate change caused by CO2. During the air quality clash
many storylines were iterated such as the storyline that ambient air pollution is
mainly caused by transport and traffic, but also the storyline that the Netherlands
became blocked to infrastructure development due to the stringent air quality stan-
dards and the important storyline that clean air is essentially a human right because
these standards are laid down in law. The content of these storylines may well be dis-
puted, but truth is not a quality applicable to storylines. Storylines may hold grains of
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truth or not, the point is that they are told, reiterated and used in debates to get the
upper hand. If they consistently do so, they will take on an almost absolute quality,
and people will treat them as the natural explanation for certain social and physical
phenomena. In relation to social problems I consider storylines to contain the defini-
tion of a certain situation as problematic, the cause of it and the solution for it. When
problems are constructed, different storylines compete with one another in order to
determine the dominant conceptualisation of a certain problem.
Discourses evolve because manners of speech and practices evolve. Storylines are
intermediate concepts through which a discourse might be modified by discoursing
actors. A discourse may be defined as an interrelated web of storylines, some almost
forgotten, some alive and prospering and some so dominant that they are not even
noticed as being storylines. Changes in the storylines change the discourse itself.
Discourse coalitions
When different actors who normally discuss issues from diverse perspectives, start to
employ the same storyline or set of storylines, one speaks of a discourse coalition. A
discourse coalition refers to a group of actors that share the usage of a storyline or a
particular set of storylines over a particular period of time (Website Maarten Hajer).
Discourse coalitions are formed when previously unrelated actors become discur-
sively related to one another (Hajer 1993, p. 45). Discourse coalitions can have consid-
erable influence on actors to accept or reject storylines. When actors that come from
different backgrounds become discursively related to one another, weight is added to
a certain storyline. It is not only confined to certain actors, but becomes a shared way
of thinking and speaking.
Discourse coalitions strengthen storylines, and frequently add new elements to it. A
storyline is vigorous when it becomes more comprehensive, and when it manages to
cement larger discourse coalitions. Likewise a storyline may become stale when no
new elements are added to it, and when discourse coalitions fall apart that use it.
When certain storylines about a given situation become dominant, they define the
state of affairs in question among the actors participating in the debate.
Emblems
The last Hajerian notion I wish to illuminate is that of the emblem. Hajer discusses the
emblem in the context of environmental problems, and defines an emblem as a case
that dominates the perception of the whole environmental crisis in some period. In
that sense, acid rain was the emblematic case in the 1980s, and air quality was the
emblematic case in the Netherlands in 2005. I wish to propose a slightly different def-
inition of emblem in the context of this study in order to relate it directly to the concept
of storyline, Hajer himself does not do so. An emblem is a unique example that has
particular force within a certain storyline. Emblems are the main discursive elements
around which a storyline evolves. At some point in the air quality clash, for instance,
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the notion that living close to the highway was equal to the passive smoking of 17
cigarettes became current. The ‘17 cigarettes’ became an emblem, because by men-
tioning it, one immediately invoked the whole storyline of bad air quality as a health
problem caused by transport. The first area in the Netherlands in which problems
became clear was the residential neighbourhood of Overschie. ‘Overschie’ is an
emblem aswell, and it too invokes the storyline of bad air quality as a health problem.
In the same vein, the Dutch Delta Works is an emblematic example of Dutch ingenu-
ity, invoking the storyline of the success of Dutch spatial planning.
Camps
One term that can neither be found in Joel Best, nor inMaarten Hajer’s work, but used
extensively in the later chapters of this study is the term ‘camp’. In this study a camp
indicates a set of actors bringing forth the same claims, using the same discursive
means. The term connects the idea of claims makers with the concept of the discourse
coalition, because the actors that comprise a camp use the same discursive means to
bring forth their claims. Although the interests of the actors involvedmay be different,
the crucial aspect of a camp is that the same claims are made. It differs from the term
claims maker in that a camp always consists of more than one distinct organisation or
individual claims maker. The terms discourse coalition and camp do overlap to a sig-
nificant extent, in the sense that in the way the idea is used here, all camps are con-
sidered discourse coalitions. However, not all discourse coalitions make claims and
therefore not all discourse coalitions are camps. If a certain issue has been settled,
actorsmay still conceptualise a situation in a similar way andmaintain their discourse
coalition, even though they may not face opposition. A camp though is always pitted
within one or more arenas against other claims makers or counter-claims makers.
. IDEAL TYPES OF ECOLOGICAL MODERNISAT ION AND THE LEGALITY
OF PRECAUTION
The social constructivist research methodology is augmented by the use of ideal
types. They are used to analyse the claims making and policy making activities
and the storylines used against the backdrop of regulatory and legal change. Con-
structing ideal types of the discourses of ecological modernisation and the legality
of precaution enable me to answer the last two sub questions raised above. An ideal
type is formed by assembling elements from the given phenomena, but the ideal type
is not intended to correspond to all characteristics of the phenomena in question
totally. In fact ideal types are accentuations of phenomena and specific characteristics
have been emphasised by the researcher. It is never found as such in reality, but it is a
device with which reality may be ordered and categorised. An ideal type is an ana-
lytical construct and serves to ascertain similarities as well as deviations between con-
crete cases and the phenomena thus typified. In our case it serves to indicate
discrepancies and correspondences between the events recounted in the context of
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the air quality clash, ecological modernisation and the legality of precaution. In soci-
ology of law ideal types are a frequently used device to make comparisons possible,
the already mentioned work by Hoekema and Van Manen on types of legality in the
Weberian tradition being a prime example.
In this study, the social construction of the air quality clash will be related to two ideal
types of ecological modernisation, a strong and a weak variation. Moreover the ideal
typical constructions of ecological modernisation are contrasted with an ideal type of
the earlier policy discourse, ‘limits to growth’. In this section, the meaning and the
background of these two concepts are explained.
1.5.1 Ecological modernisation
The term ‘ecological modernisation’ is taken from the discipline of policy analysis. I
use it to denote the specific environmental policy discourse which according to Hajer
(1995) became dominant in the Netherlands during the middle of the 1980s. Ecolog-
ical modernisation has been conceptualised differently by various authors (Buttel
2000a). Firstly, it is considered an independent sociological school of thought. The
works of Arthur Mol and Gert Spaargaren fit in that tradition as well as the classical
eco-modernist literature of Jänicke and Huber. Secondly, ecological modernisation is
used to describe processes in environmental management of the private sector and
industrial ecology. Thirdly, ecological modernisation is considered a discourse,
and Hajer is considered the main scholar to employ the concept in an analytic and
social constructivist way (Buttel 2000a, p. 58).
The discourse of ecological modernisation enabled political scientists and politicians to
deal with the challenge of environmental conflict in practice. The term was first coined
in German social scientific debate about the future of environmental policy, and was ini-
tially expressed by environmental sociologists Joseph Huber and Martin Jänicke in the
early 1980s. These early authors stressed in particular the need to address environmental
problems by the use of technology and by furthermodernisation. This was a break away
from mainstream environmental critique, which in general was suspicious of further
industrialisation (Mol & Jänicke 2010, p. 20). Ecological modernisation has the theme
of an increase in modernisation in common with Ulrich Beck’s notion of reflexive mod-
ernisation (Buttel 2000b), but proponents are generally more optimistic about the role of
the market and technology in this process than Beck was. If imaginatively managed, the
market and technology may cause the social changes that authors such as Beck feel are
needed to deal with the problems of the risk society. One core aspect of ecological mod-
ernisation is the conviction that the behavioural change necessary for an ecologically sus-
tainable society may be realised by relying on the logic of the market.
The shift towards ecological modernisation started in the 1980s. It designated a
new type of pollution-control politics that differed from those used in the 1970s.
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Previously, environmental degradation had been an argument of the counter cultural
movements to point out the negative effects of capitalism. In this view, environmental
protection necessitated a thorough restructuring of the economy with the emphasis on
de-industrialisation or ‘counter productivity’ (Mol& Spaargaren 2000, p. 19). Ecological
modernisation challenged that assumption. In the logic of ecological modernisation,
environmental degradation posed a significant challenge to the capitalist economic
order, but it could be solved within the structures of capitalism. In fact, the answer
to environmental degradation was considered to be found not in less modernisation
but in more, albeit of a qualitatively different kind (Young 2000, p. 2). Other character-
istic features are the promotion of shared responsibility between state and civil society,
including non-state actors such as NGOs and the industry, for environmental protec-
tion, a reliance on preventative, long-term integrated policies, and the search for win-
win scenarios if clashes erupt between economic and ecological interests.
Even though ecological modernisation is not anymore in the forefront of the theoret-
ical debates concerning the relationship between economy and ecology, the air quality
clash gives us the opportunity to investigate to what extent storylines that fit in the
discourse of ecological modernisation were still used in 2010 to describe and discuss a
problem in which environmental and economic demands are pitted against each
other and whether the discourse was still able to reconcile these diverse interests.
In order to undertake this task I construe ideal types with which I can typify this envi-
ronmental policy discourse, based on the works of Winsemius (1986), Hajer (1995),
Young (2000), and Dryzek (2005) among others.
1.5.2 Ideal typical elements of ecological modernisation
A number of characteristic features of ecological modernisation can be teased out
from secondary literature and from the history of environmental policy. Ecological
modernisation emerged as a reaction to the policies of the 1970s, whichwere generally
perceived as sluggish and ineffective and presented its own set of solutions. The typ-
ical Dutch way of conducting ecological modernistic policy is described in chapter 3,
and there the historical background of ecological modernisation is recounted in detail.
This account is necessary because the typically Dutch characteristics of environmental
policy making are of importance for understanding the air quality clash. I cannot
undertake this full historical exploration in this introductory chapter, but I will give
an account of the characteristic eco-modernist elements that have informed my ideal
type of this discourse. The elements have been extracted from the secondary literature
and from examples of Dutch political practice. For comparison, they will be posi-
tioned opposite the characteristic elements of the earlier environmental discourse,
dominant in the 1970s, known as ‘limits to growth.8
8. After the highly influential Report for the club of Rome,with the same title: The Limits to Growth, a Report
for the Club of Rome’s Project of the Predicament of Mankind (Meadows et al. 1972).
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In what follows I consider characteristic features of eco-modernist discourse, these
features pertain to: 1) the relationship between economy and ecology, 2) the type
of science that dominates the presentation of environmental problems, 3) consensus
and conflict, 4) the stance towards prevention and precaution, 5) responsibilisation,
and 6) the stance towards long-term planning and comprehensive policy making.
The following summation is presented to the reader in order to give an account for
why I have chosen to focus on these specific features to construct my ideal type.
The citations and examples of concrete policy are chosen as illustrations to make clear
why I adopted that specific element in my typology.
1 Relationship between economy and ecology
Theorists agree that in the perspective of the ecological modernisation theory, ecology
and economy are notmutually exclusive interests. Hajermentions in this regard the ‘pos-
itive sum game’ format of ecological modernisation. Whereas earlier environmental the-
ory presented a choice for either economy or ecology, ecological modernisation offers the
‘beguiling vision’ of a win-win scenario (Young 2000, p. 2). Adhering to ecological mod-
ernisation entails accepting the idea that economic progress and environmentalwellbeing
may go hand in hand. In its stronger forms, ecological modernisation discourse even
assumes that environmental protection may be a very good investment andmay benefit
the economy. Not only will future costs of pollution clean-up be avoided if one embarks
on a policy of preventing pollution in the first place, the technological innovations which
pollution protection and prevention require will later turn out to yield a competitive
advantage. Albert Weale provides a good example of such an argument when he quotes
Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Dutch politician for D66 and the former Director General of the
European DG Environment, and a defender of ecological modernisation:
‘Secondly, I have become very much concerned – and I think this concern is shared by other depart-
ments – that environment and technology, environment and competition have become brothers and
sisters. It is not because of low prices that Japanese products are making inroads into all kinds of areas
(whether we speak of cars or computers), but it is largely because of the quality of their products and in
the field of cars at least, their very high emission standards’ (Weale et al. 2000, p. 78).
The first and arguablymost important of ecological modernisation is the idea that eco-
logical interests and economic interests are notmutually exclusive andmay even rein-
force each other.
2 The type of science that dominates the presentation of environmental problems
Within ecological modernisation, various frames of reference for the environmental
problem are different from those used in the older environment-related discourse.
An economic and managerial description of the environment gradually displaced
an ecocentric, environmental scientific one. Ecological modernisation conceptualises
the environmental problem by using managerial and economic language. For
instance, in the Dutch 1989 Natural and Environmental Policy Plan (Natuur en Mili-
eubeleidsplan, hereafter NMP) we may find the following section: ‘We are presented
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with unexpected bills from the past for behaviour that may be typified as obtaining loans. Life
cannot be lived on the tick, this goes for the budget deficit, as well as for the environment’
(VROM, V&W, Econ, L&V, 1989, p. 70). Hajer (1995) pays attention to this redefinition
of the environmental problem, and Blühdorn and Welsh also consider that propo-
nents of ecological modernisation reframe environmental problems in economic
and management terms (Blühdorn & Welsh 2007).
3 Consensus and conflict
One of the most influential changes in ecological modernisation concerns the role of the
state in environmental protection. In ecological modernisation theory, an environmen-
tally ambitious Government intends to work together with market parties and not
against them (Mol 1995, pp. 46/47, in Buttel 2000a, p. 61). This new strategy is rational
if one considers that in ecological modernisation environmental interests and economic
interests do not clash, but depend on each other.However, it is a definite shift fromearlier
times. Whereas traditionally market parties were seen as obstacles to environmental
improvements, in ecological modernisation they are seen as allies. Industry and other
important economic sectors should work together with the Government and with the
environmental movement in order to solve the environmental predicament. As Stephen
Young writes: ‘The state appears to play a more limited role than in the 1970s, but it establishes
supportive frameworks and promotes consensus based solutions’ (Young, 2000, p. 33). Also Pie-
ter Winsemius, one of the prime Dutch ideologues of ecological modernisation empha-
sises consensus building: ‘Essential for the process of internalisation of environmental values, is
building consensus among those who are the primary targets of environmental policy, those whose
action needs to be influenced and corrected most’ (Winsemius 1986, p. 62). It is therefore con-
sidered that in ecological modernisation, the state should establish the frameworks and
conditions for environmental improvement by market-based means, and negotiate with
interested parties to form a consensus. It should also facilitate andmoderate negotiations
between environmental groups and groups representing economic interests.
4 Stance towards prevention
Various authors (Von Prittwitz 1990; Hajer 1995) consider that environmental policy
changed from a reactive and curative policy to a proactive and preventative one. Eco-
logical modernisation fully subscribes to the need for proactive and preventative pol-
icy. It is assumed that a preventative approach is superior because clean-up costs that
are incurred later will be higher than the costs of prevention now. The embrace of such
a preventative policy is argued for in economic terms, as befits the eco-modernist dis-
course. Albert Weale calls the insight that ‘the failure to address a pollution problem does
not save costs, but merely displaces them elsewhere around the economy’, one ‘of the key prop-
ositions of ecological modernisation’ (Weale 1992, p. 83). To warrant a proactive preven-
tative policy, the legal notion of the precautionary principle was proposed, which
states that scientific uncertainty could not be an excuse not to take preventative mea-
sures this was an important indication of the shift in environmental policy and law
(Flynn & Bayliss 1996; Hajer 1995; Andersen & Massa 2000).
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5 Responsibilisation
Ecologicalmodernisation has an affinitywith philosophies of civic responsibility, self-
regulation, and reducing the scope of the public sector. In this context Van Tatenhove
and Leroy (2010) speak of the ‘societisation’ and ‘marketisation’ of environmental pol-
itics. In line with these commitments, environmental protection should no longer be
the responsibility of some actors in the political arena, such as the environmentalMin-
istry, but should become the responsibility of other Ministries, corporations, pro-
ducers, the industry and – in the last instance – the public at large. Winsemius
states this goal as follows: ‘This is what I mean with internalisation of environmental
responsibility, seeing it as a normal aspect of daily routines to act responsibly towards the
environment’ (Winsemius 1986, p. 61). To this end, numerous awareness-raising cam-
paigns were started in the Netherlands. In 2001, the EU explicitly incorporated the
mobilisation of citizens into its strategy for sustainable development (EUCommission
2001a, 8). The state wishes to motivate the public in making the ‘right’ environmental
choice. Moreover, the public is urged to participate in the debates on environmental
policy and the environmental direction of society. Policies should be ‘an opening up of
the existing policy making practices and the creation of new participatory practices’ (Hajer
1995, 29).
This new role of the state as a moderator for consensus building meant a departure
from themore state-centred days of the 1970s (Van Tatenhove 1993). In those days, the
Ministry of Public Health and the Environment (Volksgezondheid en Milieu, hence-
forth known as VOMIL) saw environmental protection as a task entrusted to it, and
fulfilled it. It did reach out to other actors in the field, but was not successful, partly
because it presented a gloomy image of environmental protection (Hajer 1995).
6 Adoption of strategic planning approaches and comprehensive policies
The complexity of environmental problems reached a point where a strategic plan-
ning approach was considered necessary, and was preferred to ad hoc legislative
measures. A preventative policy also made such a strategic approach more plausi-
ble. Integral policies were considered necessary to tackle complex environmental
issues. Ecological modernisation entailed a long-term perspective on environmental
problems (Andersen &Massa 2000). Pollution should be targeted in plans that tran-
scend differences between forms of pollution. Piecemeal policies tended to displace
pollution. A law against waste burning for instance in order to protect air quality
could result in waste being dumped at sea instead, leading to marine pollution. Ide-
ally, these comprehensive plans should transcend different policy domains as well.
The most comprehensive policies and plans also aim at changing people’s
behaviour.
Such large-scale goals of social engineering certainly require long-term and broad
strategies. The Dutch NMP is an example of that approach, and is considered an
example of ecological modernisation (Weale 1992). According to John Dryzek:
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‘It (ecological modernisation TA) requires political commitment to the enlightened long term rather
than the narrow minded short term and a holistic analysis of economic and environmental processes
rather than piecemeal focus on particular environmental abuses’ (Dryzek 2005, 168-169).
1.5.3 Ideal types of ecological modernisation discourse and ‘limits to growth’
The ideal type of ecological modernisation presented above is not yet sufficiently fine-
tuned. It presents a general outline, but says nothing about the level of commitment to
more or less ambitious environmental policies. A proponent of minimal
environmental policies may use this discourse as well as a highly ambitious environ-
mental policy maker, intent on thoroughly reshaping production and consumption
patterns. Therefore, a distinction between strong and weak versions of ecological
modernisation is sometimes made in the literature (Spaargaren 2000; Christoff
2000, p. 228). I distinguish between strong andweak ecological modernisation aswell,
and the distinctions proposed are again ideal typical. In practice, mixes of these types
are most likely to occur. Moreover, ecological modernisation must be distinguished
from an alternative environmental policy discourse in order to facilitate comparison.
Therefore it is contrasted with the discourse that reined over environmental policy in
the 1970s, the discourse I named ‘limits to growth’, after the influential 1971 report of
the same name. Even though this discourse reached the peak of its influence in the
1970s, elements of it can still be found in modern day discussions, and also in the
air quality clash. Within this discourse, economic and environmental interests are
sharply opposed. Economic growth is considered an imminent threat because of
the danger of resource depletion, and technological progress is considered a hin-
drance more than a boon.
Within the scope of my research, the distinctions within eco-modernist discourse are
important because they are used to assess the level of ambition of environmental pol-
icy. Weak ecological modernisation suits a technocratic endeavour to reduce environ-
mental degradation by developing technological innovations and managerial
administration. When actors apply arguments that conform to the weak form of eco-
logical modernisation, they may well be playing down ambitious policies because
they consider that technological innovation will solve the crisis in the end, and that
robust economic growth is necessary to achieve these technological innovations.
The weak variation accommodates the environmental movement into consensus-
based structures, and manages to depoliticise environmental conflict without upset-
ting vested interests or having to change deep-seated structures of society.
Strong ecological modernisation, however, demands a far more ambitious set of pol-
icies, and adherence to it may require far-reaching shifts in society’s approach to risk
and blame. Strong ecological modernisation is characterised by the need for behav-
iour change among many different sections of society, including the industry, trans-
port, producers and consumers. However, it must be kept in mind that ecological
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modernisation is a programme for evolutionary change, rather than a revolutionary
upset of existing practices.
In contrast, a policy inspired by limits to growth is committed to a stabilisation of the
economy and to a rigorous restructuring of society to avoid resource depletion. From
this point of view, environmental considerations rule supreme, because our current
reliance on industrialization, resource use, food production and the concomitant
emissions lead to a situation of either collapse or decline (Meadows et al. 1972).
The difference between the diverse strands of eco-modernisation and the limits-to-
growth approach is visible in all the aforementioned features. The positive sum game
format may imply solely that economic growth is possible without increasing envi-
ronmental degradation. In the weak form of ecological modernisation, environmental
wellbeing is not necessarily threatened by economic growth. Theweak type considers
that environmental protection and economic growth can be adjusted in a way that
they reinforce each other. The strong variation leads to more ambitious environmen-
tal policies based on the assumption that ecological policy can be a newmotor for eco-
nomic growth. In the ‘limits to growth’ discourse, the implication that economic
growth may be beneficial to the environment is rejected.
Ecological modernisation presents ecological as well as managerial and economic
problems. However, strong ecological modernisationwould also introduce ecological
terms to define economic conditions.9 In strong ecological modernisation, economic
and ecological discourses merge.
The consensus-making role of the Government can be analysed in a similar fashion.
The weak form of ecological modernisation urges cooperation with market parties to
combat environmental problems, but they should be restricted by regulation as little
as possible. This may be achieved, for instance, through the use of self-regulation. In
the strong version, participatory structures are developed that facilitate direct nego-
tiation between industrial interests and the environmental movement. In the Nether-
lands, the ‘Green PolderModel’ (Weggeman 2003) is an example of such a practice. As
regards ‘limits to growth’, opposition from market parties needs to be broken by a
forceful state. Top down regulation and standard setting should force market parties
in an eco-friendly direction.
A preventative approach is an integral part of ecological modernisation. This implies
that policy that targets the source of pollution directly is preferred. Pollution that is
9. For instance, the intention to replace or supplement the Gross Domestic Product as an indicator of a
nation’s wealth with a Genuine Progress Indicator is an example of strong ecological modernisation,
because not only is the language of ecology ‘economised’, but the language of economy is ‘ecologised’
as well.
1 The air quality clash: introduction and methodology
not emitted does not need to be cleaned up afterwards. The weak variation focuses on
the sources of pollution, such as industry, transport, and the like, and establishes rules
and regulations to make these sources produce cleaner air. In contrast, strong ecolog-
ical modernisation targets the people who own and operate these industrial installa-
tions, as well as the producers and owners of cars and lorries. Not only should they
incorporate new technology to pollute less, but they should also adopt less polluting
methods of production. This implies a change in behaviour rather than simply incor-
porating new technology. An example of strong ecological modernisation is the set-
ting of environmental standards that are so tight that they force the creation of new
technology, or force producers and consumers to change their patterns of production
and consumption. The application of the precautionary principle befits strong ecolog-
ical modernisation as well. In the European REACH regulation, for instance, pro-
ducers and not public authorities are under the onus to provide safety information
about the chemicals used in products.10 The policy also calls for a gradual substitution
of hazardous chemicals by safer ones.
Responsibilisation of the public and other actors can be achieved by stronger or
weaker ways as well. The weak way involves targeting them with environmental
campaigns to take their own environmental measures. In weak ecological moderni-
sation, environmental pressure groups are enlisted as allies who need to influence
other actors to internalise environmental concerns. A strong version of mobilisation
involves designing curricula to raise environmental awareness and improve access to
justice for citizens in environmental matters, and for instance to provide informa-
tional rights to pollution registries. In this model, the public and the environmental
movementmay become a true countervailing power to the industry. As regards limits
to growth, more is required from the state; it needs to use its regulatory power to
halt environmental degradation. This role of the state was more fitting in the 1970s
than it is today, but voices can still be heard that argue for strong state intervention
(Somsen 2011).
The distinctions between the different discourses apply to comprehensive policy
making as well, because ecological modernisation transcends the sectorial approach
to pollution that divides pollution into separate categories. Such a division is artificial,
because if a pollutant is burned for instance it becomes air pollution, but if it is emitted
in the rivers directly it returns as soil and water pollution. In the 1980s and 1990s, pol-
icieswere devised that proposed to tackle all these forms of pollution at the same time.
The European Directive on Integrative Pollution Prevention and Control is an exam-
ple of such a rule. However, this form of integration still belongs to the weak category
of ecological modernisation. In its strong variation comprehensive polices target the
10. Website REACH, last accessed 14-12 2012. REACH stands for Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation
and Restriction of chemicals and aims to protect public health by improving the identification and eval-
uation of the properties of chemical substances used in products.
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behaviour of polluters themselves, instead of merely focusing on an integration of
types of pollution. The Dutch NMP and the EU’s Fifth Environmental Action Pro-
grammeare good examples of such holistic plans. A holistic approach was recommen-
ded in the report ‘limits to growth’ as well (Meadows et al. 1973). During the time that
this discourse reigned, however, the Dutch state did intervene but only through piece-
meal sector based policy (Van Tatenhove 1993, p. 17). Notably, other influential texts
in the 1970s environmental discourse did not recommend the holistic state centred
approach, for instance Schumacher (1973) and Goldsmith & Prescott-Allen (1972).
Realising their visions though would involve an even more thorough rearranging
of society according to ecological needs.
The difference between strong ecological modernisation and the weak version is not
only a difference in the ambitions of ecological modernistic policies. There is a differ-
ence in the intensity of institutional change that they demand. It is certainly true that
the weak forms of ecological modernisation present an affirmative answer to Ulrich
Beck’s rhetorical question as to whether the problems of the risk society could be tack-
led in the sameway as the problems in industrial society (Beck 1994, pp. 11/12).Weak
ecological modernisation relies on the same offerings as did industrial society, mar-
ket, technology and Government. However, that is not the case for the strong version
of ecological modernisation. Strong ecological modernisation as conceptualised
above is more than a technocratic commitment to solving the environmental crisis
through market friendly regulation and technological innovation. The technocratic
dimension is supplemented with a ‘sociocratic’ dimension (Jänicke 2000, p. 3; Mol
& Sonnenfeld 2000). The limits-to-growth approach takes this sociocratic dimension
to the extreme. According to this discourse, society and especially the economy
should be rearranged along ecological lines.11
Regarding ecological modernisation, the strong, sociocratic, and reflexive form
implies much more than technological innovation and market-based solutions. Its
analysis of the ecological crisis and the answers it provides do not simply conform
to the existing practices of industrial society. Strong ecological modernisation implies
that ecological considerations will lead to institutional change. These new arrange-
ments should overcome the boundaries between ecology and economy, and ‘correct
the prevailing bias towards economization and scientification ... []’ (Hajer 1995, p. 281).
Strong ecological modernisation involves behaviour change, social learning, and
new democratic institutions. It means internalisation of environmental norms and
values, changing patterns of consumption and production, life style policies, and
changing consumer preferences. It resembles limits to growth, but it is far more opti-
mistic. The boundaries between economic wellbeing and environmental degradation
should be transcended, and thismakes possible a new type of development that caters
11. An example of this approach may be found in Schumacher’s collection of essays bundled in ‘Small is
Beautiful’ (Schumacher 1973) and in Goldmith & Prescott-Allen (1972).
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to both. From a limits to growth perspective, such a vision is naïve. Instead, we should
sacrifice our need for economic growth and make do with a ‘steady state economy’ in
which population growth, consumption, and production remain stable.
After this clarification, the typology of ecological modernisation can be completed. It
is presented in table 1 above, and is contrasted with the limits-to-growth discourse
Table 1
Policy discourse Limits to growth Weak ecological
modernisation
Strong ecological
modernisation
Relationship
between
economy and
ecology
Inimical: economic growth
threatens the environment.
Peaceful coexistence: Economy
and ecology may progress side
by side.
Positively intertwined: Ecological
progress will lead to economic
growth.
Role of science Natural science and ecological
science are used to assess the
state of environmental
degradation. Natural scientific
considerations should steer
policy.
Science provides the data to
discuss ecological problems in
economic, natural scientific and
managerial terms.
Science is applied to take stock of
environmental threats, and
economic problems are discussed
by including indicators of
environmental performance.
Resource use, depletion, and
pollution become an important
concern in economic management.
Consensus
building
Market parties should be forced
to commit to the goals of
environmental policy through
top-down regulation.
Negotiations between the
Government, environmental
pressure groups and industry on
the topic of environmental
regulation.
Broad mechanisms of
participation for industry and the
environmental movement in
policy making.
Preventative
approach
Ecological disturbance should be
reduced to a minimum. This
implies rigid application of the
precautionary principle and an
antagonistic view towards
economic growth.
Pollution should be prevented by
cleaner processes of production
and if necessary application of
the precautionary principle.
Targeting the polluting individual,
enterprise and consumer him or
herself. Broad application of the
precautionary principle and
internalization of it by
addressees.
Responsibilisation Education and legislation should
be combined to raise the right
environmental mentality.
Awareness raising through media
campaigns, supplying
information and subsidising
environmental pressure groups.
Active involvement of citizens
through education, granting rights
to review corporate registries and
access to justice, alliance
between environmentalists and
Government.
Comprehensive
policies
The earth is considered one
interdependent ecosystem.
Ideally, policy is integrated and
formulated holistically. In practice
though, only piecemeal regulation
could be realised in the 1970s.
Targeting multiple forms of
pollution in multiple
environmental media with the
same policy.
Targeting multiple forms of
pollution as well as establishing
behaviour change with regard to
polluters within the same policy.
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that is characterised on the left-hand side. This table will be used when policies and
storylines are judged for their adherence to the discourse of ecological modernisation
and in establishing whether weak or strong ecological modernisation is being
advocated.
1.5.4 Ecological modernisation: its critics and its possibilities
Research interest in ecological modernisation peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
but it has since lost ground to other approaches. Ecological modernisation has a great
deal of affinity with the notion of sustainable development; however, the two should
not be conflated. Sustainable development contains elements of international solidar-
ity that are absent from ecological modernisation. The concept of sustainable devel-
opment though managed to overtake ecological modernisation in social science and
policy research. Currently new conceptualisations of environmental policy have
caught the spotlight such as social ecological resilience thinking, for an application
of this perspective in socio-legal studies see O’Mally (2013).
Moreover, like every theory, ecological modernisation is not without its problems and
critics. Critical comments about the usefulness of the theory have beenmade by Buttel
(2000a), Blühdorn (2000), and Andersen & Massa (2000), among others. Much of the
criticism concerns the different uses of the term as well as the imprecise nature of the
concept. It is argued that ecological modernisation comes in many guises and means
different things, dependent on the author. This deficiency is acknowledged, and in
this chapter an attempt has been made to forge conceptual coherency by constructing
a typology of ecological modernisation and discriminating clearly between a strong
and a weak variation. Moreover, I treat this concept exclusively as a policy discourse
in order to avoid conceptual confusion.
In addition ecological modernisation has drawn sharp ideological criticism. Some
authors regard it as legitimating unsustainable trends in production and consumption
(Blühdorn &Welsh 2007, p. 187). According to Blühdorn, ecological modernisation ser-
ves to keep themyth ofmodernity alive in the face of the ecological challenge (Blühdorn
2000). Foster et al. (2010) argue that it is merely a thinly veiled attempt to protect cap-
italist structures from the challenge they face in terms of environmental degradation.
Despite these criticisms I have chosen to use an ideal typical rendition of ecological
modernisation discourse as one of the two analytical lenses through which the con-
struction of the air quality clash is analysed. I have done so especially because ecolog-
ical modernisation was an important policy discourse at the time of the clash and
especially at the time the policies and plans were drafted that precipitated the clash.
Blühdorn, who is otherwise critical of the notion, noted in 2000 that the practice of
ecological modernisation was the dominant response of contemporary European
societies to environmental challenge (Blühdorn 2000). Moreover, as both Cohen
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(2000) and Hajer (1995) have stated, ecological modernisation seems remarkably con-
gruent with how policy making in the Netherlands is often characterised, namely as a
consensus democracy with policies that contain a peculiar mix of moralism and eye
for economic opportunity (Andeweg & Irwin 2005). These considerations warrant the
question whether ecological modernisation in the Netherlands still managed to
bridge competing economic and environmental/health interests in environmental
conflicts such as the air quality clash. In my study I argue that storylines taken from
weak ecological modernisation resolved the conflict over air quality, although the dis-
course did lose the glory it had in the 1980s.
1.5.5 The legality of precaution and the precautionary principle
The rise of environmental problems is often cited as an indication that our society,
sometimes referred to as ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986), or ‘post traditional society’ (Gid-
dens 1994), is in a phase of transition. Ulrich Beck is probably the most well-known
proponent of the thesis that newly emerging technological risks force society to adapt
to these new challenges. However, various authors in the field of sociology of risk
elaborate on his work, and question the nature of this social transition. They point
out that society is changing in its tolerance of risk (Ewald 1999; Furedi 1997; Burgess
2004; Pieterman 2008; Hanekamp 2015). Summarised roughly, their proposal is that
the point of the risk society is not that the risks themselves have increased dramati-
cally, but that our attitude towards risk has changed. During most of the 20th century,
faith in science, in technology and in progress, optimism concerning human ingenu-
ity, and a focus on the control of nature reigned in industrial society. This shifted in the
1960s In Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring a pessimistic account of technological
progress is given and a pessimistic account of the danger presented by reliance on
growth for environmental health is given in the alreadymentioned report for the Club
of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972).
The point of the authors mentioned above is that our relation to risk and uncertainty
always changes and I relate the air quality clash to transformations regarding risk and
uncertainty as well; however I take an explicitly socio-legal approach. I am interested
in changes in the legal order, meaning the law and its institutions such as the judi-
ciary, legislation, and legal doctrine. Therefore I place myself in the Weber-inspired
tradition within sociology of law in which we also find Dutch sociologists of law,
André Hoekema and Niels van Manen. Inspired by their book ‘Types of Legality’
(2000), I will construct a new ideal type of legality that I see emerging on the horizon,
a legality of precaution. In the legality of precaution the prevailing attitude of risk
management by compensation for the victims is gradually becoming eclipsed by
an attitude of intolerance towards risk per se. The emphasis is on extreme prevention
in order to minimise risk as much as possible, irrespective of costs. This new emphasis
on precaution is linked to changes in the perception of human nature, society, and the
threats deserving of most concern. Societal and legal concerns have shifted from a
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focus on short- and medium-term damage that is calculable and insurable to cata-
strophic, uncertain, and incalculable damage (Pieterman 2008). Humankind is seen
as an environmental threat, and from this perspective the relationship with science
and technology is ambivalent. Though they provide the tools for damage prevention,
the increasing hold of science and technology on our lives is seen as one of the main
causes of potentially catastrophic threats.
The most conspicuous legal pendant of this view as to the relationship between
humankind and its environment is the precautionary principle. There are many ver-
sions of the principle, but in one influential formulation it is stated as such: ‘Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion’ (1992 Rio Declaration at the UNCED Conference, Principle 15, in: Freestone &
Hey 1996, p. 3). From a legal point of view, the most important aspect of this principle
is that it may be required to take positive environmental measures before scientific
proof of harm has been provided (Freestone & Hey, 1996, p. 13). Stronger variations
of the precautionary principle may leave out the requirement of cost-effectiveness,
and/or shift the burden of proof of harm.12 Dutch scholar Arie Trouwborst describes
the essence of the principle with the Latin phrase ‘in dubio pro natura’ (Trouwborst
2009, p. 108). The precautionary principle has since found its way into many environ-
mental treaties and in European and international law. Article 191 paragraph 2 of the
Lisbon treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that European
environmental policy should be based on the precautionary principle.
I will investigate whether the air quality clash and its legal implications are consistent
with the type of change from risk and compensation to precaution.13 To that end, I
construct ideal types of the legality of precaution and the legality of risk and
compensation.
1.5.6 Ideal types of the legality of risk and compensation and the legality of precaution
Below, I will present the ideal typical reconstruction of the legality of risk and com-
pensation and the legality of precaution. I discuss eight features of these types of
12. Such a strong version may be found in article 5 paragraphs a and b of the Earth Charter in which the
precautionary approach is described as: a. Take action to avoid the possibility of serious or irreversible
environmental harm even when scientific knowledge is incomplete or inconclusive.
b. Place the burden of proof on thosewho argue that a proposed activity will not cause significant harm,
and make the responsible parties liable for environmental harm. (Website Earth Charter, last accessed
12-10 2015).
13. The legality of precautionwill not replace the legality of compensation.When a type of legality becomes
dominant all other types are not immediately eradicated. The older type of legality will still remain per-
sistent in some aspects of the legal order. It will only cease to be the dominant type visible in the legal
order.
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legality I consider to be characteristic. These features are: the core imperative of the
legal order, category of damage of most concern, moral reaction to damage, percep-
tion of the victim, level of proof and safety guarantees required, view on public par-
ticipation, stance towards the possibility of social engineering by law and the value of
most protection. They are indebted to a large degree to Pieterman 2008.
1 Core imperative of the legal order
Within the legality of risk and compensation, the necessity of compensation and the
spreading of risk by insurance mechanisms are central features of the legal order. The
misfortune of the victims has to be redressed because victimhood is the product of the
complex organisation of modern industrial society. The arrangements that form and
sustain our social order necessarily produce victims; think for instance of our reliance
on mobility. The ubiquitous presence of motorised traffic takes lives causes injuries in
the form of accidents. These injuries are considered bad luck, the inevitable by-prod-
uct of our arrangement of society and the victim is entitled to compensation. This type
of legality appeals strongly to social solidarity between victims and non-victims. Pre-
vention is important in this type of legality, but it extends to calculable and certain
threats and only applies where the costs of prevention are lower than the cost of
compensation.
Within the legality of precaution, prevention of damage is the core imperative. The
occurrence of damage is considered to be the product of mismanagement. Social
arrangements such as mobility, production, housing and the environment should
be managed in a way to provide maximum safety, and applying the precautionary
principle is necessary to obtain a safe society. Uncertain threats should be accounted
for and prevented if possible, regardless of costs, because if they are not prevented at
an early stage, it may be too late. ‘First do no harm’ is an expression that typifies this
type of legality (Pieterman 2008, p. 64). It appeals less to solidarity than compensation
does, because ideally damage is prevented before it can occur. It does appeal to
responsibility however, but now to the collective responsibility of producers, con-
sumers, and the state to keep us safe. The precautionary principle plays an important
part here, because it invites the relevant authorities to anticipate on potential threats.
In such a situation, scientific institutes becomemore heavily occupied with the signal-
ling of threats before they occur than with finding a solution to problems after they
have materialised. Legally, this means that an administration is considered to be at
fault, and should be overruled by the court if it has taken insufficiently into account
what could possibly happen rather than what would probably happen (Furedi 2009).
The necessity of prevention is extended from certain and calculable threats to uncer-
tain, but possible threats. Even if the cost of prevention is predicted to be higher than
the cost of compensation, prevention should be chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the
prevention of harm is a moral duty and secondly, (excessive) prevention protects
us against the possibility of the realisation of worst case scenarios, it is better to be
safe than sorry.
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2 Category of damage considered of most concern
The legality of risk and compensation is both forward and backward looking (Ewald
1999). It is forward looking in the sense that people anticipate risks and collectivise
them in order to be insured when damage occurs. It is backward looking in the sense
that if damage occurs compensation is provided for, based on the rationale of insur-
ance. This rationale implies that short- and medium-term damage is considered to be
of greatest concern. Damage that is calculable and probable can be insured, but long-
termdamage cannot. However, people had an optimistic view of science and progress
(Pieterman 2008, p. 65), and for that reason long-term damage was of little concern to
the public. Conflicts occurred over compensation after damage occurred, but rela-
tively little over the need to take preventative measures.
The legality of precaution is forward looking. Potential damage must be prevented,
even if it may only occur in the long term. The focus is on the typical problems of the
risk society, such as environmental damage of the potentially catastrophic kind. This
kind of damage is not insurable. Therefore ideally long-term damage is identified, and
preventative measures are taken early in order to ward off the threat. Conflicts arise
over when measures should be taken to prevent a future threat and how invasive
these measures are allowed to be.
3 Moral reaction to damage
The legality of risk and compensation is not only a legality of compensation but also of
prevention (Ewald 2002, p. 281). Ideally, damage is prevented, but there is a limit to pre-
vention.Damage arises fromotherwise productive andbeneficial social arrangements such
as mass production or mobility, and it is accepted that safety can only be provided to a
certain extent. If damage occurs anyway, it is due to otherwise healthy social arrangements
that we cannot do without. Even if we know that a certain activity, mobility for instance,
will cause a certain amount of damage, no one will argue for banning all road traffic.
This is not the case in the legality of precaution. Damage should be prevented, and if it
occurs, it means that the authorities – whoever they may be – have been negligent
(Pieterman 2008, p. 71). The moral dimension that is not or is only dimly present
in the legality of risk and compensation is conspicuous in the legality of precaution.
It becomes incumbent on the authorities to demonstrate that they have exercised an
effective amount of precaution.
4 Perception of the victim
Victims are considered to be people who have had bad luck in the legality of risk and
compensation. They have been the hapless casualties of our social arrangements. To
make sure that they can cope, they are caught within a tightly woven web of private
and public insurance schemes against which they have rights. They can claim these
rights, and the unfortunate situation can be redressed (Hoekema & Van Manen 2000,
Pieterman 2008).
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This consideration of the victim changes in the legality of precaution. Damage should
not have occurred, and consequently the victim is a citizen that has been hurt in his
legitimate expectations of care. He is not just unlucky, but has suffered the injustice of
negligence, and therefore he can claim those rights against the people who are the
responsible authorities. This is not explicitly concluded by Pieterman, but follows
from the logic of his scheme.
5 Level of proof and safety guarantees required in decision making
Rules on evidence and justification are important for all institutionswithin a legal order.
These rules determine the outcome of conflicts and limit the competency of important
institutions, such as policymakers and judges to a large extent. In the legality of risk and
compensation, the calculation and prioritisation of risks play a large role. Exact calcu-
lation is important for the correct and optimal spread of risk, as well as to determine an
optimal ratio between costs and benefits. In fact, the development of cost-benefit anal-
ysis and risk assessment made possible the rise of this legality (Pieterman 2008). Weig-
hing of interests is considered crucial, and cost-benefit assessment is considered an
important tool to achieve an optimal solution. Administrative and legal decision mak-
ing can point towards the optimal weighing of interests to motivate decisions.14
In the legality of precaution, scientific knowledge and calculation are important as
well, but the emphasis on prevention leads to a reversal of the burden of proof. Gov-
ernments and companies should present proof that their activities do not cause harm
(Pieterman 2008, p. 72). Because this is logically impossible, the next best thing is
demanded: namely, proof that the threat of harm is negligible. This means more
research needs to be done as to the potential harm certain activities may cause, includ-
ing research on less likely but possible worst-case scenarios.
6 View on public participation
Public participation in the legality of risk and solidarity is considered of secondary
importance. The emphasis is on expert knowledge, and these experts are considered
crucial in obtaining the knowledge of optimal outcomes of decision making. In the
legality of precaution, faith in scientific expertise has declined, and the opinions
and views of laypersons are considered more important. Ideally, all views should
be taken into account, and the ‘subjective’ risk assessment of laypersons is considered
important because they are ‘experiential experts’, experiencing the outcomes of pol-
icies and decisions at street level.
If it is impossible to let lay persons participate directly, interest groups and social
movements that represent their interests must be taken on board, even if they have
no official scientific credentials. Legitimacy is thought to be enhanced when different
14. Important in tort law is the ‘Learned hand formula’ in US jurisprudence (Posner 1982). A Dutch classic
in this regard is the ‘Kelderluik’ judgment of 1965 HR 05-11-1965, NJ 1966, 136, LJN AB7079.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
groups representing the interests of laypersons have broad participatory rights,
including access to justice.
7 Stance towards the possibility of social engineering by law
Legal reformers in the early 20th century pointed to the possibility of realising desir-
able social goals through an instrumental use of the law (Schwitters 2008, pp. 53-58).
This idea was contrary to formal legality that contained the ideal of legal neutrality.
The state and therefore the law should not decree what is or is not a desirable social
situation, because that is for the autonomous, rational individual to decide. It should
only realise a general, stable, and predictable legal order within which economically
active, free, and autonomous individuals are able to realise their own ends (Hoekema
& VanManen 2000, pp. 50-51). In subsequent types of legality, this consideration was
abandoned, and an instrumental use of the law became pervasive. Through regula-
tion, the state tried to achieve desirable end states. The environmental laws in the
Netherlands from the 1970s are a good example of the type of regulation used:
top-down, command and control type regulation that was piecemeal in character.
Each environmental sector, such as air and water, was covered by a separate law.
Such laws gradually governed all sorts of safety and health issues including accidents
in the work place, child labour, and food safety.
In a legality of precaution, the instrumental use of regulation is expanded upon and
piecemeal command and control regulation gives way to law based on programmatic
long-term planning with a comprehensive and integrated character. The assumption
is that law can and should stop environmental degradation. The prescription of amin-
imum standard is no longer the main aim, but long-term incremental improvement is
desired. These long-term plans and programmes do not only warrant certain environ-
mental quality standards, they also encourage behavioural change and innovation in
the fields of safety and protection.
8 Value most worthy of protection
The legality of risk and solidarity is rooted squarely in the progress of modern indus-
trial society. The discovery of the concept of risk and its usefulness in insurance sche-
mes meant that it was possible to spread the risks associated with modern living.
Moreover, the advent of socialism and communism was conducive to the view that
damagewas a social problem, caused by otherwise useful societal arrangement rather
than the victim’s private problem (Pieterman 2008, pp. 55-56).
The permeating optimistic notion of societal progress legitimised the further develop-
ment of these systems to overcome problems of scarcity. However, according to Ulrich
Beck, at the end of the 20th century we had overcome scarcity and social conflicts were
no longer primarily about scarcity but about risk positions. In industrial society, strug-
gles occurred over the distribution of goods, while struggles these days occur over dis-
tribution of the bads – notably pollution risks and other industrial hazards.
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The typologies of the legality of risk and solidarity and the legality of precaution
reflect these changes. In the legality of risk and solidarity, innovation and expansion
of industry andmobility are stimulated, and the delivery of the goods of mobility and
industry to the people is considered crucial to ease the burden of scarcity. Economic
expansion is considered of primary importance, and the expansion of roads and
establishment of a free and competitive market are prime political goals. State inter-
ference in the economic sphere is present, firstly to secure an optimal function of the
market, and secondly to ensure that the quest for growth and development does not
lead to victims suffering from it without compensation. Otherwise however, enter-
prises should be allowed to proceed with little regulatory and legal intervention.
In the legality of precaution, this relationship is turned on its head. Ecological har-
mony is considered most desirable. The values in need of nurturing are immaterial
ones, such as a clean living environment and public health. Business is allowed to pro-
ceed if it can show that it does not lead to victims. The use of the precautionary prin-
ciple gives the state a mandate to interfere in the economic sphere in order to protect
the environment or health, also if it is not clear that a certain activity will lead to any
damage (Pieterman & Arnoldussen 2008).
Table 2
Legality of risk and compensation Legality of precaution
Core aspect of the legal
order
Compensation of damage by spreading of risk is
the prime imperative; hence, strict liability and
public and private insurance schemes are
essential. Prevention of damage if it is cost-
effective to do so.
Prevention of damage is the prime imperative;
hence, application of the Precautionary
Principle is essential. Prevention extends to
possible threats of an uncertain magnitude.
Category of damage
considered of most
concern
Short- to medium-term damage of a relatively
certain magnitude and probability.
Long-term damage of the potentially
catastrophic kind but of an uncertain
probability.
Moral reaction to
damage
Damage cannot be prevented totally, but
compensation is in order when it occurs.
Damage is disgrace and should have been
prevented.
Perception of the victim Rights-bearing member of a risk collective. Civilian damaged by negligence of responsible
authority, agency, or enterprise.
Level of proof and safety
guarantees required
in decision making
Decision making procedures should rely on
scientific knowledge and cost benefit
assessment to determine optimal solutions.
Decision making procedures should be based
on proof that the chance of harm is negligible,
and proof is required from the actor undertaking
the risky activity.
Stance on the possibility
of social engineering
by law
Society may be improved by piecemeal policies
and an instrumental use of legislation.
Society may be improved by comprehensive
policy making (i.e. long-term holistic planning)
and societal awareness raising.
View on public
participation
Civilians are seen as laypersons with little
knowledge of risks or expert systems. Policy
needs to be determined by experts.
Imperative because the citizen is an ‘experiential
expert’, and policy and law need to provide
opportunities for citizens to present their views.
Value most worthy of
protection
Economic development: growth and expansion
of construction, mobility, and innovation.
Ecological harmony: balance of eco-systems,
public health, and safety from possible threats.
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The considerations above lead to the construction of the following ideal types of legality,
the legality of risk and compensation and the legality of precaution, see table 2 above.
. WHAT THIS BOOK IS ABOUT
After this introduction of the research methodology and perspectives, I like to present
summary overview of the main themes of this study. This book offers some answers
to the puzzling fact that from the end of 2004 to the first months of 2010 we witnessed
an ‘air quality clash’ in the Netherlands. My purpose is to explain why air quality is so
hotly debated as a social problem during these years after a period of some fifteen
years in which the lack of attention suggested ‘the problem’ had been ‘solved’.
The answers I shall provide rest on the use of a social constructivist approach. This socio-
logical perspective holds that not ‘objective facts’ but ‘social definitions’determinewhether
a social problem exists, what the problem ‘really is’ and how it should be ‘solved’.
The chapters in this book for themost part follow a chronological orderwith some over-
lap because of the need to shift back and forth from the Dutch national to the EU supra-
national level. In this first chapter I presented key elements of my social constructivist
approach which is inspired by the work of Joel Best on social problems and Maarten
Hajer on discourse analysis. Using this perspective I will investigate three specific ques-
tions in order to offermy answers to the riddle that drives this study. First, I shall look at
the interplay between the Netherlands and the EU. This involves investigating the rel-
evant Dutch and EU regulatory developments. The Dutch developments are presented
in chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7, while chapters 4 and 8 are concerned with EU regulation.
Where appropriate, explicit attention is paid to the interaction between Dutch and
European developments. For example, chapter 4 portrays the influence the Dutch have
exerted on EU regulation by involving theWHO in order to arrive at scientifically sup-
ported air quality norms. Chapter 5 then analyses the way the EU Air Quality Direc-
tives were incorporated in the Dutch legal system.
The second specific question I investigate concerns the environmental policy discourse
known as ‘ecological modernisation’. I concluded my presentation of this discourse in
this first chapter by constructing two Weberian style ideal types of a weak and a strong
version, which I contrasted with the discourse known as ‘limits to growth’. The develop-
ment of the Dutch, weak type of ecological modernisation is traced in chapter 3. Here
Dutch environmental policy will be characterised as a consensual way of developing
and implementing environmental policies, with a keen eye for costs and benefits. The
relevance of thisweak type of ecologicalmodernisation for the questionwhy the air qual-
ity clash came about and was finally solved, is discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The third specific question I investigate concerns the rise of the legality of precaution.
In addition to the types of legality developed by the sociologists of law Hoekema and
van Manen I have developed this new Ideal type. Whereas the legality of risk and
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compensation is more geared towards preventing and compensating well documen-
ted and understood risks, the legality of precaution extends that attitude to uncertain
threats.
Chapter 2 discusses the scientific debate about the medical expertise on the health
threats of particulate matter in order to find out whether they concern well documen-
ted and understood risks or are perhaps better understood as uncertain threats. This
issue is picked up again in chapter 5 when discussing the way the Dutch deal with EU
directives before the air quality clash actually erupts. Scientific uncertainty also fig-
ures prominently in chapter 8 when the evaluation of Air Quality Directive 99/30
by the European Commission is discussed.
As sketched above, the three specific questions that need to be answered to solve the
riddle behind this study, are all dealt with in several chapters. By tracing these ques-
tions in the research material I focussed on two arenas where the contestants in the
Dutch air quality clash confronted each other. The first arena is the Dutch adminis-
trative court. As recounted in chapter 6, the highest administrative court, The Council
of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division instigated the clash. In 2004 it accepted
the claim of the contestants that prioritised the interests of health and environment
that projects to further develop Dutch infrastructure should not be allowed as the
air quality was below EU standards. It also closed the clash, as discussed in chapter 7,
by accepting in 2010 the position of the Dutch Government that the programmatic
approach to air quality improvementwas a legally valid option to continue infrastructure
development in such a way that Dutch air quality would be improved.
The second arena where the contestants clashed is the Dutch Parliament, especially
the Second Chamber, which is the more political of the two chambers. How the con-
testants divided in two camps –the pro-health camp and the pro-infrastructure camp
– confronted each other in Parliament is analysed in chapters 6 and 7.
Because of the extensive amount ofmaterial analysed and presented and the complex-
ity of the study both at the conceptual and the empirical level, I have opted to reca-
pitulate in the concluding chapter 9 the most salient elements of this research. This
chapter first provides answers to the three specific questions and then wraps up
the study with a summarising answer to the riddle of the air quality clash in the Neth-
erlands from September 2004 to the 31st of March 2010.
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 PUBLIC HEALTH CLAIMS ABOUT PARTICULATE
MATTER IN THE EARLY 1990S
INTRODUCTION
The main pollutant of note in the air quality clash was a pollutant known as PM10, or
particulate matter. This pollutant was considered the gravest threat to public health
andmoreover the standards for particulate matter were exceeded inmany parts of the
country when the clash over air quality erupted in 2004.
Before delving into the development of Dutch and European environmental and air
quality policy, I will discuss the way Particulate Matter became considered a domi-
nant health threat by epidemiologists and how this claim was disseminated to Euro-
pean and Dutch policy makers. Because epidemiological scientists acted as the
dominant claims makers in the early period of the social construction of air quality
as a serious health problem, a lot of attention in this chapter is devoted to the question
what the implications of these epidemiological claims are. Apart from presenting an
account of how PM10 came to dominate the environmental agenda on air pollution,
this chapter raises the questionwhether bad air quality by itself may be considered the
most prominent threat or whether bad air quality should be considered as one in a
complex of causes that play a part in the higher prematuremortality rates among peo-
ple living in impoverished neighbourhoods.
In section 2.1 themain characteristics of particulatematter are described. Section 2.2 is
devoted to the discovery of PM10 as a health threat by epidemiologists and the main
studies that showed that there was a correlation between air pollution and premature
mortality. In section 2.3 the possibilities and limitations of epidemiological studies are
highlighted and section 2.4 focusses on the uncertainties present in the two most
important studies about PM10. Section 2.5 covers epidemiological studies in theNeth-
erlands on PM10 and claims making activities by agencies responsible for public
health. In the sixth and final section remarks are made in regard to the claims about
air quality and to epidemiology as a science particularly conducive to a precautionary
approach. Finally the question is raised whether air pollution should be considered a
typical risk society conflict in the sense that it is primarily a question of who should
bear the risks engendered by our current way of life and how these risks should be
dealt with politically.
. PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION
Particulate Matter is a type of particle pollution. In common language, it is a form of
dust, albeit a very small one, although claims that particulate air pollution in the form
of smoke causes health damage go back as far as the 16th century (Brimblecombe
1987). The most well-known incident of high pollution levels is the great London
fog of 1952, in which it is estimated that thousands of people died owing to the
exceedingly high levels of air pollution (Buijsman 2007, p. 11).
In the early 1990s, the topic of particulate air pollution started to climb on the political
agenda. During the air-quality clash of the 2000s, public concerns over PM10 rose
sharply in the Netherlands, and worrying reports indicated that thousands would
die prematurely because of it. We will discuss the medical and social construction
of this threat, but first we will look at PM10, and determine what kind of pollution
is under consideration.
2.1.1 What kind of pollutant is Particulate Matter?
In simple terms, Particulate Matter is a certain type of what we commonly refer to as
dust. It is actually dust of a certain size, tiny particles. To be considered PM10, the par-
ticle must have a diameter smaller than 10 micron. Dust was one of the first pollutants
to receive attention, but the division according to particle size is more recent. Up until
the 1980s, dust wasmeasured in different ways. In the United States, themost common
procedurewas the gravimetricmethod, bywhich dustwas caught in a filter and landed
on a highly sensitiveweighingmechanism. Byweighing the particles, researchers could
assess the total number of particles per cubic meter of air. Initially, no difference was
made regarding particle size, and what was measured was the total number of partic-
ulates suspended in the air (TSP, Total Suspended Particulates).
In Europe, particles have generally been measured differently. They were caught in a
filter, and by measuring the device’s blackness, researchers can evaluate how much
soot, smoke, and other contaminants the air contains. This is the black-smoke method
devised in the 1960s in the UK, and this type of measurement emphasised different
characteristics of the pollutant in question. Particulate Matter or PM10 is generally
measured by leading air through a filter, which strains out particles larger than 10
micron. Particulate Matter is measured by weight per cubic meter of air, and the
weight per meter typically runs into the micrograms. The European yearly standard,
for example, allows for an annual average of 40 microgram per cubic meter of air:
40mug/m3.
It is important to note that this categorisation only tells us something about the size of
the particles. It says nothing about their chemical composition, or whether they are
naturally occurring particles or of human origin, caused by combustion, for instance.
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In this sense, Particulate Matter is a catch-all term for a complex and always changing
mixture of different particles (RIVM 1998; Buijsman 2007, p. 18).
The mixture contains in varying quantities:
• Inorganic secondary substances such as sulphates, nitrates, and ammonium par-
ticles. These are formed in the atmosphere by gasses such as SO2, NOx, and ammo-
nium (NH3). These particles fall within the 90% range in the category of PM2.5, and
are usually of human origin.
• Carbonaceous substances: These particles are usually emitted directly into the
atmosphere. Elementary carbon that can be found in soot, for instance, is of human
origin. This category also contains a small number of polycyclic aromatic hydro-
carbons (PAHs), which are of human origin as well and presumably relevant to
health.
• Salts: PM contains salts, and these particles occur naturally. In the Netherlands, on
average, 4 to 5 mug/m3 of all PM10 consists of sea salt, which is generally consid-
ered to be benign. Along the coast, the amount of sea salt is higher than in the east
of the country. Salt particles can be very small indeed, and are easily dispersed in
the lungs, but also quickly broken down.
• Oxidised metals and silicium: These particles mostly occur naturally, but may be
dispersed by human activity, such as driving or digging.
• Water: Inorganic secondary substances in particular can bind with water to form
droplets. It is considered that 10 to 50% of PM10 concentrations consist of water.1
Nevertheless, not all these different particles are equally relevant for health. Elemen-
tary carbon and PAHs are considered to be harmful, but even that depends on the
exact chemical composition. Salt, however, is not considered harmful to human
health. Since PM10 concentrations all consist of a mixture of these particles, and since
the consistency of this mixture differs depending on the natural composition of the
region and the human activities taking place, it is hard to compare PM10 concentra-
tions in one locationwith those in another. Close to the sea or in the Sahara desert, one
will find a great deal of naturally occurring PM and less PM of human origin, while
the reverse is true beside a busy inner-city thoroughfare.
2.1.2 Different categories of PM
The first type of particulate air pollution under consideration was smoke, measured
either as black smoke or as total suspended particulates. PM10 is a further classifica-
tion of dust of a certain size. The diameter of 10 micron was chosen because it was
thought that these smaller particles could enter the lungs more easily than bigger par-
ticles. However, further diversifications were made. Currently, a smaller fraction of
PM is measured as well, with PM2.5 consisting of particles having a diameter smaller
1. For a more elaborate version, see Buijsman 2007, p. 18.
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than 2.5 micron. Even PM1 and PM0.1 are under scrutiny. These particles have a
diameter of 1 micron and 01 micron, respectively. The reason for focusing on increas-
ingly smaller particles is that they can penetrate the lungs more deeply. At present,
some experts and interested parties suggest that these smaller fractions of PM are
more relevant to health (Buijsman 2007, p. 78; TNO 2012, p. 6). PM1 and PM0.1
are known to be ultra-fine Particulate Matter.
PM10 was first regulated in the US in 1987. The UK followed in 1997, and, the first
European air-quality standards for PM10 were established in 1999.2 However, it
was already known that it was not the most health relevant fraction.3
The reason PM10 was regulated by the US, UK and EU respectively, was because it
was considered a dangerous health threat after epidemiological research established a
correlation between premature mortality and high levels of air pollution. This asso-
ciation was found by comparing the mortality rates in areas with high levels of air
pollution with mortality rates in areas with low level of air pollution. In order to
understand the construction process of PM10 as a health threat we will now turn
to an examination of the most important epidemiological studies.
. THE DISCOVERY OF PM AS A HEALTH THREAT
In the 1980s, particulate air pollution was not high on the political agenda. Instead,
acid rain was receiving widespread attention, and scientists were concentrating on
acidifying pollutants such as sulphur dioxide (SO2) and later nitrous oxides (NOx).
Urban air pollution – the kind that one encounters mostly in cities and that has harm-
ful consequences for health – was given less notice. This situation changed in the
1990s, however, when Particulate Matter emerged suddenly as a grave threat to pub-
lic health. In this section, the new focus on particle pollution is under examination,
and we will see how research undertaken by epidemiologists in the 1990s was instru-
mental in establishing of a link between health damage and air pollution resulting
from road traffic.
The situation changed mainly as a result of two epidemiological studies that origi-
nated in the US, and that had a significant impact on all other research involving
PM10. These studies on the effects of PM on health were the Harvard Six Cities Study
conducted byDockery et al. (1993) and theACS Study conducted by Pope et al. (1995).
2. The construction process of these European standards is the subject of chapter 4.
3. This is also acknowledged in the most important US studies: the ACS and Six Cities Studies. These con-
cerned mostly PM2.5, and not PM10. In 2006, the US Environmental Protection Agency EPA dropped
the annual standard for PM10 that had originally been set at an average concentration 50 mug/m3 per
year.
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We will turn first to the Harvard Six Cities Study and the ACS Study, the results of
which became available in the early 1990s.
2.2.1 Two significant studies: Harvard Six Cities and ACS
The first and possibly most well-known piece of research regarding the effects of par-
ticulate matter on public health is known as the Harvard Six Cities Study. From 1974
to 1988, pollution levels were recorded in six US cities: Watertown Massachusetts;
Portage Wisconsin; Topeka Kansas; Harriman Tennessee; St. Louis Missouri; and
Steubenville Ohio. Death rates in these cities were compared and related to concen-
trations of PM and other pollutants. Of these cities, Portage recorded the lowest levels
and Steubenville recorded the highest concentrations of air pollution for various pol-
lutants.4 The air in Steubenville contained roughly two-and-a-half times as much
PM10 and PM2.5 than Portage, and almost three times as much sulphate, a type of
sulphur-based pollutant. Researchers found that people in Steubenville ran a 26%
chance of dying prematurely. This means that a quarter of all the people in Steuben-
ville died before their expected date of death, compared to people living in Portage. In
epidemiological terms, this meant that a relative risk of 1.26 was found between peo-
ple living in these two cities (Krewski et al. 2000b, p.ii).
A second epidemiological study that had a significant impact on the US debate on the
regulation of PM10 as well as of PM2.5 was the American Cancer Society Study (ACS)
(Greenbaum 2003, p. 1495; Krewski 2003, p. 1514). The ACS Study is larger in scope
than the Six Cities Study, and was conducted by using a large cohort of 1.2 million
people living across all 50 States of the US and in Puerto Rico.5 Residents were pro-
vided with questionnaires regarding their health, and the death certificates involving
this cohort were compared for the metropolitan area in which they lived. The princi-
pal results of these analyses showed that fine particle concentrations were associated
with increased mortality from all causes, and involved cardiopulmonary disease in
bothmen andwomen; however, an association between fine particles and lung cancer
was not apparent (Krewski 2003, p. 1513).
The studies provoked controversy when they first appeared, and especially when the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used them to argue for a revision of the
standards for air pollution (HEI 2000). Controversial issues surrounding the research
4. The ranges of concentration between these two cities were 18.2 mg/m3 for Portage and 46.5 mg/m3 for
Steubenville for PM10, 11.0-29.6 mg/m3 for fine particles, (PM2.5) and 4.8-12.8 mg/m3 for sulphate
(Krewski 2003, p. 1512).
5. The investigations included 552,138 adult subjects who resided in 151 U.S. metropolitan areas in which
sulphate data had been collected regularly in 1980 and 1981, and 295,223 adult subjects who lived in the
50 metropolitan areas for which fine particle (PM2.5) data were available (collected from 1979 through
to 1983).
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included the charge of hiding data (website Harvard School of Public Health),6 various
methodological issues (Moolgavkar 2005), and the measurements used to determine
the types of pollutant involved and their concentration levels (Phalen 2002, p. 11).
The results of these two studies were reviewed by the HEI, which concluded that the
studieswithstood critical review. A re-analysis team led byDaniel Krewski at the Uni-
versity of Ottawa found that the data and the results of those two studies were gen-
erally robust. HEI released the following statement: ‘Overall, the re-analyses assured the
quality of the original data, the original results, and tested those results against alternative risk
models and analytic approaches without substantively altering the original findings of an
association between indicators of particulate matter air pollution and mortality’ (HEI web-
site). According to HEI, the replication of the Six Cities Study indicated that in a city
where there was 18.6 mug/m3 more PM2.5 in the air, premature mortality from all
causes was 28% higher. The ACS Study indicated that people living in the most pol-
luted area ran an 18% higher risk of dying prematurely than people in the least pol-
luted area, with the difference in air quality being almost 25 mug/m3 (HEI 2000, p. 1).
The belief that air pollution by Particulate Matter had serious health effects became
widely accepted among epidemiologists (Pope 2003), and was one of the most com-
mon arguments for air-quality policy as well. However, the amount of epidemiolog-
ical research regarding long-term health effects of PM was small at the beginning of
this century. At the time, there existed only five cohort studies, and these had supplied
the epidemiological data (Buringh & Opperhuizen 2002a, p. 34). The two most prom-
inent pieces of research remained the aforementioned Six Cities Study and the ACS
Study.
. PROSPECTIVE EP IDEMIOLOGY, POSS IB IL IT IES AND LIMITAT IONS
Before we can assess the relevance of these findings in the construction process, an
introduction to prospective epidemiology – the branch of medicine that spawned
them – is required. The implications of the studies cannot be assessed without some
knowledge of the field, and of the difference between epidemiology and another
branch of medicine, toxicology. Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of an epide-
miological study need to bemapped out before we can proceed with an assessment of
the two pivotal studies.
2.3.1 Epidemiology and toxicology
Epidemiology is ‘the study of the occurrence of health and disease in populations with a view
to illuminating the causes of disease and, ultimately, its control or prevention’ (Kabat 2009, p. 19).
6. Website Harvard School of Public Health, last accessed July 2013.
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Aclassic example that illustrates the epidemiologicalmethod is thework of physician John
Snow,who analysed the spread of disease during a 19th-century London cholera epidemic.
He noticed that cholera was more prevalent in some areas than in others, and began to
recognise a pattern. By analysing the pattern, he concluded that a street pump in the Soho
district had to be the source of the disease, and hewas able to stop the epidemic by remov-
ing the pump’s handle. This was one of the earliest successes involving epidemiological
research (Kabat 2009, p. 21).
Essentially, epidemiology is based onmaking comparisons between groups, and then
examining the differences. It compares rates of disease or mortality between groups
that are differentiated according to various characteristics: for instance, sex, gender,
age, socio-economic level, or nationality. By comparing these groups, epidemiologists
try to construe possible hypotheses as to why a certain condition occurs predomi-
nantly in some groups rather than in others, and why certain groups display levels
of disease that deviate significantly from the expected base rate. Epidemiology reveals
associations between particular types of ailments and certain groups, with the classi-
cal example being that of finding highly elevated levels of lung cancer among smokers
(Brandt 1993, p. 161). This discovery led epidemiologists to conclude that therewas an
association between smoking and lung cancer. Through establishing this strong cor-
relation, epidemiologists were able to point with conviction to the risk of smokers
developing lung cancer.
The notion of risk is central to epidemiology. While it can predict that smokers run a
higher risk of developing lung cancer, it cannot predict whether a certain smoker will
in fact develop lung cancer. By using statistical analysis, it can estimate how much
greater the risk for a smoker would be in comparison with a non-smoker. A study
undertaken by E. Cuyler Hammond in the 1950s showed that lung cancer deathswere
5 to 16 times higher among heavy smokers than among non-smokers (Brandt 1993,
p. 162). In epidemiological terms, this means that heavy smokers ran a risk that
was 5 to 16 times higher than non-smokers of developing lung cancer.
Even though the relative risk factor was high in this case, epidemiological studies
still only uncovered a correlation between smoking and lung cancer. They did
not establish causative mechanisms: namely, the way in which the body reacted
to cigarette smoke and developed cancer. However, since the relative risk factor
of heavy smokers was very high at 5 to 16, it was safe to assume that when such
a high risk was found, the correlation between smoking and developing lung cancer
was indeed causative: namely, indicating that smoking causes cancer, even though
the biological mechanism by which smoking led to cancer was not known at
the time.
Epidemiological studies may be conducted by using different research designs, and a
familiar one involves the case control study. This is a retrospective method, because
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the subjects under scrutiny are patients who have developed a certain medical con-
dition. In a case control study, subjects are questioned, and the answers to these
questions may uncover a circumstance relative to that particular disease. The first
investigations to test the hypothesis that smoking and lung cancer were related
were conducted by questioning hospitalised sufferers of lung cancer about
their smoking habits. This type of study is referred to as ‘retrospective’, because
it looks back in time and tries to establish a possible reason that a certain disease
developed.
Another type of research is the prospective study, such as a cohort study. Cohorts are
groups that are formed according to certain characteristic features, and then followed
over a prolonged period of time. In a prospective epidemiological study, a group is
not selected according to the development of a certain disease, but because the mem-
bers have all been exposed to a certain agent. The researcher investigates whether
there is a relationship between the exposure and the development of a disease in
group members. For instance, one can research the effects of exposure to traffic-
related air pollution by comparing a group of people more exposed to such pollution
with a group exposed to normal levels of air pollution, and determine whether certain
diseases are more prevalent within the first group. In this way, for instance, Beelen
et al. (2008) established that traffic intensity on a road situated closest to members
of the first group was associated with premature mortality due to all causes: cardio-
vascular disease, respiratory disease, and lung cancer. This type of study is of special
interest for the topic of our thesis, air pollution, because both the Six Cities Study and
that of the ACS were prospective epidemiological studies.
It is crucial to realise that although epidemiological researchmay uncover correlations
between pollution and adverse health effects, it cannot logically establish definitive
causations, because it does not investigate what goes on in the body. The causative
mechanisms through which pollutants harm the body are established by another
branch of medicine: toxicology. In contrast to epidemiologists, toxicologists work
in laboratory conditions, and test the effects of agents on bodies by way of exposing
them to the agents in controlled conditions. Researchers often use test animals to
observe the physical effects of a certain substance, and dissection may uncover path-
ways through which a particular agent enters the body, and reveal the effects it has.
By means of such research, the toxicologist may uncover dose-response relationships
and determine causal effects of substances. Whereas the epidemiologist may study
long-term effects of a certain substance on a group of subjects, the toxicologist focuses
on single bodies and generally on short-term effects, because it is difficult to observe
long-term effects under laboratory conditions. Ideally, the two branches reinforce
each other. The toxicologist establishes the plausibility of the epidemiological findings
by uncovering the mechanism through which the body is harmed. If such a mecha-
nism is indeed found, the chance that an association discovered by an epidemiologist
is truly a causal one is strongly supported.
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In this case, the differences between these branches are relevant because – as will be
discussed later – toxicologists had a hard time accounting for the reports put forward
by epidemiologists regarding the harmful effects of air pollution.
In regard to smoking, epidemiologists uncovered strong associations, including dose
response relationships, whereas toxicologists did not yet find the mechanism by
which smoking harmed the body. The association was so strong, however, that it
was highly unlikely that such a mechanism was not present, even though toxicolo-
gists could not account for it at the time. This was a great triumph for epidemiology,
because it illustrated that it was able to detect threats earlier than classical toxicolog-
ical science could.7
2.3.2 Possibilities and limitations of epidemiological studies
Epidemiology can be applied to uncover risks that cannot be observed in toxicological
studies, because either the bodily effects occur long after exposure has taken place or
because toxicological experiments are not possible. For instance, one cannot endanger
human test subjects. However, establishing causality is more complicated in epidemi-
ology than it is in toxicology.
The strength of prospective epidemiology lies in its ability to detect trends in dis-
ease and to differentiate populations according to more or less sensitive groups.
It uncovers potential threats and provides indications that certain groups run a
higher risk than others of developing a certain disease. For policy makers, this
feature is significant, because it allows for measures that target different groups.
During episodes of high air pollution, for instance, older or asthmatic people may
be advised to remain indoors, while healthy citizens receive no such warning. It
is also very useful for insurance companies when they draft risk profiles. More-
over, agents that affect the body only after long-term exposure can be detected by
following cohorts. This type of study has advantages over retrospective studies,
since these researchers rely on cohort members providing personal reports with
regard to exposure to certain agents. The account may be biased, however,
because after becoming afflicted, the respondents themselves begin to mull over
the causes. This is known as the information bias. Since prospective studies gen-
erally do not rely on reports from afflicted subjects, they avoid this kind of bias
(Kabat 2009, p. 30).
Epidemiology scored a number of successes by relying on prospective studies that
were used to bolster the findings of earlier retrospective research into the relationship
between smoking and lung cancer (Brandt 1993). However, as with all scientific
7. The biological mechanisms by which smoking causes disease have now been identified, and can be
found in US Department of Health and Human Services (2010).
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research designs, prospective epidemiology has its limitations. One of the most vex-
ing questions concerns when it is justified to make the leap from association to cau-
sation. As stated, epidemiology identifies statistical correlations but not causal
biological mechanisms. Since laboratory conditions cannot be achieved in prospective
epidemiological studies, it is difficult to exclude all kinds of interfering factors, ones
that ‘muddy’ the association of interest because they are related to both the popula-
tion and to the disease under scrutiny. Such interferences are called confounding fac-
tors, and may always account for the associations found, causing the researcher to
infer causation from correlation in a misleading manner. If, for instance, one were
to compare heart attack rates among the populations of Alaska and southern states
in the US, one could mistakenly infer that the risk of having a heart attack is much
higher in the southern states than in Alaska. However, the population of Alaska is
younger than that of the southern states, and age is correlated with incidences of heart
attack. The age variation explains the difference in heart attack rates among Alaskans
and other US residents (Kabat 2009, p. 23).
Such a distortion of the data, or misinterpretation of it due to bias, is a persistent dan-
ger in epidemiological research, and for this reason the renowned epidemiologist Sir
Austin Bradford Hill devised a set of considerations that helped to minimise the
chance of wrongly inferring causation from correlation. In his classic 1965 essay, Hill
identified nine such considerations.
1 Strength
According to Hill, the first criterion of note was the strength of the association
found. The associations found in the studies in regard to smoking and lung cancer
lay in the range of relative risks from 9 to 30 (Hill 1965, p. 296): that is, one ran a 9 to
30 times higher risk of dying from lung cancer as a smoker than as a non-smoker.
Hill considered this a strong association, whereas he considered an association of 2
or more to be weak (Hill 1965, p. 296). Such a weak correlation did not rule out the
possibility of causation, but made it more likely that some other confounding fac-
tor was the real underlying cause of the association. The strength of a correlation
was an important point raised by other epidemiologists as well. Geoffrey Kabat
argued that a relative risk below 2.0 was very small. Moreover, relative risk
was usually given as the median within a certain margin, and this margin was
due to the statistical margin of error. Kabat considered that if this margin included
a relative risk of 1.0, meaning no extra risk at all, the statistical significance should
be questioned (Kabat 2009, p. 33).
2 Consistency
It is more likely that an association is indeed causative when the findings are repeated
over time in different studies and in different places. This makes it less likely that a
confounding factor is in play, because the association remains persistent over time
and within different studies.
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3 Specificity
A cause may be more easily inferred when a specific type of disease is connected to a
particular area or type of work.Workingwith asbestos and developing a specific form
of lung cancer are examples of such distinct incidences of disease among a particular
type of manual labourer.
4 Temporality
Epidemiology gives rise to questions regarding causality, and one of these is the age-
old chicken and egg question: which came first? When an association is found
between certain dietary habits and the onset of a disease, for instance, it is tempting
to conclude that the diet caused the disease. However, a disease may also interfere
with people’s eating habits, and in that case the disease caused the change in diet.
5 Biological gradient
If a regular dose-response curve can be found – that is, if an increase in the dose of the
agent suggests a similar increase in the incidence of disease – a causative association is
more likely.
6 Biological plausibility
If there is a biological explanation present for the causation found, a causative relation
is easier to accept. This criterion, however, should not be considered absolute, because
there may be an as yet unknown biological explanation.
7 Coherence
However, a proposed causative relation should not conflict with what we already
know and have scientifically established. If such a hypothesis is in conflict with other
scientific facts, causation is unlikely.
8 Experiment
Ideally, some experimental discoveries are present that corroborate the epidemiolog-
ical findings. For instance, if epidemiological research suggests that dust in the work-
place leads to lung disease, onewouldwant to conduct an experiment by reducing the
dust and determining whether it leads to a decrease in lung disease cases.
9 Analogy
A causative relationship is more plausible if there are similar cases in which the same rela-
tionship can be established. For instance, whenwe know that a certain drug adMinistered
to pregnant women may cause harm to embryos, and we find a relationship between a
similar drug and birth defects, it is more likely that the relationship is indeed causative.
These considerations safeguard the scientific rigour of conclusions drawn from the
findings, and are still used by researchers as an evaluative framework (Kreis &Cromwell
2013, p. 145).
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2.3.3 Epidemiology and its critics
After their success in discovering the dangers of smoking, researchers were tempted
to uncover all sorts of other relations, especially regarding the incidence of cancer. In
the 1970s, the Western diet came under increased scrutiny, and Richard Doll, a prom-
inent epidemiologist well known from research involving the relationship between
lung cancer and smoking, pronounced that the Western diet was a cause of many
types of cancer (Le Fanu 1999, p. 353).
Other researchers tended to look elsewhere to uncover the cause of this disease, and
environmental factors received increased attention, especially after publication of
Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ in 1962. In this book, she warned of a bleak future
resulting fromman-made chemicals being released into the environment. Epidemiol-
ogists turned to exploring the relationship between all kinds of environmental factors
and health problems, and uncovered a host of potential threats. Many pharmaceutical
substances were labelled as threats, but non-medical substances had also at one time
or another been related to conditions such as strokes, heart attacks, birth defects, and
cancer. Epidemiologist Alvin Feinstein (1988a), for instance, noted coffee, water,
sugar, saccharin, and alcohol.8
However, these associations rarely stood up to rigorous scientific scrutiny. According
to Le Fanu (1999), almost all claims pertaining to health effects of environmental fac-
tors were false, because the quantities of pollutants to which we were exposed in
Western society were too low to have effects on the body (Le Fanu 1999, p. 361).
Le Fanu stated that the association between electromagnetic fields caused by electric-
ity pylons and leukaemiawas false, the danger of water pollutionwas overstated, and
the putative causative relation between air pollution and asthma could not hold,
because incidences of asthma were higher in less polluted cities than in polluted ones
(Le Fanu 1999, p. 361). Kabat discredited the relationship between passive smoking
and lung cancer, electromagnetic fields and leukaemia, DDT and breast cancer, and
air pollution and lung cancer (Kabat 2009, p. 35). In all these cases, the relative risk
factors were very small; moreover; it was difficult to assess the type and amount
of exposure. It was difficult, for instance, to isolate a group that was subjected to a
specific amount of passive smoking, and such exposure information was crucial in
order to assess the data accurately and ascertain a significant association. Especially
when exposure information is limited and only weak associations are found, it is dif-
ficult to infer whether the effects seen are indeed real or are a product of confounding
factors (Kabat 2009, p. 36).
The tendency of epidemiologists to link environmental factors quickly to the inci-
dence of disease, and to jump rapidly from correlation to causation, was criticised
8. For a long list, see Brignell (2004, p. 140).
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by a number of practitioners in the field. I have already cited Geoffrey Kabat (2009) –
who felt health hazards were hyped by epidemiologists – extensively, but one of the
most scathing criticisms came from a celebrated epidemiologist. In 1988, Alvin Fein-
stein, then director of the clinical epidemiology unit at Yale University School of Med-
icine, published an article in the renowned journal Science (1988) in which he criticised
the research method and biases of his fellow epidemiologists (Feinstein 1988a). Later
that year, he also published a special commentary in the American Journal of Med-
icine, in which he formulated three succinct points of criticism (Feinstein 1988b).
1. The research methods applied lead to distortions. Groups are compared that seem
equal but are not, due to some bias in the selection of the groups or in the agents
that are considered responsible for the differences found between the groups. For
instance, when one compares the survival rates of groups operated on in instances
of cancer with those that did not have the operation, one compares biased groups.
Patients that are termed to be operable at all will be healthier than patients that are
termed inoperable, and therefore the mortality rates will differ, regardless of
whether surgery indeed takes place. Feinstein was especially critical of observa-
tional studies. In these studies, groups are formed and are observed in real life
situations, such as living close to a highway. Feinstein considered that such com-
parisons would often be biased by the many natural phenomena occurring in such
situations, which could distort the comparison. If possible, such observational
findings would need to be corroborated by other experimentally derived evidence
(Feinstein 1988b, p. 476).
2. The interpretation of data is prone to ‘delusion’, because they are interpreted in the
light of contemporary beliefs held by the epidemiologist in question. Feinstein
cited two classic examples, in which unbiased data were interpreted in line with
inaccurate beliefs held about pathogenesis at the time. Even though theywere clas-
sic examples, Feinstein considered that such delusions were still commonplace
(Feinstein 1988, p. 476).
3. ‘The consensus syndrome’ plays a role (Feinstein 1988, p. 477). Authoritative opin-
ion is established by consensus mechanisms rather than by the application of rig-
orous scientific analysis. Conferences and panels are called, and authorities in
those panels determine what the consensus is regarding certain medical problem
in their field. These consensus mechanisms silence ‘heretical’ voices, and, accor-
ding to Feinstein, ‘hamper progress’ (Feinstein 1988b, p. 477).
In addition to the above criticism, Feinstein was repeatedly critical of what he called
the double standard in epidemiology (Feinstein & Horrowitz 1982; Feinstein 1988b).
In order to accept that a certain agent has a therapeutic effect on a group, massive
corroborating evidence is required, but when a certain threat to health is found, no
such control checks are demanded. Accordingly, it is much easier to detect and pub-
lish findings relating to a possible threat than it is to confirm a possible benefit. This
double standard steers epidemiology in the direction of detecting threats.
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Criticisms similar to those presented by Feinstein were made by Dutch epidemiolo-
gist Paul Knipschild, who until his retirement in 2005 was professor of epidemiology
at Maastricht University. In his farewell speech, Knipschild castigated the research
done by his colleagues, and stated that he had become tired of explaining all themeth-
odological shortcomings. He expressed a wish for a new type of critical review, such
as that of Feinstein in Science (Knipschild 2005, p. 10).
According to Knipschild, Feinstein’s article in Science made ‘short work’ of epidemi-
ological research that looked for environmental factors as causes of disease (Knip-
schild 2005, p. 10). In his article, Knipschild levelled another set of criticisms at his
colleagues: namely, the use of ‘convenience cohorts’. These are groups of people
whose habits and living conditions are analysed in order to uncover meaningful asso-
ciations between lifestyle or environmental factors and incidence of disease. Cohort
study is a well-knownmethodology. However, in the case of convenience cohorts, the
groups are formed initially for a research purpose other than that for which the cohort
is eventually used. For instance, a cohort formed in order to examine the effects of
dietary habits might be used in air research on air pollution. This cohort is used
for the sake of convenience, and is not customised in accordance with the research
hypotheses under investigation. Feinstein also points towards ‘data dredging’ as a
scientifically problematic practice. Data dredging occurs when ‘a large number of sta-
tistical associations are explored in an automated manner for diverse individual groups and
outcomes’ (Feinstein 1988a, p. 1259). In other words, a group is divided into many dif-
ferent sub-groups – for instance, according to age, gender, smoking habits, and so on –
and is subsequently studied within the context of a long list of possible pollutants to
see whether a statistically significant relationship can be found between a certain pol-
lutant and the rate of mortality in one of these sub-groups. If this is done with a suf-
ficiently long list of sub- groups, together with a long enough list of possible
pollutants, at least one significant association is bound to show up, even if only by
chance.
While they pointed out methodological flaws, double standards, and the tendency to
interpret data according to preconceived beliefs, critics like Feinstein acknowledged
that epidemiology had been successful at detecting threats. Before WWII, epidemio-
logical studies had had ‘a more profound impact on public health, infectious disease and
individual longevity than any other branch of medicine’ (Feinstein 1988a, p. 1257). After
WWII, rigorous epidemiological science contributed to the eradication of smallpox,
to demonstrating that rubella causes birth defects, to the finding that fluoridated
water protects the teeth, and to the finding that cigarette smoke leads to lung cancer
(Feinstein 1988a, p. 1257). The criticism raised was against the practice of warning
against all kinds of minor lifestyle and environmental risks.
Prospective epidemiology is a branch of medicine that uses complex statistical ana-
lyses to establish associations between lifestyle and environmental factors and
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disease. Whereas the classical studies on smoking produced strong associations, cur-
rent research on lifestyle and environmental factors identify much smaller risk ratios.
However, since many people are subjected to environmental factors like water or air
pollution, even a small increase in the risk of developing a certain disease can lead to a
large prognosis of premature mortality (Phalen 2004). The possibility of detecting
minute threats makes it very useful to argue for preventative policies based on epi-
demiological findings. The tendency to focus on lifestyle and environmental threats
is reinforced by the fact that threats are quickly identified and accepted as a possibility
without thorough meticulous review. The ‘double standard’ identified by Feinstein
holds that while therapeutic effects of substances are subject to rigorous control,
screening and replication, epidemiological discoveries relating to threats are publis-
hed quickly and subsequently eagerly picked up by the media. According to Kabat,
epidemiology has become instrumental within a ‘sociology of health hazards’, func-
tioning within the larger constraints of a society that emphasises prevention and
precaution.
. REMAINING UNCERTAINT IES IN THE HARVARD SIX CIT IES
AND THE ACS STUDIES
Now that we have a handle on the possibilities and limitations of epidemiological
studies, we turn once more to the main epidemiological studies underpinning the
claim that PM10 is a serious threat to health. The HEI review concluded that although
the findings were robust, upon closer examination, a number of persistent questions
still remained. In this section these uncertainties will be discussed and an alternative
explanation is offered.
2.4.1 Critical objections to the findings in the ACS and Harvard Six Cities studies
When we review the two key studies and the HEI follow-up, we will see that some of
the critics’ objections pertain to these studies as well.
Exposure information
In order to establish meaningful associations, exposure information needs to be opti-
mal. In many ways, exposure information in the two studies is not entirely satisfac-
tory. PM10 and PM2.5 are complex mixtures of a differing constitution; for instance,
we do not knowwhether PM from Portage can be compared to PM from Steubenville.
To give a practical example, in the Netherlands an important fraction of PM10 will
consist of sea salt, which is considered harmless. However, sea salt will not comprise
a large fraction of PM10 found in the Czech Republic. Moreover, in the case of the Six
Cities Study, air pollution levels from the 1970s were taken into account. Particles
were only measured as TSP, Total Suspended Particulates, while PM10 and PM2.5
were measured later. The ACS Study took place later, and contains differentiated
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measurements for PM10 and PM2.5 (Krewski et al. 2000, p. 7). Nevertheless, even cur-
rent measurements of PM10 and PM2.5 are largely uncertain, and correction factors
are applied to account for them (Buijsman 2007). The appropriate correction factor is
subject to debate, and different countries use diverse factors; according to the RIVM,
measurements display uncertainties ranging from 10 to 25%. In light of these findings,
I doubt that measurements taken in the early 1980s offer a sufficient degree of cer-
tainty upon which to base accurate exposure information.
Information regarding illnesses and causes of mortality is also not the most desir-
able, as the studies use questionnaires and death certificates to relate exposure to
pollution to cause of death. Death certificates, however, are notably untrustworthy
sources of information. According to Feinstein, a certificate of death is ‘so untrust-
worthy that very few thoughtful clinical scientists pay any attention to it’ (Feinstein
1988b, p. 477).
Small relative risk factors
The risk factors found in the Six Cities, ACS, and HEI studies are all quite small. In the
table below, the relative-risk factors in the ACS and Six City studies for PM2.5 are
displayed together with their confidence level, indicating a certain margin for error.
The HEI validation confirmed the findings and noted relative risks of 1.28 for the Six
Cities Study and 1.18 for the ACS Study. These associations are still very small, and
should be treated with caution, in accordance with Hill’s previously mentioned con-
siderations (Hill 1965). Scientists generally counter this finding by pointing out the
consistency in the results over the course of different studies (for example, MNP
2005, p. 57). They apparently attach more value to the second of Hill’s considerations
than to the first. However, little epidemiological research has been carried out regard-
ing the long-term effects of PM10, and at least one substantial study, involving US
veterans, does not corroborate the Six Cities Study and the ACS Study. Lipfert, the
epidemiologist who concluded that study, argued that epidemiological research
regarding PM10 did not sufficiently meet the criteria laid down by Hill to be able
to conclude that a causal relation had been uncovered (Lipfert 1994 in Phalen
2004). However, the MNP, for instance, consider that this study was less robust,
and that the US studies taken into account were consistent (MNP 2005, p. 57).
Table 3
Cause of death Six Cities PM2.5 ACS PM2.5 ACS SO4 (sulphates)
All causes 1.26 (1.08 – 1.47) 1.17 (1.09-1.26) 1.15 (1.09-1.22)
Cardiopulmonary 1.37 (1.11 – 1.68) 1.31 (1.17-1.46) 1.26. (1.16-137)
Lung cancer 1.37 0-81-2.31 1.03 (080-1.33_ 1.36 (1.11-1.66)
All others 1.01 (0.79-1.30) 1.07 (0.92-1.24) 1.01 (0.92-1.11)
Table taken from Pope & Dockery 1999, p. 691
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Confounding factors
Confounding factors are ones that relate to both the group under consideration and to
premature mortality. The presence of these factors makes it difficult to state definitely
that a certain pollutant is the cause of premature mortality. HEI researcher Daniel
Krewski himself cast doubts upon whether the premature mortality was in fact
due to PM, or to PM in combination with something else. He demonstrated that mor-
tality was associated significantly with sulphur dioxide, SO2, in addition to PM2.5.
This is ironic, because the combination of smoke and SO2 was considered dangerous
before the 1990s. Later on, science moved away from considering particles and SO2
together. In an article submitted to the American Journal of Toxicology and Environ-
mental Health, Krewski et al. (2003) concluded: ‘Collectively, our re-analyses suggest that
mortality may be attributed to more than one component of the complex mixture of ambient air
pollutants in urban areas in the United States’ (Krewski et al. 2003, p. 1548). This sounds
less convincing than the conclusion of the Six Cities Study and others that air pollution
by itself was responsible for a large number of premature deaths.
In addition to the possible distorting presence of other pollutants, the review found a
significantmodifying effect of education onmortality attributed to PM. It appears that
the relative risk of mortality due to PM exposure was less among people who had
achieved higher levels of education (Krewski 2003, p. 1547). In otherwords, the higher
the level of education, the lower the chance of succumbing to a pollution-related dis-
ease. This is odd, because whywould awell-educated person be less prone to the neg-
ative health effects associated with Particulate Matter than a less educated one? This
finding points to education as a potentially large confounding factor that leads to
what Feinstein refers to as distortion.
Krewski and co-workers continued to monitor air pollution, using epidemiological
cohort studies. In 2009, another analysis of the cohort appeared (Krewski et al.
2009), and the same association between a high level of education andmortality resul-
ting from air pollution showed up (Krewski et al. 2009, p. 2). In their conclusion, the
researchers attributed this to chance, but in section 4.3.3 I will construe a hypothesis in
which the finding that air pollution mortality is related to education plays a part.
Experimental validation
The group used in the ACS Study was a convenience cohort, used originally to check
incidences of cancer. Both studies and the follow-up study were observational ones in
which cohorts were followed in real-life conditions. Those kinds of studies were cri-
ticised by Feinstein and Knipschild, who claimed the research should be corroborated
by experimental evidence. One of Hill’s considerationswas the presence of a plausible
biological mechanism as well.
However, at the beginning of the 21st century, numerous uncertainties still existed
about the causal relation between air pollution and observed harmful effects in the
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human body (Hanekamp & Pieterman 2005; Van Bree & Cassee 2000, p. 33; MNP
2005, p. 56; EPA 2006, attachment A p. 5, Ayres et al. 2008, p. 76) Toxicological studies
listed by theWHO (2003) found only mild or no effects, and effects were noted only at
high concentrations (200 mug/m3) (WHO 2003, p. 13).
Many different possible biological mechanisms were hypothesised, but none could
lay claim to being the definitive explanation, though Buringh and Opperhuizen
(2002) provided an ingenuous scheme with a number of feasible explanatory mech-
anisms and their possible complex interrelationships (Buringh and Opperhuizen
2002a, p. 38). Robert Phalen provided a list of themost commonly proposed biological
mechanisms as well, and stated that all of them could explain the epidemiological
findings. However, it was uncertainwhether theywere present in sufficient quantities
in susceptible persons to produce illness or death (Phalen 2004). Currently, the most
prominent hypothesis is that PM10 causes what is termed ‘oxidative stress’, which
in turn causes inflammation of the lungs (MacNee & Donaldson 2003; Van Bree &
Cassee 2000, p. 26; Ayres et al. 2008, p. 92). Oxidative stress occurs when the body
cannot detoxify a reactive oxygen species (ROS), reactive molecules that contain oxy-
gen. These molecules are produced naturally as a consequence of metabolism, but the
hypothesis is that air pollution causes their number to increase and cause damage to
cell structures. ROS and resulting oxidative stress have been implicated in a variety of
adverse effects, such as aging and the development of cancer.
Oxidative stress as a biological explanation for the epidemiological results is in itself
not significantly strong. The problem is that the ROS that cause oxidative stress occur
naturally as well as through environmental factors; in addition, the occurrence of oxi-
dative stress can be due to a multiplicity of causes. Air pollution is considered to be
one of them (Yang & Omaye 2009), but diet is also implicated (Hou et al. 2013), as are
sunlight (Wenk et al. 2001) and strenuous physical exercise (Powers & Jackson 2007)
It is also implicated in the occurrence of a wide array of disorders, from asthma and
COPD to bipolar personality disorder and depression,9 and therefore it is hard to pin-
point what exactly oxidative stress does. It has many causes and is implied in many
symptoms, and as a result it is questionable as to whether air pollution and the symp-
toms it causes can be fully attributed to it.
2.4.2 Assessing the claims of early air quality research10
According to Kabat (2009), inaccurate exposure information coupled with weak asso-
ciations is a sign that the claim of uncovering a causal relationship is questionable. In
9. Website oxidative stress, last accessed 12-06 2015.
10. Many more uncertainties are present in the case of air quality assessment and measurement (Buijsman
2007). Here I focus mostly on epidemiological science, because epidemiologists acted as the primary
claims makers.
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this case, experimental evidence is thin aswell, although there are counter-arguments.
The HEI study is updated frequently, a number of studies have found roughly similar
estimates of relative risk, and we know air pollution can be harmful on the basis of
situations in the past, such as the deadly London fog in 1952. The findings correspond
to some of Hill’s considerations but not to others and where they do not seem to cor-
respond to the criteria, additional explanations may be provided. The weak strength
of the association is accounted for by pointing towards the consistency of the findings;
a weak level of specificity may be countered by arguing that a biological gradient is
determined; and in answer to the lack of experimental validation, biological plausi-
bility may be put forward. However, the uncertainties remain considerable and are
persistent.
The conclusion of the HEI 2009 study, mentioning the mysterious inverted association
between education and premature mortality due to PMmay provide an angle for a fur-
ther hypothesis: namely, one that considers air pollution to be an indicator for low socio-
economic status, with the result that people living areas afflictedwith different problems,
will be found to die earlier. I will expand on this idea further in the next section.
2.4.3 Air pollution as an indicator for low socio-economic status
The epidemiological and toxicological findings regarding PM10 were highly uncer-
tain, but they did lead to social unrest and to regulation at the EU level. The findings
that linked air pollution to premature mortality were also persistent, even though the
risks were small. However, it remained a concern due to the large number of people
subjected to this small risk.
The consistent findings of cohort studies suggested that people who lived in polluted
areas had more health problems than people who lived in non-polluted regions. The
question is whether air pollution is solely responsible, or only one of many factors that
explained those health problems? The association between air pollution and mortality
was weak, and exposure-related information was not convincing. This means there is
room for an alternative explanation that relates both to air pollution and to life expec-
tancy. Socio-economic status, as indicated by the level of education, relates to both.
Socio-economic status is related to air pollution, because people with a low income
maywell end up living in areas where the pollution ismore prominent: alongside high-
ways, for instance. A low socio-economic status is also related to premature mortality,
as was admitted in the research: ‘It is possible that educational attainment is a marker for
socioeconomic status, which is known to be correlated with health status’ (Krewski 2003,
p. 1547). This suggests that exposure to fine particles might be one of a number of
threats that cause premature mortality in subjects with a lower social-economic status.
People in poor economic circumstances may well live in areas that are more highly
exposed to PM10, such as busy roads, and may die earlier than people who are
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financially well off (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2010, p. 35; National Audit
Office 2010, p. 4). In general, living in areas with bad air shortens life expectancy. Such
areas tend to be poorer, noisier, and generally less wholesome than other places. Air
pollution might be an indicator for whether living in a certain area is healthy alto-
gether. Moreover, people with a lower socio economic status tend to be exposed to
other unhealthy environmental factors such as poorer diet, less exercise and poorer
housing.
According to Dutch scientist RobMaas, it could not be ruled out that the PM problem
is actually a socio-economic issue, as many associations can be found between cardio-
pulmonary disease and factors affecting less affluent groups. Strong associations can
also be found between cardiopulmonary diseases and traffic noise. Moreover, cardio-
pulmonary disease is also related to the quality of housing and to the diet of low-
income families (Maas 2007, p. 367).
Krewski and co-workers asserted that the association between education and prema-
turemortality due to pollution could be due to chance. This is a possibility, but it is not
a strong argument, because the findings themselves display weak associations that
are minimally statistically relevant. The researchers themselves cast doubts on the
statement by conceding that the same negative association between a high level of
education and premature mortality due to lifestyle factors shows up in Dutch epide-
miological research (Krewski 2009, p. 134). Therefore I consider it more probable that
air pollution is indeed one of the many risks that people living in poor neighbour-
hoods are exposed to and that, taken together, indeed lead to a life expectancy that
is lower than that of residents in affluent neighbourhoods.
. DUTCH EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND CLAIMS MAKING
BY HEALTH AGENCIES
The mentioning of Dutch epidemiological research by Krewski’s team is not coinci-
dental. Dutch epidemiologists have contributed significantly to our knowledge of
air pollution and especially to uncovering associations between premature mortality
and living close to highways. The results of these studies have led to claims making in
1999 by the Rotterdam Municipal health agency that the air pollution in the Dutch
residential area of Overschie was problematic and a health threat to the residents
of this area. In this section first the work of Dutch epidemiologists will be discussed
and subsequently the claims about the health situation inOverschie will be recounted.
2.5.1 Dutch epidemiological research
In the Netherlands the research findings of US scientists were noted early on. Dutch
health and environmental institutes turned their attention to PM10 early on and PM10
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was measured in the Netherlands generally earlier than it was in other European
countries (Hans Eerens, interview). This was partly the result of cooperation between
Dutch and US health institutes in the 1980s and the modern measuring network pre-
sent in the Netherlands (Clarenburg 1995; Buijsman 2003).
Dutch epidemiological scientists worked closely with their American colleagues as
well. For the Netherlands, Dutch research conducted by epidemiologists Gerard
Hoek and Bert Brunekreef is of importance. Brunekreef’swork is of particular interest,
because it played a part in the construction of PM10 as a serious problem for public
health in general, not only in the Netherlands. He contributed to the first EPA stan-
dard setting for Particulate Matter, and to research supporting the EU air-quality
Directives, according to the tribute paid to him in honour of his winning the Heineken
Prize for Environmental Sciences in 2008. He won this prize for his ground breaking
research on the health effects of air pollution.
Brunekreef was also present at WHOmeetings in 1987 which resulted in the drafting
of the WHO guidelines for air quality. As will be explained in the next chapter, these
guidelines were a crucial factor in the construction of the EU air quality regulation.
Additionally he was a member of the Dutch Health Council. He worked closely
together with the epidemiologists who had conducted the Harvard Six Cities Study,
for instance, resulting in a publication regarding the association between asthma and
dampness in the home (Brunekreef et al. 1989), and later on regarding outdoor air
pollution in 1991 (Brunekreef et al. 1991). All of this made him an authority on the
topic of Particulate Matter.
In 1995 he received media coverage because of his research on the relationship
between asthma in children and living close to highways. The notion that living close
to highways is dangerous is a persistent emblem in the discussions in the Netherlands
on PM10. One of the places where he conducted his research is in Overschie, a small
residential area that would become the focus of a health scare over air pollution in the
Netherlands.
2.5.2 Claims made by the Dutch Municipal Health Agency
The research of Dutch epidemiologists received increased attention in the late 1990s.
In 1996, an investigation was conducted at Wageningen University on the health of
children living near busy roads, and epidemiologists published findings that the chil-
dren’s health had been significantly affected (Van Vliet et al. 1996). The research was
subsequently published in an international journal (Brunekreef et al. 1997).
One of the municipalities in which Brunekreef and his team conducted their research
was the residential region of Overschie, which became an important area in the his-
tory of the air-quality clash, owing to a report from the municipal health service
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(Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst, henceforth GGD) published in 1999 (Hegger &
Slob 1999). In this report, the researchers mentioned a problem with air quality in
Overschie. The team proclaimed that living near the Overschie highway was damag-
ing to health. They presented the research findings in the form of a trope by proclai-
ming that living in Overschie was like passively smoking 17 cigarettes a day (Hegger
& Slob 1999, p. 4). This trope became a persistent emblem in the public’s perception of
the PM problem.
The use of this emblem was instrumental in attracting political attention from the
Minister11 Jan Pronk for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, (Volkshuis-
vesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, henceforth VROM) (Ecorys-Kolpron 2002,
p. 34). Minister Pronk of VROM paid visits to the area, and these visits generated
media attention (Dutch newspapers: (NRC 11-02-1999; Trouw 11-02-1999). He
quickly commissioned follow-up research conducted by the same team of epidemiol-
ogists who had conducted the research near Overschie, including Bert Brunekreef.
This research was broader in scope, and confirmed the earlier findings (Aarts et al.
1999). Pronk received the results of the study in 1999, and sent it to Parliament.
In Parliament, he reiterated that living inOverschie equalled the passive smoking of ‘a
packet of cigarettes per day’.12 By this time, he had become committed to the situation
in Overschie, and he acknowledged the necessity of curbing the increase in traffic and
transport. Partly on Pronk’s instigation, a measure was considered for Overschie to
push back air pollution in the area; to this end, the speed limit was reduced from
120 km/h to 80 km/h in 2002. This measure was based in the premise that vehicles
that drive slower emit fewer pollutants. The scientific findings caused Pronk to
oppose further expansion of roads, but before a clash between the Ministries of
VROM and Transport and Water Management could erupt, the Cabinet resigned
in 2002, owing to a wholly unrelated matter.
The issue of Overschie and the speed limits will be elaborated on further in chapter 6,
but for now it is important to note that Dutch epidemiologists and public health agen-
cies managed to mobilise public and political support in the Netherlands around the
storyline that living close to highways was damaging to health. This storyline emer-
ged from claims by Dutch and international epidemiologists that found a correlation
between PM and premature mortality. The connection with highways remained
11. In the Netherlands the office of Minister refers to the highest officer of state appointed to head an exec-
utive or administrative department of Government. It is comparable to the title of Secretary of State in
the UK. In the Netherlands on the other hand, the title Secretary of State denotes a second tier state offi-
cial comparable to anUnder Secretary of State in theUK. TheDutch political constellationwill be further
explained in chapter 3.
12. Handelingen I 1999-2000 nr. 21, p. 925. Because of their length, throughout this book references to Dutch
policy documents and court cases will be made in foot notes rather than in text.
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present throughout the debates in the Netherlands, and caused the air-quality clash to
become a struggle about mobility and its possibly pernicious influence. Brunekreef
remained a powerful figure in the PM10 discussions. In 2002, he published an article
in the renowned medical journal The Lancet, in which he sounded the alarm bell over
the health effects of transport. This article forced theMinister of Verkeer enWaterstaat
(Transport and Watermanagement, hereafter V&W) to issue a letter detailing the
adverse health effects.13 These debates raised public awareness that transport could
be more harmful than expected, a case made earlier by former Minister Jan Pronk.
In particular, the simplistic translations of complex chemical phenomena into a con-
crete threat by the GGD facilitated the creation of problems by attracting the attention
of politicians and the media. The connection with passive smoking meant that the
threat was immediately recognisable to the public. Epidemiologists themselves gen-
erally mentioned the uncertainties inherent in their findings, but these were overloo-
ked in public and political discussions. The public recognition of the storyline that
PM10 from cars and other vehicles damaged public health began for the Netherlands
in Overschie.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion of this chapter 2 further remarks will be made on the important claims
making work by epidemiological scientists and the characterization of the conflict
over air pollution as a typical risk society problem. I want to highlight that the air
quality clash is a clash over the perceptions of risk. The question is who should bear
the risks generated by economically important arrangements such as transport and
mobility.
2.6.1 Experts as claims makers
The claim that the emission of PM10 leads to severe health damage was mainly
brought forward by scientists and health agencies. In the US the claims of scientists
led to a revision of the standards for PM10 by the US EPA, in the UK they emerged
together with a public health scare over asthma as will be recounted in the next chap-
ter and in the EU they influenced policy making through a variety of ways. As will be
explained, the EU based their regulation on WHO air quality guidelines that were in
turn influenced by the main epidemiological findings discussed in this chapter and
the studies were known by the EU expert committees assigned to investigate the
desirability of setting air quality standards as well.
13. Kamerstukken II 2002/2003, 28 600 XI nr. 73.
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In the Netherlands the storyline that bad air quality was bad for the health of children
emerged through epidemiological research by Dutch epidemiologists, but especially
through the claims making activities of the Rotterdam GGD. The emblem that the
risks of air pollution in Overschie were comparable to passively smoking 17 cigarettes
a day struck a nerve. This emblem bypassed difficult numerical risk estimates of
which the implications were unclear to the public. Instead it offered an immediately
comprehensible picture of the problem at hand. All through the Netherland air qual-
ity standards were exceeded in 2005 and the air quality in Overschie was not much
worse than it was in the rest of the country, but this frame turned the area in an
emblematic case of concern during the air quality clash.
In the case of the Netherlands and probably in the US too, experts functioned as the
primary claims makers that bad air quality due to particulate matter was a significant
cause for concern. In the Dutch situation the storyline that bad air quality was bad for
health focused mainly on transport and traffic as an important culprit. It received an
emblem in the situation in Overschie and the area would feature in many of the early
political discussions on air quality. Also during the heydays of the clash, in 2005,
‘Overschie’ featured in a television documentary (Zembla) about the negative effects
associated with traffic and transport (Website Zembla, last accessed 23-06 2015).
By itself the issue of Overschie cannot explain the emergence of the air quality prob-
lem, an investigation of larger political processes is necessary to give a complete
account. The storyline that bad air quality caused by traffic, however, supplied pro-
ponents of environmental and health interests with ammunition in subsequent Par-
liamentary debates and extra Parliamentary social campaigns against bad air quality.
2.6.2 Epidemiology as a precautionary science
The social construction of air pollution as a health threat in the Netherlands began
with warnings from epidemiological scientists that the effects of air pollution may
be underestimated. A critical examination of this process reveals that epidemiology
fits within a precautionary attitude of the population regarding health threats (Pieterman
2008). In this case epidemiology acted as a kind of ‘precautionary science’ in the social
construction of problems regarding air pollution. With this characterisation I denote a
science that is capable of detecting potential threats early on, but is not capable of deter-
mining the exact nature of these threats or their magnitude. Therefore the exact nature of
the threat remains unknown and a solution is difficult to determine. This situation fuels
the anxiety among the public about this elusive threat.
In the wake of Rachel Carson’s bestseller ‘Silent Spring’, published in September 1962,
epidemiologists looked for environmental factors that could explain the occurrence
of all kinds of diseases. Meticulously, they began to identify possible environmental
threats (Kabat 2009). In fact, epidemiology fits well within a society that is increasingly
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worried about all sorts of health and environmental threats, because it is a medical sci-
ence that is exceedingly apt at detecting them. Researchers use a cohort, divide it into
subgroups, detect their mortality rates over time, and then relate these to a wide range
of different environmental variables in order to determine possible associations (Fein-
stein 1988a). When such associations are discovered, the alarm bells are sounded. For
policy makers, it is easier to err on the side of caution, since overlooking a potentially
grave health threat is sure to lead to political unrest.
The way in which research on air pollution was used to attract attention to the plight
of residents in Overschie involved both the aptitude of epidemiology to detect threats
and the possibility of attracting media attention by presenting findings in a certain
ominous light. The risks of dying from lung cancer caused by air pollution in Over-
schie were minimal, and of a similar small magnitude as the risk associated with pas-
sive smoking. The chance of dying from lung cancer due to passive smoking was
minimal as well. However, in the public eye, passive smoking was a potential threat,
due to its association with active smoking. By linking the two, the threat of air pollu-
tion was made immediately tangible. It led to the first political measures of the 2000s
with regard to air pollution, and provided the breeding ground for a new social prob-
lem to emerge.
2.6.3 Conflicts over air quality as ‘risk society conflicts’
The scientific findings regarding air quality and its impact on health are rife with
uncertainties. One of the oddities in the research is that the effects of air pollution
are negatively correlated with the level of educational attainment. Moreover, the
problems with air quality appear to be mainly associated with living close to high
ways and other less wholesome residential areas. This raises the question whether
the air quality problem should be considered in isolation or whether it should be con-
sidered part of a set of bigger social economic problems that are faced by poorer clas-
ses in society.
I consider that this social component would make the conflict about air pollution a
typical risk-society issue. Air pollution is one of a number of dangers created by
our current way of life, together with other risks relating to lifestyle and socio-eco-
nomic class. In the present risk society, people compete with one another over the
risks they should be expected to bear and how to reduce the ones imposed (Beck
1986). The conflict regarding air pollution is essentially, an environmental spatial con-
flict (De Roo 2003), and not a medical one. The conflict over air pollution is a conflict
about the use of space and the risks associated with it. It is part of a larger conflict
about who should bear the risks connected with everyday activities. A road through
a residential area may be a profitable use of space for car owners, but it creates risks
for the residents of the area. By and large, these risks are uncertain, and therefore pol-
icy makers cannot avoid them. The conflicts of risk distribution have to do with
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cultural values, such as the freedom of mobility versus the right not to be subjected to
the polluting activities of others. I contend that the Dutch air quality clash which
would unfold in 2005 is a clash over values such as the use of space for economic
or residential purposes, the desirability of the expansion of roads and the perceived
right of citizens to be protected from pollution by precautionary measures. These are
mainly political questions and therefore we will turn to investigate Dutch and Euro-
pean environmental and air quality policy in the remainder of this book.
TIMELINE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND CLAIMS
1993 Harvard Six cities study published by Dockery et al.
1995 ACS Study published by Pope et al.
1996 Van Vliet et al. publish research about respiratory health of children living near highways
1997 Brunekreef et al. publish finding about respiratory health of children in journal Epidemiology
Jan. 1999 Aarts et al publish VROM commissioned follow up research about health of children in report
Feb. 1999 Minister Pronk visits Overschie
June 1999 Hegger and Slob (GGD) publish report on health in Overschie in which they compare air pollution to
passive smoking
2000 Review of ACS and Harvard Six Cities Study by Krewski et al.
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 DUTCH ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 1972 – 2002
INTRODUCTION
After the investigation into the initial construction of PM as a health threat by scien-
tific experts, we now turn to investigate the discursive political context within which
the air quality emerged. We will look at the emergence of a policy discourse that sha-
ped the way environmental politics has been conducted in the Netherlands up to this
day, ecological modernisation. The emergence itself will be examined and the
continuities and discontinuities in Dutch environmental policy will be analysed.
Moreover, we will discuss whether ecological modernisation could live up to its
promise to reconcile environmental and economic interests.
Considerable ground on the topic of Dutch environmental policy and its history has
already been covered by various authors (Van Tatenhove 1993; Arentsen et al. 1993;
Hajer 1995; Van Tatenhove & Goverde 2007). I wish to emphasise certain aspects that
are important to understand the context in which the clash over air quality appeared
in the Netherlands, and that also explain the Dutch position in the European negoti-
ations on air quality.
The examination starts with policymaking in the 1970s and early 1980s. The review of
this period sheds light on several important ingrained characteristics of Dutch envi-
ronmental policy, and understanding these characteristics helps us to comprehend
the latter policies on air quality.
Subsequently, the turn to ecological modernisation will be described, with special
attention being paid to how modern managerial discourse entered environmental
policy, and infused it with the storyline that environmental policy creates economic
opportunities. This storyline corresponds with one of the most important postulates
of ecological modernisation: namely, that a positive sum game between environmen-
tal protection and economic development is possible.
In the third section, the aftermath of the turn to eco-modernism is reviewed, and a mixed
picture of success and failure is presented. Ecological modernisation managed to alleviate
environmental conflicts in some areas, but was less successful in others, notably transport.
I will conclude by arguing that the strong emphasis on consensus and economic
opportunity led to a high degree of ambition on the level of principles and
plans, but also to a pragmatic implementation of concrete policies. Following
an old saying, Dutch policy is characterised in this chapter as an example of
the tension between an idealistic ‘reverend’, who preaches that ecological inter-
ests need to be taken seriously, and a pennywise ‘merchant’, who keeps an eye
on his wallet.
. THE EARLY DAYS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS
This study comprises a time span of roughly 30 years, from the onset ecological
modernisation to the eventual resolution of the air quality clash. However, to under-
stand the emergence of ecological modernisation in the Netherlands it is necessary
to go back even further, because ecological modernisation was the discursive
answer to the political problems environmental policy encountered in the 1970s.
The nature of Dutch ecological modernisation can only be understood by assessing
the continuities and discontinuities of environmental policy as it was shaped in that
decade.
Environmental policy making during its first years had four main characteristics: the
tactic of mobilising allies behind the environmental cause; the adoption of a program-
matic approach to environmental policy; the setting of environmental quality stan-
dards; and the entwinement of spatial planning and environmental protection. In
addition, I will focus on the discrepancy of a highly idealistically charged also play
a part in the air quality clash but it is of interest to note that they were central features
of Dutch environmental policy from its very inception.
The emergence of the first Dutch Ministry dealing with environmental matters, the
Ministry of Public Health and the Environment (Volksgezondheid en Milieu, hereaf-
ter VOMIL), will be outlined in section 3.1.2. In this context, the strategy of mobilisa-
tion will be discussed in section 3.1.3. Subsequently the long term programmatic
nature of Dutch environmental policy is under discussion by reviewing the first envi-
ronmental policy plan, the UrgentMemorandumon Environmental Hygiene. The use
of environmental standards as policy instruments is discussed in section 3.1.4 and in
section 3.1.5; the peculiar Dutch entwinement of the domains of environmental policy
and spatial planning is under scrutiny. In the final sub section an overview is presen-
ted of Dutch environmental policy in the context of the limits to growth discourse and
the discrepancy between broad environmental rhetoric and modest policy initiatives
in practice. However, before we review the history and nature of Dutch environmen-
tal policy, some explanation of the Dutch policy process is in order for a sound under-
standing of the following section, but also in order to shed light on the event
recounted in the next chapters.
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3.1.1 The policy process in the Netherlands
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. The king is formally
the head of state. Moreover the king is part of the Government, but the fact that Min-
isters are held responsible for acts of the king in the Netherlands ensures his position
is symbolic. The term ‘Government’ in its narrow sense refers to the executive branch
of the state formed by the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers. In this study the term is applied
in a broad sense to include the whole machinery of civil servants and representatives
and to refer to the Dutch Government without specifically referring to a certain Cab-
inet. When the term Cabinet is used, specific reference is made to a certain Cabinet of
Ministers in power at the time. Usually Cabinets are referred to by referring to the
prime minister chairing a Cabinet, such as the Balkenende Cabinets from the 2000s
or the political colour of the parties forming the Cabinet such as the so called ‘purple’
Cabinets of the 1990s.1
The legislative branch of the state is formed by the Government and two chambers of
Parliament, the second and First Chamber. The main function of the Second Chamber
of Parliament is to control the Government and to draft legislation, together with the
Government. Both the Government and Members of the Second Chamber of Parlia-
ment may propose legislation and legislative proposals have to be accepted by the
Second Chamber in order to become law. The Second Chamber holds the right to
amendment meaning it can propose amendments to legislative proposals.
The function of the First Chamber of Parliament is to study and check the legislative
proposals accepted by the Second Chamber in Parliament. The First Chamber does
not hold the right to amendment, or the right to propose legislation.
When a proposal is sent to the SecondChamber, it is first discussed by the commission
of Parliamentarians that deal with the relevant field of policy. The Minister responds
to the questions and remarks made by the commission. Subsequently, the proposal is
discussed in a plenary session in the Second Chamber of Parliament, and Parliamen-
tarians have the possibility of introducing amendments to the proposal. After the ple-
nary discussion, there are votes about the proposal and the amendments introduced.
If the proposal passes, it is sent to the First Chamber of Parliament. The procedure is
generally quicker here because the senators do not have the right to amend proposals,
and the First Chamber has a less political profile. If the proposal passes, it is then sent
to be signed by the reigning monarch and the responsible Minister. The law is con-
sidered to be in force once it has been published in the ‘Staatsblad’, the official Dutch
gazette (Van Deth & Vis, 2006, p. 87).
1. After the mixture of blue for the liberal VVD and red for the socialist PvdA. The third party in this coa-
lition was the left liberal D66. See for more explanation on Dutch political parties appendix 3.
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Within the Dutch system lower administrative bodies such as municipalities and
provinces have a significant degree of autonomy, owing to the goal of decentralisa-
tion, prominent in Dutch politics. These bodies take administrative decisions about
infrastructural matters for instance. These decisions can be appealed before the
administrative court. In this study, the term ‘lower administrative bodies’ is usually
used to refer to municipalities.
A legislative proposal must be sent to the Council of State for advice before it is sent to
the Second Chamber of Parliament. The Council of State is a reputable body of the
State and it consists of two separate sections, the Advisory Division and the Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Division. The Advisory Division advises the Government on leg-
islative proposals and the Administrative Jurisdiction Division acts as the highest
administrative court. More on the Council of State may be found in the text box on
page 131.
The procedure discussed above must be followed when the highest legislative instru-
ment is proposed, a so called ‘formal law’. Various laws though delegate powers to
the Government and in those cases the Government may enact regulatory instru-
ments of a lesser rank based on the competencies granted in formal laws. The most
important of those are the General Administrative Order and the Ministerial Decree.
A general Administrative Order is a decision by the Government, and must be based
on a formal law that delegates decision making powers to the Government. The Min-
isterial Decree may be issued by one Minister alone, on the basis of delegation by for-
mal law or by General Administrative Order. A General Administrative Order must
be discussed in the Cabinet of Ministers and the Advisory Division of the Council of
State must be heard, whereas such is not necessary in case of a Ministerial decree.
Each Cabinet Minister is responsible for a different field of policy or for a number of
different fields, organised around directorates general or departments. The Cabinet
Minister, orMinister for short, is the highest ranking Government official responsible,
but he may delegate certain aspects of policy making to a Secretary of State. The envi-
ronment for instance is at times in the portfolio of a Minister and at times in that of a
secretary of state. If a subject is delegated to a secretary of state, then usually it is con-
sidered of less political importance.
For a sound understanding of the Dutch political landscape it is necessary to consider
that the Netherlands is always run by coalition Governments. The Netherlands has a
multi-party system and election votes are counted based on the principle of propor-
tionate representationwithout a threshold. In practice no political party establishes an
absolute majority of 51% or Parliamentary seats. There are 150 seats in the Second
Chamber of Parliament. The political parties that may establish a Parliamentary
majority together negotiate after elections in order to explore whether they think they
could establish a working coalition Government. This coalition system ensures that
Governmental power tends to rotate among numerous parties and that political
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parties favour consensus style policies because alienation of other parties is strategi-
cally unwise. After the next election one may need to enter negotiations with that
party in order to explore possibilities for a coalition.
This system also leads to a Government consisting of ministers with different political
colours working together within one Cabinet. Formally Government policy is unitary
and Ministers are required to uphold that fiction. Even though in practice friction
between variousministries sometimes occurs, the Dutch democratic system is consen-
sualistic (Lijphard 1968) and has a long tradition of plan based policy, especially in the
realm of spatial planning (Hajer & Zonneveld 2000, p. 339). Both these aspects are
important in light of this study and the following sections.
3.1.2 The institution of the Ministry of VOMIL
In the early days of environmental policy, starting at the end of the 1960s and the
beginning of the 1970s, environmental concerns were tied closely to issues of public
health. The creation of the first Dutch Ministry for the Environment illustrated this
connection. The Directorate General for the Environment was combined with that
of Public Health to form the Ministry of VOMIL.
TheMinistry of VOMILwas created in 1971, at a timewhenmanyDutch citizenswere
concerned about the poor quality of the environment. In the Rotterdam Rijnmond
area, citizens had clashed with politicians over plans for further industrialisation near
the Rotterdam harbour and over the resulting air pollution (Boender 1985). The Neth-
erlands had undergone a rapid phase of industrialisation, and heavy industries such
as steel and the petrochemical industry had become dominant economic factors,
ensuring the speedy recovery of the Dutch economy after the war. However, this type
of industry was also highly polluting. In addition, complaints about nuisance from air
pollution increased in the 1960s.
In the 1960s, the fledgling environmental movement was strengthened by a pervasive
mood of social change in Dutch society (Kennedy 1995). At the start of the 1970s, 45%
of the population ranked environmental degradation among the top five societal
problems. That number was well above unemployment (5.5%), inflation (8.1%),
and economic problems (5.5%) (Van Der Heijden 2000, p. 58).
The first Minister of VOMILwas Louis Stuyt, a medical doctor who joined the Catholic
political party, KVP, just before becomingMinister. Later, this party would merge with
other Christian parties to form the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). From 1973
until 1977, the position of Minister was held by Irene Vorrink of the socialist PvdA.
The newMinistrywas not short of societal goodwill, but it lackedmeans.Moreover, it
did not have competency in all environment-related issues, but was competent solely
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in environmental matters insofar as they had public health aspects. Non-health-
related environmental policy belonged to other Ministries, such as the Ministry of
Spatial Planning, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of V&W. This
last Ministry was to a large extent competent in the field of air pollution caused by
transport and traffic (Van Tatenhove 1993, p. 20).
To increase its influence, the newMinistry used a tactic of cooperation and accommo-
dation. During the course of the 1970s, it created various advisory committees and
scientific institutes that allowed the Minister to spread the message of environmental
care. One of themost important was the Preliminary Central Council for Environmen-
tal Hygiene (VCRMH, later the CRMH) in 1974 (Van Tatenhove 1993, p. 36). The new
Council for Air Pollution (Raad voor de Luchtverontreiniging) also acted as an advi-
sory council for VOMIL, and the National Institute for Public Health (RIV) started to
work closely with this Ministry. In 1984, the National Institute for Public Health
became the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (Rijksinstituut
voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, RIVM). The VCRMH acted as a think tank for
future environmental policy, and the RIVM was its scientific institute.
In addition to these formal allies, the Ministry approached the more moderate sec-
tion of the environmental movement (Hanf & Van de Gronden 1998, p. 158; Van der
Heijden 2000, p. 59). A pivotal role was played by the Stichting Natuur en Milieu
(Foundation for Nature and Environment, henceforth SNM). This foundation was
instituted as a co-operative effort by a number of environmental associations,
and became a lobby group for the environmentalist movement. In addition, theMin-
istry co-opted sections of the environmental movement into the CRMH, by inviting
representatives of four environmental pressure groups into this Council (Van der
Hoek 1996). In its early days, accommodation was already part of the strategy of
the Ministry of VOMIL, and this consensual spirit has remained in environmental
policy.
In 1972, the new Ministry set out to publish its views on environmental policy in the
seminal paper ‘Urgent Memorandum on Environmental Hygiene’. This document
was analysed extensively in Hajer 1995 and also in Arentsen et al. 1993. I will not
repeat their analyses, but Hajer mostly signalled the differences between the Urgent
Memorandum and recent Dutch environmental policy, and I would like to pay par-
ticular attention to certain abiding characteristics of Dutch policy. The first item of
note was the importance attached to public awareness of environmental problems
and behaviour change. The document contained an ecological vision in which the
earth was understood as a number of interrelating eco-systems. Our way of living
at that time did not conform to this ecological vision; a harmony once present in agrar-
ian societies had been lost. The only solution was to direct our thinking towards more
ecologically appropriate behaviour (VOMIL 1972, p. 6, 11). This behaviour came
down to respecting the limits placed upon us by our ecological situation. This view
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of the environment as a limit to expansion was taken from the famous report for the
Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, also from 1972.
To achieve this more appropriate behaviour, environmental education and nurturing
an ‘environmentalmentality’ via ‘influencing consumers’were suggested. The impor-
tance of public participation behind environmental goals was highlighted. The
Urgent Memorandum stated: ‘…normative reasoning needs to be made clear on a bigger
scale than today’ and ‘contemporary environmental policy demands a high volume of infor-
mation directed at the public’ (VOMIL 1972, p. 22). Moreover, the document emphasised
the desirability of involving the organisations of enterprises, such as the agrarian sec-
tor (VOMIL 1972, p. 55) and the waste removal sector (VOMIL 1972, p. 41). In general,
the Memorandum considered that industrial sectors should accept responsibility in
resolving the environmental predicament (VOMIL 1972, p. 24).
Another noteworthy and abiding feature of Dutch environmental policy was its pref-
erence for international co-operation. Environmental policy should be co-ordinated
by international bodies, and deals preferably be made internationally. The EU, the
World Health Organisation, and other international bodies were seen as the appro-
priate place to exchange research and expertise. International co-ordination had
the added advantage that international competition was not affected by environmen-
tal standards that were applicable in one country and not in another (VOMIL 1972,
p. 24). The risk of disruptions of international competitiveness was a core concern
for the Netherlands (Hanf & Van de Gronden 1998). Moreover, pollution did not
respect national boundaries. Strict standards in one country were pointless if neigh-
bouring countries did not have equally strict standards; this was especially applicable
to a small country like the Netherlands.
In brief, from the beginning, behavioural change was on the agenda in the making of
Dutch environmental policy. The Ministry was modest in terms of official power, but
had ambitious aims to change society. The international dimension of environmental
policy was also acknowledged from early on.
3.1.3 A programmatic and long-term approach to environmental policy
The Urgent Memorandum was an early example of an approach that would later
become trendsetting in Dutch, EU, and even global environmental policy: namely,
the strategic long-term approach to environmental management. Although the
Urgent Memorandum was sometimes very pessimistic about our possibility to live
in harmonywith nature, and at other times overly optimistic about our ability to clean
up pollution, it did contain a tentative pathway to ecological development.
The Urgent Memorandum divided environmental policy into different phases.
The first was the correction phase, in which the trend to increase the speed of
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environmental degradation had to come to an end. The second was the clean-up
phase, in which environmental degradation had to be diminished, and the emphasis
was on cleaning up areas polluted in the past. After environmental degradation was
brought to a halt and cleaned up, a new phase started. In this new phase, environmen-
tal hygiene needed to become an integral component of structural policy, and to deter-
mine which activities should be stimulated and which should be discouraged
(VOMIL 1972, p. 19).
In accordance with the Memorandum, the clean-up phase restricted the possibility to
take large-scale ambitious environmental initiatives (VOMIL 1972, p. 22). Efforts were
concentrated on cleaning up themost polluted areas, and local measures were chosen,
such as cleaning up the Rotterdam Rijnmond area. More encompassing measures
would have to wait for a later stage of policy development. According to the Mem-
orandum, Dutch society was in the phase of cleaning up the worst pollution, but was
on its way to a phase in which our awareness of the finitude of production factors and
other limits would define our further economic, technical, and societal developments.
Although the programme was modest compared to later plans, the three-step devel-
opment marked the beginning of a long-term vision. In hindsight, the perspectives of
the Memorandum were far too optimistic, but the inclusion of environmental har-
mony as a long- term objective sounded very modern. The 1972 Memorandum con-
tained the goals of later policy in seminal form. The strategic long-term perspective
related to the ambition of behavioural change discussed in the previous sub-section.
From the beginning, the goal of an environmentally sound society was on the agenda:
namely, that through behavioural change, people would learn to respect ecological
limits. This change did not come about overnight, and in those early years the empha-
sis was still on local clean up, but that was not the overall aim.
3.1.4 Setting standards and providing permits
Environmental policy does not have teeth if it cannot use policy instruments to protect
the environment. In the 1970s, a system of environmental protection was developed
that remains influential up to this day. In the Urgent Memorandum, it was already
decided that pollutionwould be combatted by the prescribing of permit requirements
for industries polluting the environment. In later years, this system was elaborated
upon.
The regulatory policies in the 1970s followed from the pervasive understanding that
protecting the environment demanded the limitation of economic expansion and pro-
duction, in line with commitment to the points of view expressed in The Limits to
Growth. Permits set pollution limits, and they did so by requiring certain technolog-
ical fixes regarding the emission of pollutants: these fixes were referred to as ‘end of
pipe’ solutions.
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The permit requirements were to be based on standards that should be met for dif-
ferent kinds of pollutants and products. Quality standards were under consideration
first, and stipulated how much of a certain substance the air or water or soil could
contain. The manner in which quality standards would influence concrete permit
requirements was kept vague in the Urgent Memorandum, but the standards them-
selves would have to be set by scientific institutions like the Dutch Health Council
(Gezondheidsraad).2
Box 2: Of standards and values
Dutch environmental policy relied on the concept of setting environmental stan-
dards. In this chapter and in the following ones, mention will be made of various
environmental standards.
One of the earliest standards involved product standards. These prescribed an
environmental characteristic that a product must have: for instance, the sulphur
content of fuels, or the requirement that a car had to have a catalytic converter.
Quality standards represented the desired environmental quality of the soil, the
air, the water, and so on. They prescribed maximum concentration levels for a cer-
tain pollutant in the air, for instance. An example was the yearly standard for Par-
ticulate Matter of 40 Mug/m3 (microgram per cubic metre). According to this
standard, on average, air could not contain more than 40 Mug/m3 or particulate
Matter per year.
Additionally, emission standards prescribed limits to the amount of pollution a
source, such as an industrial site, was allowed to emit. As a result of the 2001
EU National Emission Ceilings Directive, for instance, all sources in the Nether-
lands in total are allowed to emit 50 Kilotons of Sulphur Dioxide.
A fourth category of standards set limits on the exposure of humans, animals,
plants, or soil types to certain pollutants. An example was the standard for radia-
tion. For instance, a person could be exposed to a maximum radiation level of
1mSv (millisievert) per year for amaximumof five years above the naturally occur-
ring background radiation.
For our topic, quality standards are the most important. These may be set by using
limit values, which is a maximum concentration standard that has to be met. It
confers a result-oriented obligation on an administrative body to reach that stan-
dard. Quality standards may also be set by using a target value, which is a stricter
standard than the limit value, but it does not confer a result-oriented obligation. It
merely states the desired concentration level to which administrative bodies need
to strive.
2. Later on, emission-based standards were preferred. Emission standards determined how much of a
given pollutant may be emitted into the air, water or soil. The advantage of emission standards is that
they combat pollution at the source at which it is created. If a certain pollutant is not emitted into the
environment, it does not cause harm. With its preference for emission standards, The Dutch Govern-
ment conformed with the German approach to environmental policy.
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Another term of note is the ‘no-effect level’, which is the scientifically determined
concentration level at which no adverse effects on humans or eco-systems are to be
expected. Ideally, concentration levels for pollutants fall below the no-effect level.
In practice, this level is hard to reach, and limit values are often set above no-effect
levels. However, the no-effect level is an important guide for setting Dutch quality
standards.
In the Memorandum, it was acknowledged that on the level of ecosystems, the
environment was to be considered as a large interrelated eco-system. However,
for the purpose of managing environmental pollution, the environment was con-
sidered to consist of different sectors such air, water, soil, noise, and radiation.
Pollution abatement was organised in this sectorial manner. This sectorial divi-
sion differed from the holistic outlook of the Urgent Memorandum, but was a
consequence of the limited task granted to the Ministry of VOMIL (Van Taten-
hove 1993).
Each of the various laws and regulations considered only one of the numerous
different sectors. During the 1970s, sectorial environmental laws were created that
corresponded to the different environmental sectors mentioned in the Urgent Mem-
orandum. Laws were drafted that dealt with water pollution, air pollution, noise
nuisance, and so on. These laws all established different permit requirements and dif-
ferent inspectorates for various types of pollution.
The sectorial laws emerged in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Below the different sec-
torial laws from 1969 to 1982 may be found in a table.
During this decade, the groundwork was laid for the Dutch system of environmental
protection by way of permits and standards. Permits postulated the requirements to
which industries had to adhere in order in terms of causing pollution, and standards
represented policy goals as the desired level of environmental quality.
Table 4
Sectorial law Year of promulgation Reference
Pollution of Surface Waters Act 1969 Stb. 1969, 536
Air Pollution Act 1970 Stb. 1970, 580
Marine Pollution Act 1975 Stb. 1975, 352
Chemical Waste Act 1976 Stb. 1976, 214
Waste Act 1977 Stb. 1977, 455
Noise abatement Act 1979 Stb. 1979, 99
Ground water Act 1981 Stb. 1981, 392
Soil Clean-up Interim Act 1982 Stb. 1982, 763
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3.1.5 The entwinement of spatial planning and environmental policy
In the Urgent Memorandum, it was envisioned that environmental policy and spatial
planning would have to work closely together. Environmental criteria had to become
a structural feature of regional and provincial development plans, and the link
between spatial planning was stressed on a number of pages. In regard to mobility
and transport, references were found to this connection on page 18: ‘Measures from
town planning and the instruments available to spatial planning in general form an important
means to influence traffic flows’. Problems with noise pollution also needed to find a
place in spatial development plans, and with regard to soil pollution, the relationship
between spatial planning and environmental policy was mentioned as well (VOMIL
1972, p. 4, 14).
In legislation, this link between spatial planning and environmental policy was con-
cludedwith the promulgation of the Noise Abatement Act of 1979 (De Roo 2003). This
law set quality standards for noise nuisance, and stated that in areas where the stan-
dards were exceeded no environmentally sensitive functions such as housing could
be conducted. Effectively, this provision created zones in which no housing or other
activities could be undertaken because the area was subjected to pollution in excess of
the standards; in this case, pollution was in the form of noise. One such zone, for
instance, was the Schiphol area; the presence of the airport was the cause of consid-
erable noise, and in effect this made conducting other noisy activities impossible.
The philosophy behind the Noise Abatement Act influenced the regulatory conse-
quences of environmental quality standards, up to and including the standards for
PM set in 2005. In areas affected by soil pollution, for instance, building became
impossible. Standards for odour determined circles around polluting factories or
waste incineration plants, within which housing was prohibited. This had a double
effect; namely, enterprises that contributed to pollution were not allowed to expand
if they were located within a zone in which the standards for noise or odour were not
met. Moreover, other activities within these zones became prohibited as well. This
situation gave rise to environmental spatial conflicts (De Roo 2003), because often
an area was claimed by competing activities. Through this system of zoning, spatial
planning and environmental regulation became intimately related.
Environmental legislation was strict with regard to spatial planning. It left no room
for a weighing of interests, but created boundary conditions that spatial planning
needed to take into account. The centrally established standards were considered
to overrule any local weighing of interests (VROMraad 2009, p. 29).
While the connection between spatial planning and environmental policy was made
in the early days, the Ministry of VOMIL had little influence over spatial planning
policy. Spatial planning resided under the Ministry of Spatial Planning, which had
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a strong position in the Government at the time, and it wielded considerable influence
over environmental planning via the Council of Spatial Planning (Raad voor de Ruim-
telijke Ordening, RARO) (Van Tatenhove & Goverde 2007, p. 56).
3.1.6 The discrepancy between idealistic rhetoric and pragmatic politics
The early days of Dutch environmental policy making are often maligned, especially
in comparison to the more successful 1980s. However, it was in the 1970s that the sub-
sequent course of Dutch environmental policywas determined. Environmental policy
began in response to the social problem of continued environmental degradation due
to rapid industrialisation after the Second World War. The state of the environment
was considered as deeply problematic and the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Limits to
Growth report infused environmental discourse in the Netherlands. A system of per-
mits and environmental standards was designed to control environmental degrada-
tion. Strategically, environmental policy strived from the beginning to create a large
public consensus on environmental matters, and tried to mobilise the public behind
environmental ideals. It did so by accommodating and mobilising its allies, and by
trying to gain new ones.
When comparing the discourse of the Ministry of VOMIL with its political acts, one
cannot fail to notice a discrepancy in the way issues were discursively framed and the
way they were dealt with in concrete policies. Maarten Hajer had already pointed out
the tendency for stark apocalyptic rhetoric in Dutch environmental policy (Hajer
1995, p. 269), and this was certainly true in the Urgent Memorandum. However,
the reality of policy making was still dominated by concerns of economic welfare
and industrialisation. The concrete measures proposed in the Urgent Memorandum
were therefore only modest and piecemeal. The competitive position of Dutch indus-
try was a concern that theMinistry of VOMIL always had to take into account. In fact,
we may find this eye for economic concerns in the Urgent Memorandum as well as in
the Memorandum Ambient Environmental Standards (VOMIL 1976, p. 11). The
Dutch concern regarding competitiveness was also one of the reasons to stress the
need for international collaboration (Hanf and van der Gronden 1998).
The relationship between economy and ecology was regarded as deeply problematic
in the early days of environmental policy. The main ecological storyline within the
limits to growth discourse in those days was the disharmonious way in which modern
humans interacted with nature. Economic concerns were considered a threat to the
environment, and, ideally, humankind needed to restructure its economy to respect
environmental limits; an emphasis on economic growth was considered detrimental.
The Ministry of VOMIL was never able to realise its ecological ambitions, and was
forced to settle for piecemeal policy making. Because of its limited competency, it
was not able to wield much power, and resorted to a strategy to convince other
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Ministries by providing scientific arguments and environmental rhetoric. However, it
found itself pitted against theMinistry of Economic Affairs, which used arguments and
insights from the field of economics and management to counter the natural-scientifi-
cally informed language of VOMIL (Fürst 2004, p. 108). As Leroy& vanWiering noted,
the economic growth discourse of other departments consistently dominated the limits
to growthdiscourse of the environmental department (Leroy& vanWiering 2007, p. 82).
VOMIL’s policies were not very effective. The sectorial system of the 1970s, with its
different permit requirements for every environmental sector, was cumbersome. It
was a patchy way of legislating with every department and authority asking for dif-
ferent permits. According to Bressers and Plettenburg, Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) levels
had indeed fallen in the 1970s, but that was in spite of the permitting requirements
rather than because of them, since the permits generally allowed the emission of
one and a half times as much air pollution as was produced in reality (Bressers & Plet-
tenburg 1995, p. 30). This ineffectiveness made the system unpopular with the envi-
ronmental movement (Hanf and van der Gronden 1998, p. 163).
The system was equally unpopular with the polluting industries, because it led to
bureaucracy. The permits were granted by different agencies, each of which represen-
ted different environmental sectors, and the administrative staff often adopted a
standoffish or hostile attitude towards representatives of economic interests (Bressers
& Plettenburg 1995, p. 16; Fürst 2004, p. 107).
The burgeoning wave of environmental legislation and the isolated position of the
Ministry of VOMILwith respect tomoremainstream fields of policymaking became
a problem in itself, and led to the reorganisation of the Ministry. However, it needs
to be stressed that many features of Dutch environmental policy that remain
intact to this day can be traced to these times: for instance, the system of standards
and permits, a long-term programmatic orientation, close ties with spatial plan-
ning, and in particular an emphasis on consensus, education, and the raising of
awareness.
. EMBRACING ECOLOGICAL MODERNISAT ION
In response to the regulatory problems encountered in the 1970s, and the recognition
of transboundary environmental problems in the 1980s, the Netherlands developed
an environmental policy with which it became a European front-runner. It based
these policies on ideas that were in line with the ecological modernist line of argumen-
tation and policy making.
In this section, I examine the history of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Plan-
ning, and the Environment (Volkshuisvesting Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu,
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hereafter VROM). The VROM Ministry succeeded VOMIL as the Ministry respon-
sible for the environment, and during its expansion in the 1980s it embraced and
added to the discourse of ecological modernisation. The policy discourse developed
in this era remained the institutionalised environmental discourse at least up until
the new millennium.
3.2.1 The role of modern managers in the new VROM Ministry
In the 1970s, it had already become clear that environmental policy had difficulties
holding its own position against other fields of policy. The way it was applied was
contentious and ineffective, and environmental policy makers intended to better inte-
grate the environmental dimension into Dutch policy as a whole. The ‘Memorandum
on Selective Economic Growth’ (EZ 1976), issued by theMinistry of Economic Affairs,
(Economische Zaken in Dutch, henceforth EZ), was one of the first attempts to make a
consistent case for the integration of environmental concerns in broader economically
oriented policies. This Memorandum on Selective Economic Growth was written
under the responsibility of the Minister of EZ, Ruud Lubbers, later a Dutch Prime
Minister. It proposed thinking in terms of ‘facet policy’. The idea was to see all aspects
of policy making, such as energy politics, spatial planning, and environment as well
as foreign aid, as aspects of the same whole, a coherent Dutch national policy. Accor-
ding to the memorandum, economic continuity would benefit in the future from
keeping environmental concerns a priority.
This development was an important turning point, because it showed that integra-
tion of environmental considerations in other fields of policy was now also a
concern in more economy-minded Ministries. It also demonstrated that the envi-
ronment was gradually becoming a mainstream topic. This ‘rapprochement’ had
two effects; firstly, environmental concerns became the concerns of former adver-
saries, the economically oriented policy fields; secondly, economic considerations
took hold in the environmental discourse as well. However, even though a certain
détente emerged and Lubbers’ facet policy managed to integrate the environment
and the economy in the same political discourse, we cannot as yet speak of a
discourse coalition. It would take another ten years before environmental and
economic storylines became intertwined within the discourse of ecological
modernisation.
The way the environmental Ministry eventually became reorganised in the early
1980s displayed the increasing influence of managerial and economic science in the
environmental field. The first Cabinet of the 1980s embraced the plan to integrate
environmental policy with mainstream concerns. This Cabinet, led by Prime Minister
Dries van Agt, was short-lived, but it began an investigation – called Project Integra-
tion Environment Policy (Project Intergatie Milieubeleid: PIM) – into the possibilities
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of better profiling environmental policy within mainstream Dutch policy. After the
demise of this Van Agt Cabinet, a new Cabinet emerged with Ruud Lubbers at the
helm. Ruud Lubbers was the original author of the Memorandum on Selective Eco-
nomic Growth, and the PIM project began to bloom.
The project was set up in accordance with the Dutch tradition of consensual and
accommodative policy making. It aimed to overhaul the Department of the Environ-
ment in order to ‘accomplish a large degree of completeness and coherency in the preparation,
adoption, implementation and evaluation of environmental policy making’ (Staatscourant
1982a, 149, p. 6). The project involved many of the stakeholders including industry,
the environmental movement (SNM and even the Dutch branch of Friends of the
Earth), and other Ministries. External advisors obtained leading positions in the
implementation of the plan. R.H.P.W. Kottman of Schoenmaker BV and D.J. Schoen-
maker of Twijnstra Gudde consultancy agency played leading roles (Staatscourant
1982, p. 29). These two consultants were organisational experts, and the agencies
involved had a modern managerial outlook regarding organisational problems. A
preventative environmental policy was a specific aim of the plan, and this type of pol-
icy required a ‘more conscious integration of the environmental aspect in other aspects of
policy making’ (Staatscourant 1982b, p. 29).
The PIM project had important consequences. It merged the intimately linked policy
fields of spatial planning and the environment into one Ministry. The new Ministry
of VROM was responsible for both spatial planning and environmental policy.
Within the PIM project, environmental quality standards were considered to be
the cement between the two different policy fields, and they gained in importance
as instruments to integrate environmental concerns into the spatial development of
the Netherlands (De Roo 2003, 175). On the whole, however, the fragmented insti-
tutionalisation of environmental policy was retained. VROM was by no means a
‘super Ministry’, as many areas of environmental interest, such as agriculture
and energy policy, were outside of its competency. Nevertheless, within PIM, the
other Ministries committed themselves to a joint effort in strengthening environ-
mental policy (Van Tatenhove 1993, p. 22).
PIM’s importance lay in the reorientation of environmental discourse that this
reorganisation had made possible. Up until then, the Ministry of VOMIL had been
populated by environmentalists who shared a pessimistic outlook regarding pos-
sibilities to impact the environment positively through regulation. PIM, however,
was carried out by modern managers and consultants. The new VROM Minister,
Pieter Winsemius (VVD), had a background in management as well, and he was a
firm believer in positive management theories (Winsemius 1986; Hajer 1995, p.
187; Schenkel 1998 p. 135). This involvement of managers and consultants made
it possible for the environmental department to shed its aura of gloom and doom,
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and to embrace a more upbeat discourse that was more palatable to the econom-
ically inclined Ministries and industrial sectors.
3.2.2 Accommodation and responsibilisation revisited
When Winsemius took the helm of the Ministry of the Environment, environmental
policy was viewed as a problematic field. The new Lubbers Cabinet had promised to
‘roll back the state’ according to the neo-liberal principles in vogue at the time, with
President Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. Nationally, the envi-
ronmental question polarised the left and the right in the debate on the use of nuclear
energy. Internationally, the acid rain problem had appeared on the scene. Acid rain,
nuclear energy, and climate change were different problems than those that had
demanded attention in the previous decade. They were transboundary concerns that
did not cause damage primarily to public health but to eco-systems. These problems
developed primarily in the international arena, and they demanded more penetrat-
ing, long-term, and global answers than the local health-based issues with which
VOMIL was used to dealing. Winsemius found himself in the middle of all these dif-
ferent demands, and set out to reorganise the Ministry of the Environment to meet
them. The way the new Ministry responded to these diverse pressures determined
environmental policy up to at least 2000.
Especially in the first years of its existence, VROM was short on staff and financial
means, just like its predecessor had been. Winsemius was a Minister from the conser-
vative liberal party VVD, traditionally pro-economy and mobility. He was trained as
a natural scientist, but before he became Minister of VROM he had worked for the
consultancy agency McKinsey. He was certainly not averse to the goals of environ-
mental policy, but he approached the Ministry as a modern manager and not as an
idealist. He had to work with little means, and the deregulation agenda prevented
far-reaching legislation. As a result, Winsemius employed a cautious and strategic
approach to environmental policy, key notions of which involved long-term plan-
ning, internalisation, and responsibilisation.
Long-term planning was important for environmental policy, since prevention was
its cardinal goal, and because it facilitated the involvement of other actors in envi-
ronmental protection. In the summary of the first Memorandum written in his
period as a Minister, known under the title ‘More than the sum of its parts’, we read:
‘This long-term perspective is indispensable for reaching a preventative environmental pol-
icy which emphasises the responsibility for environmental protection of each of us’ (VROM
1984a, p. 6). The involvement of other actors was crucial, because Winsemius was
working under the same conditions as the old VOMILMinisters. He inherited a frag-
mented policy field, and the Ministry of VROM tried to consolidate slowly and to
expand its position rather than launch far-reaching proposals for further policies (Van
Tatenhove 1993, p. 22).
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Since top-down regulation was not considered, increasing environmental awareness
would need to bring about bottom-up changes in the behaviour of polluters. To this
end, Winsemius’Ministry introduced what was called the ‘target group policy’ in the
middle of the 1980s. Instead of focusing on pollution, the VROM Ministry started to
target polluters directly. Polluters were considered by sector, such as the chemical
industry, the electricity sector, the transport sector, consumers, and so on. The Min-
ister began to negotiate directly with the representatives of these different sectors and
the big economic industrial powerhouses. He tried to conclude ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ments’with them, and in exchange for their cooperation to meet certain environmen-
tal targets, these representatives were given a seat at the table. In addition, if possible,
voluntary agreements on pollution reduction were concluded. For different target
groups, specific policies were made to ensure that certain environmental quality stan-
dards were met. Inventories were drawn up concerning which target group contrib-
uted what to environmental problems, and what kind of measures they needed to
take to ameliorate them.
The aim of this policy of negotiation and consensus was known as ‘internalisation’.
Environmental demands should no longer be felt as external obligations prescribed
by the Ministry, but as intrinsic ethical commitments. Representatives of target
groups should become convinced that they needed to change their own behaviour
in order not to spoil the natural resources that they used. The goal of internalisation
was not confined to industry. Other policy makers needed to internalise environmen-
tal values as well, and so did the general public through awareness-raising cam-
paigns. The environmental movement could fulfil a useful function as a mediator
between the Ministry and the target groups.
To this end, the Ministry responsible for the environment subsidised the activities
of environmental groups. Through these grants it created networks of environ-
mental allies that could approach target groups and engage them with a similar
level of expertise and connections. This network could also supply the necessary
environmental education and awareness-raising campaigns. According to Van
Tatenhove and Goverde, the subsidising of environmental groups and the resul-
ting mobilisation of public opinion had to be considered in connection with the
drive to integrate the environment in other departments. The resulting network
of civil servants in the environmental department, the CRMH, and the environ-
mental movement became thoroughly professionalised. According to Pieter
Leroy, Professor in Environmental policy, the VROMMinistry, the environmental
movement, and environmental science formed an ‘Iron Triangle’ in the 1980s (Van
Tatenhove & Goverde 2007, p. 61).
The strategy of internalisationwas helped by the emergence of the problem of acid rain
on the political agenda (Hajer 1995). Acid rainwas the popular name for the problem of
acidification, a transboundary environmental problem that threatened the balance of
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eco-systems, and could cause, among other things, a depletion of fish stocks and
the disappearance of forests, as well as damage to cultural artefacts. In its environ-
mental awareness-raising campaigns, the VROM Ministry used stark images of a
statue of the Virgin Mary purportedly defaced by exposure to acid rain. The very
resource base of industry appeared to be under threat, and the internalisation of
environmental standards was considered a fair deal in response to this grave
threat (Hajer 1995).
The aim of shared responsibility was transmitted primarily by advertising cam-
paigns to target the public, and by concluding covenants with representatives of
important economic sectors. These covenants fulfilled a double role. They would
make sure certain environmental aims were met, but they also involved the indus-
try in environmental protection. One of the first was the KWS 2000 covenant, con-
cluded in 1989 to ban the use of harmful hydrocarbons in many different products
(Infomil 2000).
3.2.3 Expansion of the integrated long-term perspective
VROM’s environmental policy in the 1980s preferred long-term programmes to ad
hoc intervention, as internalisation and responsibilisation required a long-term
vision. Moreover, the type of problems on the political agenda, such as acid rain
and other threats to the eco-system, demanded a more holistic approach. This
gradual reconfiguration of environmental policy took place in long-term environ-
mental plans referred to as ‘Indicatief Meerjarenplan’ (Indicative Multi Year Policy
Plans, IMPs).
Initially, the IMPs were sector specific; for instance, they existed for air, soil, water,
and noise. They covered a four-year time span, and were updated on a yearly basis.
In the middle of the 1980s, an integral IMP appeared, known as IMP M.,3 which
concerned general environmental planning for the following four years, and was
updated yearly as well. In total, three updates appeared: 1985-1989, 1986-1990,
and 1987-1991.
The IMP M. transcended the traditional sectorial approach. The environment was no
longer considered as being carved up into segments such as air, water, and soil, but
was seen as a unified whole in which certain problems occurred. Policy focused on
curbing environmental problems such as acidification, eutrophication, the spread
of dangerous substances, disturbances of the living environment, and so on, rather
than on cleaning up specific environmental sectors.
3. The M. stands for Milieubeheer, the Dutch term for environmental management.
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These problems needed to be tackled by the Ministry of VROM, but also by society as
a whole. In this process, the target groups, the various Ministries, and environmental
pressure groups had their specific role to play. As described above, target groups had
to internalise environmental responsibility, and other Ministries had to incorporate
environmental considerations into their own policies. In their turn, the environmental
organisations were to supply environment-related know-how, and to provide infor-
mation to the target groups and the public at large in order for them to incorporate
environmental considerations into their actions.
The IMPs introduced more influential innovations. Firstly, for air quality, the intro-
duction of the two-track policy was important. Standards that determined environ-
mental quality were employed in addition to emission standards, and, ideally,
these standards ensured that quality standards were reached. This system would
ensure that the various standards promulgated by the Ministry all contributed in uni-
son. As we will see in chapter 4, this system was adopted by the European Union
when it drafted its own policy on air quality. The setting of environmental quality
standards became known as ‘the effect-based policy’.
Secondly, the notion of region-specific policy was introduced. Not all regions in the
Netherlands would benefit from the same type of policy, so tailor-made solutions
were sometimes necessary, and region-specific policy would make this possible.
The notion of region-specific policy further strengthened the co-operation between
spatial planning and environmental concerns, but also created space for some flexi-
bility, since different regions could have different economic and ecological needs.
Thirdly, an ‘integrative risk management’ approach to harmful substances was intro-
duced. It made weighing the seriousness of environmental problems possible; by
quantifying the risk they posed to health or to eco-systems, and made it easier to
set priorities. The risk management approach was closely related to the environmen-
tal impact assessment, and large-scale projects had to perform an investigation
regarding their impact on the environment in terms of the risks they caused. Winse-
mius considered this instrument a ‘think before you act’ law, and he claimed that –
together with the United States – the Netherlands was an international forerunner
in these areas (Winsemius 1986, p. 70). These new policies were used to instil a sense
of responsibility in target groups and civilians. Such instruments sometimes replaced
traditional legislation (VROM 1984b, p. 7).
3.2.4 The possibility of a ‘positive sum game’
One of the most crucial innovations in the 1980s was discursive, and was important
for the coherency of this new type of environmental policy. Instead of presenting the
environment and the economy as mutually exclusive interests, Winsemius argued
that environmental policy could entail opportunities for economic growth. He
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contended that people would change their behaviour in a pro-environmental way if
they had a positive idea of the cost-benefit ratio of that change, and if they expected
positive reinforcement from their social environment. Hence, it was important to pre-
sent economically viable environment-friendly alternatives in a positive light. In fact,
people could change their behaviour in a pro-environmental directionwithout having
any pro-environmental considerations whatsoever, provided that the cost-benefit
ratio pointed in that direction.
Environmental consciousness itself was not enough, as this would attract only a small
number of pioneers. However, a positive vision of the economic benefits of this behav-
iour could change the behaviour of a broad range of actors. The IMPAir 1984-1988 con-
cludes: ‘All measures that this IMP aims at, such as promoting clean technology, energy saving
techniques, sustainable sources of energy, traffic circulation plans and clean modes of transport,
need to be seen from this perspective’ (VROM 1983, p. 109). The change of tone was aptly
summarised in the first IMP M. A quote from the IMP M 1984-1988: ‘Environment and
economy may reinforce each other, when managed appropriately’ (VROM 1984b, p. 17).
I consider the embracing of this idea to be a Copernican turn for environmental policy.
The intuition that environmental measures are a strain on the economy is strong, and
this perception hinders the willingness to take environmental measures. In the 1970s,
a clean environment was considered to necessitate economic sacrifice, and it was
assumed that increasing environmental well-beingwould entail a decrease in produc-
tion and services (VOMIL 1974, p. 53).
Winsemius highlighted the benefits that environmental policy could have for employ-
ment and technological development, and this perspective became a mainstay of
Dutch policy. It was used to convince an international audience as well. During a
1984 conference organised by the OECD in Paris, Winsemius was the chairman. At
this conference, the desirability of integration of environmental and economic policies
was proclaimed, as well as the need for preventative and anticipatory policies. Win-
semius offered help to countries that were developing an environmental policy, such
as Greece and Portugal, and this aid bolstered the Dutch position as an international
front-runner in new and innovative policies in the 1980s (Schenkel 1998, p. 99). Dutch
policy maker and Director General of Environmental Affairs, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst
pleaded in the EU to take product standards seriously because they could lead to bet-
ter economic performance (Weale 1992).
The notion that the environment could provide opportunities for economic welfare,
and the conviction that if well managed, economy and ecology could reinforce each
other, is fundamental for ecological modernisation. The gap between ecology and
economy was bridged by this notion, because, without it, all efforts at development
would be suspicious from an environmental perspective, and environmental protec-
tion would only be considered a drain on resources from an economic perspective.
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It is important to note that although the discursive form changed, the fundaments of
Dutch environmental policy remained intact. The permit system was augmented by
new instruments of environmental policy but not supplanted by it. Similarly, environ-
mental standards were still considered crucial for protection of the environment
(Winsemius 1986).
The type of ecological modernisation employed was still weak, and did not change
fundamentally the relation between environmental and economic interests. Although
it was ambitious on issues like awareness raising and internalisation, economic rea-
soning in practice still held considerable sway over policies of the VROM Ministry.
The prime negotiating partners for policy were the target groups, and these were eco-
nomically important sectors, as their concerns determined the type of regulation to a
significant degree. The judicious tactics of Winsemius meant that environmental pol-
icy became a continuous balancing act between the diverging interests of various eco-
nomic sectors, pressure groups, andMinistries. Measures could hardly ever be radical
or truly environmentally ambitious, because theywere based on negotiationswith the
target groups. Environmental policy had to live up to its promise that economic wel-
fare would not be endangered.Winsemius’motto was: ‘Nobody should be asked to do the
impossible’ (Winsemius 1986, p. 50; Hajer 1995, pp. 236/237). From an ecological per-
spective, this motto boiled down to a defence of feasibility concerns over ecological
concerns, because no one could be asked to do something that was unreasonable from
an economic point of view.
3.2.5 Dutch ecological modernisation: The coming of age
The breakthrough towards a stronger form of ecological modernisation came about in
1989 with the release of the report ‘Take Care of Tomorrow’ and the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Plan (NMP). The Dutch national environmental policy plan NMP
was the successor to the earlier IMP M. and contained the strongest articulation of
holistic environmental policy planning with a high level of ecological sophistication.
At the same time it did not shun economic language and presented environmental
degradation as a sincere economic threat. The plan welded, as it were, the economical
discourse of the environmental managers to an ecological discourse obtained from
environmental science.
The NMP was an important milestone, because it established the Netherlands as a
significant environmental forerunner in Europe, perhaps even worldwide at the time,
and because the direction of the NMP determined Dutch environmental policy for the
future. NMP sequels were issued all through the 1990s.
At the time the NMP was drafted, the environment was a heated topic of debate
among the Dutch public and among scientists. Shortly before the NMP’s appearance,
a report was published by the RIVM, which highlighted in strong terms the
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environmental predicament of the country. The report was titled ‘Take Care of
Tomorrow’ (Zorgen voor Morgen), but the Dutch title contained a double entendre,
as Zorgen voor Morgenmay also mean ‘Tomorrow’s Worries’. According to one com-
mentator, this report ‘could have been written by environmental groups like Greenpeace or
Friends of the Earth’ (Kronsell 2000, p. 96).
The report categorised environmental problems on a number of scales that ranged
from themost local to themost global. It warned that environmental problems tended
to be pushed from local scales to the continental and even the global scale, causing
widespread damage over a large area. In the report, the environment was characte-
rised as a set of streams that connected reservoirs. Water, air, and radiation were con-
sidered essentially to be streams, whilst fossil fuels and biological substances were
reservoirs. Streams were sources of energy that could be regenerated, provided the
streams did not dry up or become overly contaminated. Air pollution contaminated
the stream of air, for example, and water pollution spoiled the fluvial streams. A non-
sustainable use of resources meant overexploitation was taking place, and the reser-
voirs could dry up and the streams become polluted. Ecological cycles needed to be
closed in order to prevent waste and over-exploitation (Langeweg 1988, p. 2). The
report argued that the state of the environment was deteriorating on multiple fronts
at the same time, and that the situation regarding each of these fronts had repercus-
sions for the others. The novelty of the report lay in the holistic description it gave of
the environment (K. Zoeteman, interview 05-09 2012). This description was powerful,
because the interdependent relations between environmental problems pointed to
only one solution: namely, a radical change in consumption and production rather
than piecemeal improvement.
The report struck a nerve in Dutch society, to the extent that even the Queen (Beatrix)
commented on the ostensibly bleak state of the environment. In her Christmas speech
of 1988, she proclaimed, ‘The earth is slowly dying’. This proclamation was an embar-
rassment to the Government of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, and established the
environment as a priority issue.4 At the time that influential environmental scientists
were drafting Zorgen voor Morgen, policy makers were in the process of creating the
first truly integral plan to create an environmentally sustainable society. Minister
Winsemius had already hinted at the plan back in 1986, but his successor Ed Nijpels
took it further. Initially, the plan did not proceed well, hampered as it was by oppo-
sition from other Ministries, especially in regard to the long-term level of ambition
(K. Zoeteman, interview 05-09 2012). After the Queen’s Christmas speech and Zorgen
voor Morgen, however, the political environment was much more conducive to the
idea of an environmental strategy (K. Zoeteman, interview 05-09 2012). In any event,
Prime Minister Lubbers now supported his Minister for the Environment, Ed Nijpels.
4. Contrary to the Dutch ‘Troonrede’, a kind of Dutch ‘State of the Union’ speech written by the Prime
Minister, the reigning monarch is responsible for the Christmas speech.
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TheNMPwas drafted by peoplewho had a background in policymaking aswell as in
environmental science. The same people had in some cases been involved both in Zor-
gen voor Morgen and the NMP, and the ecological tone of Zorgen voor Morgen could
also be found in the NMP. Quotes taken from it provided some telling examples of
an eco-modernist framing of environmental problems. Environmental degradation,
for instance, was likened to the budget deficit, a highly influential economic storyline
in the Netherlands:
‘From the past, we get unexpected bills for behaviour that may be typified as obtaining loans. What
goes for the budget deficit holds for the environment as well, life cannot be lived on the tick. Paying
back environmental loans includes paying interest’ (VROM 1989, p. 70).
In this economical/ecological vein, the NMP urged us to look at the environment not
as a ‘free good’ to be exploited by anyone but as a commons that had a limited carrying
capacity. It argued that environmental problems resulted from various ‘displacement
mechanisms, and costs like pollution were ‘externalised’, and these externalisations
created ‘environmental loans’. These were costs that might not be felt at the time,
but would have to be repaid with interest by coming generations.
The policy advocated in the NMP consisted of an expansion of the strategies used in
the IMPs. The internalisation of environmental considerations by target groups was
now considered on a much broader and deeper scale, involving internationally oper-
ating economic actors. Product and emission standards retained their function, but
needed to be set as challenging as possible to stimulate new sustainable solutions
and technologies. Research institutes like RIVM, TNO, and ECN, as well as univer-
sities should include sustainable development as a major element in their strategies,
and the state should strongly encourage major enterprises to do the same.
Households were already considered an independent target group, but now citizens
were targeted as well in their role of consumers and employees. The people’s choice
of transportation and their behaviour ‘in the living environment’ would be the subject
of campaigns to raise awareness. Access to information would be improved in order
to increase public knowledge of environmental matters. Consumers were also subjected
to positive and negative financial reinforcement, and in education the attention paid to
the environment would be substantially broadened. This wouldmake behaviour change
possible because, as the NMP urged: ‘Each of us is considered to know his responsibility
towards the environment and subjects his actions to this responsibility’ (VROM 1989, p. 13).
Consumers determined which products would be produced, so their sense of respon-
sibility needed to be strengthened (VROM 1989, p. 89). To this end, for instance,
advertising would be subject to regulation that would prohibit it from giving ‘a neg-
ative impulse to sustainable development’ (VROM 1989, p. 221) According to the
plan, we were all ‘environmental managers’ (VROM 1989, p. 115).
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The environmental movement was stimulated, since it was seen as a ‘tool’ to encour-
age others to internalise environmental responsibility. These movements would sig-
nal environmental problems early, disseminate information to the public, and
stimulate internalisation in all other target groups (VROM 1989, p. 37).
The integration theme was clearly present in the NMP, and in a sense was already
embodied by it. The NMP was not only drafted by VROM but involved the cooper-
ation of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Transport and Water
Management. In addition to the Minister of VROM, the Minister of Transport, the
Minister of Economic Affairs, and the Minister of Agriculture and Fishery were also
responsible for the plan. The plan had close links to policies drafted by these Depart-
ments, such as the Structural Scheme for Traffic and Transport (Tweede Structuur-
schema Verkeer en Vervoer SVV2) and the Fourth Memorandum on Spatial
Planning (VINO/VINEX).
The long-term and transboundary focus of the document implied that the integra-
tion ideal could not be confined to the Netherlands alone. The plan urged Dutch
representatives to make sure that environmental matters became the concerns of
foreign countries and organisations. To this end, international forums for environ-
mental policy needed to be strengthened and EU environmental policy stimulated.
In line with the internationalist outlook, priority was given to problems that con-
cerned higher levels, such as continental and global. This focus on transboundary
problems implied that an ambitious international environmental policy was
necessary.
In summary, the new economy/ecology discourse involving ecological modernisa-
tion sought to address members of the public in their role as consumers, and because
the worst problems were considered transboundary, the discourse pleaded for an
ambitious international environmental policy. It buttressed long-term goals by polit-
ical action, although we will see in the next section that the concrete measures were
not as ambitious as the overall political vision and strategy.
3.2.6 Assessing the NMP; the turn to strong ecological modernisation
With the NMP, the Dutch Ministry of VROM shifted to a discourse that could be cha-
racterised as strong ecological modernisation. The languages of economy and ecology
were fully integrated. The message was put across starkly that current economic and
ecological trends would lead to mishap, but that a different kind of development was
possible and desirable, andwithwhich theywould both be served. The precautionary
principle was endorsed, and its need was underscored by the language of the NMP.
Discursively, the NMP broke new ground for more ambition, and the plan was hailed
as highly advanced in Europe and the rest of theworld (Weale 1992). TheNetherlands
had been eager to showcase its state-of-the-art environmental plan, and civil servants
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from the VROMMinistry were sent abroad to spread the message (Arts, Dieperink &
Liefferink 2002; Pettenger 2007, p. 58; K. Zoeteman, interview 05-09 2012).
With the NMP, a development that started in the first years of the 1980s with the PIM
project came to fruition. The failure of the old sectorial system and the emergence of
transboundary environmental problems necessitated a different approach to environ-
mental policy. The infusion of managerial and economic discourse within the existing
discursive structures of the Ministry of VROM had made policy much easier to sell to
the representatives of industry and other powerful economic sectors than had the
divided and bureaucratic approach of the 1970s.
During the period of the formation of ecological modernisation discourse, traditional
features of Dutch environmental policy were deepened and became more pro-
nounced, but did not change. Firstly, long-term planning became advanced and insti-
tutionalised with the NMP. Secondly, consensus seeking not only became the norm
but it also secured the place and the role of the environmental movement in this pro-
cess. Thirdly, the link between spatial planning and environmental policy remained
intact; in fact, the cooperation of the Ministers of Transport, Agriculture, and Eco-
nomic affairs ensured that the Ministry of the Environment exerted more influence
over other fields of policy. Fourthly, the system of permits and standards did not
change, but the choice of instruments for environmental protection was expanded.
Many things that had been detrimental to the development of environmental policy
were discarded, and the system of sectorial division was replaced with an integrated
holistic view. The negative hostile attitude was succeeded by a stance more amenable
to business, and the prevailing belief on both sides of the political spectrum that envi-
ronmental and economic interests were mutually exclusive was broken.
Nevertheless, the NMP was criticised because of a lack of penetrating measures. For
instance, the measures taken were predicted to preserve only 20% of Dutch forests
(Hajer 1995, p. 195). Maarten Hajer spoke of a carefully co-ordinated anti-climax with
which the Dutch Government inflicted a crisis of legitimacy on itself (Hajer 1995,
p. 195), and Gerda Dinkelmanmentioned that the environmental movement was crit-
ical when the plan appeared (Dinkelman 1995, p. 126). Dutch ecological modernisa-
tion still rested mainly on instilling a strong sense of urgency into the public, and on a
penetrating perception of environmental problems. Policy refrained from taking top-
down measures, and further developed a preference for self-regulation, target group
policy, and covenants. The discourse moved towards strong ecological modernisa-
tion, but it still rested on consensus between different segments of society, including
representatives of powerful economic interests. Radical environmental policy meas-
ures were ruled out. In the end, the targets set in the NMP fell short of the ecological
rhetoric and the recommendations put forward in ‘Zorgen voorMorgen’. A year later,
the ambitions of the NMP were raised, and a more purposeful version was released:
the NMP+. The rise in standards was good news from an environmental point of
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view, but the targets set in ‘Take Care of Tomorrow’ could still not be met. In a sense,
the NMPwas a case of history repeating itself; discursively, it was strong, but in terms
of concrete measures it was more modest.
The VROM Ministry was at the apex of its power, however, and potentially it could
influence policy fields like spatial planning and transport. The success of ecological
modernisation depended on the struggles that were about to ensue in the 1990s.
. THE AFTERMATH OF THE NMP: ACCOMMODATION, AND CONFLICT
IN THE S
The discourse of ecological modernisation legitimised the strategic orientations of the
VROM Ministry. However, the question was whether environmental policy would
end up in the same situation as it did in the 1970s: namely, as part of the problem
rather than the solution. To examine this question, we will investigate whether the
integrative and consensual themes embodied in the NMP yielded results. Since it
is impossible to investigate the reception of the NMP in every area of environmentally
important policies, we will look specifically at environmental cooperation with the
industry, the political participation of the environmental movement, the attempt to
ecologically modernise the transport sector, and conflicts over infra-structural pro-
jects that emerged in the 1990s. We will pay particular attention to the process of juri-
dification of these conflicts, as the courts also played a central role in the air quality
clash.
3.3.1 Environmental cooperation with the industry
In the 1990s, this style of conducting environmental policy by focusing on target
groups and regulated covenants continued, despite personal changes in the Minis-
tries, and in different coalitions governing the country. In fact, environmental policy
shows a great deal of continuity during this decade. After the initial NMP, four more
versions appeared. In the second NMP, the term ‘Self-regulation within boundaries’
(Zelfregulering binnen kaders) was introduced (VROM 1993), and it denoted a fur-
ther sophistication of the target group policy. The emphasis shifted further away from
‘command and control’ legislation to regulation based on consensus with the inter-
ested parties.
In the 1990s, this type of consensual environmental politics was considered inno-
vative and successful (OECD 1995, p. 200), as was the covenant system as pionee-
red by the Netherlands (Hafkamp 1997, p. 260; Jordan et al. 2003, p. 116). These
agreements were integrated within the comprehensive framework of environmen-
tal planning and management, and in contrast to Germany for instance, they were
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most often binding, and contained ambitious long-term targets (Delmas & Terlaak
2002, pp. 16/17).
During these years, covenants were concluded in a range of sectors and for a range of
different products. In line with the overall aim of internalisation, the covenants did
not necessarily have to lead to a reduction of emissions, but could, for example, also
contain a requirement to make it obligatory for companies to draft yearly environ-
mental reports.5 At the end of the 1990s, more than one hundred environmental cov-
enants were in force (Van der Jagt 2006, p. 19).
After 2000, criticism of the covenant approach was voiced in administrative circles.
The fourth NMP, in force from 2001, promised to critically evaluate compliance with
the voluntary agreements (Van der Jagt 2006, p. 21). The rise of the covenant illus-
trated how environmental policy was gradually shaped around consensual instru-
ments and negotiation, but the criticisms voiced in 2000 indicated that there were
doubts over its efficacy.
In the 1990s, the environmental consensus held reasonably well for relations between
environmental policy and industry. According to the OECD in 2003, the industry had
been responsive and proactive in environmental matters, and had integrated environ-
mental concerns into their own industrial policies. TheOECD stated, ‘The characteristic
policy mix of regulation/licensing plus economic instruments plus environmental agreements
continues to be productive’ (OECD 2003, p 21).
However, not all industries adopted willingly the tasks thrust upon them. For
instance, the chemical industry and the steel industries had to be threatened with
stringent Government legislation before they gave in (Pettenger 2007, p. 59). The
industry had been sensitive to the idea that if it negotiated with the Government, for-
mal regulation could be avoided and environmental well-being and continuous pro-
duction ensured (Hajer 1995, p. 189). Dutch industries ranked among themost energy
efficient in the world in 2005, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ 2005,
p. 20), whose report cited an International Environmental Agency’s review from 2004
as a source.
I conclude that with respect to the industry, the ecological modernistic approach of
environmental management through consensus influenced industrial sectors not nor-
mally amenable to environmental protection. In this respect, Glasbergen andDriessen
noted that although the changes in Dutch environmental policy did not come about
without conflict, wewitnessed a ‘clear development taking place [...] of […] Environmental
politics increasingly taking the form of organising various learning processes in collaborations
of stakeholders on environmental issues’ (Glasbergen & Driessen 2002, p. 23).
5. Kamerstukken II 1997-1998, 25 605. nr. 2
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3.3.2 Increased participation of the Environmental Movement
Another integrationist aim of the NMP beside participation of the industry was the
participation of environmental groups in policy making. Already in the 1970s and
1980s, the environmental pressure groups were considered allies of the environmen-
tal Ministry. They were able to fulfil a bridging function between the Ministry and
other target groups such as industry and the public.
The environmental consensus forged around the NMP and its brand of ecological
modernisation had indeed led to increased participation of the environmental move-
ment and its concerns within policy making as well. In 1989, employer organisations
and trade unions decided to make the environmental question a topic of regular con-
sultancy. The Social Economic Council (SER), one of the most influential advisory
councils of the DutchGovernment, proclaimed thatmaintaining the ecological system
was a goal of a higher order even than social economic targets (Dinkelman 1995,
p. 259).
The process of accommodation continued in the 1990s. In this decade, theDutch accom-
modative strategy to overcome social conflicts between employers and employees
made headlines as the ‘polder model’. In the later 1990s, this idea was extended to a
‘green polder model’ (Weggeman 2003). This was seen as a way to accommodate envi-
ronmental interests more strongly in the typical consensus-minded institutions of
Dutch policy making by involving environmental interest groups early on in decision
making.
Environmental interests had already been represented since the 1970s in some insti-
tutions, but access had generally been restricted to the Foundation for Nature and
Environment (Stichting Natuur en Milieu; SNM). In the environmental movement,
this group was considered to be moderate, and more prone to negotiate than to pro-
test. The green polder model also included more radical and newer environmental
movements such as the Dutch version of Friends of the Earth, Milieudefensie. Milieu-
defensie joined the SER in 1999. The public by then was well aware of environmental
degradation, so raising awareness was no longer an issue for the radical environmen-
tal groups. Milieudefensie started to focus less on action and more on bringing sus-
tainable alternatives to the attention of the public.
The green polder model was an attempt to bring environmental groups closer to the
policy making process, and to give them a seat at the table. In this respect, the NMP’s
integrationist policy was successful, because the environmental movement had
become a serious negotiating partner. In section 2.4.5, however, we will see that many
of the negotiations between the environmental movement and other interested parties
in the field of infrastructure planning broke down. In 2000 and 2001 the enthusiasm
for the green polder model already waned (Weggeman 2003).
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3.3.3 Ecological modernisation of the transport sector
One of the main themes in Dutch environmental policy in general and in ecological
modernisation in particular was the integration of environmental policy in other
fields of policy making. While the OECD was positive about the integration of envi-
ronmental concerns within the decision making practices of industrial sectors, it was
not positive about integrating environmental concerns into transport policies and the
agricultural sector. It concluded that the Netherlands was not yet moving in the direc-
tion of sustainable transport. Moreover, economic policies and ambitious economic
targets for the transport sector presented grave environmental challenges (OECD
2003, p. 177). In the air quality clash the harmful emissions of cars and lorries attracted
much attention and so a look at the attempted ecological modernisation of transport
and mobility should not omitted.
The OECD verdict is interesting because a serious attempt had been made to bring
transport policy in line with environmental policy. At the time of the NMP, the Dutch
Ministry of V&Wunveiled its own plans for the future. Transport policywas laid down
in ‘structural schemes’, programmes that determined future road planning, expansion
of public transport, and the relation of transport within the wider scope of spatial plan-
ning. In 1989, the Dutch Government unveiled the Second Structural Scheme for Traffic
and Transport (Tweede Structuur Schema Verkeer en Vervoer, SVV2).
The first draft of the SVV2, (part A), dated fromDecember 1988, and contains the policy
proposal (V&W1988). The final proposedversion of the SVV2 (partD), dated from1990
(V&W 1990). This plan was very much an adaptation of eco-modernist policy to the
field of transport and mobility. The aim of the plan was twofold: namely, to relieve
the Dutch roads of the heavy burden of congestion, but also to restructure transport
in order to reach a sustainable transport system. Because congestionwas a severe threat
to the Dutch economy, reducing congestionwas amainstay ofDutch transport policies,
as the transport sector was economically important (Brokking 2001). The focus on sus-
tainable transport was new, and the SVV2 part D was a plan that focused more than
any earlier one on public transport as the future of mass transit in the Netherlands.
Uncharacteristic for a transport and mobility programme, further expansion of the
roads was portrayed as unsustainable, and was one of the ‘nightmare scenarios’ dis-
cussed on page 14 (V&W 1988, p. 14). In order to guarantee the high quality of the
living environment in cities, the accessibility of cities by car would have to be limited
(V&W 1990, p. 10). The alternative to road expansion was the further development of
public transport. Moreover, various strategies were adopted to restrict economically
non-viable transport.
To this end, a kind of target group approach was used in the SVV2. For instance, pub-
lic transport and freight transport needed to gain access to preferential lanes, and
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commuting by car and using the car for recreational purposes was dissuaded. ‘Unnec-
essary driving’was to be reduced, and, if possible, both consumers and freight trans-
port should use rail instead of road transport to fulfil their mobility needs. The switch
from the automobile to another, cleaner mode of transportation was referred to as
‘modal shift’. In the SVV2, modal shift was an important policy target.
The public was to be targeted by awareness-raising campaigns, and to be educated on
the deleterious effects of using a car. Communication efforts were to make sure that
civilians were acutely aware of the ‘nigh insurmountable problems’ that mobility posed
to the living environment (V&W 1990, p. 89). A change in people’s perception of the
car was deemed inevitable in this context, with the car being treated not as a status
symbol but as an ordinary object like any other (V&W 1990, p. 17). In a vein similar to
what VROM had done earlier, the Ministry of V&W intended to mobilise NGOs and
segments of society to disseminate these policy ideals:
‘Societal organisation form the intermediary segment towards the public. Co-operation from these
organisations is of essential importance to create a consensus in society for the often drastic measures
which are necessary to realize a sustainable transport and traffic policy’ (V&W 1990, p. 125).
The intertwinement of spatial planning and the environment was well established,
but in the SVV2, spatial planning policy was used to achieve the goal of reducing
mobility growth. People would, for instance, be stimulated to live close to their work.
In practice, this meant that some locations rather than others would also be more eas-
ily reached by car. To stimulate public transport, labour-intensive companies and
facilities that attracted a large number of people should be easily reachable by public
transport. These locationswere dubbedA locations. Less labour-intensive companies,
such as businesses in the service sector, should be reachable by car. These locations
were henceforth known as C locations. B locations were mixed: that is, reasonably
reachable both by public transport and by car. This ABC policy also had ramifications
for the number of parking places allotted; for instance, ‘A locations’ in the city would
have only 10 parking places per 100 employees.
A further measure to reduce the use of the car was the introduction of a pricing mech-
anism. Charging for use of the roadwas introduced in the SVV2 for the first time in the
Netherlands. In the first draft, the instrument of choice was road charging per kilo-
metre. These extra charges were justified by pointing out that drivers would pay
for the extra costs of environmental clean-up that they caused. However, the interna-
lisation of costs was not the only motive – extra charges would also help attain the
target of limiting traffic growth (V&W 1990, p. 40).
Though the plan had a definite environmental slant, the economic importance of the
Dutch position as a gateway to Europe was not forgotten. The transport sector would
not be curtailed, for instance. The SVV2 emphasised the competitive possibilities of
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the Dutch transport sector. The distribution function of the Netherlands for the other
countries in Europe should be strengthened, and thiswouldmean an increase inmobil-
ity. A number of infrastructural improvements were foreseen, such as harbours, trans-
port corridors to Germany and Belgium, and an expansion of Schiphol Airport. All
these projects generated not only economic growth but potentially also extra mobility.
All themeasures that curbedmobility needed to compensate for this increase in order to
reduce congestion for economically important transport. Some of these new infrastruc-
tural projects were very ambitious and controversial, such as the expansion of Schiphol
Airport and the Port of Rotterdam, along with rail links with Belgium and Germany.
Within the SVV2, classical eco-modernist elements could be discerned. Firstly, there
was the dual goal of economic expansion and environmental protection. Secondly, a
policy of responsibilisation towards drivers started. Thirdly, spatial planning was
used to influence the behaviour of motorists in an environmentally friendly way.
Fourthly, advertising campaigns and environmental groups should forge a consensus
on driving responsibly for the sake of the environment. However, in order to be able
to stimulate the economically important transport sector without having to expand
the roads, the plan restricted the freedom of the ordinary motorist. The rail links
should in principlemakemodal shift an appealing option, but one of these trajectories
ran right through a nature area.
Box 3: Policy innovations stemming from the SVV2
The SVV2 led to policy innovations, which were of interest from an ecological modernist
point of view. Of note was the introduction of a more programmatic approach to infrastruc-
ture development through the ‘MIT’ (Multiyear programme on Infrastructure and Trans-
port), in which projects had to be announced, forcing the department to work on a more
programmatic basis. Another innovation originating from the SVV2 was the ‘Route Law’
(Tracéwet), laying down consultation procedures for adapting and constructing roads.
These procedures granted the public significant rights of participation and access to the
administrative court, but they also caused decision making to take a long time. This raised
annoyance among political parties in favour of mobility legitimated large investments in
public transport and in mega projects aimed to facilitate (rail) transport. Experiments were
conducted with separate lanes for car-pooling, and car-pooling was stimulated by public
awareness campaigns.
3.3.4 The failed ecological modernisation of the transport sector (1989 – 2001)
The SVV2 was an ambitious attempt to ecologically modernise the transport sector
and mobility as a whole, but it was unsuccessful from the point of view of accommo-
dation and consensus building. Car users tended to see the SVV2 as an anti-car policy
and as pro-public transport (Vrijssen 2010). In particular, the issue of road pricing
through the charge per kilometre created resentment among motorists, united in
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the AlgemeneNederlandseWielrijders Bond (DutchMotorist Association, ANWB). Suc-
cessive Cabinets were not able to introduce a form of road pricing. However, attempts to
persuade the ordinary motorist not to use the car but to embrace public transport also
failed (Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat 1998, p. 6). It was easy to see why the ordinary
motorist was against the SVV2 measures, as drivers would have to pay for them in var-
ious ways. Motorists were targeted with all kinds of extra charges, but they reaped none
of the benefits. Transport had preferential lanes, good rail links, and expanded corridors
to the German hinterland, but the motorist was left with selective accessibility, limited
access to cities, and few parking spaces in his or her work place.
The final version of the SVV2 was introduced by the third Lubbers Cabinet that had
taken its seats in November 1989. After a campaign in which environmental issues
played an unprecedented role, the VVD was ousted from power and replaced by
the socialist PvdA. The Christian Democrat CDA remained the biggest party and
Ruud Lubbers (CDA) took on a third term as Prime Minister. In the field of the envi-
ronment this Cabinet continued the work of its predecessor, even strengthening the
SVV2 and releasing a reinforced version of the NMP. Fuel prices were also raised
quite steeply. The measure became popularly known as ‘Kok’s dime’ (het kwartje
van Kok), named after the Minister of Finance – and later Prime Minister –Wim Kok.
Ordinary motorists though resented the plans in the SVV2, especially road pricing
and the rise in fuel prices. They found allies in the motorists association ANWB
and in the VVD, now in the opposition.
In the latter half of the 1990s, we witnessed a gradual relinquishment of environmen-
tal ambitions in transport policy as accessibility and combating congestion became
more important throughout the decade. After the third and last Lubbers Cabinet,
the PvdA formed a Cabinet with its notorious political adversary the VVD with
the left liberal D66 as the glue that held this ‘purple Cabinet’6 together. The intention
of these three parties was to finally oust the CDA of its traditional hold on power and
the Christian Democrats found themselves in the opposition. Margreeth de Boer from
the PvdA became theMinister of VROM and in that capacity would oversee the Euro-
pean negotiations over the Air Quality Directives. Annemarie Jorritsma of the VVD
became Minister of V&W.
The motto of this new Dutch Cabinet in the 1990s was ‘work, work, work’ in order
to combat unemployment. Economic issues gradually came to the fore. A storyline gai-
ned in ascendancy in which the Netherlands was positioned as a ‘distribution country’
and a ‘gateway to Europe’, and to fulfil this ambition the large-scale infrastructural pro-
jects of the expansion of Schiphol and Rotterdam, and the construction of a railroad
through the nature area Betuwe and down to Belgium, needed to be realised. This
pro-mobility storyline established itself firmly at the end of the decade. Congestion
was seen as a major public nuisance during that time. The strong ecological
6. After the mix of the collors red, the colour of the PvdA and blue, the colour of the VVD.
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modernisation of the transport sector faltered on the ever-present concern in the Neth-
erlands for economic efficiency and its place in international competitive relations.
This gradual shift was outlined in a number of policy documents after the SVV2,
for instance in theMemorandum ‘SamenWerkenAan Bereikbaarheid’ (SWAB, Co-oper-
ating for accessibility, V&W 1996), issued by Minister Jorritsma. In the ‘Perspectives
Memorandum on Transport’ from 1999, (Perspectievennota Transport) efficient use of
road capacity replaced the transition car to rail and from car to bicycle as a main instru-
ment for an efficient transport system. Road pricing should ensure further efficiency and
relieve congestion. In the long term, new technologies were to present solutions to both
congestion and environmental degradation. The scarcity of infrastructure was the num-
ber onepriority of theMinistry, and a behavioural change on the part of the driverwas no
longer considered. In fact, even the Advisory Council of the Ministry of VROM, the
VROMraad, emphasised the social value of mobility: ‘The positive1 contribution of mobility
for the individual and for society can hardly be overstated’ (VROMraad 1999, p. 17).
The idealistic expectations of the SVV2 died down during the 1990s, and were repla-
ced by a business-like approach and a less ambitious form of ecological modernisa-
tion. New technology and especially road pricing should lead to a more efficient use
of the road, and to an internalisation of environmental costs by the polluter. The end-
point in this development towards an ecological modernisation based solely on tech-
nology and road pricing was reached with the proposal of a new transport plan to
replace the SVV2. One of the last actions of the purple Cabinet was the proposal of
the National Traffic and Transport Plan (Nationaal Verkeer en Vervoersplan) in
the year 2000. All the idealistic and normative overtones of the SVV2 disappeared
and one of the new plan’s coremessageswas ‘Mobility is allowed and belongs to a modern
society’ (V&W2001, p. 3). However, themotorist would have to pay for his or her choi-
ces. In the NVVP, road pricing as a market-based regulatory instrument was the cen-
tral mechanism to adjust individual interests of mobility and the public interest of the
environment: ‘Individual and collective interest find each other if all societal costs of mobility
are included in the price one pays for mobility’ (NVVP 2001, p. 10).
The introduction of this form of payment for car use instead of simply car ownership
became the central ecological modernistic element in the NVVP. It led to environmen-
tal gains, because road users were to pay compensation for the damage they inflicted
upon the environment. All the idealism of behaviour change through other means
was gone, however, and nothing remained of target group policy, modal shift, or
the ABC policy of parking places.
In its turn, road pricing became the last vestige of ecological modernisation to be
knocked down. Road pricing by way of a charge per kilometre was still highly con-
troversial, and societal resistance wasmobilised by the ANWB, the Dutch Association
of Motorists (Website Wegenwiki NVVP). Its traditional ally in Parliament was the
VVD. At the last moment, the coalition partner withdrew its support for the plan, just
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before the purple Cabinet was forced to resign in 2002. The 2002 elections resulted in a vic-
tory for pro economy and infrastructure development parties, which would form a new
coalition, including the VVD. This new coalition led by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balke-
nende would almost do away with ecological modernisation all but in name. Road con-
struction and expansion,without roadpricing,would become a spearhead of thisCabinet.7
Upon evaluation in 1998, the SVV2 received a scathing review by the scientific bureau
of the Ministry of V&W, the Council for Transport and Water Management (Raad
voor Verkeer enWaterstaat). ‘In no other societal sector does the effectiveness of the admin-
istrative system seem to be so low as in transport and mobility’ (Raad voor Verkeer en
Waterstaat 1998, p. 5). This indicated that already in 1998 the strong ecological mod-
ernisation of transport and infrastructure was considered a pipe dream. In fact, the
second half of this decade saw environmental conflict recur over the ambitious mega
projects that were planned to facilitate the transport sector.
3.3.5 Legal conflicts over the megaprojects
The ecological modernisation of transport policy failed because of sustained opposi-
tion from motorists united in the ANWB and pro-mobility parties. However, the
infrastructural projects foreseen in the SVV2 also suffered setbacks. In this case, the
environmental movement was the party that broke the consensus.
Empirical research showed that Dutch pressure groups in the Netherlands took mat-
ters to court much more often than did their colleagues abroad. According to De Sae-
deleer, between 1997 and 2001 an estimate of 4000 cases had been brought before the
courts. Neighbouring countries like Germany, Belgium, and the UKwere estimated to
have had only around 100 such cases, and only France was involved in more than
1000 cases (De Saedeleer et al. 2002, p. 3).
Table taken fromDe Saedeleer et al. (2002), the number for theNetherlandswas based
on rough estimations.
In the 1990s, legal conflicts erupted over proposed megaprojects mentioned in the
SVV2, and more extensively in two Memorandums on spatial planning, in the fourth
Memorandumon Spatial Planning, known as VINO, and in the FourthMemorandum
on Spatial Planning Extra, known as VINEX. The VINEX partly reflected the
Table 5: Estimated absolute number of court cases brought by environmental associations
Belgium France Netherlands Portugal Italy Germany UK Denmark
1996-2001 146 1197 4000 57 117 115 102 4
7. Balkenende would run four Cabinets in total. These Cabinets are in power during the years of the air
quality clash, recounted in chapters 6 and 7.
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environmental concerns of the age. The ABC policy, for instance, was developedmost
fully in this document, but it also shared the economic consideration of making
the Netherlands a prime distribution country. Ambitious projects like the above-
mentioned rail links and expansions at Schiphol and Rotterdam had to facilitate
the flows of extra transport.
The construction of the Betuwe rail link and the expansion of Rotterdam Port and
Schiphol Airport were especially controversial. The Betuwe route was a thorn in
the side of the environmentalists, because it was planned through a nature conserva-
tion area. The expansion of Schiphol Airport was controversial, because of the
increase in noise nuisance for the inhabitants of nearby living areas. Understanding
this resistance was important for understanding the air quality clash, since this clash
involved struggles over infrastructural projects as well.
In the context of the green polder model, negotiations between stakeholders about
expansion of Schiphol Airport took place in the TOPS negotiation (TOPS: Tijdelijk
Onderhandelingsplatform Schiphol, Temporary Negotiation Platform Schiphol).
The environmental movement was present, including the radical Milieudefensie.
The expansion of Rotterdam Port was discussed in the Project Main Port Develop-
ment Rotterdam (PMR), but the TOPS negotiations between Schiphol and environ-
mental pressure groups failed.
In the face of the failing negotiations, pressure groups and local groups of residents went
to court to protest, amongother things, the expansion of SchipholAirport and the Betuwe
rail route.8 In the Netherlands, access to the administrative court was open, efficient, and
cheap (VROMraad 2008; SER 2006), and environmental pressure groups had relatively
easy access. In order for a complaint to be eligible, the claimant had to be a ‘stakeholder’,
whichmeant its interests needed to be at stake. The conceptwas broadlydefined inDutch
administrative law, and it included NGOs and lower administrative bodies who could
initiate proceedings against administrative decisions (Marseille 2011, p. 239). Open access
to the administrative courts fit the strategy tomobilise the public and to involve it in envi-
ronmental matters, but it also made going to court an attractive option if negotiations
failed.Conflict between environmental pressure groups and the administrationwas often
adjudicated. In particular, conflicts surrounding the big spatial projects often ended up in
administrative courtrooms (Weggeman 2003, p. 83).
This fight over the use of space and the juridification of these political clashes was a
thorn in the side of the Government. In November 1997, a Commission chaired by Jos
van Kemenade issued a Memorandum titled ‘Met Recht Verantwoordelijk’ (Respon-
sible Law). In it the complaint was raised that environmental pressure groups used
8. In Parliament, conflicts over the megaprojects were researched by a Parliamentary Commission chaired
by Adri Duijvestein. He presented his final report in 2004, and the Parliamentary documents that con-
tain the reports can be found on this website (Website Duijvestein last accessed 22-02 2012).
3 Dutch ecological modernisation and environmental regulation: 1972 – 2002
the law as a mechanism to obtain a second chance if political negotiations failed. This
situation was considered undesirable, and parties were urged to use the law and lit-
igation in a responsible manner, preferably as little as possible.
From the point of view of the Government and other policy makers, this complaint
was understandable. However, from the perspective of the environmental move-
ment, the law was a legitimate mechanism to redress a situation they considered
unjust. The environmental consensus of protecting the environment by further eco-
nomic development was mostly between policy makers and little attention had been
paid to whether it was legally workable. In the case of environmental spatial law, the
way quality standards worked in the Netherlands was consistent with a limit to
growth discourse in which limits needed to be set on economic expansion. Together
with the broadmechanisms of participation and easy access to the courts, the law pro-
vided means to block the plans.
These legal opportunities had been put in place to make sure economic interests
would not overpower ecological interests. However, also in the time of ecological
modernisation they were still useful. This time not to set limits on growth, but to cre-
ate a balance of power between environmental and economic interests. They were a
relic of the past though and did not foster consensus. Environmental spatial conflicts
would become a distinct feature of environmental politics in the 1990s and 2000s.
Apparently, consensus on the approach to environmental policy did not translate easily
into consensus with regard to other conflicts, such as those between environmental inter-
ests and the interests of motorists, or mutually exclusive claims on the use of space. Clas-
hes over the megaprojects could be seen as the prelude to the air quality problem, or
conversely, the air quality problem could be considered as being borne out of clashes over
the megaprojects. The construction of infrastructure created drastic interventions involv-
ing the landscape and other environmental concerns. These demands caused anxiety
among people who lived close to the areas under consideration, and these people were
a prestigious target for environmental groups who did not see the need for further eco-
nomic expansion. In the Netherlands, space was a scarce commodity worth fighting for.
Legal battles over themegaprojects displayed an inherent strain in eco-modernist pol-
icy discourse. On the one hand, bringing infrastructural projects to fruition became
almost impossible, because of the number of procedures that had to be undertaken,
the number of hearings in which complaints could be voiced, and the strict limiting
character of environmental standards. These impediments were the result of
demands to involve the public in decision making that had an environmental impact,
and tomake sure that spatial development proceededwithout damaging the environ-
ment. On the other hand, the positive sum game format of ecological modernisation
demanded economic growth, and – as a means to this end – infrastructure develop-
ment. In the long run, environmental well-being and economic progress could
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coincide on an abstract level, but residents who lived near Schiphol, for instance, did
not benefit from these abstract improvements, nor did commuters who were stuck in
traffic.
3.3.6 The nature of environmental conflict and the position of the VROM Ministry
The history of conflict in the 1990s highlighted the downsides of the optimistic eco-
modernistic discourse used by VROM. Its ambition tomerge ecological and economic
language resulted in large-scale legal conflicts that this discourse was meant to avoid.
The desire to keep theNetherlands competitive, while not encouraging road transport
led to the expansion of rail links and other megaprojects that themselves engendered
opposition. Ecological modernistic discourse propelled the Ministry to a prominent
position at the end of the 1980s, but at the end of the 1990s economic thinking once
again dominated VROM’s environmental discourse. This becomes clear when one
compares policy documents from the beginning of the 1990s with those at the end
of the decade. At the beginning of that decade, the political programmes regarding
spatial planning and transport were geared towards VROM’s environmental dis-
course. Notions like the target group policy emerged, along with the use of spatial
planning to serve the environment. At the end of the decade, an economy-dominated
discourse was firmly in the driver’s seat with regard to mobility and infrastructure
development. Lip service was paid to sustainable mobility, but no more than that.
This shift illustrated the declining power of the Ministry of VROM. It was no longer
able to export its once innovative storylines. Gradually, ambitious environmental pol-
icy was viewed again as problematic, as it obstructed quick decision making with
regard to the expansion of roads and other types of infrastructure development.
The fact that the V&WMinistry strongly dominated discussions on the megaprojects
was a sign that VROM had lost the power it held in the early 1990s.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the preceding sections, I have provided a historical account of the rise to promi-
nence of the VROMMinistry and the concomitant institutionalisation of a new direc-
tion for environmental policy. The setbacks have been discussed in the latter sections.
I will use the final section to draw conclusions on the nature of Dutch ecological mod-
ernisation and on Dutch environmental policy in general.
3.4.1 Continuity and discontinuity in Dutch environmental policy
By accepting eco-modernist discourse, the Dutch Government let go of its earlier com-
mitment to a discourse tinged with the idea of setting limits to growth. These two dis-
courses were antithetical regarding their perception of the role of economic
development and the regulatory instruments to be used. Ecological modernisation
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argued for economic growth and flexible policies to combat environmental degrada-
tion, while the discourse of limits to growth demanded limits on economic expansion
through top-down regulation. It is remarkable, however, how much continuity there
was otherwise in the policies of VROM. Many policy innovations that we consider
modern and fitting with ecological modernisation had already been considered in
the 1970s, and were envisioned in the Urgent Memorandum on Environmental
Hygiene published in 1972. This phenomenon is little noticed by environmental
scholars, but important in light of a proper understanding of the air quality clash.
Many features of Dutch environmental policy are apparently ingrained in Dutch deci-
sion making practices and cannot easily be overturned.
The Urgent Memorandum contained a holistic vision of the environment as an inte-
grated whole consisting of eco-systems. For practical purposes, legislation covered
the environment sector by sector, but that did not correspond to its theoretical out-
look. Moreover, the Urgent Memorandum urged for partnerships with the environ-
mental movement, and for reaching out to industrial sectors. Though the Ministry of
VOMIL, which had released the document, was not successful in finding partners
among industrial sectors, the intention was there. Finally, the policies from the
1970s also called for a preventative approach, for the use of sound scientific knowl-
edge and for reaching out internationally to stop environmental degradation. These
were all considered novelties in the 1980s, but these intentionswere already present in
Dutch environmental policy from its inception onwards.
Discursively, these programmatic aspects were compatible with many of the charac-
teristics contained in ideal typical ecological modernisation. We may therefore con-
clude that Dutch environmental policy was ecologically modern ‘avant la lettre’. In
practice, however, the Ministry could not realise these intentions. Antagonism
between the Ministry of VOMIL on one side and more economically oriented Minis-
tries and powerful economic sectors on the other thwarted many of its more ambi-
tious intentions.
Interestingly, things started to look up for the Ministry in the 1980s, at a time when
deregulation was a spearhead of policy, and the Government became committed to
rolling back state interference in societal affairs. The department of the Environment
was combined with the department of Spatial Planning and Housing, which made it
possible for environmental policy to lose its focus on environmental hygiene and to
focus on the environment as it related to the use of space. The newMinistry of VROM
had neither themeans nor the ideological commitment to start a regulatory campaign,
so it devised instead a strategy of consolidation and consensus building.
A number of other continuities in policy are of special importance. Environmental
spatial law was only augmented rather than being drastically changed. The permit
system remained the cornerstone of Dutch practical environmental policy, and
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permits set limits regarding emissions of harmful substances. Moreover, environmen-
tal quality standards determined the amount of pollution permissible in a certain area,
and permits could no longer be granted if these limits were transgressed. These pol-
icies were more reminiscent of ideal typical ‘limits to growth’ than of ecological mod-
ernisation. The internationalist outlook and the goal other reaching out to other actors
beyond the Ministry’s direct sphere of influence was also present in the Urgent Mem-
orandum and not a particular novelty of ecological modernisation.
In terms of environmental radicalism and in terms of a precautionary approach to
environmental problems the discourse of ecological modernisation embraced by
VROMwas actually a step back from the discourse of limits to growth. It is paradox-
ical that by taking a step back in ambition, the VROM Ministry by and large succee-
ded where VOMIL failed, namely in getting the environment high on the political
agenda. In the next sub section I will argue that this success is due to the emergence
of a new storyline on the economic efficacy of environmental protection.
3.4.2 Environmental protection as necessary for business: The powerful storyline
of win-win scenarios
In the previous sections, the rise of a managerial discourse in environmental policy
has been recounted. Discursively, the storyline that managed to forge new alliances
between economic and environmental actorwas the storyline that environmental pro-
tection could provide economic revenues. This storylines, which I refer to as the sto-
ryline of win-win scenarios was the most innovative line of the ecological modernistic
approach of policy. Ecological modernisation relied onmarket parties, capitalist logic,
and technological innovation for beneficial environmental results. The storyline was
introduced into Dutch policy by Pieter Winsemius, who used his knowledge of mod-
ernmanagement and positive reinforcement tomake environmental policy appealing
to the target groups. He assumed that people would accept the demands of environ-
mental policy more easily if they could be convinced it was in their economic interest
to do so. By appealing to a storyline that fitted well within traditional capitalist logic,
he was able to argue for environmental policy and to circumvent ethical appeals for a
more harmonious life or for other ecological/ethical arguments. The keyword became
‘internalisation’, the drive to persuade economically important sectors and otherMin-
istries to incorporate environmental concerns into their own policies.
It is of interest that the VVD spearheaded the development of this innovative policy
discourse. In further chapters of this study the VVDwill often be portrayed as a polit-
ical party that advocates infrastructure development and rolling back environmental
regulation. However, during the late 1980’s the VVD was certainly not merely a ‘pro
economy party’. Ecological modernisation managed to weld environmental protec-
tion, a traditionally leftist subject, with principles of industrial self-regulation and
faith in the operation of the market traditionally embraced by the VVD. I conjecture
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that the steadfast reputation of the VVD as a defender of entrepreneurialism andmar-
ket party autonomy, made it possible for the Minister to rally the industry behind his
course. He spoke the language of the manager and was not frowned upon with sus-
picion. It is the irony of environmental history that the most noteworthy and ambi-
tious environmental Ministers were delivered by the party that was least expected
to do so.
In the early and the mid-1980s, Winsemius seduced the industry with this win-win
storyline that portrayed environmental protection as necessary to protect economic
interests and the environmental movement and environmental scientists created a
sense of urgency among the population by presenting a worrisome account of envi-
ronmental risk. In 1989, environmental scientists presented a bleak image of environ-
mental degradation in a report called ‘Take Care of Tomorrow’. In response to this
report, the VROMMinistry came upwith its first large-scale integratedNational Envi-
ronmental Policy Plan – the NMP. Other departments had to commit themselves to
the policies of the VROM Ministry by co-signing the NMP.
In the NMP, the ecological aspects of policy were translated into economic language.
Through the use of metaphors derived from economics and management, the case
was made that protecting the environment now would be cheaper than having to
clean it up in the future. The representatives of economic interests could be reached
more easily through language and logic that was familiar to them. It seemed no coin-
cidence that VVD Ministers who generally supported business interests introduced
such logic into environmental policy. It made environmental protection appealing
to their own rank and file, and promised that instead of economic stagnation it would
lead to growth if correctly managed.
In 1989, the Ministry of VROM was at the peak of its discursive power. VROM man-
aged to export its concepts to other Ministries such as the Ministry of V&W. In the
later 1980s and early 1990s, we saw concepts developed by VROM appear in plans
issued by this Ministry. Furthermore, the environmental movement was accommo-
dated and it gained seats at the negotiation tables of various Dutch advisory councils
and other consensus-building institutions.
By introducing the storyline that environmental protection created economic oppor-
tunities, Winsemius and his successor Ed Nijpels managed to form a discourse coa-
lition between the industry, the VROM Ministry, and the moderate elements of the
environmental movement. This storyline and the introduction of managerial lan-
guage within the discourse of the VROM Ministry established it as a credible nego-
tiation partner for these different actors. This discourse coalition accepted the positive
sum game postulate of ecological modernisation, and subsequently this discourse
was used in Dutch environmental policy. Initially, a weak form of ecological modern-
isation held sway which was supported by gentlemen’s agreements with industrial
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sectors. Gradually opportunities arose to introduce a stronger version of ecological
modernisation, especially after the publication of the worrying report ‘take care of
tomorrow’. In the NMP and also in the transport plan SVV2, a strong version of eco-
logical modernisation is introduced with particular emphasis on behaviour change in
an ecological direction.
3.4.3 The Achilles heel of ecological modernisation; transport and infrastructure
The most celebrated Dutch environmental policy, the NMP, introduced ecological
themes into Dutch policy, such as a view towards production and consumption in
terms of ecological cycles and streams of energy. It aimed at behavioural change,
by urging everyone to assume responsibility for the environment. Even education
and advertising, for instance, should be made subject to the message of sustainable
development. It appeared that strong ecological modernisation was about to become
a dominant policy discourse, but this study shows that it failed on two important ter-
rains, transport and infrastructure development. These terrains would become battle
grounds during the air quality clash.
The NMP had a counterpart in the Structural Scheme for Transport and Traffic: the
SVV2. In the SVV2, behavioural change was envisioned with regard to the mode
of transportation. People were urged to make far less use of the car, and to opt for
a form of collective transportation. People had to be made aware of the detrimental
effects that auto-mobility had on the environment. However, the SVV2 failed to bring
about eco-modernistic changes in the transport sector. In the SVV2, green plans to
modernise traffic and transport were unveiled, and many policies were designed
to curb transport and traffic. However, the economically important transport sector
was by and large exempt from the burdens, and its growthwas even encouraged. The
tab had to be paid by ordinary motorists, who resented this strategy and went on to
block reforms, evenwhen the sharp edges had already been filed off. Theywere repre-
sented by powerful a powerful organisation such as the ANWB and also the VVD,
back in the opposition in the first half of the 1990s, represented their interests.
Moreover, the desire to construct megaprojects such as an expansion of Schiphol Air-
port, the Port of Rotterdam, and the realisation of a rail link to the German hinterland
carriedmore weight. Gradually, successive coalition Cabinets started to lend its ear to
more economically motivated storyline, such as the wish to position the Netherlands
as a prime distribution country in Europe.
The megaprojects in particular were areas where the ecological modernistic consen-
sus faltered. The Government’s efforts to introduce the typical highly institutionalised
Dutch consensus democracy to the environmental domain failed when the polder tur-
ned into a legal battlefield over important infrastructure projects such as the Betuwe
rail link and the expansion of Schiphol airport. The environmental movement was
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empowered by Government support and the ecological mind-set of the public, but it
became disillusioned when it could not make many gains at the negotiation table. The
environmental movement took their claims to court when theywere not heeded, leading
to large scale juridification of environmental/spatial conflicts. The legal conflicts over
megaprojects foreshadowed those over air quality ten years later. The introduction of eco-
logical modernisation in these fields caused polarisation instead of consensus.
It is curious that environmental policy lost ground so quickly in the Netherlands. In
1989 the Ministry of V&W still took over concepts developed in environmental policy
and utilised them to ecologically modernise transport policy, while in the second half
of the 1990s economic issues firmly retook the driver’s seat. In theory the Cabinets that
ruled during the 1990s, first a Cabinet of CDA and PvdA, than Cabinets of PvdA,
VVD and the environmentally conscious D66, were more susceptible to environmen-
tal concerns in theory than the CDA / VVD Cabinets of the 1980s. Changes in the
political colour of the Cabinets in power cannot explain this loss of environmental
ambition. Partly the relinquishment of environmental ambition had to dowith an eco-
nomic downturn and an emphasis on the importance of the Netherlands as a trans-
port and distribution country.
On the other hand I also conclude that for an environmental cause to succeed it is
important that it is championed by people and parties that enjoy a certain amount
of trust with the industry and other vested economic interests. Ecological modernistic
discourse can bemore convincingly ‘sold’ to the sceptics by aVVDMinister. The party
is traditionally a reliable partner for interests of industry and transport. Ecological
modernisation is dependent on the success and consensus building skills of Govern-
ment officials. The absence of the VVD during the first half of the 1990s in the Gov-
ernment may well explain why ecological modernisation did not manage to win
ground among the motorists. It was resented by motorists who could easily rally
against the socialist Minister of Finance requiring them to pay more for fuel and
against the socialistMinister of VROM. TheMinister of V&WwasHanjaMaijWeggen
of the CDA. She became resented among car owners for her road pricing proposals.
With the VVD in opposition it became much harder to reach out to the traffic and
transport sectors and these sectors themselves toughened their opposition. The
VVD committed itself to promises to end congestion and therefore, when it returned
to power in the mid 1990s it had nothing to gain by supporting environmental policy.
In the purple Cabinets it could profile itself as a defender of economic interests and
distance itself from theMinister of VROM. By 2001 the VVDwas adamant in its oppo-
sition to road pricing and even scuttled the successor to the old SVV2, a plan proposed
by a Cabinet it participated in itself.
The conflicts over the megaprojects and the failed ecological modernisation of trans-
port, display the serious drawbacks of Dutch eco-modernistic policy. It forces the
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Government to balance carefully, because it needs to establish consensus between
interests traditionally regarded as inimical. The Government is under constant pres-
sure to deliver on its promise than environmental protection and economic growth
can progress together. In its heyday, during the early 1990s, weak ecological modern-
isation was successful. Nationally polluting industries signed covenants to clean up
their act. During the negations over the megaprojects and in the case of transport and
traffic it was far less successful. Its propensity for consensus also fosters a mentality in
which making hard choices is postponed. Winsemius’ motto that ‘No one should be
asked to do the impossible’ is telling in this regard. The eco-modernist style of policy
making avoided difficult societal question when interests were not easily aligned.
Therefore it gave rise to charges of dishonesty from social groups as diverse as car
owners and environmentalists.
3.4.4 The merchant and the reverend
Dutch ecological modernisation succeeded partially in breaking up traditional ani-
mosities, but it did so at a cost. The discourse coalition between economic and envi-
ronmental interests also meant that environmental policy discussions became
influenced by themanagerial and economically oriented dialogue of its coalition part-
ners, and lost much of its earlier radical character. Environmental policy committed
itself to the same logic of growth and development as traditional economic policy.
Achieving economic growth became a target of environmental policy, as well as safe-
guarding the environment, nature, and public health. Even its language became tin-
ged with economic justifications.
This strategy seemed to pay off in the early 1990s. Strong ecological modernisation
seemed to be the course Dutch politics was heading for. However, after the release
of the NMP, Dutch ecological modernisation gradually lost many of its strong char-
acteristics. After release of the NMP in the early 1990s, and especially in the latter half
of the 1990s economic considerations were on the rise again, and the Netherlands
embarked on a path to become a prime distribution country, undoubtedly attracting
environmentally harmful transport and traffic in the process. The Netherlands pos-
tured as an environmental leader abroad, but it was especially adept at exporting pol-
icy principles and policy discourse. It did so with a keen eye for economic interests.
Wemay conclude that where environmental policywas concerned – and to cite an old
Dutch maxim – the Dutch Government acted as both merchant and reverend. This
emblem describes a mentality of preaching idealistic rhetoric while making sure that
profits are maintained. In environmental policy, the Government – like a reverend –
preached high-minded environmental ideas, but – like a shrewd merchant – it also
kept a close watch on costs and profits. This characteristic was not unique for envi-
ronmental policy, however; Andeweg and Irwin (2005, p. 206) contended that in
the area of foreign policy the same comparison could be made.
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While both the ‘merchant’ and the ‘reverend’ preside over Dutch environmental pol-
icy, during some years the merchant is on top and at other times the reverend leads
the way. VVDMinister Winsemius may be considered an environmentally wise mer-
chant. He ‘sold’ environmental policy to a sceptical audience of industrialists. How-
ever, after ‘take care for tomorrow’ was published, the reverend took over in
environmental policy. During the 1990s he had to tone down his preaching again
because economic considerations came to the fore.
The policy discourse of ecological modernisation fits this merchant and reverend
mentality. The discourse can be used to argue for an ambitious environmental policy
with a strong emphasis on precaution and behaviour change, or for a cautious policy
which demands minor economic adjustments and fits with free market capitalism.
Pieter Winsemius had introduced a weak form of ecological modernisation in Dutch
politics, a mercantile form. The discourse gradually acquired characteristics of strong
ecological modernisation during its 1989-1992 heydays. After these ‘golden years’ of
environmentalism, the discourse lost many of its strong features, especially in regard
to transport and infrastructure, and assumed a weak form again. It gradually weak-
ened until in 2002 new PM Jan Peter Balkenende almost does away with it altogether
as we will see in chapter 6.
Dutch environmental policy displays a pendular movement and is caught between
the merchant and the revered, with the merchant holding the upper hand most of
the time. Weak ecological modernisation ruled throughout most of the 1980s and
most of the 1990s with the late 1980s and the early 1990s being exceptions. During
these years the strong ecological modernisation took over and the Dutch reverend
preached successfully, not only at home, but also in Europe as the history of the social
construction of European air quality policy displays. This realisation is of importance:
The Netherlands exported policy principles abroad that were recommended by the
reverend but became blocked by the merchant, at least in the Netherlands. Whereas
in the Netherlands policy principles did not lead to equally tough measures, they did
in the European Union, in any case with regard to air quality policy. In the Nether-
landsweak ecological modernisation generally held sway, but strong eco-modernistic
principles were exported to the EU.
3.4.5 Dutch environmental policy and the legality of precaution
Early Dutch environmental policy was characterised by the discourse of limits to
growth. Potentially this discourse may lead to the institution of a precautionary legal-
ity among legislators and the judiciary. The discourse also had some effects on the
legal order pushing it in a precautionary direction. The link between environmental
standards and spatial planning is a case in point. On the whole though, this discourse
did not have far-reaching precautionary effects. The Government did apply laws and
set standards but they were by and large ineffective and still based on what was
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considered economically reasonable. Pollution abatement of the era succeeded
despite the permit system and not because of it.
The onset of ecological modernisation brought more opportunities for a precaution-
ary legality to gain ground. In the early days of Winsemius’Ministry feasibility con-
cerns still reigned but gradually eco-modernist discourse became stronger. The strong
variation of ecological modernisation seeks to influence consumers and producers
and urge them to seek prevention of environmental degradation out of an environ-
mentalist but also an economic rationale. Because is considered to prevention pay
off, resistance against more far-reaching environmental measures lessened. The
strong eco-modernistic policy plans such as the NMP and the SVV2 leave more room
for a legality of precaution. The NMP sought to utilise legal instruments such as crim-
inal liability and broader product liability in the service of the environment and the
SVV2 urged the prevention of mobility growth out of environmental reasons. Both
plans tried to instil environmental awareness in the public through education and
advertising campaigns.
However, the strong ecological modernistic period lasted relatively briefly. The eco-
logical modernisation of the transport sector and mobility in general failed in the
1990s. Economic considerations started gaining the upper hand again and environ-
mental interests receded to the background again. The environmental awareness rais-
ing campaigns and relatively open access to the administrative courts led to
juridification of environmental conflicts but the Council of State did not posture itself
as the guardian of environmental interests at the time. Moreover, the logic of ecolog-
ical modernisation, even in the strong variation, forms a dam against notions of exces-
sive prevention. Excessive prevention would harm the economy and for ecological
modernisation discourse to succeed it should show that the economy would actually
benefit from environmental measures. In order to do that it sought win-win solutions
and that in turn required weighing costs and benefits, a core element of the legality of
risk and compensation.
We may conclude that although ecological modernisation and the legality of precau-
tion shared an affinity with a precautionary approach and strong ecological modern-
isation could even have fostered a legality of precaution, the variation dominant in the
Netherlands was not conducive to the emergence of this type of legality. Economic
consideration pulled too much weight during most of the years between 1972 and
2000 for a legality of precaution to take root.
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TIMELINE THE MERCHANT AND THE REVEREND, DUTCH ECOLOGICAL
MODERNISATION
1969-1971 Air pollution protests in Rotterdam Rijnmond area
1971 Ministry of VOMIL founded
1972 Report for the Club of Rome published
1972 Urgent Memorandum published
1976 Minister Lubbers released ‘Perspectives Memorandum’
1982 Project PIM unveiled, restructuring Ministry of VOMIL
1982 Ruud Lubbers takes over as Prime Minister, Ministry of VROM founded, Pieter Winsemius first Minister of VROM
1984 First IMP. M. released
1986 Ed Nijpels takes over as Minister of VROM
1987 Release of Brundtland report “Our Common Future”
1988 Release of In Care of Tomorrow
1988 Presentation of first draft Tweede Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer, SVV2
1989 First Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan, NMP, released
1990 Release of SVV2 final version
1990 Release of NMP+, a fortified version of the NMP
1994 ‘Purple’ Cabinet takes over, Wim Kok Prime Minister
1996 Minister Jorritsma (V&W) releases ‘Samen Werken Aan Bereikbaarheid’, anti-congestion plan.
1999 Perspectives Memorandum on Transport released
2002 New Transport Plan, NVVP, proposed and rejected in Parliament.
2002 Resignation of the purple Cabinet and formation of the first ‘Balkenende Cabinet’.
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 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN
AIR QUALITY LEGISLATION: 1983 – 1999
INTRODUCTION
After the general investigation of Dutch environmental policy in the previous chapter,
we turn our attention here to the policymaking process in the European Union. It was
in this political arena that the regulations that caused problems for the Netherlands
were conceived. The onset of an ecological modernist discourse in the EU however,
turned out to be an important influence on these regulations as well. The question
how EU air quality regulation in the 1990s was shaped and the influence of various
actors including the European Commission and the Dutch Government in this pro-
cess is the topic of this chapter.
Two EU directives drafted in the latter half of the 1990s are of particular importance
for understanding how the Dutch air quality clash came about. The first of these,
referred to as the ‘Framework Directive’, contained the strategic elements of the
new EU air quality policy. The second directive – referred to as the ‘Daughter Direc-
tive’ – contained the specific air quality standards for, among others, NO2 and PM10.
In this chapter four aspects most relevant to this study that shaped these two EU Air
Quality Directives will be examined in particular.
These are:
1. The rise of ambitious eco-modernistic ideas in European environmental policy
making around the beginning of the 1990s;
2. The influence exerted by the World Health Organisation on the Daughter
Directive;
3. The economic evaluation supporting the Daughter Directive;
4. The lead taken by the UK during the proposal and negotiation of the Daughter
Directive.
These aspects were of course not the only influences that shaped the directive, but
were the most prominent ones found, based on the Explanatory Memorandums,
the secondary literature, and respondents’ answers. The influence of eco-modernist
ideas became conspicuous when the explanatory memorandum and the main ideas
found in the framework and the Daughter Directive were analysed. The two direc-
tives both cite the EU’s eco modernistic 5th Environmental Action Programme as a
basis for these policies. These directives as well as secondary literature also dis-
played the prominence of the WHO. The economic evaluation came to the fore in
secondary literature and moreover, such an economic evaluation became a main-
stay of more recent European environmental policy. The economic evaluation
was also mentioned in Dutch policy documents. The role of the UK was mentioned
mainly by various respondents in face to face interviews and became a subject of
study later on. Secondary literature, UK policy documents and Dutch grey literature
support the notion that the UK played a pivotal role in the negotiations on the Air
Quality Directives.
The rise to prominence of ecologically modernistic ideas in the EU is discussed in
section 4.2; the involvement of the WHO in air quality politics is considered in
section 4.3; the economic evaluation is examined in section 4.4; and the role of the
UK is explored in section 4.5. In section 4.6, the actual adoption of the Air Quality Direc-
tives is mentioned, and section 4.7 contains concluding remarks. In the following section,
I provide information about the decision to update the EU air quality policy in the 1990s,
and I present an analysis of the proposals made by the European Commission.
. UPDATE OF THE EU AIR QUALITY POLICY IN THE S
In the 1990s, two Directives concerning air quality were promulgated: the ‘Directive
on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and Management’ (96/62/EC, the Framework
Directive) and the ‘Directive relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air’ (99/30/
EC, the Daughter Directive). They were adopted in 1996 and 1999, respectively.
The Framework Directive contained the overall strategy and provided for the possi-
bility to set air quality standards that would subsequently be set in ‘Daughter Direc-
tives’ based on the framework of Directive 96/62/EC. Directive 99/30/EC was the
first Daughter Directive. Three more followed in the early 2000s, but were of no rel-
evance for the air quality clash, and so will not be discussed.
These Air Quality Directives included more polluting substances than the previous
ones, and the standards they set were far stricter. The directives had to be implemen-
ted in national legislation, and the European standards formed the basis of the Dutch
legislation that eventually led the highest Dutch administrative court to cancel all
sorts of infrastructure projects.
The first preliminary proposals for these directives were under discussion between
representatives of the national Government and European Commission officials in
the spring of 1993 (Wettestad & Farmer 2003, p. 6). In October 1993, EU’s DG Envi-
ronment representative Kathleen Cameron outlined the new European plans for air
quality legislation. Cameron warned that the standards themselves would be ‘quite
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stringent’ because the goal was ‘to provide a high degree of protection for man and the envi-
ronment’ (ENDS report Oct. 1993).
As Cameron’s words indicated, the new Air Quality Directives embodied the EU’s
wish to tighten its air quality policy in order to harmonise different strategies and
to ensure good air quality in the various Member States.
The new policy was a response to the perceived failure of older directives. The first air
quality rules set by the European Union dated from the 1980s, during which four sub-
stances had been regulated by way of Air Quality Directives. These substances were
sulphur dioxide, known to be harmful to human health and a major cause of acidi-
fication, smoke, lead, and NO2 (Bennett 1991). These early standards were lenient
and lacked force, and respondents from the RIVM referred to them as ‘almost merely
reporting obligations’ (Rob Maas & Hans Eerens, interview). According to a report
released in 1995, even the modest obligations imposed by these directives were not
taken seriously by most Member States (European Commission 1995). In the Nether-
lands as well, compliance with the directives was lacking (VROM 1992), and at the
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, ambient air quality lacked urgency
in many Member States.
The lack of urgency was a thorn in the side of the European Commission and the DG
Environment. Various respondents mentioned that Prudencio Perera, Director Gen-
eral of the DG Environment at the time, came up with the idea of revamping EU air
quality regulation. However, the information I gathered on this issue is contradictory.
Whatever the case, there are more structural explanations for the drafting of new Air
Quality Directives and their contents than the influence of one high-ranking Commis-
sion official.
In the proposals themselves, and in the attached Explanatory Memorandums, the
aims, the context, and the justification for the proposals are revealed. They offer sig-
nificant information regarding the inquiry into the social construction of the EU air
quality policy from the late 1990s.
Box 4: The EU policy making process
In order to understand the social construction of the air quality policy in the EU, some basic
knowledge of EU policy making is necessary. Policy in the EU is made by three organs in
unison, each of which has its own separate function. The European Commission submits a
proposal for legislation. In this case, it is handled under the cooperation procedure (formally
known as the Article 252 procedure), and sent to the European Parliament and to theCoun-
cil of Ministers. The EP discusses the proposal in a first and second reading. The EP may
propose amendments, and sends its opinion to the Council of Ministers. The Council of
Ministers discusses the proposal as well, and when the Ministers agree among themselves,
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the Council produces a new proposal, a situation known as ‘common position’. Generally,
the Council of Ministers consists of Ministers who hold the portfolio of the subject under
considerationwithin theirMember States. For instance, the Environmental Council consists
of Ministers responsible for the environment.
The common position is sent to the European Parliament, and the Parliament may
propose amendments to the Commission. If the Commission accepts all or some
amendments, it sends the proposal to the Council of Ministers. The Council can
either accept the amended proposal in a second reading, or reject it and adopt a
proposal that differs from that proposed by Parliament. If it adopts the amend-
ments proposed by the EP, is can adopt the proposal by qualified majority. If it
decides to accept a proposal that differs from that proposed in a second reading
by the EP, it needs unanimity to adopt the proposal.
The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are considered the EU’s
main legislative bodies, but the initiative for legislation lays with the Commission
making it a powerful body in practice. The Commission may issue Decisions,
Communications, propose Directives and propose regulations, among other
for this study less relevant regulatory instrument. A Decision pertains to an issue
relevant to a single Member State. Commission Decisions are directly binding. In
Communications the Commission announces policy plans. Directives are pieces of
European legislation that need to be implemented in the national law of a Member
State. Directives generally impose the achievement of certain results on a Member
State, but the Member State itself is free in choosing the means of achievement.
Regulations on the other hand are pieces of Community legislation that directly
bind Member States, no national legislation to implement them is required.
An important player in the actual negotiations in the Council of Ministers is the
President. The Presidency of the Council rotates among the Member States every
six months. The presidency is an office that allows representatives of the country
holding the presidency to decide on the agenda of Council Meetings, and to decide
which legislative proposals will be handled with priority (Elgstrom 2003). The suc-
cess of a presidency is generally measured by the progress it has made on the var-
ious legislative proposals under consideration (Würzel 2005). Presidents are
expected to act as honest brokers in the negotiation phase, but they also engage
in shaping agendas to further national interests.
As the Air Quality Directives demonstrate, it takesmany years from the time a pro-
posal is introduced to its eventual adoption. It is common to divide into three pha-
ses the process during which a European Directive is proposed, negotiated, and
eventually implemented in national legislation. At the time the proposal is drafted,
experts deliberate about the scientific and economic rationale of the Directive
under consideration. It is common to refer to this as the expert phase. When the
proposal is drafted and negotiations begin, the Council of Ministers and the Euro-
pean Parliament become involved. This is referred to as the negotiation phase.
After the proposal is adopted and the Directive is finalised, the Directive needs
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to be implemented in the national law of the Member States. This is known as the
implementation phase
The European Commission is the EU’s highest administrative body, although not
the highest legislative body. TheCouncil ofMinisters together with the European
Parliament officially pass European legislation. The most important pieces of leg-
islation are directives and regulations. While not the principal legislative body, the
Commission has considerable power to shape the EU regulatory agenda, because
theCommission proposes the directives and regulations. These proposals are sub-
sequently discussed and amended by the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament. The Commission can also revoke its proposal or force the Council to
adopt a proposal by anonymity if the Commission feels that the proposal has been
diluted too severely in the subsequent negotiations.
What is referred to as ‘The European Commission’ is in fact a multifaceted actor
comprised of a large number of Directorates General, each of which administers
its own field of policy. In practice, environmental matters are dealt with mostly by
theDGEnvironment. TheDGEnvironment caters to the interests of environmen-
tal protection, and therefore favours a clean Europe. One of its core interests is the
harmonisation of the environmental regulation of Member States, and bringing it
into line with European standards. It is at times opposed by other DGs such as the
DGEcon,when they consider the proposals of the DGEnv. to impose toomuch of a
burden on Member States.
4.1.1 Proposal for the Framework Directive COM(94)104
Proposal COM(94)104 (European Commission 1994), was a Framework Directive on
ambient air quality assessment and management. It included stipulations about how
to assess and manage air quality, and it prepared the ground for more directives in
which standards for air quality would be promulgated. After the Framework Direc-
tive was adopted, four more Daughter Directives followed in which these standards
were laid down. These air quality standards were mandatory throughout the entire
territory of the EU, except in the workplace. The reason for this exception was that
other directives covered air quality near workplaces and industrial installations.
The Framework Directive was presented initially as a harmonisation effort, and it
contained the principles for effective and uniform air quality measurement as well
as rules for the provision of information by the Member States to the Commission
and other agencies. It set ‘[c]ommunity wide, minimum harmonization criteria’ to enable
‘a community wide assessment of ambient air quality’ (European Commission 1994, p. 12).
However, the Framework Directive also contained significant strategic ideas. The text
indicated that in addition to air quality standards, information about air quality had
to be made publicly available and presented to relevant organisations. Moreover,
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measurements and methods of assessment needed to be harmonised in order to be
able to compare developments in different Member States. This made accurate assess-
ment of progress possible.
The text specifically mentioned that the best way to safeguard air quality was the par-
allel development of ambient air quality standards and emission/product standards
(European Commission 1994, p. 2). This mention of the parallel development of emis-
sion and quality standards was interesting because it resembled the Dutch idea of the
‘two-track policy’, referred to in the previous chapter. In the 1980s, The Dutch Gov-
ernment intended to base environmental protection on a harmonious mix of emission
standards and quality standards. The explanatory Memorandum praised the Nether-
lands for basing its environmental policy on the development of both these instru-
ments European Commission 1994, p. 7-8).
The proposal promised that long-term targets for the protection of health and eco systems
would be set. A booklet published by the Commission stated that the Directive would
force Member States to introduce additional far-reaching environmental policies, such
as ‘innovative methods of city planning’ and/or ‘environmentally targeted public transport pol-
icies’ (EuropeanCommission 1998, p. 12).Wemay conclude that the air quality standards
functioned in the context of a broader strategy to ‘green’Member State policies. This is an
important aspect, because it indicates that there was a policy philosophy behind these
directives that went beyond the mere promulgation of standards for air quality.
Europe’s 5th Environmental Action Programme (5th EAP), in force since 1993, provided
the rationale for these new strategic ideas (European Commission 1994, p. 1). Environ-
mental Action Programmes gave an indication of forthcoming EU policies and the stra-
tegic direction that environmental policy was taking. According to the Explanatory
Memorandum to proposal COM(94)104, the 5th EAP demanded that fundamental
levels of environmental care and protection be established by community legislation,
that policy be optimised by using statistics and indicators, and that long-term objectives
be set. The standards should be based on the recommendations of scientific bodies,
among which were the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (European Commission 1994, p. 16).
The document mentioned the number and types of pollutants to be regulated, but it
did not give specific numerical values. To that end, Daughter Directives would be
proposed. These directives contained the concrete standards but otherwise fit within
the framework and relied on the same strategy.
4.1.2 Proposal for the Daughter Directive COM(97)500
The first Daughter Directive, 99/30/EC, stipulated standards for the concentration of,
among others, PM10 andNO2 in the air. The entry date was 2005 for the PM10 standards
and 2010 for NO2. Both substances gave rise to political trouble in the Netherlands.
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TheDaughter Directivewas proposed in 1997, after the formal adoption of the Frame-
workDirective. Proposal COM(97)500 (European Commission 1997) highlighted con-
tinuity with the Framework Directive. Its objectives were to lay down standards for
four pollutants: sulphur dioxide (SO2), NO2, PM10, and lead. Moreover, it provided
regulations for the provision of information to the public, and filled in some technical
details regarding assessment and management of those pollutants.
The wording of the Explanatory Memorandum stressed that the standards were
based on scientific evidence. In the context of the directive, scientific evidence meant
knowledge obtained from health and environmental science. Scientific insights were
compiled in working documents by a working group consisting of representatives
from Member States, NGOs, and the Industry, as well as scientific institutes such
as the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and the World Health Organisation
(WHO). However, cooperation with the WHOwas mentioned in particular. The pro-
posal stated that air quality standards would be based on the WHO Air Quality
Guidelines for Europe. A common agreement to work on air quality standards
together was signed with the WHO (European Commission 1997, p. 5), and the
WHO 1987 guidelines were to be updated in 1997.
Not only environmental and health scienceswere involved; managerial and economic
science also played a crucial role. The directive was supported by a cost-benefit anal-
ysis undertaken by a team of researchers from several European Universities. The
conclusion of the assessment was that the proposal would incur costs but yield ben-
efits that far outweighed the costs in terms of health gains. The costs and benefits,
including health gains, were evaluated in monetary terms (European Commission
1997, p. 4). Especially for PM10, the policy was considered to be highly cost-effective.
The Commission advised caution while interpreting the results of the cost-benefit
assessment, but stated: ‘…In so far as benefits are quantifiable and bearing in mind the lim-
itations inherent in the estimation, benefits (ECU 408 to 5 900 million) are expected to exceed
the costs (ECU 5 to 285 million) (European Commission 1997, p. 25). In summary, the
Commission expected costs to run into the millions EUwide, but benefits were sched-
uled to run into the billions.
. THE  TH EAP AND THE RISE OF ECO-MODERNIST IC EU POLICY
The 5th EuropeanAction Programme contained the target that by the year 2000,WHO
standards for air quality should be mandatory at the EU level. As a concrete action, it
stipulated that assessment and measurement systems had to be in place (European
Commission 1993, p. 49). This target, as well as the wording of the proposal for
the Framework Directive, indicated that the 5th EAP provided the backdrop for the
new EU air quality policy. The 5th EAP will be discussed in the following section.
The ideas in this programme turned out to be similar to Dutch ideas developed in
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the NMP. Section 4.2.1 provides a general discussion of the document. In section 4.2.2, the
report ‘1992, the environmental dimension’ is considered. This report was a precursor to
the 5th EAP, but it also explainedwhy the EU turned to setting environmental quality stan-
dards in the latter 1990s. In section 4.2.3, the Dutch influence on European ecological mod-
ernisation is discussed.
4.2.1 The 5th EAP
The 5th EAP was an ambitious environmental action programme that contained a
coherent strategy as well as numerous actions to be taken, and it had a longer time
span than the earlier action programmes. The 5th EAP outlined environmental policy
for the whole decade, from its inception in 1992 through to the year 2000. It was the
first Environmental Action Programme after the establishment of the internal market,
and it served as the EU’s answer to various important worldwide developments in
environmental policy, such as the UNCED’s Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 and the release of the 1989 Brundtland report ‘Our Common Future’. In this
report, the concept of sustainable development was articulated systematically, and
the 5th EAP was placed squarely in the tradition of sustainable development by
its title ‘Towards Sustainability’. After Brundtland and the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio
de Janeiro, an optimistic atmosphere permeated environmental policy in the EU
(M. Van Giezen, interview). According to Mirjam van Giezen, a new kind of devel-
opment seemed possible, where win- win solutions for both the economy and the
environment were feasible.
The 5th EAP embodied these new ideas. It was an especially important milestone,
because it indicated a shift in the environmental policy of the European Union
(Hey 2005; Kronsell 2000; Lenschow 1997). The programme containedmany elements
of ecological modernisation as defined and considered in chapters 1 and 3.
Firstly, it advocated the positive sum game postulate between environmental protec-
tion and economic welfare. It stated: ‘The perceived conflict between environmental pro-
tection and economic competitiveness stems from a narrow view on the sources of prosperity
and a static view of competition. Rather than reduce competitive advantage, stringent envi-
ronmental requirements can actually enhance it by triggering upgrading and innovation’ (EU
Commission 1993, p. 31). In eco-modernistic fashion, the 5th EAP focused on regula-
tion by way of economic and market instruments, such as taxes and other fiscal
instruments.
Secondly, it underscored the goal of internalisation of environmental values on the
part of polluters, policy makers, and the general public. It aimed at behavioural
change. The plan no longer focused on pollution that took place within the various
environmental media but on the sectors that caused pollution. This way of organising
the plan had a lot in commonwith the Dutch target group approach. The 5th EAPwas
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divided into five ‘target sectors’: industry, energy, transport, agriculture, and tourism,
and industries within these sectors all had specific tasks in protecting the envi-
ronment.
The ambition to change behaviour was also evident in the wish to integrate environ-
mental considerations in other policy fields. Where earlier conceptions of environ-
mental policy tended to view the environment as a separate policy domain, the 5th
EAP highlighted the interdependencies of community policies that have environmen-
tal impacts. The programme stated:
‘It (the implementation of the strategy of sustainable development TA) requires that environmental
protection requirements be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community
policies, not just for the sake of the environment, but also for the sake of continued efficiency of
the other policy areas themselves’ (EU Commission 1993, p. 24).
In its quest for sustainability, the Commission saw the public as an ally, and therefore
the public had to be mobilised by providing them with information. The document
emphasised that each citizen had three roles to play. Firstly, he or she was a citizen
concerned with the quality of his or her living environment. Secondly, he or she was a
producer of pollution as an employer or an employee, as a commuter, and as a par-
ticipator in leisure activities. Thirdly, the citizen was a consumer of products and ser-
vices (EU Commission 1993, p. 27). In order to fulfil these roles in an environmentally
benign way, the public should be targeted by awareness-raising campaigns and by
environment-related information. The active involvement of NGOs, consumer orga-
nisations, and trade unions was considered crucial in this process. The public should
also be given opportunities to buy environmentally friendly products, and the price of
harmful products could be raised to provide an incentive for making a choice for the
environment.
The third eco-modernistic element was the prominent role for consensus policies. The
new approach included reaching out to industrial target groups as well, and it aimed
at replacing a prescriptive, top-down approach to regulation with a horizontal one. In
thewords of the Commission, a ‘thou shalt not approach’ should be replacedwith one
of ‘let’s work together’, so that industry would become part of the solution instead of
part of the problem (EU Commission 1993, p. 28). The Commission should enter into
dialogue with industry, and high environmental standards should be combined with
incentives to improve efficiency. Key notions involved improving management and
strategic planning within the industry, and introducing environmental impact assess-
ment, self-regulation, and covenants (EU Commission 1993, p. 29).
The precautionary elements of ecological modernisation were present in the 5th EAP
as well. The bigger role for industry should not be detrimental to high levels of ambi-
tion. The 5th EAP contained ambitious environmental legal principles, such as the
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precautionary approach and the polluter-pays principle. The precautionary principle
was named in the same sentence as the notion of shared responsibility: ‘The precau-
tionary approach and the concept of shared responsibility’ (EU Commission 1993, p. 24).
This is an indication that target groups themselves were considered to internalise
the precautionary approach. The rise of this precautionary approach was also evident
from the adoption of the precautionary principle in the Maastricht treaty of 1992. It
was laid down in the latter EC treaty, in article 130R, and is now found in article
191 EU treaty (Treaty of Lisbon).
Managerial and natural scientific insights came to the fore as well, especially when
concrete targets and timetables were discussed. A case in point was the desire expres-
sed to use the WHO guidelines as a legitimation for the air quality targets. The plan
allowed for scientific expertise to have considerable clout in the political debate over
standard setting.
‘Dutch’ elements of ecological modernisation were conspicuous. Emphasis was less
on prescriptive regulation andmore on internalisation, consensus building, and beha-
vioural change, especially on the part of industry and the public. The argument that
environmental improvement was a matter of shared civic responsibility was carried
through consistently. This theme was also stressed forcefully by the Dutch ‘reverend’
in national environmental policy.
In summary, the policy was a clear-cut example of ecological modernisation. It con-
tained the positive sum game format, the emphasis on precaution as well as on con-
sensus, the preference for long term-strategic planning, and targets that were
legitimated by referring to managerial and natural scientific insight.
4.2.2 The move towards quality standards in 1992, the environmental dimension
Many ideas featuring in the Air Quality Directives fit into the new ecological modern-
istic frame laid down in the 5th EAP. However, there were frictions as well. Proposals
for the Air Quality Directives contained a hybridmix of old and new instruments. Old
instruments like quality standards were combined with new measures like informa-
tion requirements along with new goals such as public participation, prevention, and
the greening of other policies. The real complaint regarding the Air Quality Direc-
tives, however, had to do with the strict air quality standards. Air quality standards
were traditional regulatory instruments, and are in fact one of the oldest instruments
around. To see how standard setting featured in the new EU environmental policy,
we will have to review another report – ‘1992, the environmental dimension’.
This document appeared in 1990 as the result of concerns about the environmental
effects of a single EuropeanMarket. On 1 and 2October 1988, the EnvironmentalMin-
isters called on the Commission to report on the environmental dimension of the
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single market. The Commission convened a group of independent experts to identify
the key issues and likely environmental impacts of the single market (Taskforce Envi-
ronment and Internal Market, 1990, section 12.2). The experts pointed out certain sig-
nificant negative effects of the internal market, due to, among others, the increased
transport of goods and increased emissions from industrial sources. Theywarned that
the internal market should not have negative environmental consequences, as this
could endanger the long-term sustainability of the economic growth it would offer
(Taskforce Environment and Internal Market, 199, section 12.1).
To avoid this scenario, the taskforce presented eco-modernistic ideas such as more
policy integration, a favourable climate for improved environmental management,
use of fiscal measures, and raising awareness by providing information and educa-
tion. Ideally, economic growth and environmental degradation had to be ‘uncou-
pled’. This concept means that the supposed link between increased economic
growth and increased environmental degradation needs to be broken. It is natural
to presuppose this link because increased production and consumption leads
to increase strain on the environment, so breaking this linkwas therefore an important
eco modernistic target. However, technical measures alone were considered unlikely
to achieve this uncoupling, which was especially considered urgent in the transport
sector (Taskforce Environment and Internal Market, 1990, section 12.12).
Contrary to themoremarket-based direction of the 5th EAP, however, the report pleaded
for a system ofminimumquality standards for environmental media in order for citizens
to enjoy sustained environmental quality. These minimum standards should not be low,
because according to the treaty the European citizen had a right to high environmental
protection, and the EU’s environmental policy should be ‘preventative’ in nature (Task-
force Environment and Internal Market, 1990, section 12.14).
The Taskforce was quite optimistic about the economic opportunities that quality
standards could generate:
‘Countries adopting comparatively stringent standards will reap benefits from higher environmental
quality, which would tend to compensate for higher costs of environmental protection. Moreover, envi-
ronmental quality can be an important factor in influencing the location of economic activities, including
service sectors such as tourism’ (Taskforce Environment and Internal Market, 1990, section. 8.5).
Another key economic argument was the intention to create a ‘level playing field’.
Divergent quality standards ran counter to the treaty and the free movement of goods
and services, because citizens had a right to a decent environment, irrespective of
workplace and place of residence (Taskforce Environment and Internal Market,
1990, section 8.2). Moreover, having different standards in different Member States
would have the consequence that industries in someMember States needed to comply
with stricter regulation than industries in other Member States. This was contrary to
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the notion of a free market where competition is equal. However, on the basis of the
EU treaty, Member States could set stricter environmental quality standards. In order
to discourage this, standards needed to be high, which would prevent the more
ecology-minded Member States from setting more ambitious standards themselves.
This report is interesting because eco-modernistic arguments, like the economic
opportunities in a high-quality environment, were used to legitimate traditional
regulation by way of quality standards. The Air Quality Directive contained a mix
of eco-modernistic arguments and flanking measures as well as traditional quality
standards. This kind of traditional regulation was dictated by the logic of the internal
market, and underlying the generic approach of the EU was the important idea of the
level playing field. It was considered necessary to impose the same standards on
every Member State in order to avoid competitive advantages stemming from differ-
entiation in standard setting. This rigid approach was contrary to Dutch notions that
gained prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s, as Dutch policy started to favour flex-
ibility and tailor-made solutions.
The ‘1992’ report ‘struck like a bomb shell’ according to Klatte (1997), because up until
then EU officials had an eye only for the advantages of the internal market. The mes-
sage that the internal market could become an ‘environmental nightmare’ was highly
inconvenient (Klatte 1997, p. 87). This report gave an impetus to environmental
awareness on the part of heads of state, and they issued a declaration on the environ-
ment in 1990. This declaration and the report by the Taskforce were precursors of the
5th EAP and of the wave of environmental regulation dating from the latter 1990s,
including the Air Quality Directives. The directives followed the logic of the report
in which quality standards were favoured. Apart from Air Quality Directives, other
framework regulation, such as the one on water quality, displayed the same policy
philosophy.
4.2.3 Dutch influence on the eco-modernistic shift
The policy discourse laid down in the 5th EAP and to a lesser extent in ‘‘1992’, the
environmental dimension’ bore close resemblance to the Dutch approach laid down
in the National Environmental Policy Plan discussed in the previous chapter. This
resemblance is not coincidental, as the Netherlands was known at the time as an envi-
ronmental forerunner. Indeed, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark became the
EU’s ‘environmental troika’ in the 1980s, and still held that reputation in the 1990s
(OECD 1995). The NMP itself argued for active environmental diplomacy and for
strengthening international environmental policy (VROM 1989).
A significant number of policy advisors who drafted the 5th EAPwere either Dutch or
schooled in the Netherlands (Jörgens 2004, p. 162). Arts, Dieperink, and Liefferink
also mention that the Dutch Government sent an experienced civil servant to write
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
the 5th EAP (Arts Dieperink & Liefferink 2002). The aforementioned Laurens Jan
Brinkhorst in particular played a part in setting up a coalition that shaped EU policy
in an ecologically modernistic fashion. Brinkhorst was Director General of the EU’s
Directorate for the Environment andNuclear Safety from 1987 to 1994. He argued that
stringent environmental standards for products were necessary to ensure that they
remained competitive in a post-industrial world economy. If Europe were to be com-
petitive, and intended to gain a position of leadership, it had to enforce strong envi-
ronmental standards (Weale 1992, pp. 77-78).
Through such arguments, Brinkhorst managed to forge a discourse coalition on envi-
ronmental and economic issues. The main storyline around which this coalition cen-
tred was that environmental policies were the key to future successes in post-
industrial economic development and in acquiring a position of leadership in product
standards and innovation, again a variation on the themes of win-win scenario’s and
environment as opportunity. According to Annika Kronsell, Brinkhorst led a group of
scientists and policymakers in the EU environmental directorate, who used the Dutch
example of the NMP as a blueprint for the 5th EAP (Kronsell 2000, pp. 91-92). There
were indeed strong similarities between the NMP and the 5th EAP as noted above.
Elements such as the target-group approach, consensus seeking, and the holistic
approach to pollution were noted as ‘Dutch’ characteristics (Weale et al. 2000, p. 61).
The discourse coalition on environmental matters led by Brinkhorst was influential in
the early 1990s. In 1992, the Commission chairman Jacques Delors became convinced of
the potentially beneficial effects environmental policies could have regarding the envi-
ronment. The Commission outlined these benefits in a white paper called the White
Paper on Growth Competitiveness and Employment. As well as embracing the ecolog-
ical modernistic tenet that environmental measures could have economically beneficial
consequences, it proposed a different model of taxation that would bring about a more
environmentally friendly and economically sound path to progress and development.
This white paper was a significant success, because environmental projects took centre
stage in aWhite Paper that was essentially concerned with solving economic problems
(Weale 2005; De Cendra de Laragan 2009; Lenschow & Zito 1997).
The shift towards an ecologically modernistic discourse created opportunities to draft
strict environmental regulation because of the storyline that high environmental stan-
dards had competitive potential. The traditional argument made by vested economic
interests that environmental regulation harmed competition could be refuted by pointing
towards the competitive edge of higher quality products. Instead of causing economic
harm, strict regulation could have long-term economic benefits, such as higher potential
for innovation, better quality of life, and a healthier, more productive work force.
The Dutch Government followed the proposals made in the NMP to export their eco-
modernist ideas abroad and became an ambassador for them in the EU arena. The
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reasoning behind this is clear; as a small country, the Netherlands profits when its
neighbouring states enact strict environmental policies, and the environment in the
Netherlands is as vulnerable to foreign pressures as the Dutch economy. Hence, an
EU environmental policy that promoted high ambitions without impeding interna-
tional economic activity was in the Dutch interest. By inducing EU Member States
to take ambitious market-based environmental measures, it appeased both the envi-
ronmental reverend as well as the economic merchant.
. WHO INVOLVEMENT IN THE EU AIR QUALITY POL ICY
The 5th EAP and ‘1992’, outlined the philosophy on which the strict proposals for the
EU air quality policy floated like a cork on water. Another crucial feature in the emer-
gence of the air quality policy was the involvement of the WHO in air quality policy
(Wettestad 2006; Rood 2003; Edwards, 1999). Its participation is of interest because it
provides another example of Dutch influence on EU policies; moreover, it demon-
strates the disadvantage of using powerful international bodies to reach national leg-
islative aims.
The air quality standards based on the WHO’s research was decisive in the negotia-
tion phase of the directive (Rood 2005; Wettestad 2006). The WHO recommendations
became a pervasive part of the storyline with which strong measures were justified.
According to this storyline, bad air quality was a problematic social condition, and by
implication motor traffic was likewise problematic. Reconstructing the reasons for
WHO involvement may show us why and how health considerations became an
overriding concern.
4.3.1 Dutch proposal to the WHO
It was mentioned above that the scientific work of international bodies, and explicitly
the work of the WHO, formed the basis of the proposed air quality standards. In the
Explanatory Memorandum to Commission Proposal COM(94)109, The Netherlands
was praised because it had taken international initiatives that ‘have resulted in the past
in the drafting of the World Health Organisation Air Quality Guidelines for Europe (1987)’
(European Commission 1994, p. 7). As noted in the proposal for the Daughter Direc-
tive, the guidelines were important because the standards would be based on the new
updated version of these guidelines. Apparently there was a Dutch connection to
another one of the key factors that shaped the Directive – involvement of the WHO.
This involvement began in 1983, more than ten years before the Framework Directive
was adopted. Toxicologist Klaas Krijgsheld called it a ‘remarkable intervention’ (Krijgs-
held 1987, p. 74), because it was rare for theWHO to give such clear recommendations
on which to orient policy. For my own reconstruction of the WHO involvement,
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I used Krijgsheld’s article together with material obtained from an interview with
Kees Zoeteman, the civil servant who initiated contact with the organisation and
requested that it draft air quality guidelines.
In 1983, Zoeteman had just becomeDirector of the Air Department of the VROMMin-
istry. Before joining the Ministry, he had been working with the Dutch Institute for
Drinking Water. In that capacity, he had been involved in drafting the WHO guide-
lines for drinking water and was in the subsequent negotiation regarding the Euro-
pean Water Directives. Therefore, when air quality standards were needed, he
considered it would be beneficial if the WHO could also draft air quality guidelines
(Zoeteman, interview 17-8 2011).
Kees Zoeteman asked the WHO’s European Regional Office if it could take the
initiative to draft air quality guidelines. The WHO responded positively, and
set up a working group. At the time, four pollutants had already been regulated
by way of European Directives, and had also been investigated by the WHO in
1972. This newWHO investigation, however, would have a much broader scope,
with 28 pollutants on its target list. It was considered that the effectiveness of
these guidelines would be strongly increased if the standards were set in numer-
ical values, and the form of a risk assessment or the establishment of a ‘no-effect’
level were preferred. A ‘no effect’ was the level of concentration of a pollutant in
the air at which no effects to human health can be measured. In the Netherlands
itself, this ‘no effect level’ was the preferred value on which to base standards. It
was agreed that the WHO would limit its involvement to establishing the no-
effect levels or the risk assessments, and the Dutch Government would bear
the project’s financial costs.
According to Krijgsheld, the research method adopted was expert consultation. A
group of around 130 experts were split into groups, each considering a number of dif-
ferent pollutants. Before the discussionwithin aworking group started, a background
document was composed by one of the members. The meeting resulted in a text con-
taining recommendations, and these texts would be further scrutinised by a review
panel. The experts hailed from different countries, and various research institutes
hosted the meetings. Particulate Matter, for instance, was discussed in Bilthoven,
the place of residence of the Dutch RIVM.
Considering the task at hand, the time frame in which the WHO needed to operate
was short, as drafting air quality standards for 28 pollutants demanded considerable
effort and was a matter of grave complexity. Krijgsheld mentioned that the proce-
dures employed by the WHO in establishing the limit values were ‘contrary to
WHO tradition of thorough and time consuming research of chemical substances an ambitious
planning was adopted to evaluate a number of around 20 pollutants in the space of three years’
(Krijgsheld 1987, p. 74).
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The resulting Air Quality Guidelines was a document on which consensus was rea-
ched by the experts, whichmade it attractive as a frame of reference for policymakers.
However, the scientific value of this consensus should not be overstated. According to
Kees Zoeteman:
‘There is an international document over which there is consensus, but consensus between whom?
The WHO, which means a commission containing fifteen ladies and gentlemen who agree on some-
thing. At that time, that was without any consultation. On the basis of their own expertise a docu-
ment is drafted and these are the WHO guidelines. But there was just nothing better’ (Zoeteman,
interview). The project was completed in 1987, and it immediately became an important
benchmark in the context of the EU (Wettestad 2006).
4.3.2 The role of WHO expertise in the adoption of the air quality Daughter Directive
The WHO air quality guidelines were not the only scientific data on which standards
in the EU proposals were based. The EU intended to base its standards on scientific
expertise, and it assigned scientific committees to propose standards as well.
In the case of the proposal for the first Daughter Directive, the European Commission
created a number of working groups in order to look at the four different pollutants
under consideration in the proposal. The most health-relevant pollutant was PM10.
The technical working group on particulatematter that had to supply advice on appli-
cable standards for PM10 consisted of delegations from Spain, Denmark, France, The
Netherlands, Germany, and theUK,with Germany and theUK co-chairing the group.
The task was onerous, especially regarding PM10, because at the time of drafting the
proposal and of the subsequent negotiations, theWHO had declined to give a specific
numerical recommendation. It considered that a ‘no-effect level’ could not be establis-
hed. Instead, it provided the scientific Working Group on Particulate Matter with
research findings indicating dose-response relationships.1 PM10 was a problematic
pollutant for both the WHO and the EU experts to assess, because its exact effects
and even its composition were subject to uncertainty, as became apparent from
chapter 2.
As recounted herein, the Netherlands was one of the first countries to begin measur-
ing PM10, having imported this category from the United States of America. Dutch
and American researchers on air pollution were in close contact (Buijsman 2003,
p. 116). However, many parts of Europe did not measure PM10 when the proposal
was put forward. The information of the Working Group on Particulate Matter con-
tained gaps as well as a large number of other uncertainties. There were limited emis-
sion inventories, so it was difficult to know how much PM10 was emitted in the
1. The dose-response relationship indicated by the WHO is provided here in Appendix 1 at the end of the
chapter.
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European air, but there were additional pressing issues as well. The Working Group
felt that uncertainties regarding the effects of PM10 were so large that a fixed numer-
ical standard might not be the best option. Such a standard would present a false
sense of certainty, and there was little information about the costs (TechnicalWorking
Group on Particulate Matter 1997, p. 33). It was also considered problematic that the
final version of theWHOAirQuality Guidelineswas not yet fully available (Technical
Working Group on Particulate Matter 1997, p. 33). It was questionable as well as to
whether the right kind of particulate matter has been targeted. The Working Groups
expected that the EU would regulate PM10, but the smaller variety of particulate pol-
lution, PM2.5, was considered more dangerous. Regulating PM10 was a compromise
in this perspective. The Working Group on Particulate Matter stated:
‘At present, however, PM10 as a PMmetric seems to be a reasonable compromise between theoretical
arguments favouring the measurement of very small particles and the knowledge and practical expe-
rience based on existing PM10 and TSP (Total Suspended Particulates TA) (and BS [Black Smoke
TA]) measurements’ (Technical Working Group Particulate Matter 1997, p. 1).
Uncertainties notwithstanding, the Working Group recommended the following stan-
dards: a 24-hour PM10 limit value of 50mug/m3 as a 98-percentile (of dailymean values
over a calendar year) in conjunction with an annual mean limit value of 20 mug/m3. It
recommended these standards for health reasons, and considered that the economic eval-
uation of the attainability of these standards was yet to come. Both US and European
studies along with the dose-response relationship provided by the WHO were consid-
ered crucial (Technical Working Group on Particulate Matter 1997, p. 2).
In the European Parliament, the Commission proposal was welcomed and in some
senses reinforced. The socialist UK Parliamentarian Anita Pollack drafted a report
about the Commission proposal to be discussed in the plenary session. She approv-
ingly mentioned the WHO and other scientific involvement, and hailed the Commis-
sion proposal as ‘an end to the tale of disaster’ (European Parliament 1998, p. 71) facing
public health, eco-systems, and cultural heritage. Ritt Bjerregard, Commissioner for
the Environment, was present on behalf of the European commission. She also defen-
ded the Commission’s proposal as having been based on close cooperation with
the WHO:
‘It sets new limit values for sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead. These
limit values are based on WHO guidelines adopted in 1996 in the wake of a programme of collabo-
ration with the Commission’ (European Parliament 1998, p. 78).
In Parliament, the proposed Directivemet with little resistance. In general, the EPwas
considered to be more environmental friendly than the Council of Ministers, and the
Parliament’s Environmental Committee in particular had a reputation as an environ-
mental watchdog in the 1990s (Bomberg & Burns 1999, p. 178).
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The final say belonged to the Council of Environmental Ministers. I found no public
records of the Council meeting of 16-17 June 1998, but telephone interviews as well as
grey and secondary literature shed light on the proceedings. The negotiations were
concluded at a fast pace, according to Dutch negotiator Tom Blom (Project Group
Air Quality Directives, 1998, on file with the author). Representatives from the north-
ern European countries and especially Austria favoured tough standards, while
southern European countries argued for postponement and exceptions to the
PM10 standard because of naturally occurring phenomena – such as Sahara dust –
that influence the concentrations of PM10 in the air. The proposal was discussed in
the last days of the UK presidency of the Council, and the UK negotiators tried to
bridge the gap between the conservative and the more progressive nations (M. Wil-
liams, telephone interview). In the end, the Council agreed unanimously on a pro-
posal that somewhat weakened the standards for PM10. However, due in part to
the Netherlands’ insistence, a clause that called for a review of the standards by
2003 was introduced into the document.
Rood et al. (2005) and Jürgen Wettestad (2006) indicate that the WHO air quality
guidelines were influential in the Council debates. Most Member States agreed on
tough standards for PM10 and NO2 because they took the WHO recommendations
very seriously. Due to the existence of WHO guidelines, representatives of the Mem-
ber States did not heed the lack of scientific certainty in many respects of air quality
(Rood et al. 2005, p. 17). The health threat that was posed by PM10 and the other pol-
lutants had become the overriding argument in the debates, and the seriousness of the
threat of air pollution was never called into question.
According to Wettestad, acceptance of the WHO air quality guidelines as targets in
the 5th EAP had done much to lessen the Council of Ministers’ opposition to tough
standards. It had already been accepted that the WHO guidelines would be used
as a benchmark, which made it difficult for the Ministers to disregard the air quality
guidelines at the time of the negotiations.
Wettestad captured the dynamic between the political action of the EU and the sci-
entific work of the WHO in figure 1 (Wettestad 2006, p. 294).
The WHO guidelines asserted considerable influence on the draft of the air quality
Daughter Directive in the expert committees as well as in the negotiation phase.
The strategy to involve the WHO to smoothen the eventual negotiations had been
a deliberate move by the Commission. It intended to ensure consensus on the prin-
ciples of the air quality regulation by first securing the adoption of the air quality
Framework Directive.
The interdependency between the WHO and the European Commission enforced
both parties. The Commission gained the necessary scientific legitimacy for its
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proposal, while the WHO gained real political influence. Involvement of the WHO in
the environmental domain reinforced the storyline that health protection and envi-
ronmental protection were strongly intertwined. Public health arguments reinforced
environmental policy and vice versa.
4.3.3 WHO involvement from a Dutch perspective
TheWHO involvement is an influential explanation for the eventual acceptance of the
Air Quality Directives, and theDutch Government had proposed enthusiastically that
the WHO play an active role. This raises the question as to what the Netherlands had
to gain by involving the WHO, and why the Dutch Government paid for the research
to be undertaken. The answer can be found in the increasing prominence of environ-
mental matters on the political agenda in the Netherlands back in 1982.2 The idea of
integrating environmental policy into other policy fields was gaining ground, and
policy makers were searching for adequate instruments pertaining to environmental
protection. In the 1982 IMP Air, environmental quality standards were considered a
key element, and – together with standards pertaining to the emission of pollutants –
they were the cornerstones of Dutch air pollution policy, which became known as the
‘two- track policy’. The EU proposals for its air pollution policy mentioned the same
idea, referred to now as ‘parallel policy’.
For a number of reasons, it was appealing for the Dutch Government to bring in the
WHO. Firstly, a very practical reason was that air quality standards were hard to
determine, and setting them required considerable scientific expertise. TheWHO took
some of the work out of the hands of the Government. Secondly, according to
Figure 1
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2. This was mentioned in the previous chapter.
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Krijgsheld (1987) andWettestad (2006), the acceptance of measures increased when it
was seen that the international competitive position would not be harmed by
unevenly heavy-handedmeasures in comparison to other countries. The industry fea-
red that if the Netherlands set standards of its own, it would have to incur costs to
clean its production while its competitors abroad did not need to face such costs.
The WHO lent legitimacy to the standards, and this was useful for the Government
in discussions with its own industries. Moreover, it could also persuade other coun-
tries to accept similar standards.
Thirdly, the trans-boundary character of air pollution made it difficult for the Neth-
erlands to influence pollution concentrations on its own. Concentrations of air pollu-
tion in the Netherlands were also influenced by the emission of pollutants in
neighbouring countries. If the WHO guidelines were to become a benchmark, other
countries would be more prone to reduce their pollution levels as well.
The air quality guidelines were also appealing to the EU. According to Kees Zoete-
man, the European legislator was keen on using knowledge that was already at hand.
When there was nothing else, the European Commission was tempted to turn to a
document like the WHO guidelines, because apparently there was consensus about
it. Discussions with the Member States could be minimised if the EU could demon-
strate that it based itself on sound science. When environmental directives were con-
cerned, the Commission started by setting up working groups of experts, and they
asked these experts what their proposals were. The Commission proposal was then
based on the suggestions of these working groups. These experts also looked at the
things that had already been done, andwhen there were guidelines they took them as
a point of reference (Zoeteman, interview).
This kind of action on the part of the Dutch Government was not unheard of. The
Netherlands was traditionally active in persuading countries to adopt strict environ-
mental standards, and themix of idealism and protection of economic interests led the
Netherlands to take on an active role in international organisations. The same senti-
ments were at play here, and the WHO involvement served Dutch interests in a
number of ways. The WHO relieved Dutch scientific bodies of conducting time-
consuming and costly research, the Dutch Government would have a stronger
hand if industry were to oppose the Dutch regulation on air quality, and the
WHO document could be used as a benchmark to persuade other countries to
incorporate similar legislation.
The Netherlands is generally not averse to applying the tactic of using experts and
state-of-the-art scientific knowledge whenever it intends to export its own approach
to the European arena; indeed, the Netherlands is known for what Marcus Haverland
calls the use of the ‘expert strategy’ (Haverland 2009). Through the use of scientific
expertise, the Netherlands is able to create leverage for its policies while a bigger
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country can rely on its power within EU institutions. Through its alliance with the
WHO, the Dutch Government was able to gain the expertise and clout of the
WHO to influence other actors at home or abroad. This internationalisation ensured
that competition remained equal and environmental measures did not lead to a wors-
ening of the competitive position of Dutch industry. Again, we witness the dual focus
on idealistic initiative and competitive position: the well understood self-interest of
the merchant / reverend. Although one could never predict such a document would
eventually become EU policy (Zoeteman, interview), the advantages for the Dutch
Government of having the WHO on its side were evident.
In the Netherlands itself, enthusiasm regarding the air quality guidelines died down.
Dutch involvement with theWHOAir Quality Guidelines was mentioned in the IMP
air 1984-1988 (VROM 1983, p. 114), but was no longer mentioned in the later IMPs or
the NMP. Air quality standards lost their political saliency, and the Netherlands did
not regulate air quality further on its own. The European Commission took over the
initiative at the beginning of the 1990s.
When the Daughter Directive was under discussion in EU circles, the situation in the
Netherlandswas very different from that in the 1980s. Memorandums from a project
group formed during the negotiations indicated there was increasing alarm about
the consequences of air quality standards. In order to monitor negotiations on the
Daughter Directive, this project group was set up by the VROM Ministry, and
included scientists within the RIVM, representatives of the VROM Ministry, and
other stakeholders. This group became increasingly worried about the validity of
the scientific data used, and privately considered the PM standards very difficult
to meet. In an internal Memorandum, toxicologist Peter Rombout complained that
if it had been known beforehand how theWHOair quality guidelineswould be used
in legislation, their conclusions might well have turned out to be very different
(Internal Memorandum Project Group Air Quality, Sept. 1998, on file with the
author).
However, WHO involvement had already infused debates on the EU air quality pol-
icy with a powerful storyline: namely, that air pollution was an important health
threat that needed to be tackled forcefully. Subsequent European debates displayed
that the involvement of the WHO provided a powerful sense of urgency to the nego-
tiations (Rood et al. 2005).
. COST-BENEF IT ANALYS IS OF PROPOSAL COM()
The third factor of importance was the cost benefit analysis supporting the proposal
for the Daughter Directive. In the Netherlands, the overwhelming costs of implemen-
ting the directive led to debates between theMinister of VROMand Parliamentarians.
4 The social construction of European air quality legislation: 1983 – 1999
A figure of 30 billion Euroswasmentioned in those debates.3 Yet how could such high
costs be caused by a policy that was supported by an economic evaluation and should
have been highly cost-effective?
The evaluation was conducted jointly by researchers from the Free University of
Amsterdam, the Austrian Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Norwegian
Institute for Air Research (NILU). The research demonstrated that the air quality pol-
icy in regard to PM10, NO2, and SO2 would provide benefits that far outweighed the
costs. The research was important to persuade Member States to accept the proposal,
because it showed that the air quality standards could be implemented without high
costs. In the following sections the assessment and its conclusion that the air quality
regulation would not lead to high costs will be examined.
4.4.1 Economic forecasts for the air quality standards
The purpose of the impact assessmentwas to determinewhat additional actionwould
be needed in order to meet proposed standards. The researchers calculated the costs
of such additional action by using the most effective solutions, and assessed the ben-
efits that could be expected frommeeting the standards (European Commission 1997,
p. 3). Where possible, the benefits were quantified in monetary terms. Since health
benefits were the main advantages of the regulation, a monetary value was given
to a statistical human life. Based on various studies, the value of a human life was
estimated to lay between 2.6 to 4.2 million ECU (European Commission 1997, p. 4).
The figures appeared highly favourable for air quality regulation, as the economic
evaluation showed that the benefits were very high and lay between 5 and 50 billion
ECU.4 The large gap between the figures was explained by the range within which a
human life had been quantified, as well as by uncertainties in relation to mortality
rates attributable in particular to PM10. Basing their conclusions regarding the mor-
tality rates on the same US research that the WHO had used, the researchers pooled
the estimates of the various studies provided by the WHO, in essence combining
the figures of separate studies. The WHO itself cautioned against pooling estimates.
The institutes resorted to pulling the estimates because ‘at present it is not possible to take
into account the local factors contributing to heterogeneity and to develop locale detailed esti-
mates of impacts’ (Olsthoorn et al. 1997, p. 66). Admittedly, this procedure increased
uncertainty, and was the reason that the uncertainty interval on the benefit side
was very high.
It was projected that compliance with the directive would cost the EU countries taken
together between 50 to 300 million Euros per annum. These costs were low for a
3. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 400 XI, nr. 56, p. 1/2.
4. European Currency Unit: ECU. The value of the ECU is equivalent to that of the Euro.
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directive that purportedly set stringent air quality standards. The researchers consid-
ered that the standards could be met against relatively little cost because other EU
legislation would also lead to lower emissions, especially due to cleaner cars. The
cost-benefit assessment was drafted under the assumption that another EU pro-
gramme – the auto-oil programme – would yield improvements for air quality:
‘The assumptions with respect to the options for control of PM10 emissions from mobile sources are
based on the results of the auto-oil study. This study assumes an emissions reduction of 50% relative
to the current 1996 level of emission standards’ (Olsthoorn et al. 1997, p. 46).
It was envisioned that emissions from transport cars andmotorcycles would decrease
by 80% in the 1990s due to planned EU regulation. It was estimated that emission
from heavy-duty vehicles would be reduced by about 50% (Olsthoorn, 1997, p. 24).
The researchers were also optimistic about non-technical market-based measures
such as introducing road pricing and the introduction of LPG busses. They foresaw
a reduction of emissions of 20% by such measures alone. However, the researchers
noted that if these measures did not have the desired effect, the cost curve would rise
sharply. The results of the auto-oil programme were especially crucial. The auto-oil
programme was the name of a covenant between the European Commission and
the main bodies representing the auto industry and the oil industry at the EU level.
The environmental Commissioner Ritt Bjerregard had high expectations of this pro-
gramme as well, and endorsed it by stating: ‘we should see cleaner air in our cities and we
shall have fewer ozone episodes in the summer’ (Wettestad and Farmer 2003, p. 19). In
summary, the researchers argued that only a modest additional effort needed to be
made, because the lion’s share of thework had already been done, owing to the reduc-
tion of emissions resulting from other EU regulation.
4.4.2 Problems with the economic evaluation
In hindsight, figures for the costs presented in the economic evaluationweremuch too
low. The Dutch Court of Audit, the Algemene Rekenkamer, drafted a report about the
rising costs of compliance with the air quality standards. In 1997, at a time when the
Dutch Government still relied on the Commission’s figures, it estimated costs from 1.3
million to 3.2 million Euro per year, an amount that could be incorporated without
much difficulty into the roughly 1 billion Euro budget for environmental manage-
ment.5 However, it soon became clear to the Dutch Government that expenses would
rise significantly, and a year later the costs of meeting the standards were considered
to be 340 million Euro per year. But at the time the policy was implemented in 2001,
5. Based on the VROMbudget for the year 2000, Law of 14 September 2000, regarding changes in the bud-
get of the Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and Environmental Management for the year 2000; Stb.
2000, 393.
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various assessments of the costs had been made that ranged from only 21 million
Euros to an estimate of 16 billion Euros (Algemene Rekenkamer 2004, p. 48). In
2002, Buringh and Opperhuizen concluded that reducing PM10 concentrations by
a modest 1.1. mug/m3 countrywide would cost 6 billion Euros. They concluded that
even with all possible reduction policies, compliance with the daily standard for
PM10 as prescribed in the EU directive was not feasible (Buringh & Opperhuizen
2002b, section 6.14).
The reason the costs rose exponentially was that calculations in the economic eval-
uation relied to a great extent on projected advantages emanating from other pol-
icies; for instance, the calculations included the supposition that the auto-oil
programme would generate significant benefits. However, these did not material-
ise, as the auto-oil negotiations were mired in conflicts between the European Par-
liament, the oil industry, and the automotive industry. The programme was based
on a novel approach that fit with the philosophy of the 5th EAP, but it was criticised
for its lack of transparency. Moreover, the German Government demanded the
inclusion of many more stakeholders in the second stage of the programme. This
wrangling caused significant delays and brought the policy process to ‘all but a halt’
(Würzel 2002, p. 175). Moreover, in a review of the Auto-Oil Study it was mentioned
that onlymodest reductions of PM10 could be expected by 2010 (European Commis-
sion 2000a, p. 11).
High yields were also expected from non-technical measures such as road pricing, but
road pricing did not emerge in the European Union. In the Netherlands, it was con-
sidered highly controversial, as we saw in the previous chapter.
This reliance on other policies was the central problem distorting the economic eval-
uation. These environmental policies were designed to cooperate with other policies,
and to spill over into other sectors like transport or agriculture. However, when pol-
icies are not as compatible as hoped, and if the projected benefits from one policy do
not materialise, the whole system becomes unstable. At the time, his instability was
exacerbated by uncertainties that were rife in the air pollution case, and there was lit-
tle in the way of reliable measurements and models, little information about the exact
health impacts of PM10 in particular, and little knowledge as to how concentration
levels could be reduced. When policies are designed in response to other policies,
the problem of uncertainty becomes doubled because these policies are subject to
uncertainties, thus exponentially increasing the amount of uncertainty.
This kind of cost-benefit analysis exhibited another problem. The benefits were pre-
sented in monetary terms, but they did not constitute real financial revenues – they
constituted life years gained by the population. These statistical lives saved could not
be added to the balance sheet of any company or Member State. The costs were felt
immediately, and by some sectors and states more than by others, while the benefits
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remained diffuse and spread over the whole population. To calculate the benefits, the
working group valued a statistical life at 3.2 million Euros, making pollution reduc-
tion cost-effective, but who earned that amount of money? In the end, health was gai-
ned in exchange for money. This increase in health could well have been bought for a
good price, but presenting it as an investment that would produce revenues in mon-
etary terms distorted the economic picture.
The cost-benefit analysis had been so influential that the Dutch delegation, for
instance, did not conduct an alternative analysis; it simply took at face value the num-
bers presented by the Commission (Rood et al. 2005, p. 19).
. THE UK AS A ‘CHAMPION ’ OF THE AIR QUALITY DAUGHTER
DIRECTIVE
Drafting new directives is a political process in which Member States play an impor-
tant part. They have a say in the Council ofMinisters, but they can also choose to influ-
ence the Commission when drafting the proposal by sending their own personnel to
aid the Commission, or by presenting their own policies as an example for the Com-
mission. The role of Member States in the policy process is crucial. According to
Adrienne Héritier, Christoph Knill, and Susanne Mingers (1996), Member States
can act as ‘champions’ of a certain European regulation and play a front-runner role
in the process of its adoption. I argue that in the air quality case, the UK acted as a
champion for the Daughter Directive.
The position of the United Kingdom was of importance, not only for adoption of
the air quality regulation but because a more in-depth review of the UK’s involve-
ment demonstrated that similar problems had erupted in the UK about ten years
earlier than in the Netherlands. This points towards an interesting dynamic
regarding the construction of environmental problems within the EU. Countries
export these problems to the EU level for regulation, and this regulation in turn
creates similar problems for other Member States. Moreover, the UK example
reveals what was at stake in the issue of ambient air quality. As the subsequent
analysis will show, the interests of transport and auto-mobility were pitted against
public health interests.
The importance of the UK emerged during the investigation, and is based on inter-
views with people involved, on the literature, and on grey literature. Especially
important are references from the following: Rob Maas and Hans Eerens from the
RIVM, Marjan Van Giezen from the Ministry of VROM, Richard Mills, a civil servant
from the UK, the Dutch Project Group for Air Quality Directives, and a report from
the Clingendael institute (Rood et al. 2005). UK Parliamentary documents also point
to leadership on this issue.
4 The social construction of European air quality legislation: 1983 – 1999
There are various reasons for considering the UK a champion in the political process
that led to the Air Quality Directives, especially the Daughter Directive. The UK
supplied scientific and political expertise in the negotiation phase as well as in
the expert phase, and this influence caused a convergence between the EU and
UK strategies (Elsom 1999). It sent a national civil servant, Lynne Edwards, to
the EU Commission to oversee negotiations, and she was extremely influential
(Maas & Eerens, interview; R. Mills, interview). Moreover, negotiations between
the Member States were finalised in June 1998 under UK Presidency. The rotating
EU Presidency of the Council of Ministers is an important office because the Pres-
ident can shape the policy making agenda (see also box 4). The President acts an
important broker between the various Member States and their respective positions
on the negotiation table. The negotiations were finalised hastily in the last days of
the UK presidency, indicating that the UK attached great significance to achieving a
deal under its leadership. UK officials and scientific expertise from UK institutes
played key roles, with the UK acting together with Germany as chair of theWorking
Group on Particulate Matter. The scientific data used to underpin the standards
were gathered predominantly from UK research institutes, and the rapporteur to
the EP in the case of both the Framework and the Daughter Directive was from
London.
The UKwas a prima facie unlikely candidate to have such a strong involvement in the
air quality Daughter Directive, as it was not known as an environmental front-runner.
There were, however, two main reasons the UK attached importance to the proposal
for an ambient Air Quality Directive. The first was the fact that the UK already had an
air quality strategy in place when the EU negotiations over the Daughter Directive
began in 1997. Advanced regulation by a Member State acts like a benchmark for
the EU, and is frequently incorporated by the EU itself (Knill & Liefferink 2007; Hol-
zinger et al. 2008). It was in the interest of the Member State to have the EU regulation
match the national regulation as closely as possible so that no costs would be incurred
by having to change the national regulation to any extent. Moreover, by succeeding in
having its national policy ‘raised’ to the level of European policy, it ensured that its
own industries would not be alone in being burdened by regulation (Héritier, Knill &
Mingers 1996).
The second reason was that the UK Government of the young Labour leader Tony
Blair was intent on showing a green and pro-European face during its 1998 presi-
dency. During his presidency, Socialist leader Blair made the environment one of
his priorities, and the Air Quality Directive fit this overall aim.
Both of these reasons for UK involvement had to do with a domestic conflict over air
quality in the early 1990s. An examination of the policy documents relating to air pol-
lution showed that during the 1990s air pollution had become a salient political topic
because of concerns over childhood asthma. This finding was important, because ten
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years later Dutch environmental movements raised a similar concern over children
who lived close to highways, therefore I will take a closer look at the emergence of
this strategy here.
4.5.1 Emergence of the UK National Ambient Air Quality Strategy
In the UK, air quality was of concern in the first programmatic approach to environ-
mental management launched in the country; it was called This Common Inheritance.
The approach marked the start of a greener phase in the UK’s environmental policy,
which up until then had been paltry. With regard to air pollution policy, the document
stated that the Government was interested in developing standards for air quality and
that theWHOguidelines could act as a guide. The document did not include any policy
initiatives on this front, however, but advised an increase inmonitoring stations and set
up an advisory council that would inform the Government on air quality standards.
The UK was known to base its environmental policy on sound scientific insights (Hajer
1995) and the air quality standardswere no exception. A number of scientific bodieswere
dealing with air pollution, and during my investigation I identified five different ones in
total. The first was the Expert Panel onAir Quality Standards (EPAQS), instituted shortly
after This Common Inheritance was issued. EPAQS in turn based its recommendations
on the work of other expert bodies, most notably COMEAP (Committee on the Medical
Effects of Air Pollutants; independent but connected to the Ministry of Health).
Not mentioned in This Common Inheritance but nevertheless important was the advi-
sory body called the Quality of Urban Air Review Group (QUARG). The highly regar-
ded Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution investigated air pollution as well.
This was and remains a reputable institution that had been sworn in already back in
1971. Finally, the research body, ‘Medical Aspects of Air Pollution Episodes’ (MAAPE),
was set up in 1990 as a subdivision of COMEAP. Its explicit terms of reference were to
determinewhether public advice needed to be given during air pollution episodes, and,
if so, what kind of advice (Website COMEAP, last accessed 24-06 2015).
All these research institutes released worrying scientific reports in the 1990s. In July
1991, a report by MAAPE appeared, regarding the pollutant ozone. Though not
alarming on the whole, the MAAPE report concludes that the effects of ozone could
be more troublesome for people with asthma. Children were mentioned separately.
General measures did not need be taken, but extra information should be supplied to
groups that might be more sensitive. The UK Government led by the Conservative
party responded by providing information bulletins on television and by instituting
extra help-lines that could be called free of charge.
During the Christmas period of 1991, the UK experienced a week-long episode of
intense air pollution. In January of the following year, QUARG was assigned to
4 The social construction of European air quality legislation: 1983 – 1999
examine urban air quality, and published its report in 1993 (QUARG 1993a). The
researchers pointed their fingers at transport as being responsible for bad air quality
in British cities, especially in London. The issue led to a number of Parliamentary
debates and to written questions about air quality ( for example: Hansard 28 Jan.,
10 Feb., 17 Feb., 2 March, 22 March, 23 March and 25 June 1993). The press mean-
while picked up on the story of childhood asthma, in 1993 as exemplified by pub-
lication of the heart-wrenching story of the wheezing baby, Lydia Wolfe. The
dramatic headline proclaimed: ‘Exhaust fumes are suffocating our children’ (The Inde-
pendent 10-10 1993).
By December 1993, QUARG had issued its second report. This time diesel vehicles
were considered the guilty party in environmental pollution (QUARG 1993b). Air
quality came under closer scrutiny when data about the potential damage of PM10
emerged. During the spring of 1994, Parliamentarians responded to a short article
in the New Scientist in March. According to the article, PM10 posed a much more sig-
nificant threat than had previously been thought (Brown 1994, pp. 12/13). On 10
March 1994, the Independent quoted from the article and concluded that according
to epidemiologist Joel Schwartz, 10,000 people in the UK could be dying annually
because of exposure to PM10 (The Independent 10-03 1994).
On 17 March 1994, Under Secretary of State for Public Health, Tom Sackville sugge-
sted that the Committee for the Medical Effects of Air Pollution was of the opinion
that there was evidence to suspect PM10 of being responsible for having an effect
on health (Hansard, 17 March 1994). This represented a change of position. Back in
1992, MAAPE had still suggested that PM10 caused little harm (MAAPE 1992).
By then, the link between air pollution and transport was by now firmly established in
the public eye, and these concerns had started to pick up in Parliament aswell. Labour
MPs from London, notably JeremyCorbyn andAustinWalker, began to campaign on
the issue in December 1993. In Parliament, Secretary of State John Gummer was con-
fronted by questions as to why there were so few monitoring stations, especially con-
sidering the link with asthma (Hansard 1 Dec. 1993). Minister of State Tim Yeo had to
reply to questions in writing (Hansard 17 Dec. 1993).
In the summer of 1994, a new smog episode appeared to be on its way, and air
quality was discussed in the press in increasingly jittery terms (The Guardian,
5-07 1994; The Independent, 5-07 1994). The issue reached its zenith after 17 July.
On that day, the Independent reported an asthma incident following the evening
of 24 June, three weeks earlier. On its front page, the newspaper wrote that after a
period of severe thunderstorms, hospitals had become overcrowded at night
with people suffering from asthma. The doctors questioned by the journalists
compared the situation to ‘a plane crash happening near every hospital’. The news-
paper itself featured the dramatic headline: ‘The day Britain choked’ (The
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Independent, 17-07 1994).6 The next day, The Guardian called for ‘a politician that
can clear the air, because ‘we were told that legislation had banished smog, but now it is
stiflingly, chokingly, sometimes murderously, back’ (The Guardian 18-07 1994).
The conservative Government came under mounting pressure when concerns over
asthma were intertwined with ongoing protests over road expansions. In 1990, the
conservative Government announced one of the most ambitious road-building sche-
mes in UK history, but protest against it was fierce. In 1994, the issue of road expan-
sion and asthma became connected. In July 1994, the month of the smog panic around
asthma, LabourMP JoanneWalley, who had been in the frontline from the start, attac-
ked the Government’s transport policies together with Labour MP Denham. Denham
accused the Tory Transport Minister of ‘complete complacency’ regarding the fate of
‘one million sufferers of asthma’ (Hansard 18 July 1994). She demanded a halt to the
road-building scheme.
Combinedwith the anti-roads protests, the asthma issue became a campaign issue for
Labour. On 20 July 1994, a Labour document denouncing the roads programme fea-
tured in a long debate, during which different Labour MPs lambasted the initiatives
taken by the Environmental Minister of State, Robert Atkins. Among the critical MPs
were Austin Walker, Keith Hill, and Paul Flynn. All the emblematic cases were cited,
such as the WHO guidelines, the 10,000 deaths due to PM10, the pollution incident in
1991, the deadly smog episodes in London’s past, and the large increase in asthma
reported by the Independent in its article on how Britain had choked (Hansard 20 July
1994). In October, Michael Meacher, Labour Shadow Minister for the Environment,
held a long speech in which he condemned the roads programme on behalf of the
Labour Party (Hansard 31 October 1994).
The Government finally budged early in 1995 by releasing a blueprint for an air
quality strategy (DOE 1995), and it was included in the new environmental bill.
The actual standards were not known at the time, but they would be supplied by
COMEAP. Conservative Secretary of State John Gummer’s strategy was promul-
gated on 12 March 1997. The values were indeed strict, even more so than the Euro-
pean standards that would be promulgated in 1999. However, the plan also
included provisions that were more lenient than the EU proposals. The standards
were mandatory, but they were only considered relevant for areas having public
exposure. Moreover, a weighing of interests between the air quality standards
and economic interests was possible (R. Mills, Telephone interview). The strategy
was to be Gummer’s last act as Secretary of State, because a Labour Government
took over two months later.
6. Incidentally, the Independent’s report was taken over uncritically in the Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Geneeskunde, 1994. 6 Augustus, 138 (32), under the heading of foreign news.
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4.5.2 UK 1998 Presidency
After the 1997 elections ended in a landslide victory for Labour, the partymaintained its
positive attitude towards air quality for at least the time being. Deputy Prime Minister
John Prescott declared that Labour Administration would be ‘the Greenest Government
yet’ (Carter 2001). Labour promised to deliver environmental improvements, and got
off to an environmentalist start. Prescott outlined new proposals for transport, and
cut the already decimated road programme even further (DETR 1997). He also outlined
his progressive and somewhat eco-modernistic transport programme in the white
paper ‘A new deal for transport’ (Department of the Environment, Transport and
the Regions 1998). In order to integrate transport and environment, the LabourGovern-
ment combined the Ministries of Transport and the Environment. The Department of
Transport (DOT) now merged with the Department of the Environment (DOE), and
together they formed the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(DETR). This merger had the explicit aim of integrating environmental and transport
policies (House of Commons 1998). Michael Meacher became the Minister of State
for the Environment, but John Prescott held the actual power.
In this light, it was natural for Tony Blair to prioritise environmental subjects for the
1998 Presidency of the European Council. Labour announced that the UK would use
the Presidency to embark on a significant greening of the EU policy. It made the envi-
ronment one of the top three priorities of its presidency alongside crime and jobs, and
would look in particular for integration of the environmental policy with other policy
fields. The Labour presidency was successful in, among others, establishing a com-
mon position on the air quality Daughter Directive, and in reaching an agreement
in the auto-oil programme. It also initiated the Cardiff Process, designed to integrate
environmental considerations in other fields.
According to Rudiger Würzel (2003), the UK was bent on maintaining a high profile
for environmental regulations in order to involve Euro-sceptic Britons more with the
EU. The British PrimeMinister, Tony Blair, declared that hewanted Britain to be at the
heart of Europe. Holding the Presidency in early 1998 constituted an important
opportunity for ‘new’ Labour to show its European credentials and to convince a
largely Euro-sceptic British public of the merits of EU membership. Though the
environmental flamboyance of the new Labour Government withered away swiftly
(Carter 2001, p. 133), it had a considerable impact on the EU’s air quality regulation.
The UK had an interest in having the EU clean air policy modelled after its own, and
for the European Commission as well the strategy was useful as a blueprint. UK civil
servant Lynne Edwards was sent to advise the Commission. Edwards was part of the
team that had drafted the UK strategy, and according to RIVM researchers Rob Maas
and Hans Eerens, she ‘constantly explained which route to take to arrive at the right direc-
tion (interview, Hans Eerens and Rob Maas). The final EU Directive ended up being
stricter than its UK counterpart, and did not allow for a weighing of interests in the
same manner as that of the UK strategy. According to Richard Mills, the EU possibly
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intended to ‘one up’ the UK strategy, showing that it was prepared to go further
(R. Mills, telephone interview).
The UK debate preceded the Dutch debate by roughly ten years, but the clash that
took place in the UK over childhood asthma displayed a number of discursive ele-
ments that played a part in the Dutch case as well. Particulate Matter was connected
discursively to traffic and transport, roads became considered dangerous places
because of bad air quality, and the ‘car economy’ was portrayed as unsustainable
and in need of an overhaul. The UK case showed the potency of health-based claims
against the expansion of transport and mobility interests.
. PROMULGATION OF EUROPEAN AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
Now that four crucial actors and factors for the promulgation of the directives have
been analysed, we will turn our attention to the eventual adoption of the proposals.
The proposal for the Framework Directive COM(94)104 eventually became ‘Council
Directive EC/96/62 on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and Management’, the
Framework Directive for short, promulgated in 1996. The Directive faced little polit-
ical opposition, because it contained only programmatic aspects that did not place
large burdens on the Member States. The Daughter Directive, proposed in 1997,
was politically more salient, and was officially adopted on 22 April 1999 as Council
Directive 99/30/EC, ‘relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide
and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air’.
Negotiations over this directive in the Council of Ministers were much more difficult.
The reason was that this proposal contained the actual air quality standards, and
these had a significant impact on Member States. A rift opened between southern
Member States, which aimed at having exemptions from and postponements to
the standards, and northern Member States, which felt the proposed standards did
not go far enough. The southern Member States invoked the argument that the reg-
ulations should be responsive to national characteristics.7 However, this argument in
favour of flexibility was frowned upon by the more ecologically inclinedMember Sta-
tes, including the Netherlands (Rood et al. 2005, p. 18).
The European Parliament was in favour of setting strict standards, and the UK influ-
ence was present in these Parliamentary debates as well. The rapporteur, Ms. Anita
Pollack, was a MEP from the Parliamentary Commission of Environment, Public
Health, and Consumer Protection, and was from London. Her job was to draft a rap-
port on the proposal to inform her fellow MEPs. Ms. Pollack was a Labour represen-
tative, and when the proposal was debated, she referred explicitly to the plight of
asthmatic children and the threat posed by road traffic. She stated: ‘City dwellers suffer
7. Kamerstukken II 1997-1998, 21 501-08 nr. 72, p. 3.
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most, of course, since pollution from vehicle traffic is becoming a bigger problem every year’
(European Parliament 1998, p. 71).
The eventual standards promulgated in the Daughter Directive were somewhat more
lenient than those proposed originally by the Commission. This concerned especially
the limit values for PM10. The original proposal contained two separate standards for
PM10: a yearly one and a 24-hour one. The yearly standard stipulated that the air
should not contain more particles than 30 micrograms (Mug) per cubic metre (m3)
as a yearly average. It also proposed a maximum daily concentration of 50 mug/
m3 of PM10. This maximum concentration could be exceeded 25 times per year.
The Directive as promulgated contained a yearly and a 24-hour standard as well.
The yearly standard was raised to 40 mug/m3 of PM10 per year, while the 24-hour
standard remained the same, but instead of 25 exceedances, 35 were allowed. The
standards for PM10 had to be met by 2005. It was foreseen that by 2010 the standards
would be lowered to a yearly average of 20 mug/m3 PM10 and to a daily average of
50 mug/m3, but only allowing for 7 exceedances.
The values for NO2 remained unchanged from the Commission proposal, and they
had to be met by 2010. The Framework and Daughter Directives included other nota-
ble features, such as extensive information rights for the public (Daughter Directive,
article 8) and stipulations on the harmonisation of measuring methods and locations;
Directive 99/30/EC also contained a review clause, and the standards were to be
evaluated by 2003. At this time, the Commission would also assess whether meeting
the indicative standards for 2010 would be feasible. The southern Member States
managed to obtain some exemptions for naturally occurring PM10 (Daughter Direc-
tive, article 5, sub. 4), but the directive did not allow for a weighing of interests. The
standards adopted were termed limit values, and that indicated they were result-
oriented obligations. The air quality standards concerned the outdoor air in the ter-
ritory of the whole of the EU, except where the workplace was concerned.
Even though the standards were weakened somewhat, the directive was still consid-
ered an ambitious piece of environmental legislation. The European Environmental
Bureau (EEB), which acts as a pressure group for the environment at the EU level,
was pleased with the policy making process. It concluded: ‘The level of environmental
policy demands is high’ and there was ‘even an excess of environmental representation’,
especially during the expert phase when representatives from the industry were out-
numbered by representatives from the environmental movement and from environ-
mental and health departments (Hey 2000, p. 12).
The position of the Netherlands during these final negotiations is of interest, though
the country itself did not play a crucial role during the negotiations. Despite scientific
knowledge that meeting the standards would be very difficult, it chose to side with
the northern camp. Rood et al. (2005) state that from a pragmatic standpoint this
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choice was difficult to defend and that an alliance with the southern block would
have been a more obvious choice (Rood et al. 2005, p. 18). In retrospect, this is cer-
tainly the case, but in the light of the time, the Dutch position is understandable as
well. The Dutch Government had a hand in many of the developments that even-
tually led to the Framework and Daughter Directives, and it consciously lobbied
for ambitious EU policies based on eco-modernistic ideas. Getting the WHO
involved in air quality standards had been a Dutch idea as well. At the time, the
Netherlands was still clinging to the role of front-runner in European environmental
politics, and intended to go further than the Council of Ministers eventually had
done (Jan Pronk, interview).
On the whole, the Dutch Government was not simply a marginal player in the air
quality policy field. Although Dutch politicians painted this picture during the air
quality clash of 2004-2008, based on the current analysis, that depiction is incorrect.
On a number of fronts, the Dutch Government played a decisive role in the emergence
of the directive. In essence, the rhetorical talent of the Dutch ‘reverend’was influential
in European environmental policy making. Nor did the Netherlands forget its mer-
chant side, but in this case the merchant was overruled by a highly influential
WHO doctor that delivered its troubling diagnosis to an audience of worried Euro-
pean policy makers.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the conclusion to this chapter I will make a number of comments on four topics that
came to the fore. The first topic of interest is the policy making process in the Euro-
pean arena. This process should be characterised as a process of bricolage.Many inter-
ests and stakeholders are present, and they all intend to influence the policy making
process. The directives reflect this diverse set of interests and actors, and consequently
they contain a mix of elements, sometimes haphazardly put together. Secondly, the
emergence of the Air Quality Directives shows the importance of involving doctors
in discourse coalitions over environmental problems. When an environmental prob-
lem is recognised as a health threat, even vested economic interests have to back
down. Thirdly, environmental problems facing one country become problems concer-
ning all the EuropeanMember States. When the public of aMember State experiences
a situation as problematic, it makes sense to export these problem definitions to the
European arena. In this way, aMember State makes sure it becomes a European prob-
lem and subject to European regulation, thus avoiding having to take domestic meas-
ures. Fourthly, I will address the question of whether the Air Quality Directives are
examples of precautionary legality. It will be argued that although the air quality pol-
icy in the EU has the hallmarks of precaution regulation, the policy process also con-
tained elements of the legality of risk and compensation, notably the presence of an
economic evaluation of the proposed Directives.
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4.7.1 Main influences on the EU Air Quality Directives from the 1990s
In theory, the European Council is the most important policy maker in terms of Joel
Best’s scheme. Formally the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament enact
legislation, however they do so on the basis of Commission proposals, giving the
European Commission a key position in the policy making process. The European
Commission is a policy maker that is influenced bymany different external pressures,
as this research indicated. These different pressures cause legislative proposals to
become cobbled together as it were by the interests of various actors and various pol-
icy philosophies in vogue at the time at the time of their preparation.
Four aspects played key roles in the shaping of the Air Quality Directives. The WHO
and theUKGovernmentwere key actors that decisively influenced the policy process.
The rise of eco-modernist ideas and the use of a cost-benefit analysis were pivotal dis-
cursive factors that shaped the eventual form and adoption of the directive.
My research indicates that within the European regulatory institutions such as the
European Commission, the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers, policy making
was influenced by the ideology that held sway at the time. Ecological modernisation
discourse was on the rise in the EU during the 1990s, and – after the single market, the
Earth Summit in Rio, and the Brundtland report that popularised the term sustainable
development – the EUwas in an upbeat mood about environmental regulation. It had
high hopes of the possibilities it provided to steer both the environment as well as the
economy to prosperity. Environmental leadership could pay off, and therefore it was
possible to table ambitious legislation.
Policy making was influenced further by institutions that had no formal political stake,
such as the WHO. The scientific legitimacy that it provided to the proposal for the
Directive made sure it encountered less opposition fromMember States than if it were
simply a proposal from the Commission based on political justifications and ‘in-house’
scientific expertise. The Commission used the WHO guidelines explicitly for that rea-
son, and theWHOwas so influential that dissenting voices stoodno chance. These stan-
dards, however, were drafted by doctors and epidemiologists. Members of these
professions have considerations that are quite different than those of politicians. Their
duty is to propose standards they consider best from the perspective of public health,
and they are not concerned with political considerations like feasibility of costs. The air
quality guidelines drafted by the WHO did become regulatory benchmarks however,
quickly after their inception in 1987.
The influential economic evaluation served as an argument for the Commission as
well. The proposal under consideration was related to other policies, and natural sci-
entific findings were used to draw conclusions about the economic feasibility of the
proposal. The package was presented as a matter of calculation, but in the end health
was traded off for money. Human lives saved were monetised and presented as
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economic gains. The payoff would never be financial, however, but would be of a dif-
fuse nature, such as a healthy population. Within the confines of cost-benefit analysis,
such considerations were obscured. Moreover, the fact that costs could vary between
Member Stateswas left out aswell. Not all countries had the same problemwith PM10 in
their cities, and those countries faced fewer costs than a country such as the Netherlands.
UK involvement was a critical factor as well, since the EU strategy was influenced by
that of the UK, and the UK supplied information and know-how during various for-
mative stages of the process. Tony Blair needed to score green points as well to secure
his image as a young progressive leader and he needed to ‘sell’ the EuropeanUnion to
a sceptical UK audience as well. Air quality is a subject close to heart of the British
public, making it an ideal topic for the new UK Government to profile itself on.
4.7.2 The Air Quality Directives as a product of ‘bricolage’
Member States have always been considered important players in the formation of
European regulation, but their influence goes further than their role in the Council
of Ministers, or in supplying experts in the preliminary phases. Policies fromMember
States that the Commission considers advanced act as blueprints for Commission pro-
posals. Member States send their personnel to aid the Commission, but these Com-
mission aides also look after the interests of the Member State in question.
The European policy arena is open toMember States that have the ability to act as ‘insider
claims makers’ in Bests terminology and to push their own policies on the Commission
agenda. It is suggested in the literature that for the Member State it is attractive to do so,
and to bring its own regulation to the attention of EU legislative bodies. Nevertheless, the
export of policy to the European arena is bound to have unintended consequences.
My conclusion is that the content of European policy depends on a process of what
can be considered bricolage. Bricolage refers to a construction process in which ele-
ments are put together in a willy-nilly fashion frommaterials that happen to be avail-
able. Member States and other institutions provide ideas and policies, but elements of
these are used and combined with other elements, creating something that is totally
different from what was envisaged.
The European arena is a policy making arena in which it takes a long time for a policy
initiative to mature and eventually be enacted in the form of a regulation or Directive.
First Member States are consulted about a certain intension of the Commission, than
experts are sought and they work out the scientific and economic details of the pro-
posal. Subsequently, rounds of negotiation between the Commission and the Council
of Ministers and the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament take place.
During all these phases European institutions, lobby groups, Member States and
other pressure groups try to make their mark on the eventual regulatory end product.
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This process becomes clear when we view the long trajectory during which the Euro-
pean air quality policy from the 1990s came to fruition. The Netherlands introduced
the idea of asking the WHO for air quality guidelines, subsequently they became a
benchmark for EU air quality policy. The Netherlands also helped to introduce
eco-modernist ideas, which found their place in the 5th EAP and through the 5th
EAP influenced the Air Quality Directives. Meanwhile the idea that policies should
be supported by cost benefit assessments and impact assessments gained ground
and such a document was duly produced. UK civil servants had their own designs
for the Air Quality Directive and it was moulded after UK, but also Dutch air quality
policies on the national level. Eventually Directives emerged that were concerned
with sustainable development and public health, but also with research into the
effects of air pollution, the role of public health institutes, the harmonisation of mea-
suring equipment, reporting to the Commission, andmaking pollution data available
to the public. These various aims of the directives reflect the interests of the actors
involved and their underlying ideology.
In the air quality case, WHO input, eco-modernistic ideas, UK influence, and eco-
nomic data were all combined and mixed, and the result was a directive that contai-
ned elements of all these disparate aspects. This process of bricolage is of interest for
Member States that intend to export their policies or their policy ideas to the European
arena. Such a process is highly unpredictable, and is influenced by factors that are
difficult to take into account and foresee in advance. Over time, the original ideas will
bemangled, recycled, translated, and embellished in unforeseenways, and by a num-
ber of different actors. It is questionablewhether the originalMember State will still be
happy with the regulatory end-product.
The case of the Netherlands in the field of air quality is a case in point. When the Neth-
erlands asked the WHO to set air quality guidelines, the issue was taken out of Dutch
Government’s hands. Years later, the WHO guidelines became an instrumental
benchmark, and would eventually cause the Dutch Government a considerable num-
ber of political and economic problems.
The same scenario is applicable to the Dutch export of eco-modernist policy ideas.
Publicmobilisationwas an eco-modernistic strategy, andwas applied in the Air Qual-
ity Directives. In the Netherlands, the public was indeedmobilised, andwent to court
over noncompliance with the directives. All was in conformity with eco-modernist
policy philosophy, but it proved to be a major economic problem. The explanation
for thismishapmay be found by comparing the Dutch policy arenawith the EU arena.
In the Netherlands, ecological modernisation was based on a tacit consensus between
market parties and the administration. Market parties would not be overburdened,
and in exchange they would adopt environmental measures considered reasonable
by both parties. It worked in an atmosphere in which the parties knew each other
and relations were not polarised. The Dutch strategy combined the target group pol-
icy with mobilisation of the public. In the European Union, however, things worked
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out differently. The Commission focused on mobilisation of the public to act as its
‘eyes and ears’ in a rather antagonistic fashion. Information rights for the public in
the Air Quality Directives were included to make the public aware of air pollution
problems, and to create pressure on the Member States to comply.
This information- and mobilisation-based strategy was combined with top-down
standard setting in the Commission proposal, which was not in conformity with
Dutch ecological modernisation, but followed from the ideas outlined in the report
‘1992, the environmental dimension’. Quality standards were the preferred British
way to regulate air quality. Both publicmobilisation aswell as the top-down character
of the air quality regulation proved to be thorns in the side of the Dutch Government
when attempting to break the deadlock over air quality in 2005. The combination of
public mobilisation and top-down standard setting together in one directive caused
unforeseen problems, because in an environmentally aware public began to use the
rigid standards to halt infrastructural development.
The importance of eco-modernistic arguments may also be illustrated by the impor-
tance attached to the cost-benefit assessment underpinning the Daughter Directive.
On the basis of overly optimistic assumptions, economists concluded that the direc-
tive was cost-effective. The emphasis on the economic aspect of environmental policy
was typical of ecological modernisation, but also typical of the multitude of consid-
erations that come into play when European proposals are under consideration. The
cost-benefit assessment took into account the effects of many policies that still had to
deliver air quality benefits, heightening the uncertainties. Nonetheless it was used to
argue in favour of strict standards.
These standards were the unintended result of initiatives and policy ideas that the
Netherlands helped to shape. In the end, they turned out to conform neither to Dutch
economic interests, nor to its policy philosophy.
4.7.3 Speaking health to power: the discursive force of ‘doctor knows best’
The WHO involvement in air quality regulation and the asthma case in the UK in the
early 1990s contributed to the re-emergence of a storyline that bad air quality was a
serious threat to human health. It was a re-emerging storyline, because the consider-
ation that bad environmental hygiene, including air pollution, damaged public health
was a pervasive rationale behind environmental regulation in the 1970s. However, in
the 1980s this connection receded to the background, and environmental problems
became linked to eco-system threats.
From a discourse analytic perspective, WHO involvement in air quality regulation
was of interest. Many respondents and the reviewed literature indicated that the
involvementwas crucial and that it managed to silence otherwise criticalMember Sta-
tes. As Krijgsheld noted, the WHOwas invited by Dutch civil servants to produce air
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quality guidelines. A critical factor was the insistence that the guidelines contain
numerical values of risk estimates. Numerical values are easily usable for policy
makers, and that was the idea behind the WHO involvement. The WHO produced
a document that could be used easily for political purposes, and the Commission could
refer to the WHO document to legitimate its regulatory aims. We find a discourse coa-
lition between the WHO scientists and the Commission, around the storyline that bad
air quality was a highliy significant health threat that proved difficult to counter.
This discourse coalition succeeded in silencing dissenting voices. No one asked crit-
ical questions about the necessity of setting health-based standards. The Dutch had
cautiously raised the issue of scientific uncertainty, but were quickly argumentatively
outgunned according to Rood et al. (2005). The policy process of the Air Quality
Directives displayed the force of health-based arguments, and theWHOmedical pro-
fessionals managed to shift the discussion in the direction of health protection, which
succeeded in overriding traditional economic concerns. With a play on words regard-
ing the classical phrase – that one may speak truth to power – we witness here a sit-
uation of speaking health to power.
The decision to bring in the medical experts in the early 1980s turned out to be a pow-
erful discursive move by the Dutch Government, and its influence in the 1990s shows
that the alliance between the fields of environmental policy and public health was still
a potentially strong one. This is an intriguing finding, because in the 1980s amore eco-
centric approach held sway, in which the importance of eco-systems was underlined.
The environment was considered important for its own sake, and the emphasis on
human health was considered a narrow-minded approach. Apparently an emphasis
on public health could still strengthen considerably the environmental cause. In fact,
the WHO’s influence was stronger in the 1990s than in the 1980s, a sign that public
health was an increasing public concern that even managed to override traditional
economic considerations.
4.7.4 ‘Pet fears’ and the Europeanisation of environmental concerns
The storyline that bad air quality was a health threat was developed further by the
asthma episode in theUK.UK representatives played an important role at the inception
of the Daughter Directive and they iterated that air pollution resulting from exhaust
fumes was particularly dangerous. The connection between asthma and air pollution
caused by road traffic was made explicitly in the discussion in the UK, but it became a
wider issue through the promulgation of the directives. The UK discussion preceded
the one in the Netherlands. Worrying scientific results were published here as well,
but they raised little alarm until 1999. In the UK, the findings of epidemiologists spar-
ked public protests much earlier, causing the UK Government to side with the Com-
mission and support the proposal. Discursively, the involvement of the UK directed
attention to the harmful effects of road traffic.
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UK involvement was no surprise when one considers that the UK was historically
prone to be fearful of air pollution. Fog in London is a peculiar British phenomenon,
but it is more than an idiosyncrasy. In 1952, the Great London Fog killed thousands
due to a combination of fog and smoke that indeed choked the city. Air quality stan-
dards were set in order to combat this type of smog in the future. The Great London
Fog is still a part of the collective British memory; it was recalled dramatically in the
asthma crisis of the 1990s, and is part and parcel of UK presentations delivered on air
pollution (Marjan Van Giezen, interview).
I am borrowing the description ‘pet fear’ from UK researcher Ragnar Lovstett to
describe a peculiar social problem that is culturally defined, and to which a particular
country or group is subject.8 Urban air quality is a British pet fear, and it is therefore
understandable that childhood asthma caused by exhaust fumes could become a
social problem in the early 1990s. This problem coincidedwith recent scientific results
on the danger of PM10 and the EU regulatory preparations for a new air quality pol-
icy. This presented the opportunity to the UK Government to export its own pet fear
to the European arena. Not every country of course has the same pet fears. According
to Lovstett, people in Denmark are fearful of the harmful effects of radiation from
power stations, while to the German psyche, the dying of forests is deeply troubling
(Bramwell 1989).
I hypothesise that we are witnessing a dynamic that leads to the proliferation of envi-
ronmental fears in the European Union. The European policy arena provides oppor-
tunities forMember States to export their own pet fears to the European level, and it is
tempting to do so. Member States are under domestic pressure to propose strict reg-
ulatory measures to curb the pet fear, just as was the UK in the case of air quality.
Because strict domestic regulation leads to a comparative disadvantage for domestic
industries, it makes sense to export one’s policy solutions to the European level. This
may not always lead to satisfactory outcomes, as discussed above, but it is tempting
nonetheless.
This export of policy is done through the discursive device of the storyline. To con-
vince the Commission and other Member States, a storyline must be presented about
why this problem needs urgent regulatory attention. Through the use of storylines,
problems are exported together with the policy solutions for them. UK representa-
tives will inform us about the potential catastrophic impacts of urban air pollution;
Danish representatives will tell us about the harm of radiation; Swedish representa-
tives push concern for chemicals in consumer products; and theGermanswill warn us
about forest decay.
8. I heard the phrase in his keynote lecture, ‘Risk Communication in the 21st Century’, at the conference
‘Grenzen aan de risicobenadering’, 13 May 2009, Scheveningen, the Netherlands.
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The threat of bad air quality was similarly exported to the Netherlands. Before the
promulgation of European directives and their outcomes in court cases, air quality
was not a topic of great concern in the Netherlands. Through European policy
making, however, it became a concern for Dutch residents as well, and the story-
line took hold. In the air quality clash, the storyline that air pollution caused by
motorised traffic leads to premature mortality is one of the most important ones.
It started with the claims made by epidemiologists and was reinforced by UK rep-
resentatives for domestic reasons and the WHO and finally embraced by EU insti-
tutions which fed it back to the public by way of regulation with an explicit
awareness raising aim.
4.7.5 Air quality standards as examples of a legality of precaution
The standards for air pollution promulgated in 1999 were European law, and they
had to be implemented inDutch law. TheNetherlands did so in 2001. Air quality stan-
dards were in fact not new; earlier EU Directives contained air quality standards as
well, but their practical importance was limited because the Netherlands generally
complied with these standards. The situation was different for the 1999 standards,
and in many parts of the country the standards would be exceeded. The question
is whether the promulgation of these standards should be considered as fitting within
a change towards a legality of precaution.
A number of considerations led to the conclusion that the air quality standards were
indeed precautionary. The main argument for considering the Air Quality Directives
as examples of precautionary legislation is that the standards for PM10 were set with-
out much scientific certainty. The EU Technical Working Group on Particulate Matter
highlighted many uncertainties and even considered whether a limit value should be
set or whether a range should be given. It was also unsure as towhether PM10was the
right fraction of PM to regulate, or whether PM2.5 should be targeted instead. The
Working Group opted for PM10 because the knowledge regarding PM2.5 was even
more incomplete. PM10 was a pollutant measured in only a few countries at the time,
and the Dutch Government considered that the information about emission invento-
ries was insufficient. Moreover, there were serious doubts regarding the feasibility of
the air quality standards. One may argue that the European Union acted early on the
basis of new scientific data such as the epidemiological studies discussed in chapter 2.
However, this discussion also revealed that much was still unclear. Policy making to
protect health or the environment without complete scientific certainty is a hallmark
of a precautionary approach because it conforms to the precautionary principle in
environmental law.
The precautionary principle is of course a cornerstone of a precautionary legality. In
the air quality case, the precautionary principle was hardly ever mentioned as such.
However, precautionary considerations lay at the heart of the air quality standards.
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They certainly lay at the heart of the UK strategy, which influenced the eventual EU
strategy. When confronted with the possibility that PM10 caused large-scale health
problems, the UK’s air pollution Committee, COMEAP, stated in 1995: ‘It would be
imprudent not to regard the associations as causal’. Such considerations are a clear indi-
cation of precautionary logic, because even before it is known whether an association
found is indeed a causative relation, it is treated as such. This implies that measures
need to be taken before the scientific evidence is settled on the issue. Moreover,
respondents from the VROMMinistry considered that these EU policies were a form
of ‘no regret policy’, as such policies prescribe taking preventative measures early in
order to avoid the possibility of acting too late.
The information requirements included in the Air Quality Directives were in line with
the legality of precaution as well. The public had to be made aware of the remaining
risks of air pollution so that it could take preventative measures, but also to enable the
public to make its voice heard.
The primary aim of the directives was to reduce the effects of long-term exposure to
air pollution. Such attention to damage becoming manifest in the long term, and with
a considerable margin of uncertainty, is the type of damage that takes centre stage in a
legality of precaution.
These reasons demonstrate that the Air Quality Directives themselves fit neatly
within the legality of precaution. However, the policy process that led to them did
not fully subscribe to this legality. Elements from the legality of risk and compensa-
tion are also conspicuous in this process, and most conspicuous is the presence of an
economic evaluation. The existence of such a cost-benefit analysis points towards the
calculation of risks, and this is indicative of a legality of risk and compensation in
which the concept of risk rather than precaution takes centre stage. Reliance on expert
data from theWHO fits within the ideal typical picture of the legality of risk and com-
pensation as well, because in this type of legality, expert knowledge is considered the
best justification for policy, while the legality of precaution also considers the layper-
son’s subjective judgment to be crucial.
An analysis of these different elements indicates that the results of the policy mak-
ing process were precautionary, but that the policy process itself also contained
elements belonging to the legality of risk and compensation. Justification for the
strict standards was not the outrage of civilians over the occurrence of damage,
as one would expect in a legality of precaution. Instead, it was an expert-driven
process in which health considerations dominated. In this case, even economic
rationality, such as the rationality to choose air quality standards in service of
the common market and the presence of a cost benefit analysis, led to precaution-
ary legislation.
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TIMELINE EU AIR QUALITY POLICY IN THE 1990S
1983 Dutch civil servant approached the WHO in order to ask for air quality guidelines
1987 WHO published first air quality guidelines
1989 NMP released
1990 Publication of “1992” The Environmental Dimension’
1993 First contacts with Member States over new air quality policy
1994 Major Concerns over asthma in the UK
1994 Proposal COM(94)104 for the Air Quality Framework Directive
1996 Adoption Framework Directive 96/62/EC
1997 UK air quality strategy unveiled
1997 Labour wins UK elections
1997 Proposal for First Air Quality Daughter Directive COM(97)500
1998 Common position on proposal COM(97)500
1999 First Daughter Directive on ambient Air Quality Directive 99/30/EC promulgated
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Endpoint Relative Risk for
PM2.5 (95% C.I.)
Relative risk for
PM10 (95% C.I.)
Bronchodilator use
Cough
LRS
PEF change (relative to mean)
Respiratory hospital admissions
Mortality 1.015 (1.011-1.019)
1.0305 (1.0201-1.0410)
1.0356 (1.0197-1.0518
1.0324 (1.0185-1.0464
1.0080 (1.0048-1.0112)
-.13% (-.17% - -.09%)
1.0074 (1.0062-1.0086)
(3) Dockery, D.W. et al.  Health effects of acid aerosols on North American children: 
 respiratory symptoms.  Environmental Health Perspectives, 104: 500-505 (1996)
(1) Dockery, D.W. et al.  An asociation between air pollution and mortality in six U.S.
  cities. New England Journal of Medicine 329: 1753-1759 (1993). 
(2) Pope, C.A. III. et al.  Particulate air pollution as a predictor of mortality in a 
 prospective study of U.S. adults.  American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care 
 Medicine 151:669-674 (1995)
(4) Raizenne, M. et al.  Health effects of acid aerosols on North American children:
 pulmonary function.  Environmental Health Perspectives, 104: 506-514 (1996)
Table Summary of Relative Risk estimates for effects of long-term exposure to PM on
 morbidity and mortality associated with a 10 μg/m increase in the 
 concentration of PM10 or PM2.5 
Table Summary of  Relative Risk estimate for bronchodilator use, cough and  LRS
 reporting, PEF changes and respiratory hospital admissions and daily mortality,
 associated with a 10 μg/m increase in the concentration of PM10 or PM2.5
 (results of meta-analysis of available studies) 
3
3
Endpoint Relative Risk for
PM2.5 (95% C.I.)
Relative Risk for
PM10 (95% C.I.)
Mortality (1)
Mortality (2)
Bronchitis (3)
% change in FEV1, children (4)
% change in FEV1, adults (5)
1.14 (1.04, 1.24)
1.07 (1.04, 1.11)
1.34 (0.94, 1.99)
-1.9% (-3.1%, -0.6%)
1.10 (1.03, 1.18)
1.29 (0.96, 1.83)
-1.2% (-2.7%, -0,1%)
-1.0% (n.a.)
n.a.
TABLE 6: PM10 RISK TABLES IN 1996 PROVIDED BY THE WHO
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 DUTCH AIR QUALITY LEGISLATION AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIR QUALITY
DIRECTIVES 1982 – 2001
INTRODUCTION
In Europe the new scientific findings related to air quality and the turn to ecological
modernisation led to an ambitious new air quality policy in 1999 that contained tough
standards as well as a program to raise awareness among the population. Meanwhile,
also in 1999, Dutch public health agencies were claiming that air quality caused sig-
nificant health damage in residential areas near highways such as Overschie. These
dual developments impacted Dutch environmental policy. The Dutch Government
was under a European obligation to implement the European Directives in Dutch
law and the new scientific findings in combination with the public stir in Overschie
also invited a policy response. In this chapter we will look at the development of
Dutch air quality policy up to and including the transposition of the Air Quality
Directives.
Frommy interviews and the policy documents it turned out the Dutch policy makers
were aware that meeting the air quality standards in the Netherlands in time would
be very difficult and very costly. The main question asked in this chapter in why the
Dutch Government chose a strict implementation of the Air Quality Directives in
Dutch law, in the face of this knowledge. In this chapter two conclusions are pro-
vided. One explanation focusses on political and strategic choices made by Minister
of VROM Jan Pronk (PvdA) at the time of the implementation. A second more struc-
tural explanation relates the strict transposition to the failure to find a political answer
to the new scientific findings. The ecological modernistic consensus in the Nether-
lands entailed that standards that were perceived as being scientifically not well sup-
ported and that placed unreasonable demands, could not be considered legitimate
standards and the Dutch Government could not be held to account for them. In light
of the events in 2004, that proved to be a costly miscalculation on the part of the
administration.
First we will examine early Dutch air quality policy from the 1980s and 1990s. The
policy process regarding air quality and its lack of urgency in these decades helps
to understandwhy theGovernment underestimated the potential regulatory problem
the air quality standards could pose. Subsequently the implementation of the EU
Directives in Dutch law is considered. In the final section, a number of explanations
for the strict implementation are provided and the role of ecological modernisation
and the legality of precaution in this process are considered.
. POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE S AND S
Before discussing the eventual implementation of the European air quality standards
in Dutch law, it is necessary to dwell on air quality policy in the 1980s and 1990s. The
policies from those decades form the political context within which the eventual
implementation of the Air Quality Directives may be understood. An investigation
into air quality policy in the 1980s is undertaken in section 5.1.1 and this reveals that
while the Dutch Government voiced ambitions in the field of air quality, in practice it
trailed European developments. In the 1990s PM emerged on the scene as a poten-
tially serious health problem (5.1.2.) and Dutch policy in response to this problem
is investigated in 5.1.3. Finally, in 5.1.4., the emergence of policy – or rather the
non-emergence of policy – in the latter half of the 1990s is under scrutiny.
5.1.1 Early Dutch air-quality regulation
In the 1980s, a policy regarding air quality received its first serious consideration as a
possible means of combatting air pollution. Quality standards became popular as a
way to integrate environmental concerns into other areas of policy, most notably spa-
tial planning.1 At the beginning of the 1980s, just before the takeover by Pieter Win-
semius and the change of Ministry from VOMIL to VROM, air-quality standards
gained political prominence.
When VROM Minister Winsemius took over in 1982, he considered air-quality stan-
dards as well, and in the plans drafted under his auspices, a list of priority substances
was provided for. These substances were to be regulatedwithin an encompassing sys-
tem of air-quality standards. It was clear, however, that such standards could not be
formulated in the short term. In principle, they had to be set at a level that could safe-
guard public health, the ongoing existence of certain plants and animals, and even
economic goods. In many cases, scientific knowledge was not yet sufficient to formu-
late such standards, making the establishing of dose/effect relationships an arduous
task. Hence, the development of WHO guidelines was considered to be helpful
(VROM 1983, p. 28).
However, practical policy moved in a different direction. Targeting the effects of pol-
lution generally became subordinate to changing the behaviour of polluters, andWin-
semius and his successor Ed Nijpels focused increasingly on target-group policy.
1. See chapter 3.
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Nijpels noted that it was difficult to formulate quality standards for all the different
substances, and that sources of pollution could also be tackled without those
demands (VROM 1986, p. 9). In later IMPs up to the NMP, the WHO guidelines were
no longer mentioned.
The IMPs contained air-quality standards for a host of polluting substances, but
because therewas no basis in Dutch law for setting such standards (Spaans&Michiels
2000, p. 102), they remained simply as extra-legal guidelines for policy makers. In
practice, the Netherlands imported European air-quality policies; standards with a
legal basis were set only for a certain number of pollutants because they becameman-
datory as a result of EU law. In 1980, the EU proclaimed standards for particle pol-
lution and SO2 (Directive 80/779/EC). In 1982, standards for lead were promulgated,
and NO2 was regulated in 1985. These early European air-quality Directives were not
very strict, however, and required only minimal policy interventions from Member
States (Hey 2005, p. 19). After setting standards for air quality became possible under
Dutch law, European air-quality Directives were implemented for SO2 and Particu-
lates (not as PM10, but as black smoke), carbon monoxide, NO2, lead, and the last
one, benzene, in 1993. Only in the case of benzene was the Dutch Government not
under an obligation imposed by previous EU directives.
Within the scope of the inquiry into the PM clash, the Directive that regulated SO2 and
particles together is of most interest. The Air Quality Order2 on SO2 and Particulates
(Besluit Luchtkwaliteit Zwaveloxide en Zwevende Deeltjes (Stb. 1986, 78), henceforth
AQO SO2 and Particulates) regulated particles and SO2 together. The AQO on SO2
and Particulates included the terms ‘limit value’ and ‘target value’. These terms
would remain in use later on and throughout further air-quality regulation. Target
values needed to be taken into consideration when policy was formulated, which
meant that although policy had to be aimed at reaching the values, failing to reach
them did not have immediate legal consequences. This target value represented a
long-term aim. The limit value was stricter, and needed to be observed (‘in acht
nemen’, in Dutch). Observing a limit value meant that policy should be adjusted to
reach and maintain those values and the administration was under a legal obligation
to reach the limit values in time, and to guarantee that they were maintained.
While use of the term limit value suggested a strict implementation, the wording of
the ExplanatoryMemorandumdemonstrated that the chance of this law having social
economic repercussionswas consideredminimal (Stb. 1986, 78). TheNetherlandswas
already in compliance with the set of limit values. For particles, it was not expected
2. The General Administrative Order is an instrument in Dutch administrative law by which the admin-
istration can execute certain competencies granted by law,without needing the approval of the First and
Second Chamber in Parliament. The General Administrative Order has the status of law see also section
3.1.1.
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that any additional measures would need to be taken, and it was anticipated that the
Netherlands would comply relatively easily with the Directive and the Dutch
implementation.
In later documents such as VROMraad (2008, p. 9) and Rood (2005, p. 8), it was clear
that the Netherlands was labouring under considerable pressure relating to the envi-
ronment, but this notion was absent in the E.M. to the Air Quality Order SO2 and Par-
ticulates. On the contrary, environmental pressure was considered to be low in the
Netherlands. On page 12 of the memorandum, it was stated that the limit values were
not exceeded in the Netherlands, because it was a flat country, because certain clima-
tologic conditions prevailed, and because gas was used on a large scale (Stb. 1986, 78).
The memorandum did not indicate what to do when limit values were exceeded, and
this lack of precision reinforced the impression that it was not considered likely that
the standards in the Netherlands would become problematic.
The Dutch AQO on SO2 and Particulates was evaluated in 1992, and it wasmade clear
that even those modest obligations had not been met. Exceedances did occur occa-
sionally, but were rarely reported, and administrative commitment to comply with
the directive was low, as lower administrative bodies did not attach great weight
to the air-quality obligations stemming from the 1980s (VROM 1992). The easy accep-
tancewithwhich EU regulations were imported, and the few consequences attributed
to them, indicate that air-quality standards were largely ignored in practice, due to
administrative indifference and lack of commitment. Such standards were generally
not considered by Dutch policy makers to be ‘painful’ (Maas & Eerens, interview).
5.1.2 The turn to PM in Dutch policy from the 1990s
Scientific awareness with respect to air quality flourished in the Netherlands, and
state-of-the-art information about pollutants was laid down in ‘criteria documents’.
In these documents, pollutants were described and their effects considered, and
the compilations were used to aid in policy making. In early 1994, as a result of
the European Union’s regulatory activity, a new criteria document on Particulate
Matter appeared (Annema et al. 1994), which was geared to the issuing of more rig-
orous air-quality regulation, including PM10 standards.3 The Dutch Government was
forced to form an opinion regarding PM10 policy. The document indicated that con-
siderable uncertainty regarding PM still existed, and urged that the findings be trea-
ted as indicative. Inmost cases, it was not fully knownwhat type of particle was being
emitted, whichmade it difficult to saymuch about PM10’s general toxicity. The RIVM
estimated at the time that industry was primarily responsible for the emission of PM
with 50-60% and traffic with 10-25% (Annema et al. 1994).
3. The first criteriadocument on PM10 dated from 1987 (Van der Meulen et al. 1987).
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This criteria document was sent to theDutchHealth Council, which reviewed the findings
and compiled a final advisory policy concerning a quality standard. The Health Council
considered that there was evidence that particulate pollution could cause chronic health
problems, but it was still not known how it led to ill health, or what components were
responsible for its effects. This made it difficult for policy makers to recommend a limit
value. PMdidnot appear to exhibit a no-effect level –one atwhich no adverse effects occur.
Due to the lack of data and the absence of a no-effect level, the Council was hesitant to
advise a specific value, but considered that any level of PM10 was probably harmful.
This conclusion had implications for policy. The Health Council advised that it was
not particularly useful to reduce the number of days in which PM10 levels were high,
but structural and technical measures reducing industrial and traffic emissions
should be taken. These measures should, however be considered in an international
context. In the Netherlands, the background concentrations were structurally high,
and had to do with the amount of PM10 in the air regardless of any source of
PM10 nearby. The high level of background concentration caused more harm than
the limited exposure in peak periods, as it led to chronic exposure.
Moreover, if there was no ‘no-effect level’, any standard was in principle arbitrary.
There was no standard below which no or far less mortality occurred; it increased
incrementally. Whether actual concentration levels were 39 mug/m3 or 41 mug/m3
did not greatly matter in terms of health. This implied that taking measures to reduce
concentration levels from 41 mug/m3 to 40 mug/m3 simply to meet the standard did
not result in large gains for public health.
Owing to such considerations, theHealthCouncil recommendednot informing the general
public. People who were particularly vulnerable were to be advised by their general prac-
titioner, but public information campaigns were not considered prudent, because they
could cause people to modify their behaviour unnecessarily (Clarenburg 1995, p. 68).
5.1.3 PM10 as a serious problem for Dutch policy
PM10 presented a tough challenge for Dutch policy. Nationally and internationally,
epidemiological scientists pointed out the possibility of serious health effects, but the
level of uncertainty remained high.
The political quandary was worsened by the fact that abatement policies were diffi-
cult and costly. Firstly, roughly two thirds of the pollution found in Dutch air was of
foreign origin. The export of air pollution from theNetherlandswas on a similar scale.
That meant that a reduction of emissions in the Netherlands would lead to drops in
the total number of pollutants emitted in the air, but since most air pollution was
imported anyway, or exported out of the Netherlands, it would have a much smaller
effect on concentrations in the Netherlands itself.
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Secondly, due to the high background concentrations in theNetherlands, it turned out
to be very difficult to achieve any drop in concentrations at all, and almost impossible
to force air-quality concentrations below the European standard. In 2005, the back-
ground concentration was already approaching the yearly standard of 40 mug/m3
proclaimed in the EUDirective, and exceeding the average daily standard. Dutch pol-
icy could only be marginally effective in the case of PM10, because the contribution of
Dutch sources of pollution to the background concentrations in the country was lim-
ited. European sources contributed a greater share. Moreover, the origins of a sizable
fraction of PM concentrations were unclear. According to the MNP in 2005, the grea-
test share of background PM was due to ‘other sources’, meaning that they could not
be specified (MNP 2005a, p. 14, table). Since we had little knowledge regarding the
origin of this amount of PM, it was unclear as to how those concentrations could
be effected. Even if peaks were to be greatly reduced – for instance, by closing the
roads – the standards could not be reached.
The limited influence that theNetherlands had on its own concentrations of PM,made
it very costly to achieve extra reductions. Buringh and Opperhuizen concluded in a
survey for the RIVM in 2002 that the maximum feasible reduction that could be ach-
ieved by reducing PM10 concentrations was 1.1 mug/m3. This package of measures
would cost the Dutch state 6 billion Euro per annum (Buringh & Opperhuizen 2002a,
p. 14). Since annual regional background concentrations averaged between 32 and 42
mug/m3 in 1995 (Van Velzen et al. 2000, p. 11), one may conclude that such a reduc-
tion constituted only a small fraction of the total concentrations of PM in the Nether-
lands. The researchers did note that higher reductions were predicted locally, also
with a less expensive package.
The question as to what to do in this situation presented a challenge for Dutch envi-
ronmental policy throughout the 1990s, but not one that policy makers were eager to
confront head on. The Netherlands had a ‘smog regulation’, which controlled the pro-
vision of information. In 1995, the Government issued a ‘preliminary policy opinion
on Particulate Matter and winter smog’ (interim beleidsstandpunt fijnstof en winter-
smog). It was proclaimed that reducing PM was considered to be of the highest pri-
ority, and that it was possible that health effects could still occur, even with the low
levels of PM10 experienced at that time. The document mentioned the paucity of
information with respect to the PM’s mixture of toxic components, and that made
it unclear as to what substance should be targeted. Reducing PM10 was considered
to be well-nigh impossible for the Netherlands to do on its own. The letter accompa-
nying the preliminary policy opinion noted: ‘The key to abate harmful effects on public
health is reducing emissions of PM10 on a European scale’.4 The political plan was to wait
for Europe to act.
4. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 005 nr. 3, p. 1.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
However, this option of waiting for Europe carried political risks, as policies from
Europe might not fit within the Dutch national context. Warnings came from the
Provinces that the new rules should fit the Dutch decentralised system, in which
lower administrative bodies were responsible for conducting local environmental
policy (Van der Werf 1997, p. 66). The VROMMinistry promised to tackle air quality
in tandem with the lower administrative bodies in a plan in which they would be
granted enough flexibility to deal with the coming standards. It promised an urban
air-quality action plan that was especially tuned to the needs of lower administrative
bodies. The Environmental Programme 1998-2001 stated:
‘One subject in the action plan is the way in which the aim of decentralisation on the national level and
centralisation on EU level will take shape. [..] The intention is to create as much discretion for local
administrations as possible and come to terms over conditions (over procedures, among other things)’.5
The quote indicated that policy makers were aware early on that these standards
could conflict with the Dutch approach to environmental regulation.
In Europe, the Dutch Government supported ambitious policy development, and
Dutch negotiators associated themselves with the green camp (Rood 2005). Environ-
mental Minister Margreeth de Boer was positive as well. Her successor Jan Pronk
stated that it was Government policy at the time to be positive towards the European
regulation; the same conclusion was drawn by the Social Economic Council, which
reviewed Dutch policy on European environmental regulation (SER 2006, p. 54).
5.1.4 Air Quality policies in the latter 1990s
In the Netherlands itself, things remained mostly quiet on the policy front. Environ-
mental policy for the long termwas laid down inNational Environmental Policy Plans,
the NMPs, and for the short term in Environmental Programmes. In 1998, the Ministry
of VROM promised to come up with a new policy document on PM to replace the
interim policy opinion. It was expected that more would be known about the continu-
ing European negotiations. In the meantime, more research had to fill the existing gaps
in information. The third NMP, also issued in 1998, outlined Dutch environmental pol-
icy from 1998-2002. It referred to this coming policy opinion (VROM 1998, p. 303), but
other than that, little was said about PM10. In these NMPs, PM10 was named as a pri-
ority, and road transport was indicated as a major contributor to PM10 emissions
(VROM 1998, p. 150), but extra reduction measures were not proposed.
In 1998, the policy statement on PM10 did not appear, nor did the plan of action on
urban air quality. According to the Environmental Programme stating the actions for
2000 to 2003, these policy documents were to be combined into one big Air Quality
5. Kamerstukken II 1997-1998, 25 605, nr. 2, p. 102.
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Memorandum.6 However, this Air Quality Memorandum also met with delays.
According to an internal memorandum (Project group EU Daughter Directives,
Minutes meeting 23-09 1998, on file with the author), these delays were due to the fact
that new scientific reports on PM10 from the RIVM were not available.
After the air-quality Daughter Directive was adopted in 1999, the uncertainties remained
considerable – somuch so in fact that because of a lack of insight into the causality between
the components in Particulate Matter and health effects, it was considered impossible to
formulate any cost-effective policy on PM10. The Environmental Programme 2002-2005
stated: In contrast to other substances, according to the RIVM it is not possible to formulate
any cost-effective reduction policy, due to lack of insight into the causal relation between the com-
position of PM10 and health effects’.7 The smog regulation was updated in 2001.
The promised memorandum on air quality was also not released. In 2001, political
developments caught upwith the Government, because the air-quality standards laid
down in the Daughter Directive had to be implemented. That meant that in the
explanatorymemorandum issuedwith the law, and in this law itself, the new air qual-
ity policy had to be laid down. It was already known that achieving the standards
would be very difficult, and the strategy of the Government was to wait for an eval-
uation of the Directive as had been promised in article 10 of the Daughter Directive,
and if possible to renegotiate with the European Commission. The political line
regarding the pollutant NO2 was summarised as follows in the Environmental Pro-
gramme 2002-2005:
‘Until the evaluation, the Government takes the following line: even though the standards forNO2 in
the directive are binding, this does not imply that in all existing situations measures need to be taken
immediately. The first plans need to be made by 2003, and they need to be executed in the years imme-
diately following. Definitive decision making about taking expensive clean-up measures needs to be
delayed as long as possible until the outcome of the evaluation of the Directive becomes available’.8
The mandated reduction of PM10 concentrations was considered to be in all proba-
bility not even feasible: ‘Concerning PM10, the situation is that concentrations in the whole
of the Netherlands are so much above the limit values that it cannot be expected that they can be
brought down enough to comply with them within a reasonable time frame’.9 This expecta-
tion was in line with RIVM’s expectation. It noted: ‘For PM10, the EU mandated daily
limit values are also not yet feasible for 2005 (RIVM 2000, p. 124).
Before the implementation, the following rule of thumb was formulated: there would
be no large-scale clean-up operations; for instance, housing in areas that were in
6. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 804, nr. 2, p. 133.
7. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 003 nr. 2, p. 13.
8. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 003 nr. 2, p. 58.
9. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 003 nr. 2, p. 56.
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breach of the air quality standards would not be demolished. However, new projects
would only be realised in locations that were considered to be non-sensitive – namely,
areas inwhich people did not spend a significant amount of time. Pronk reasoned that
this strategy would control the damage done to public health without making con-
struction impossible.
Policy started moving in earnest only after ‘Overschie’ attracted attention in 1999. In
Parliament Minister Pronk tried to raise awareness and proposed measures, among
which a moratorium on building close to highways. He also opposed his colleague
Tineke Netelenbos, Minister of V&W, on the issue of road construction and upon
his instigation the speed limit near Overschie was lowered. Initially though his pro-
posals were not heeded.
I conclude that with regard to air quality, the Government was caught between a
rock and a hard place. National measures had little impact on actual air-quality
concentrations, because of the strong influence of foreign sources and high back-
ground concentrations. Reduction policies were costly, and it was questionable
as to whether they would be effective. Scientific data was lacking as well. Inter-
nally, PM10 and NO2 were subjects of discussion, for instance, by the project
group and by the Directorate General of the Environment at the VROMMinistry.
These internal discussions were confirmed by internal memos, such as the one
issued about the Action Plan Urban Air Quality and memos made by the project
group EU Daughter Directives. Despite the discussions, however, an effective
policy was not formulated in the 1990s. The Ministry bet on the evaluation of
the Directive, and opted for a strategy that could be summarised as ‘waiting
for Europe’. In the meantime, it tried to contain the problems by formulating a
pragmatic strategy.
However, the Government was also not well prepared, as those strategies were not
laid down anywhere, and concrete proposals to tackle air quality did not emerge
either. In fact, after leaving the hands of scientists and entering the political realm,
the topic of air quality faded into the background. From a political perspective, the
subject of air quality remained a strange issue, because politicians did not foresee
it as having strong social ramifications. It was considered a European problem,
and should be dealt with on that level.
. IMPLEMENTATION OF AIR-QUALITY DIRECTIVES IN 
The implementation of EU air-quality standards in Dutch law ended the political
process that began in the 1990s, as a result of the emergence of new scientific infor-
mation. In the absence of other policy documents, the new to be drafted Air Quality
Order 2001 (Stb. 2001, 269). Hereafter AQO 2001, and its explanatory memorandum
would be the Dutch answer to these findings and to the regulation imposed by the
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EU. The Dutch Government was in a difficult situation at the time, because although
scientific findings signalled a potential threat, there were few credible interventions
to counter it.
Before looking at the transposition itself, this section is devoted to the place of envi-
ronmental quality standards in Dutch environmental law. The implications of the
implementation can only be fully understood when it is clear what the legal conse-
quences of air-quality standards were. Moreover, in order to understand the function
of those standards within the context of the Dutch system of environmental law, we
will examine the question of when it was incumbent to set environmental quality
standards in accordance with the Dutch policy philosophy.
5.2.1 The link between environmental standards and spatial planning
From early on, environmental quality standards played a role in Dutch environmen-
tal policy, even though specific air-quality standards had less impact. The use of
environmental standards resulted in a far-reaching integration between environ-
mental policy and spatial planning. As recounted in chapter 3, the law on noise nui-
sance resulted in the blueprint for the use of environmental quality standards in
Dutch law. These standards had spatial implications, because in areas where stan-
dards were exceeded, no new activities could take place that would cause further
pollution.
Air quality standards had the same legal implications as any other standards. In the
Dutch Law on Environmental Management dating from 1993, the possibility of set-
ting quality standards had been retained, and the distinction discussed earlier
between target value and limit value had been made in this law as well. Target values
only had to be taken into consideration, but limit values had to be observed (Art. 5.2.1
sub a, Law on Environmental Management [Stb. 1992, 551]). An environmental qual-
ity standardwith the status of a limit value could not be exceeded, except in the case of
‘force majeure’.10 Those quality standards were mostly directed at lower administra-
tive bodies, because they became linked to the granting of permits and to policy deci-
sions regarding land use plans.
Environmental quality standards essentially ‘sealed off’ areas for further develop-
ment, because no new polluting activities could take place. In Parliament, these con-
sequences were realised when the status of quality standards was under discussion. It
was considered: ‘Such quality standards are the result of a weighing of what is desirable from
an environmental perspective and what is technically, economically, financially or otherwise
(for instance planologically) possible’.11
10. Kamerstukken II 1988-1989, 21163 nr. 3, p. 47.
11. Kamerstukken II 1988-1989, 21163 nr. 3, p. 43.
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It was felt that quality standards should not be based on scientific data that were not
considered to be strong enough, and in the case of insufficient data, legal status should
be withheld.12 Article 5.1.1 of the Law on Environmental Management granted the
administration the right to set environmental quality standards by way of a general
administrative order, but only if the administration had properly weighed interests,
including economic ones (Art. 5.1.2 sub E).
Legal scholars tended to take a hard line regarding the phrase ‘observing the limit
values’. Drupsteen and Koeman considered that a permit needed to be refused by
the relevant administrative body if the environmental quality standard was likely
to be exceeded. If the administrative body refused the legal obligation to observe
the limit value, a decision could then be annulled by the administrative court because
it had been taken unlawfully or because principles of good governance were at stake
(Drupsteen & Koeman 1996, p. 77). Environmental quality standards bound admin-
istrative bodies aswell when they acted on account of competences not based on envi-
ronmental law, but on other laws. Michiels concluded that this included establishing
legally binding plans involving land use (Michiels 1998, p. 135). This opinion is shared
by Van der Geest and Lam (2006, p. 121), and these consequences made quality stan-
dards a highly invasive kind of regulation. In fact quality standards are an old instru-
ment of environmental regulation. They were discussed predominantly in the 1970s,
the era before ecological modernisation. The limit values should be viewed from the
perspective of the limits to growth discourse, In the Dutch system they set limits on
the amount of pollution an area may legally endure.
The link between quality standards and lower administrative decisionswas an impor-
tant and unique feature of Dutch environmental/spatial planning, and it featured
strongly in debates on the air-quality clash. From this point, I will speak of ‘the link’
when I mean the link between spatial planning and environmental rules. Historically,
the link is easy to account for, as it provided the much-desired integration of environ-
mental considerations into other fields of policy. Lower administrative bodies as well
as the Central Government had to apply environmental rules when taking spatial
decisions, and quality standards strongly influenced spatial planning, the develop-
ment of infrastructure, industrial areas, transport, and so on. The link was therefore
an important instrument by which VROM was able to influence the development of
the Netherlands. The corollary of this is that the EU quality standards had potentially
more significant implications in the Netherlands than in other European countries.
5.2.2 Implementation: the legislative procedure
The European air-quality regulation was to be implemented in 2001, a pre-election
year in theNetherlands. It was the last year inwhich the ‘purple coalition’ of the Social
12. Kamerstukken II 1988-1989, 21163 nr. 3, p. 44.
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Democrat PvdA and the conservative VVD ruled the country, together with the social
liberals of D66.
By this time, it was known that compliance with the standards laid down in the air-
quality Daughter Directive was difficult for the Netherlands, and discussions arose in
the Dutch Parliament about the pending implementation. It was still not a hotly
debated topic by any means, and certainly was not on the minds of the electorate;
it would, however, have severe consequences.
During a general discussion on 14 February 2001,Member of Parliament KleinMolen-
kamp of the VVD complained about the high costs that correct implementationwould
incur, and urged the Government to be cautious.13 In fact, his own preference was to
delay executing the Directive until it had been evaluated. The reasons for Molen-
kamp’s suspicion had been generated by statements fromMinister Pronk to the effect
that implementation of the directive would be exceedingly expensive – the figure
mentioned was around 30 billion Euros. Molenkamp wondered how it was possible
that implementing the Directive would cost a thousand times more than had initially
been thought.
Pronk agreed that even though the matter of air pollution was close to his heart, costs
were very high indeed, and he claimed that the EU had provided false estimates. Par-
tial implementation would have a more reasonable price tag, but would still amount
to a hefty 2 to 6 billion Euros.
The Minister defended the EU directives, but made an important proviso: the direc-
tives contained obligations, but these had to be based on complete information, and
they had to manageable. In this case, he considered that a firm result-oriented obli-
gation was not feasible on account of the high costs. He pointed out that he had writ-
ten a letter to EU Commissioner Margot Wallström (on 14 December 2000, TA), in
which he complained about the deadlines and argued for a more lenient interpreta-
tion.14 According toMinister Pronk, the first thing that should be done was to prevent
the potential administrative problem from worsening. He asked Brussels to evaluate
the Directive before 2003, and he would attempt to change it in order to ‘better set
priorities’ and ‘reformulate deadlines’.15
Molenkamp remained unconvinced, however, and argued that the air-quality Direc-
tive should be implemented not by a General Administrative Order but by a formal
law. In Dutch Law, this distinction is important. General Administrative Orders and
Ministerial Decrees have a lower status under Dutch law than what is known as a
13. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 400 XI nr. 56.
14. Letter from Minister Pronk to Commissioner Wallstrom briefnummer MJZ 20001499652.
15. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 400 XI nr. 56, p. 6.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
formal law. According to the Law on Environmental Management, quality standards
are stipulated by a General Administrative Order. An important point is that such a
procedure is quicker, and Parliament is not required to give its consent to the regu-
lation, but only has to be consulted.16
Minister Pronk objected to this procedure, and considered that issuing a General
Administrative Order sufficed for the implementation. A ‘legislative soap opera in
25 episodes’ (Borman 2003, p. 244) started when the AQO was issued in June 2001,
because Parliamentarians demanded that the Air Quality Directives be transposed
by way of formal law. Their demand was backed up by an article in the Law of Envi-
ronmental Management, stipulating that if a sizable minority of Members of Parlia-
ment demanded a formal law, the issue should be dealt with by using this instrument.
Pronk presented the AQO 2001 to Parliament by way of a letter to the chairmen of the
first and second chambers on 7 June 2001.17 One month later, a total of 38 Parliamen-
tarians from the VVD signed an objection demanding that the implementation take
place by means of a formal law.18 The consequence was that it became necessary
for the Government to withdraw the General Administrative Order.
In Pronk’s view, the provision in the Law on Environmental Management could not be
used to obstruct timely implementation of European law. He felt that Members of Par-
liament had the right to demand a formal law when the General Administrative Order
concept was submitted, but not after submission of the Order itself.19 He promised to
draft a proposal for a formal law but refused to withdraw the AQO 2001. Eventually,
Pronkwas forced by Parliament to withdraw it, but the Dutch Council of State Advisory
Division, the highest administrative advisory body, now objected to the withdrawal.
A year later, Pronkwas succeeded by the Christian Democrat Secretary of State, Pieter
van Geel, when a new Cabinet took over in July 2002, led by Prime Minister Jan Peter
Balkenende (CDA). Van Geel was facedwith the opinion of the Council of State that it
was impossible towithdraw theGeneral Administrative Order, because awithdrawal
would mean the Netherlands would be in breach of the European air quality regula-
tion. The Council of State considered that in the case of withdrawal, the Netherlands
would have no air-quality regulation at all, and could be accused of infringement by
the European Commission for failing to implement the Directives. He prepared a pro-
posal to arrange the matter through a formal law, and emphasised that he would con-
tinue attempts to change the Directive through negotiation at the European level.20
16. For more on the different policy instruments see section 3.1.1.
17. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 793 nr. 1/309.
18. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 793 nr. 2.
19. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 793 nr. 3.
20. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 27 793 nr. 8.
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The discussion about the correct form of implementation demonstrated that worries
existed in Parliament regarding air-quality standards. Minister Pronk himself was
convinced that the VVD Parliamentarians had only demanded a formal law in order
to oppose it in Parliament and bring it down (Jan Pronk, interview). This conflicted
with his own strategy of handling the potential problem with respect to air-quality
standards. He intended to implement the Directive dutifully, and then renegotiate
it when the consequences became dire. He felt that one should first create goodwill
and then renegotiate. The Netherlands after all had argued for a more rigorous
PM10 policy in Europe, so a withdrawal at that point would not be very convincing.
Moreover, Pronk considered that a timely implementation of the Directive would
strengthen the Dutch negotiation position where other files were concerned, such
as climate change (Jan Pronk, interview).
5.2.3 Strict implementation of the air-quality Directives into Dutch law
Minister Pronk was obliged by Parliament in 2002 to withdraw the General Administra-
tive Order, but was unable to comply, which meant that the AQO 2001 remained valid.
Because this regulation became the catalyst for the air quality clash to emerge, some
knowledge of its provisions is necessary. In the next sub-section, the contents are
interpreted in the light of the accompanying ExplanatoryMemorandum, but an over-
view of the articles is presented briefly here.
This AQO contained 33 articles, most of which followed the EU Directives in a fairly
straightforward manner. Article 5 to 19 set out the limit values for SO2, NO2, PM10,
lead, CO, and benzene, respectively.21 However, only the limit values for NO2 and
PM10 were of importance for the air quality clash. For NO2, a limit value of 40
mug/m3 as a yearly average was stipulated, and entered into force in 2010. For
PM10, a yearly limit value of 40 mug/m3 was stipulated, as well as a 24-hour average
limit value of 50 mug/m3. This second limit value could be exceeded at 35 days max-
imum. The PM10 standards entered into force in 2005.
The limit values laid down in the Daughter Directive were stricter than the ones that
had already been incorporated into Dutch law. The AQO incorporated the new stric-
ter EU values, as was mandatory under EU law.
Article 1 presented a list of definitions of terms used in the AQO, whose terminology
was very similar to that in the Dutch Law on Environmental Management, which
became clear from the first definition. The term ‘law’ in the context of the Air Quality
Order 2001 referred to the Law on EnvironmentalManagement. The term ‘limit value’
21. The substances CO and benzene are not covered by the EU Daughter Directive. They had already been
regulated in Dutch law, and the AQO incorporated those older regulations for CO and benzene. They
will not be dealt with further within the scope of this thesis.
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referred to the term ‘limit value’ as defined in article 5.1.1 of the Law on Environmen-
tal Management. Articles detailing the various limit values for different pollutants
used the same terminology as the Law on Environmental Management. Administra-
tive bodies needed to ‘observe’ the limit values for SO2, NO2, PM10, lead, CO, and
benzene. Target values were not mentioned in the AQO.
A law concerning quality standards would generally stipulate which administrative
bodies were addressed by the standards, and to what kind of decisions the standards
would apply. However, the Air Quality Order 2001 did not discriminate between
administrative bodies. The articles laying down limit values simply mentioned
‘administrative bodies’, and did not stipulate to what kind of decisions the standards
would apply. The article pertaining to PM10, article 13 for instance stated:
‘Administrative bodies observe the limit values for Particulate Matter during the exercise of their
competencies which may have an effect on air quality regarding PM10, except in the case of a con-
travening law’.
The only condition was that the competencies exercised must have consequences for
air quality. If competencies used by lower administrative bodies or the Government
itself did not qualify in this regard, the limit values would then have to be observed.
As we saw in the section on quality standards in Dutch law, Dutch legal scholars ten-
ded to take a hard line when considering the legal consequences of limit values. Deci-
sions regarding permits would need to be refused in situations where the quality
standards had been exceeded, and where decisions regarding environmental plan-
ning or spatial planning were considered to be under the ambit of the quality stan-
dards as well. The law itself did not differentiate according to type of
administrative body involved, so in principle these standards needed to be observed
in equal measure by all administrative bodies.
The actual implementation of the EU air-quality standards in Dutch law was stricter
than the Directive had prescribed. The EU Directive itself did not state that the stan-
dards needed to be observed by every administrative body during each decision,
which could have some repercussions for air quality. The Directive only mandated
that plans were to be drawn up whenever some agglomeration did not comply with
the limit values, and that Member States must make sure air quality was sufficiently
high on their territory. This left leeway for national Governments with respect to how
they would reach the limit values. The Dutch interpretation of linking the limit values
to individual administrative decisions was not necessary, and indeed unique accor-
ding to Fleurke and Koeman (Fleurke & Koeman 2004; Koeman 2006, but contra
Backes 2006). In any case, the Dutch interpretation was certainly one of the strictest
in Europe (Backes 2006a; Backes et al. 2005). This strict transposition is difficult to
explain, because it was already known that the Netherlands would face severe diffi-
culties in meeting the standards.
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5.2.4 The Air Quality Order according to the Explanatory Memorandum
Without the promised Memorandum on Air Quality, or the Action Plan Urban Air
Quality, the AQO 2001 and the ExplanatoryMemorandum accompanying it contained
the Dutch national policy on air quality. In the AQO, a number of interpretative issues
were at stake, and had to be cleared up in the ExplanatoryMemorandum. The first issue
concerned how strictly the limit values had to be interpreted, and what consequences a
breach of the standards should have. The second issue concerned provisions in the
AQO in the light of the evaluation clause in article 10 of the Directive. The third issue
had to do with the question of responsibility. Which administrative bodies would be
responsible for meeting the limit values? These three topics all re-surfaced when
PM10 became a full-fledged social problem in late 2004.
Consequences of breaching limit values
The wording of the Explanatory Memorandum (E.M.) was ambiguous in terms of
how strictly the limit values had to be interpreted, and what consequences a breach
would have, but it was strict in certain paragraphs. After first considering that the
limit values should not be breached, owing both to health and legal concerns, the
E.M. speaks of limit values as ‘result-oriented obligations’ (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 22). A
result-oriented obligation is defined by its result; namely, if a limit value is exceeded
when it is in force; the administration is in breach of a hard norm. This wording is
reminiscent of the hard line that legal scholars tended to take. Moreover, administra-
tive bodies needed to anticipate the coming limit values, and avoid future situations
in which these could be exceeded. That implied that they had to already be aware of
the values, and observe them in decisions they would take that potentially had an
impact on air quality in the future (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 22).
In regard to those result-oriented obligations, the E.M. stated:
‘Limit values are binding. They have legal consequences for administrative bodies. They limit the
competencies their bodies have in the sense that activities need to be refused or adjusted if they
threaten to lead to a transgression of the limit values for quality’ (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 25).
Regarding spatial and transport plans, the memorandum demanded an explicit
assessment of compatibility with the air-quality limit values (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 27).
Nevertheless, certain other quotes cast doubts on the intended consequences of brea-
ching a limit value, and on whether every decision that could have some repercus-
sions for air quality was considered to be subject to those limit values. The
following quote, for instance, indicated there could be some leeway:
‘Limit values need to be taken into account when deciding whether intentions can be freely executed
or whether additional provisions are necessary regarding sources or spatial planning’ (Stb. 2001,
269, p. 26). On the same page, we read: ‘If air quality is burdened to such a degree that a
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considerable contribution is delivered to exceeding the limit values, then that particular activity can-
not be condoned in this area or in this way’ (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 26).
These statements indicated that limit values should only be seen as a consideration
for policy. ‘Additional measures’ could be necessary, but a full prohibition of the
activity in question was not mentioned. Only if it delivered a ‘considerable contri-
bution’ should an activity be forbidden. Elsewhere, we find a similar consideration.
On page 23, it was stated that only ‘tasks or competencies by which certain meaningful
influence can be exercised on air quality’ (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 23) were considered. This
implies that only those competencies that had important consequences for air qual-
ity were targeted.
The vagueness of these statements was problematic. Who would decide what com-
prised a ‘meaningful’ influence or a ‘substantial’ contribution? It is clear that the Gov-
ernment did not intend for quality standards to become a rigid instrument that would
lock the country in terms of further spatial and infrastructural development.
Evaluation in 2003
As regards the troubling NO2 standard, the E.M. noted that certain breaches might
remain when the standards took effect. However, also in other Member States, some
breaches were expected to remain present. According to the E.M., this standard
would probably be revised on the occasion of the evaluation in 2003.
For PM10, it was uncertain whether those standards could be met at all in the Neth-
erlands. They would also be evaluated based upon article 10 of the Daughter Direc-
tive, however, and the Government was confident that the assessment would lead to
their relaxation, as it had noted that many Member States had problems with the
PM10 standards: ‘During the evaluation this (information TA) will undoubtedly lead to
important changes in the norm setting (relaxation)’ (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 17).
The evaluationwas a key topic in the E.M. TheGovernment trusted that the standards
would be relaxed, and was not concerned about the vagueness of the terminology. As
a result, discussion on the legal consequences of the regulation was lacking.
The administrative bodies responsible for PM10 policy
The ExplanatoryMemorandum explicitly assigned the responsibility for PM policy to
the state. Lower administrative bodies could not be held accountable for breaches of
the PM10 standards, owing to the many uncertainties about the pollutant, and espe-
cially because the standards were exceeded in many parts of the country. However,
they did have a responsibility to help reduce the PM10 problem. The imperative to
‘observe the limit values’meant that lower administrative bodies should try to reduce
PM10 emissions as much as possible. Even at state level, however, a concrete policy
could not yet be put into place. According to the E.M., there were still so many sci-
entific uncertainties regarding PM10 that until the results of further inquiry were
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known, policy would continue to be based on reducing exposure to PM10 as much as
possible by applying state-of-the-art technology and ALARA (As LowAs Reasonably
Achievable). In practice, this meant that the best available technologies had to be used
to curb PM10 exposure.
Although it was implied in the E.M. that responsibility for PM policy had been lifted
from lower administration bodies to a significant extent, it also specified forwhat kind
of decisions and competencies this memorandum had consequences. These compe-
tencies applied to lower administrative bodies as well. Those categories of competen-
cies were listed on page 23 of the E.M. (Stb. 2001, 269, p. 23). The list was long, and
consisted of decisions and competencies following from the Air Pollution Law, the
Law on Environmental Management, and the Law on Spatial Planning, as well as
the Road Infrastructure Law (Tracéwet in Dutch) and the Law on Planning Transport
and Traffic (‘Planwet Verkeer en Vervoer’ in Dutch). The link between quality stan-
dards and individual decisions of administrative bodies was clearly kept, and fea-
tured prominently in the many debates that followed after 2004/2005.
On 17 April 2001, the Council of State offered its recommendations regarding the
proposed AQO. The Council was not overly critical, and its advice was positive,
apart from a few minor details. It did not indicate that the AQO might have grave
legal consequences for spatial planning in the future, or that the views put forward
in the E.M. were somehow deficient. The AQO was published in June of the same
year (Stb. 2001, 269).
5.2.5 Early discussions on the legal character of the Air Quality Order
As far as legal problems were concerned, there were discussions in Parliament about
the possibility of infringement procedures by the European Commission.22 There was
no indication that national legal problems were foreseen at the time the AQO was
adopted. Considerations regarding national legal problems started when – owing
to findings regarding air quality – the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division in May 2002 annulled a decision to allow the development of a residential
area near a highway in Ypenburg. The administration noted that this case made clear
that research into the effects of infrastructure development on air quality was an
important aspect in decision making.23 Jan Pronk initiated discussions about the
necessity of keeping a safe distance from the highwaywhen building residential areas
(Pronk, interview). In the concept involving a newmemorandum on spatial planning,
Minister Pronk proposed building residential areas at a certain distance from the
highway.
22. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 663 nr. 2, p. 23.
23. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 089 nr. 3, p. 15.
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However, still, the Ypenburg issue did not lead to an immediate awareness that the
legal consequences of the standards might be highly damaging to Dutch spatial plan-
ning. The implicit understanding among policy makers continued to be that things
would turn out fine, and that there would be no grave consequences (Priemus
2006a, p. 6). The Minister stuck to his line of trying to fulfil the terms of the Directives
and the consequent AQO as well as possible, even if it meant that new residential
areas had to be constructed some distance away from roads. He considered that this
situation would be temporary, because he trusted in the possibilities of renegotiating
with Commissioner Wallström.
Jan Pronk successor in 2002, Pieter van Geel, was unable to persuade the European
Commission to accede to the Dutch point of view. Hence, the Government was still
unprepared when the legal ramifications became acute in 2004.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite opposition in Parliament the Air Quality Directives were implemented
strictly in Dutch law. The main question is why such a strict line has been chosen.
The first answer is that these strict consequences were not intended. The resulting
legal block on infrastructural development was neither intended nor foreseen. How-
ever, even with the knowledge available at the time, I consider the strict implemen-
tation to have been risky. In the following section I present two explanations for the
strict implementation, one has to dowith strategic political choices and the other with
a pervadingmentality resulting from the ecomodernist consensus. To conclude, I pre-
sent an analysis of the implementation of the Air Quality Directives in terms of the
legality of precaution.
5.3.1 Strategic choices by Jan Pronk
Initially the Government failed to formulate a consistent stance with respect to the air-
quality issue in the 1990s, despite knowledge of the emerging scientific data and the
forthcoming European air quality standards. In Europe it supported strict standards
thereby legally binding itself, but it was unable to comply with them, as there was no
cost-effective national policy that would make these standards reachable. Little atten-
tion was paid to this fact, because air quality was not yet a worrying public issue. The
few policy documents devoted to the topic endorsed a strategy of ‘waiting for
Europe’. Because the air pollution problem could not be solved nationally, owing
to the lack of a cost-effective strategy, international legislation was considered the
only option. The national consequences of this regulation attracted scant attention.
On the issue on air pollution, Minister Pronk chose a tactic of damage control. When
he became Minister for VROM in 1999 he was faced with a ‘fait accompli’, as the
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standards had already been agreed upon. Hewas personally committed to the air pol-
lution issue, however, and when a local health scare erupted over severe air pollution
in Overschie, he requested further research and made possible a reduction in the
speed limit, which was considered to help limit the emission of PM10 and NO2.
The European air quality rules were in any case good news for the people from Over-
schie. From a health perspective Minister Pronk was pleased with the regulation. The
health problems posed by traffic were a matter of concern to him and he supports the
application of the precautionary principle. In the absence of further rulings, the imple-
mentation by way of a General Administrative Order and the ExplanatoryMemoran-
dum constituted the whole of Dutch policy relating to air quality.
However budget wise the air quality rules were problematic. Pronk’s strategy was to
transpose the Directive dutifully into Dutch law, and to seek assistance from the Euro-
pean Commission in order to ensure practical implementation. In the meantime, he
tried to curb the impacts of the air-quality standards by demanding that any new infra-
structure be implemented some distance frommotorways. To this end, hemade a divi-
sion between locations where people spent a considerable amount of time and where
they did not. Even if standardswere exceeded, constructionwould be able to take place
in areas that people did not frequent. Pronk reasoned that public healthwas not endan-
gered in those places, and was convinced that his tactic of swaying the Commission
might have worked (J.P. Pronk, interview), but in 2002 he was replaced by Secretary
of State Pieter van Geel from the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) party. Van Geel
inherited the potential political problem regarding air quality, but did not manage to
convince the Commission to acknowledge the difficulties facing the Netherlands.
The eventual result was that the Netherlands ended up with a strict implementation
of the air- quality regulation due to the Dutch system of environmental zoning. In the
Dutch legal system, quality standards created ‘no-go areas’ for further activities when
standards were transgressed in an area. Local authorities needed to ‘observe’ the stan-
dards, which meant that they had to cancel permits and adapt spatial development
plans when the standards were exceeded locally.
The strictness of the Air Quality Order itself should be contrasted to the wording of
the Explanatory Memorandum, which sets out the reasons for and implications of
these rules. A discrepancy soon becomes apparent. In many paragraphs in the mem-
orandum, we find indications that this rigour was not intended. In the case of PM10,
for instance, it states that due to the magnitude of the problem, local administrative
bodies should not be held accountable. Moreover, the evaluation clause in the Daugh-
ter Directive is mentioned, and it was strongly considered that upon assessment, the
standards would be adjusted downwards; a clamp-down on infrastructural develop-
ment was never intended. Moreover, scientific uncertainty was used as an argument
to demand less from lower administrative bodies, and to blunt the sharp edges of the
standards relating to PM.
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When one looks at the wording of the AQO itself, it is clear that the subsequent Direc-
tive was implemented more rigorously than necessary, however. The text of the law
does not include the exceptions and considerations made in the Explanatory
Memorandum.
The main reason that Minister Pronk chose a literal and strict interpretation of the
Directive was that he considered implementation of the air-quality Directive in the
light of a more encompassing Dutch approach to EU environmental policy. A sound
implementation of the European rules offered the Dutch Government leeway to
negotiate on other terrains, such as climate change and other environmental fields
(J.P. Pronk, interview). These considerations explain why the wording of the AQO
was strict, but the E.M. allowed for a great deal more leniency. The transposition
was never intended to be inflexible, but political concerns led to a rigorous approach.
5.3.2 The conviction that unworkable standards are not legitimate standards
The eventual implementation of the air-quality Directives had important legal conse-
quences, but by and large, these were disregarded by the Government. Not enough
thought had been given to the way air-quality standards would fit within the national
system of environmental law in which quality standards would have potentially far-
reaching consequences. I consider that the eco-modernistic tradition of Dutch policy
making was conducive to a disregard of legal aspects of the implementation.
In the Netherlands, quality standards played an important role in environmental pol-
icy, because in the Dutch system of environmental law, these standards sealed off an
area whenever pollution concentrations were exceeded. This system ensured that
environmental standards had important consequences for the country’s spatial devel-
opment. However, such standards were to be used prudently, keeping in mind the
area under consideration. The Dutch implementation of European air-quality rules
did not fit this format, since they did not allow for the required flexibility. The result
was that countrywide pollution standards were set that were impossible to achieve
within the given time frame. It is odd that policy makers did not take into account
much earlier the legal consequences of using the Dutch system of environmental stan-
dards to implement the strict European standards. Subsequent Cabinets also consid-
ered that air quality was not a real problem andworthy of close examination, because
there was little information about it, and the Dutch Government had been unable to
formulate a cost-effective policy. The problem was regarded as a European one, until
the Overschie issue gave rise to stirrings of alarm. However, even then the legal issues
were not foreseen.
This illustrates that in the environmental field, the administration was not highly con-
cerned with the legal consequences relating to air-quality standards. Legal issues
arose with the Ypenburg case, but this also did not cause widespread alarm.
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Apparently air-pollution policy was still considered reasonably harmless, which is
puzzling as well. The Netherlands is a forerunner in regard to lawsuits filed by envi-
ronmental organisations, and the onset of rigid air-quality standards provided ample
opportunity for more of such lawsuits. Noticing this fact amounts of course to hind-
sight bias, but at the time, certain politicians – for instance,WijnandDuyvendak – also
recognised those opportunities (J. Wijnhoven, interview).
The answer to this puzzle may be found if one takes into account the mentality that
years of eco-modernistic policy making had fostered among Dutch politicians. Eco-
logical modernisation was a type of environmental policy that relied on consensus
making, flexibility, and sound scientific data. It was a pragmatic way of dealing with
environmental problems, and not one that concerned principles. One of themaxims of
this pragmatic consensus-oriented policy involved not asking for unreasonable sac-
rifices from anyone. In the words ofWinsemius: ‘One cannot demand the impossible’.
In the Dutch context, ecological modernisation was achieved through the internalisa-
tion of environmental norms and principles, and this internalisation had to be
brought about by presenting environmental protection as an opportunity for business
as well.
From the Dutch eco-modernistic perspective, the European standards were not rea-
sonable, as theywere not based on conclusive scientific data; the feasibility of the stan-
dards had not been taken sufficiently into account; and their implementation had
turned out to be much more expensive than was previously considered. Therefore,
the Dutch Government was convinced that the standards would be revised upon
evaluation and concluded such in the Explanatory Memorandum on the AQO. The
Government also concluded that the burden of responsibility should not be placed
at the level of lower administrative bodies, but at that of the state. However, theword-
ing of the AQO itself did not in anyway attempt to circumvent the legal consequences
following from its close connection to the terminology used in the Law on Environ-
mental Management.
The Government disregarded the legal dimension because of an unspoken consensus
that policy should only be complied with strictly when it does not have undesirable
economic consequences. The pragmatic side of eco-modernisation demanded that
economic and environmental progress proceed hand in hand. If environmental policy
was economically detrimental, it was not sound, and should not be applied rigor-
ously. This eco-modernist principle lies at the heart of the pragmatic way in which
the Government tried to deal with consequences of the AQO.2001 Here, however,
we witness a clash of rationalities. From a political perspective, this consideration
might be reasonable, but from a legal standpoint, the conclusion does not follow.
The Netherlands bound itself to the air-quality standards, which had the force of
law, irrespective of whether the administration considered them reasonable. The
pragmatic rationality of eco-modernisation clashed with the dogmatic rationality
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of law. At the time the Air Quality Order was implemented in 2001, politicians did not
consider this legal dimension, and that oversight would become costly in the years to
follow.
5.3.3 Dutch air quality policy and precautionary legality
Despite the reputation of the Netherlands as a forerunner in EU environmental policy
in the 1990s, the formulation of national air quality policy testified of a different atti-
tude. Even after the epidemiological findings became known in the middle 1990s,
Dutch air quality did not change much. A cautious strategy of ‘waiting for Europe’
was chosen, mainly because no cost-effective policy could be formulated. Bad air
quality was not considered a social problem and in the absence of cost-effective solu-
tions, political intervention was considered undesirable. Such considerations remain
squarely within the boundaries of the legality of risk and compensation. Health dam-
age should be avoided, but not at all costs and economic development should not be
halted.
Only after Jan Pronk became Minister in 1998 and the problems in Overschie became
known, did policy change in a more precautionary direction. Pronk visited the area to
speakwith residents andwas sensitive to the comparison between living in Overschie
and passive smoking. He proposed measures that can be considered precautionary,
such as not building near the sides of the roads.
The most precautionary piece of legislation from this era is undoubtedly the strict
AQO2001. However, the Government envisaged that the provisions in this piece of
legislation would be dealt with pragmatically. To Pronk as well as his successors it
was clear that complying with the Directives in full would not be feasible budget wise
and pragmatic administrative practices were devised to deal with the sharp edges of
the AQO. His letter to Wallström complaining of the feasibility of the Directives for
the Netherlands displayed the same pragmatic concerns.
Nonetheless the relative easewithwhich these standards could be implemented in the
Netherlands and the strictness of the implementation were signs that precautionary
legality was to an extent gaining ground. There was no concerted lobby against the
provisions of the AQO in any case, at least not one strong enough to force the Gov-
ernment to rescind.
Overall though, Dutch policy concerning air quality fits better within a legality of risk
and compensation, rather than precaution, despite the Government formal adherence
to the precautionary principle and despite the Dutch reputation as an environmental
front runner.
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TIMELINE EARLY DUTCH AIR QUALITY POLICY
1983 IMP Air 1984-1988 released
1986 Change in Dutch air pollution law makes setting legally binding air quality standards possible
1986 Implementation Air Quality Directive 80/779/ EC in Dutch Law; air quality standards for SO2 and Particulates
1989 NMP released
1994 New Criteria Document on PM10 released
1995 Government issued preliminary policy opinion on Particulate Matter and winter smog’ (interim beleidsstandpunt fijnstof
en wintersmog
1998 Jan Pronk Minister of VROM
1999 Directive 99/30/EC adopted on ambient air quality
2001 Air Quality Order 2001 proclaimed, together with Explanatory Memorandum
2002 Jan Peter Balkenende is installed as Prime Minister, Pieter van Geel Secretary of State for the environment, under
Minister Dekker of VROM.
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 THE RISE OF THE PRO-HEALTH CAMP
IN THE NETHERLANDS 2001 – 2005
INTRODUCTION
During his time at the Ministry and especially after ‘Overschie’ in 1999, Jan Pronk
demanded that more political attention be paid to air quality. From the point of view
of public health, he was keen to reduce concentrations of polluted air, and initiated a
policy that forbade the building of new infrastructure in placeswhere the quality stan-
dards were being exceeded, and where people might spend a significant amount of
time. In Europe though, he tried to gain more time for the Netherlands to achieve the
standards, because he knew that full compliance would not be feasible. In 2002, how-
ever, Dutch politics was about to take a turn that would greatly affect environmental
policy.
The Dutch public was shocked when Pim Fortuyn, one of the main contenders for the
Dutch premiership, was assassinated in May 2002, just before the elections. The perpe-
trator was an environmental activist. In the instantly polarised political landscape, ‘the
left’ was blamed for creating an environment in which the populist politician Fortuyn
could be shot. With their criticism of Fortuyn’s supposedly extremist ideas, left-wing
political parties were accused of having elicited the politically motivated murder.
Conservative and populist parties went on to win a substantial victory in the 2002
elections, and environmental issues were relegated in political importance. The port-
folio was granted to Christian Democrat Pieter van Geel as Secretary of State, a junior
position in the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers, and Jan Peter Balkenende from the Chris-
tian Democrat CDA became PrimeMinister. During the Balkenende Cabinets, the air-
quality clash erupted in full. I will argue in this chapter that this clash has been a
response to the environmental and mobility policies of these Cabinets.
The mobilisation of a pro-health camp – a set of actors that opposed the policies of
parties that favoured infrastructure interests – inside and outside of Parliament is
the main subject of this chapter.
We will look first at the environmental and mobility policies of the first Balkenende
Cabinet, as they laid the groundwork for the environmental policy of his later
Cabinets.1 Subsequently, two emblematic political issues will be considered: namely,
health near highways and the matter of traffic congestion. The first problem caused a
debate over the speed limit in the Netherlands, and critics argued that in light of the
health problems, the speed limit should be lowered. The problem of congestionmean-
while forced the Government to propose an Emergency Law to expand Dutch high-
ways. In the third section of this chapter, three seminal court cases that became crucial
in the eruption of the air-quality clash are discussed, and finally the mobilisation of a
pro-health camp inside and outside of Parliament, is recounted. This camp opposed
the mobility policies, and used health-based arguments to demand an increase in
clean air measures.
. THE F IRST BALKENENDE CABINETS
A bookish Christian Democratic politician, Jan Peter Balkenende became Prime Min-
ister after the resignation in 2002 of the Purple Cabinet, which consisted of the liberal
VVD, the socialist PvdA, and the social-liberal D66. The biggest left-wing party, the
PvdA, lost heavily during the 2002 elections, and the parties that formed the newCab-
inet were all situated on the right of the political spectrum (Hippe et al. 2004). The
VVD was the only party from the old Cabinet that retained its position, and it gover-
ned together with the CDA, themain Christian Democratic party. The third partner in
this three-party coalition was the LPF (‘List Pim Fortuyn’), the party founded by For-
tuyn before his assassination. After his death the party was strongly favoured by
voters. The party can best be described as populist, as it argued for law and order,
lower taxes, and less congestion on the roads.
The hapless Cabinet lasted only 86 days in power before it collapsed due to infighting
within the LPF. It is an important Cabinet to discuss, however, because in this short
time, important shifts in environmental policy and transport policy took place.
Box 5: Cabinets, Ministers, and Secretaries of State in the 2000s
Between 2000 and 2008, five different Cabinets ruled the county. Until July 2002, the Purple
Cabinet between the PvdA, D66, and the VVD was in power. Jan Pronk (PvdA) was the
VROMMinister, from 1998 until 2002 and dealt with the environment. Tineke Neetelenbos
(PvdA) was Minister of Transport and Water Management. The Kok Cabinets ruled during
the 1990s, but weariness set in during the first years of the new decade. Moreover, turbulent
political and historical occurrences, such as Pim Fortuyn’s rise and assassination, alongwith
events of ‘9-11’, destabilised the coalition as well.
1. Jan Peter Balkenende would go on to lead four Cabinets in total, and was PrimeMinister from July 2002
until October 2010.
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The political landscape changed in 2002 when Balkenende took over as PrimeMin-
ister. A conservative Cabinet was formed between the CDA, the VVD, and the LPF.
The environment was relegated to a State Secretariat, and was granted to Pieter
van Geel (CDA). Roelf de Boer (LPF) became Minister for Transport and Water
Management (V&W). In 2003, this Cabinet resigned, andwas succeeded by the sec-
ond Balkenende Cabinet, which consisted of the CDA, the VVD, and D66. Pieter
van Geel retained his post, and Carla Peijs (CDA) became Minister for Transport
and Water Management. The Minister of VROM during this Cabinet was Sybilla
Dekker from the VVD, but she did not have the environment in her portfolio. Bal-
kenende 2 lasted until the middle of 2006, when it was forced to resign. Cabinet
Balkenende 3 was quickly formed, but was in fact a minority Cabinet mandated
to propose new elections and to prepare a budget for 2007. Carla Peijs retained
her post. Dekker was forced to resign and from September 2006 to February
2007, Pieter Winsemius acted again as interim Minister of VROM. Van Geel, how-
ever, remained the Secretary of State, responsible for environmental matters.
The elections in 2007 brought the PvdA back into power, to govern the country
together with Christian Democrats of the CDA. The environment was reinstated
as a Ministerial topic, and Jacqueline Cramer headed the VROMMinistry. Camiel
Eurlings of the CDA became the new Minister of V&W.
6.1.1 Environmental policies of the Balkenende 1 Cabinet
The formation of Balkenende’s first Cabinet ran smoothly, and in July 2002 the new
Cabinet took the helm, laying down its plans for the forthcoming period in what was
called the ‘Strategic Accord’. In this relatively short document, the paragraph regard-
ing the environment did not bring much new to the table, but its tone revealed that
environmental rules and regulations were not looked upon favourably. The Cabinet
sought to decentralise environmental policy, and argued that economic development
should not be constrained. A sentence like ‘To keep the countryside alive, one should not
lock it down (to economic development, TA)’2 indicated that the emphasis was on devel-
opment and not on environmental protection. The Cabinet also stated: ‘The ambitions
and instruments from the Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan will be adapted to
financial possibilities’.3 The fourth national environmental action plan was a document
drafted by the previous Minister, Jan Pronk, and contained plans for a transition
towards a green economy. The sentence quoted above indicated that budget cuts
would be considered, and that those ambitions would be shelved for the time being.
2. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 375 nr. 5, p. 21. Because of the large amount of citations of Parliamentary
documents in this chapter, footnotes have been chosen rather than in text referencing to refer to these
documents, the same applies to court cases.
3. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 375 nr. 5, p. 22
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The new Cabinet indeed amended the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan, in
the form of a memorandum entitled ‘Vaste Waarden Nieuwe Vormen’ (‘Steady
Values, New Forms’). The memorandum intended to ‘set different priorities’, ‘use exis-
ting means in a more focused way’, and ‘indicate where short-term goals need to be “tempo-
rised” (VROM 2002, p. 3). ‘Temporisation’ was a euphemism for postponement, and
many environmental targets were postponed in this way, including targets for air
quality. The Cabinet sought to delay until 2015 the deadlines for standards, and it also
abolished subsidies for cleaner cars (VROM 2002, p. 35).
The consequences of this postponement were considered in the memorandum, but
only infringement procedures of the Commission against the Netherlands for brea-
ching the Air Quality Directives were taken into account (VROM 2002, p. 27). In
Europe, the Cabinet intended to lobby in Brussels to have the targets for air quality
deferred from 2010 to 2015.4
The new line of the Balkenende 1 Cabinet regarding environmental policy constituted
the breach of a trend. In the years prior to 2002, the funding for environmental pro-
tection had risen steadily, but cuts were now being considered. A calculation made in
Figure 2: Yearly environmental spending by the Government, 1985-2006. Dotted lines
indicate the budget of the second Purple Cabinet (2005 is considerd the baseline year),
Balkenende 1 and Balkenende 2.
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4. Interestingly, the PM10 standards would enter into force in 2005, but that date is rarely mentioned. The
Cabinet seemedmostworried by the standard for NO2whichwould indeed enter into force in 2010. The
reason why 2005 is seldom mentioned is not clear to me, but I speculate that it is because the Cabinet
considered that PM10 policy was defined as a national responsibility in the explanatory memorandum
to the AQO and not a burden on lower administrative bodies.
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2003 displayed graphically the differences between the environmental expenditures of the
Kok Cabinets and Balkenende’s first and second Cabinets (RIVM 2003, p. 8). The dotted
line in the upper right-hand corner indicates the projected expenditure of the Kok Cabinet,
while the lines below represent the foreseen spending of the Balkenende 1 Cabinet.
6.1.2 Mobility policies of the Balkenende 1 Cabinet
In contrast to its cutting back of environmental expenditures, the first BalkenendeCabinet
planned to accommodate the growth of auto-mobility. Just before the elections, the pro-
mobility partyVVD torpedoed the new transport andmobility plan – theNational Traffic
and Transport Plan (NVVP) – as was detailed in chapter 3. In particular, the VVD
opposed road pricing, because it was not popular with the party’s motorised electorate.
In this National Traffic and Transport Plan, the Kok Cabinet was already adopting a
more ‘laissez faire’ approach towards accommodating the growth of auto-mobility
than in its predecessor, the SVV2. Large investments in new roads were scheduled,
and in exchange for road expansion, the motorist would be charged for the use of
the roads instead of paying a fixed price in road taxes.
From the political perspective, road pricing was a highly controversial dossier in
Dutch politics, and in his dissertation at Tilburg University, the debates were docu-
mented extensively by Maarten Smaal (Smaal 2012). Concern for the environment
was the main reason the Government included road pricing in the SVV2. The VVD
and the motorists’ association ANWB were avowed opponents of the scheme when
the idea was first launched in the late 1980s.
The conservative Cabinet of 2002 aimed squarely at appeasing the transport sector
and the individual motorist. A levy of 25 cents per litre on fuel introduced by the
Kok coalition would be abolished and various high-profile road-building projects
were proposed, such as construction of the A4 Midden Delfland. Cabinet also plan-
ned a second ‘Coen’ tunnel, the ‘Westrand weg’, and the A9, according to the Trans-
port Ministry’s budget for infrastructure.5 The road-pricing scheme by way of a
kilometre tariff was dismantled (VROM 2002, p. 35), though debates about road pric-
ing reappeared in 2003 and after 2005, when the air quality clash erupted.
However, the new Cabinet could not base its proposals for road expansion on a trans-
port and mobility plan, and therefore there was no solid basis for expansion and con-
struction. The Cabinet devised a solution to make road expansion possible by way of
an Emergency Law on Road Expansion, which would make it possible to expand
roads and shorten procedures. Together with discussions on the speed limit, the
Emergency Law on Road Expansion was one of the two salient political issues in
5. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 600 A nr. 2.
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which the interests of mobility clashed with those of the environment and public
health, as discussed below.
The new Cabinet’s policies were the culmination of a trend in mobility policy from the
1990s onwards. With slogans like ‘gateway to Europe’ and ‘Netherlands, distribution
country’, the Dutch Cabinet sought to position the Netherlands as a transport country
in the 1990s. The newCabinet favoured policies of growth over environmental policies,
and the emphasis on transport and mobility was a natural consequence. In the Neth-
erlands, the transport sector wielded considerable economic power, and mobility was
considered the lifeblood of the economy (Brokking 2001).
The environmental and mobility policies of Balkenende1 laid the foundations for pol-
icy in these areas that remained largely unaltered during at least the first three Cab-
inets led by Balkenende. Certain changes did occur, but, as I will argue, theywere due
mainly to the eruption of the air-quality clash.
. TWO SALIENT POLIT ICAL ISSUES : HEALTH NEAR HIGHWAYS
AND TRAFF IC CONGEST ION
The Government’s mobility and environmental policies had significant repercussions
for two problems which predated the Balkenende Cabinet, but for which it sought a
solution, namely the emerging awareness that air quality near roads was bad and
road congestion. It is necessary to dwell on these two problems and the Government’s
solutions for them at length because they have led to the formation of a pro-health
camp in Parliament, a set of political parties voicing concerns over Balkenende’s
mobility and infrastructure policies.
6.2.1 Highways and health: the debates on speed limits
Asmentioned previously, discussions about the conflict between mobility and health
in the context of PM10 in the Netherlands occurred first in the area of Overschie. Epi-
demiologists pointed out that people living near busy roads could be vulnerable to
negative effects on their health. In Overschie, the local health service (GGD) and res-
idents managed to have their voices heard, and to involve influential politicians in
their struggle for acceptable air quality.
Following Minister Pronk’s visit to the Overschie area in February 1999, the ecolog-
ically minded party GroenLinks was the first to pick up on the issue, almost a year
later. After publication of the ‘Milieubalans 2000’ (State of the Environment 2000),
(MNP 2000) in September 2000, GroenLinks Parliamentarians complained during a
Parliamentary discussion with the Minister of V&W in October stating that no con-
crete measure had yet been taken to address the issue of poor air quality in the Over-
schie area. They arranged an excursion to Overschie, assuring the Minister that they
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had seenwith their own eyes how cars drove straight through that residential area at a
speed of 120 km/h.6 On 16 November 2000, the Transport Minister Netelenbos res-
ponded in writing to questions posed by the GroenLinks faction about lowering the
speed limit, stating that only in exceptional situations would the Ministry consider
lowering the speed limit.7 From then on, the speed limit became a bone of contention.
In April 2001, theMinister acceded to the request for a speed limit of 80 kilometres for
a tract of highway near Overschie, because of the involvement of her colleague Jan
Pronk. She promised a package of local measures, and announced that the first cal-
culations had indicated that reducing the speed limit might have positive effects.8
She agreed to lower the speed limit in 2002 in the vicinity of Overschie, and presented
the reduction as an experiment.
Parliamentary discussion led to increased awareness of potential air-quality bottle-
necks, referred to as ‘Overschie situations’.9 PvdA Parliamentarian Jeroen Dijssel-
bloem introduced a motion that led to a report being submitted in May 2002,
entitled ‘Knelpunten leefomgeving op het Rijkswegennet’ (Liveability Bottlenecks
on the Dutch Road Network).10 The report provided an overview of the number of
road trajectories where the air quality was poor.
The experiment to lower the speed limit was unique in the context of Dutch mobility
policy. The Transport Ministry generally insisted on at least 100 km/h on highways
(Ecorys kolpron 2002, p. 57), but the test involving speed reduction commenced on
11 May 2002.
In July 2002, Balkenende took over as PrimeMinister, and he inherited this potentially
polarising discussion on highways and health. Within his own Cabinet, two gover-
ning parties, the VVD and the LPF, were not keen on speed reduction, and in fact wan-
ted to raise the speed limit. The LPF in particular was not sensitive to environmental
issues; in Parliament, it was the left-wing parties that had been the most vocal in that
regard.
As could be expected, the successors of Netelenbos, the new Ministers first Roelf De
Boer (LPF) and later Carla Peijs (CDA), respectively, weremore cautious than shewas
on the issue of lowering speed limits. Carla Peijs took over in 2003, after the collapse of
the short-lived Balkenende 1 Cabinet. In principle, Peijs was not against reducing the
limits on other roads, but insisted that they deliver substantial contributions to air
quality, but also that they should not create any further bottlenecks for traffic. She
6. Handelingen II 2000-2001 nr. 13, p. 889.
7. Handelingen II 2000-2001 nr. 24, p. 1980.
8. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 408 nr. 26.
9. Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 408 nr. 21, p. 48.
10. Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 000 A, nr. 29.
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planned to lower speed limits only if they did not have a negative effect on traffic con-
gestion, and if they contributed to an even flow of traffic.11
Meanwhile, epidemiological studies that pointed to a connection between premature
mortality and living close to highways continued to appear.12 The newspaper Trouw
combined the figures presented in the research, together with the number of houses
situated close to highways, and asserted that 100,000 of these were in unsafe areas,
and that the 230,000 occupants of those houses ran serious health risks (Trouw 05-
08 2003). Secretary of State Pieter van Geel had to inform Parliament about air-quality
bottlenecks, and in a letter dated 21 October 2003, he made a point of referring to
the aforementioned numbers.13 Van Geel saw speed reductions combined with
strict enforcement of these limits as only a temporary solution regarding the worst
air-quality hotspots.
During the discussions on highways and health, a combination of political parties voi-
ced basically the same opinions, and argued for speed reduction. Generally, the
PvdA, GroenLinks, D66, and the left-wing Socialist Party (SP) demanded speed
reductions. Also in subsequent debates on air quality, public health would be the
main concern of this camp. In contrast, the VVD, the right-wing LPF, and – to a lesser
extent – the CDA favoured fewer reductions, and insisted on ‘compensation’ for
reductions in the form of raising speed limits on roads elsewhere.
Even though the parties forming the ruling Cabinet were not keen on the lowering of
speed limits, they could not avoid them. In the end, Peijs and Van Geel both embraced
such measures, because it was clear that the European air quality standards could not
be met. Speed reductions were regarded by the Government as a cheap measure that
could be taken to ease the burden on air quality in bottleneck areas. Speed reductions
were also considered ameans to alleviate the consequences of road expansions. Over-
schie was the first location in which the speed limit was lowered, in May 2002, in the
last months of the Purple Cabinet’s reign. However, during the air-quality clash, a
similar measure was taken in four additional locations, with the speed limit being
reduced from 100 to 80 km/h on tracts of tangential roads near the cities of Amster-
dam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, and The Hague.
6.2.2 The symbolic importance of the speed limits
The speed limit discussion went on during the period of the air-quality clash, and it
remained a contentious issue. However, it must be kept in mind that the issue was
mostly of symbolic significance. At least three reports appeared regarding lowering
11. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 28 663 nr. 11, pp. 1/2.
12. For instance, Gerard Hoek, Bert Brunekreef, and others in The Lancet, October 2002 (Hoek et al. 2002).
13. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 28 663 nr. 8.
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of the speed limits, and in 2006 a colloquium was held to discuss its effects, which
included reductions in travel time and congestion. These effects were varied, as in
some cases and on some trajectories, congestion became less, while on others, the
measures led to a significant increase in travel time. Congestion was often displaced,
because a lower speed limit on the highways led to more use of the inner roads (AVV
2006). As regards air quality, the results were mixed as well. In Overschie, the mea-
sure led to a decrease of around 25% in transport-related PM10 emissions. In itself,
that is an impressive reduction, but emissions from cars are not the only cause of poor
air quality. To a large extent, quality is determined by regional background concen-
trations, unspecified sources, and foreign, non-local sources. Therefore the measure
resulted in a fall of only 4% (TNO 2003). The same limited effects on air quality were
found on the other tracts of road (AVV 2006).
Even though the political attention to this subject suggested otherwise, the effects of
speed reductions were small, both in regard to health benefits and to losses of time.
When we use the same frame of comparing air quality to the passive smoking of cig-
arettes, we can conclude that Overschie residents passively smoked half a cigarette less
per day because of the 80 kilometre measure. Similarly, on most trajectories, any loss of
time due to the speed reduction was mostly limited. Parliamentarians and Minister
Peijs mentioned losses of time in the scope of half a minute to one minute.14 In some
areas, tests involving the speed-limit reduction were considered successful, while on
others they were not. However, political and media attention, along with public con-
cern over this debate, was ‘exceptionally high’ (van Beek et al. 2006).
These comparisons illustrate that the whole debate was a symbolic issue, albeit an
important one, judging from its political and social saliency. In discourse analytic
terms, Overschie became an emblematic case, and by referring to Overschie, actors
on the political stage could refer instantly to an entire host of problems involving
highways close to residential areas. It was not the extra cigarette or the time lost
on the road that was the issue, but whether auto-mobility and transport should be
given a free reign. Lowering the speed limit was a symbolic recognition that the
expansion of transport and mobility had its limits, and that it had to be toned down
in order not to jeopardise environmental interests. Parties that felt that economic
development should have priority saw nothing in such limits, even if the time loss
was small.
In summary, the pro-health parties considered it important to lower speed limits on as
much of the road as possible, while conservative parties in the Government objected.
Minister Peijs feared the measure would have negative consequences for the subjec-
tive appreciation of the motorist.15 The struggle over the speed limits is important
14. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 28 663 nr. 9; Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 26.
15. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 26, p. 4.
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because it sensitised discussion participants to the problems and possibilities relating
to road transport before the air quality clash began. The desirability of the expansion
of road transport was called into question through the symbolic measure taken at
Overschie, and thus became the prism through which further mobility measures
and the air-quality problem would be viewed.
6.2.3 Congestion and the proposal for an Emergency Law on Road Expansion
The second significant issue that helped give rise to the eventual clash was the prob-
lem of traffic congestion. Congestion is a mainstay on the Dutch political agenda,
because the Netherlands is a densely populated country, where car density is high,
and the transport sector is economically important. The most common occupation
among Dutch males is that of a trucker (Website Loonwijzer.nl last accessed 15 July
2014).
The issue of road congestion carried for pro-mobility and pro infrastructure parties
the same weight as the speed limit did for the pro-health and pro environmental fac-
tions. Though political parties on both the left and the right of the political spectrum
promised to reduce the problem of congestion, their proposals differed. The VVDwas
generally in favour of road construction, while GroenLinks was in favour of more
environmentally friendly solutions. Already in the old SVV2 transport plan from
1989, reducing congestion had been the main aim, together with environmental
improvement.
It is important to note that the VVD, one of the main political parties that shaped
Dutch eco-modernistic environmental policies, still framed its solutions in terms of
win-win scenarios. A new road around Overschie in addition to the one through
the area for instance would unburden the area in terms of air quality and traffic con-
gestion. However, in the ‘old’ transport plans from the late 1980s, road construction
was still considered an option in last resort, an ‘ultimum remedium’. The VVD that
took part in the Balkenende Cabinets appeared to have lost its faith in behaviour
change and relied on road construction. During one debate a GroenLinks Parliamen-
tarian mentioned that he longed for the days of Pieter Winsemius again.16
Mobility was a spearhead of the Balkenende 1 Cabinet, and its solution was based
squarely on road construction. However, the procedures to construct new roads were
long and winding. A short-cut was proposed in the form of an Emergency Law on
road expansion that would curtail procedures.
On the whole, the first Balkenende Cabinet was a spectacular failure, but on 18
November 2002, just prior to the new elections, Minister Roelf de Boer (LPF) managed
16. Handelingen II 2001-2002 nr. 25, pp. 1802-1844.
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to propose his Emergency Law on Road Expansion. The Lawwas the icing on the cake
of that Cabinet’s pro-mobility agenda, because it made the expansion of existing
roads possible in various ways: for instance, by allowing motorists to use the emer-
gency lane during heavy traffic. This law was designed to shorten and simplify deci-
sion making procedures. The expansion of roads could normally only be achieved
after a long procedure involving an environmental impact assessment, consultation
with interested parties, and an investigation into the consequences of the expansion
for environmental quality. Among the consequences taken into accountwere air qual-
ity, noise nuisance, and the consequences for plants and animals in the area. In addi-
tion, road expansion required various different administrative decisions based on
diverse laws, such as the Law on Spatial Planning and the Road Law (Tracéwet).
The Emergency Law sought to shorten these procedures. In addition, it was designed
to cut appeal proceedings, in the event that administrative decisions were challenged
in court. Lower administrative bodies, as well as interest groups, would have shorter
periods in which to object to decisions. The Emergency Law limited appeal proceed-
ings to only one instance. All in all, the Government hoped to shorten by two years the
procedure to expand roads.17
The proposal presented by LPF Minister Roelf de Boer was strongly worded. Accor-
ding to De Boer, ease of accessibility and the opening up of areas to road transport
were essential for further economic growth and well-being, and in this regard ‘The
Netherlands is all too often halted on the road’.18 The Minister considered that unneces-
sarily broad decision making mechanisms had hampered finding a solution to the
problem of congestion in the past. He proposed introducing a decision making cul-
ture with less negotiation – or ‘polderen’, as it is known in Dutch – in favour of a more
hierarchical approach:
’In an administrative culture with less negotiation and more decision making, substantial gains in
time can be made. Elaborate consultation can be limited, exceedances of terms can be pushed back,
coordination mechanisms can be better used, and unnecessarily broad forms of decision making
may be cut back.’19
Before being sent to Parliament, the proposal was submitted to the Council of State
Advisory Division, the highest administrative advisory council in the Netherlands.
The Council of State is an important institution in Dutch policy making, because it
acts as the highest advisory body, advising on all proposed legislation, as well as
being the highest administrative judge.20
17. Kamerstukken II. 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 3, p. 13.
18. Kamerstukken II. 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 3, p. 1.
19. Kamerstukken II. 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 3, p. 2.
20. For a full overview of the activities of the Council of State see box 6.
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The Council of State Advisory Division recommended sending the proposal to Par-
liament, but only after it had reconsidered a number of critical issues. The Council was
critical concerning the proposal’s place in the light of current mobility policies,
because it felt that this law had the potential to generate further mobility growth,
which ran counter to official Dutch national and international policy commitments.
Moreover, the Council felt that the law was not in accordance with ideas proposed
in the Kyoto protocol on climate change and in the European 6th Environmental
Action Programme (Council of State 2002).
The Council of State Advisory Division was also not happy with the shortening of the
procedures, and considered that rules for environmental impact assessment should
still be applicable, and that those regarding air quality and noise nuisance needed
to be observed as well. Therefore, time gains could only be reached through shorten-
ing the periods in which various decisions could be taken. The Council also advised
that – in order to maximise legal protection – the designated court of appeal be the
Council of State itself, in its capacity as highest administrative court.
The advice provided by the Council of State Advisory Division was significant,
because it demonstrated the Council’s interest in the direction that policy was taking
with regard to the environment and to legal protection.
Box 6: The Council of State
The Council of State is a historical institution within the Dutch administrative sys-
tem. Nowadays it has two functions: that of the highest administrative court, and
that of the highest advisory council regarding new legislation. It was instituted
by emperor Charles V in 1531 in order to aid his regent, for the Netherlands, Mary
ofHungary (Website Council of State, last accessed 19-06 2015). In it themost notable
gentry was represented alongside the highest clergymen and a number of lawyers.
TheCouncil of State should provide advice in regard tomatters of the gravest impor-
tance for the Dutch territories. Since 1861, civilian were able in some instances to
appeal to ‘the Crown’ in conflicts between administrative bodies and citizens.
The Crown consisted of the reigning monarch and current Ministers. In these cases,
the Council of State needed to be heard before the Crown reached its decision.
Over time, it became standard practice for the Crown to adopt the advice provided
by the special division of the Council of State that dealt with such administrative
appeal cases, the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division. Nonethe-
less the European Court ordained in the Van Benthem case that appeal to the
Crown could not be considered access to an independent court in the sense of
the European Convention of Human Rights. Since 1994, the Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division has acted as an independent Court. However,
the Council of State also retained its political function of advisory council, The
Council of State Advisory Division. The Advisory Division mostly consists of
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
former politicians and elder statesmen and its task is to advice the current gener-
ation of politicians on political and legal issues pertaining to legislative proposals.
Discussion arose about the separation of these two functions when the European
Court ordered in the Procola case that the combination of juridical and administra-
tive duties undertaken by the Council of State also compromised the independency
of the judges, and constituted an infringement of Article 6 of the European Con-
vention for Human Rights.
This case led to discussion about the separation of powers of the Council of State.
According to the Council’s yearly report on 2005, the functions were executed sepa-
rately, but the two divisions exchanged knowledge and experience (Council of State
2006, p. 47). In 2010, a new law on the organisation of the Council was enacted, which
restructured the Council, and separated both functions more clearly (Council of State
Restructuring Act 2010 [Wet herstructurering Raad van State], Stb. 2010, 175).
6.2.4 Parliamentary discussions on the Emergency Law on Road Expansion
The Emergency Law on Road Expansion was proposed in autumn 2002, at a time
when air-quality concerns were on the rise, at least in Parliament. In October 2002,
the RIVM issued a report indicating the damage that bad air quality could cause.
The institute concluded that premature mortality afflicted possibly 10-15,000 people
per year in the Netherlands (Buringh &Opperhuizen 2002, section 0.2), owing to their
chronic exposure to PM 10. This report coincided with the aforementioned publica-
tion in October 2002 by Dutch epidemiologists Hoek and Brunekreef (Hoek et al.
2002). On 6 November, some two weeks before the road expansion proposal, the
Transport Ministry sent a letter in which he explained the possible health effects.21
On 25 November 2002, this letter was discussed between Secretary of State Pieter
van Geel and the delegates of the Second Chamber of Parliament dealing with envi-
ronmental issues.22
During the debate, air quality was heatedly discussed, and the Government’s strategy
of trying to postpone implementation of the standards until 2015 was lambasted by
spokespersons for the PvdA and GroenLinks. Wijnand Duyvendak, Parliamentarian
for GroenLinks, and Ferd Crone, spokesperson for the PvdA on environmental mat-
ters, connected the emblematic issues of Overschie and passive smoking to the forth-
coming Emergency Law on Road Expansion. According to Ferd Crone, the
Government was gambling irresponsibly on postponement and on the lowering of
standards in Europe. He used the familiar trope that living near the highway was
as unhealthy as the passive smoking of 17 cigarettes a day. In terms of public health,
he doubted that these standards would be lowered in Europe, despite the
21. This letter is mentioned in the general discussion, but was not traceable.
22. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 600 XI nr. 73.
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Government’s expectation, and considered that the Emergency Law would only
worsen the situation.23
The proposal for the Emergency Law itself was discussed in a Parliamentary consul-
tation on 16 December 2002, during which the Parliamentary Commission for the
Environment and the Commission for Transport were present, as well as both Min-
isters.24 It appeared that in all probability the Law would be adopted, since the con-
servative parties had an important majority, but it granted the opposition the
opportunity to point out any weaknesses in the proposal.
One of the more forceful participants in this discussion was GroenLinks Parliamen-
tarian Duyvendak, who, as former chairman of the environmental pressure group
Milieudefensie, had good contacts with that organisation. Duyvendak argued for a
withdrawal of the Emergency Law, and for combating traffic congestion through
the use of road pricing.25
According to Milieudefensie campaign leader Joris Wijnhoven, Duyvendak noticed
early on that the European limit values for air quality could have important legal ram-
ifications for infrastructure projects (interview J.Wijnhoven, interviewW.Duyvendak).
In the debate on the Emergency Law on Road Expansion, Duyvendak tightened the
screws on Secretary of State Pieter van Geel. Firstly, Duyvendak wondered how the
Emergency Law would bring air-quality targets closer, and in his argument he men-
tioned the victims of health problems, premature mortality, and asthma.26
Secondly, Duyvendak forced Van Geel to concede explicitly that the standards for air
quality would be ‘hard conditions’, and that the Air Quality Order would remain in
full force, despite the Emergency Law.When themeeting drew to a close, Duyvendak
demanded to hear from Van Geel precisely whether provisions in the Air Quality
Order applied. In response to Duyvendaks’ insistent questioning, Van Geel affirmed
explicitly that the standards needed to be observed in the context of the Emergency
Law on Road Expansion. Van Geel informed Parliament that the Air Quality Order
would be applicable in full. He put it as follows: ‘There is no word of French in what I am
saying; regarding air quality, the standards need to be met’.27
During the debate, there was again no indication that anyone, except perhaps Duy-
vendak, had taken into account that the standard could be enforced by the Dutch
Court in proceedings against administrative decisions. Only the possibility of fines
by the Commission was mentioned. Parliamentarians tended to concentrate on
23. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 600 XI nr. 73, p. 6.
24. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 40.
25. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 40, p. 12.
26. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 40, p. 14.
27. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 679 nr. 40, p. 56.
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2010, when the NO2 standards would become applicable, but the standards for PM10
were already due in 2005. An explanation for this is perhaps that the Explanatory
Memorandum to the AQOhad stated that in regard to PM10 the state instead of lower
administrative bodies would be responsible for policy, because the limit values were
being exceeded everywhere.
In the end, the Emergency Law was accepted with a large majority. In the Second
Chamber of Parliament, even the socialist PvdA supported the law, while left-liberal
D66, the hard-left SP, and the ecological party GroenLinks rejected the proposal. After
adoption in the second and first chambers of Parliament, the Emergency Law entered
into force in 2003. During the debates, the opposition did manage to score an impor-
tant political point, even though the significance was not yet clear. Secretary of State
Van Geel was forced to proclaim that air-quality standards took precedence over the
Emergency Law, as the significance of the Air Quality Order had been affirmed by the
Government itself.
6.2.5 The emergence of a pro-health camp in response to the speed limit and road
expansion
During debates on the Emergency Law and speed limits a number of political parties
made similar claims criticising Government policy. In general left leaning parties such
as the SP, GroenLinks, D66, and the PvdA argued that liveability concerns should
trump the concerns of mobility. The air quality bottlenecks, such as the Overschie
region featured prominently in the demands to take the environment and public
health into account. GroenLinks representatives in particular posed critical questions
and warned of potential health threats.28
The issue of the speed limits also piqued the interest of the environmentalmovement. In
autumn 2002, the first posters of environmental pressure group Milieudefensie appea-
red in Voorburg, alongside the busy A12 highway, at the time that the Emergency Law
was under discussion. The pressure groupdemanded a speed reduction in order tomit-
igate the effects of road expansion on noise nuisance. In subsequent years Milieudefen-
sie also tried to influence Parliamentary debates on these issues.29 However, during the
years before the air quality clash, this coalition of parties and the pressure group lacked
the political clout to actually force abatement measures beyond the most modest ones.
However, the foundation has been laid for what I refer to as the pro-health camp, a set
of actors making similar claims about the social significance of air quality. They used
the claims of scientific institutions such as the RIVM on health impacts of air quality to
28. Among others, Handelingen II 2002-2003 nr. 62, p. 3709; Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 28 663 nr. 9;
Handelingen II 2003-2004 nr. 24, p. 1683.
29. Letter from campaign leader J. Wijnhoven to the Parliamentary Commissions of VROM and V&W, Oct.
21 2003, regarding the upcoming debates on the speed limits, letter on file with the author.
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underscore the need for protective measures. During these early years the pro-health
camp did not have a very strong hand. The Parliamentary majority clearly favoured
road expansion and air quality was not considered a pressing public issue.
It must be noted that at that point the pro-health camp consisted of parties in the
opposition (except for D66, the most moderate one, it entered the Cabinet in 2003),
and had ulterior motives for obstructing mobility policies. It was also an opportunity
to oppose the reigning Government. Nonetheless, they did commit themselves dis-
cursively to an anti-mobility storyline, much as the Labour party had done in England
when childhood asthma became a social problem. The tide for Labour turned when
grass roots opposition against the road expansions soared and asthma became a
widely discussed phenomenon. In the Netherlands the legal intervention of the Coun-
cil of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division was instrumental when it started to
annul road expansions because of conflict with the Air Quality Order.
. EMERGENCE OF THE AIR-QUALITY CLASH
In the period betweenmid-2004 and April 2005, concerns regarding air quality rose to
an unprecedented level in the Netherlands. The pro-health camp in Parliament
received a major impetus when the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Divi-
sion started to terminate high-profile road expansions and other infrastructure works
in 2004. Pro-environmental parties and movements suddenly found themselves on
the offensive.
In the following, I recount how this offensive played out within and outside of Par-
liament, and how court decisions contributed to a change in the balance of power
between the pro-health camp and the governing parties, especially the CDA and
the VVD. Before the actual clash can be discussed, it is necessary to look at air-quality
policies in the years 2003 and 2004. The policies initiated in those two years indicated
that the Government was aware that air quality in the Netherlands was potentially
problematic, but it was not considered high enough a priority to spend a great deal
of money on. According to documents from that period, the solution regarding the
improvement in Dutch air quality was thought to lie in technological progress and
in the European adoption of clean technology.
6.3.1 Pieter van Geel’s air-quality policy in 2003 and 2004
After the fall of the first Balkenende Cabinet, a newCabinet was instated inMay 2003.
It still contained the CDA and the VVD, but was now completed with the more envi-
ronment-friendly D66 instead of the LPF. The Secretary of State for the Environment,
Pieter van Geel, retained his post. Roelf de Boer, the Minister of Transport and Water
Management responsible for the Emergency Law, was replaced by Karla Peijs,
already mentioned in the context of the speed limits. Van Geel promised to come
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up with a Memorandum on Traffic Emissions in response to the situation in Over-
schie, and to the continuing lack of a consistent policy on air quality.
Before thisMemorandum appeared, VanGeel explained themain lines of his policy in
a letter dated 21 October 2003.30 This letter is of interest, because it revealed how the
Government regarded the situation before serious legal trouble becamemanifest. Van
Geel felt that the best the Government could do was minimise PM10 and NO2 emis-
sions in the Netherlands, and he considered it more effective to fight emissions
through European policy. In the meantime, he continued the policy line of not
building residential areas and ‘sensitive destinations’ – such as schools or play-
grounds – near highways. He noted, however, that this policy was causing problems
for municipalities, because a great deal of building space was being lost. In regard to
PM10, lower municipalities were required to use the ALARA principle to limit expo-
sure to PM10 as much as possible. His commitment to mobility was clear from his
consideration that a situation like the one in Overschie could only be resolved by tak-
ing the pressure off the main road by way of another one leading around the area: the
controversial A4 Midden Delfland road. He announced further measures to be taken
in the forthcoming Memorandum on Traffic Emissions.
The Memorandum was issued in June 2004, and contained several goals, principles,
and concrete actions regarding emissions of pollution, noise nuisance, and CO2, which
influenced climate change. The aim was to reduce harmful environmental effects of
emissions, but the document asserted explicitly thatmobility as suchwas not a problem
for the environment, as mobility fulfilled an ‘indispensable societal function’. From an
environmental perspective, therewas no objection tomobility per se (VROM2004, p. 7).
The Government considered that the transport and mobility sector should start to con-
tributemore to environmentalwell-being. Industry had borne the brunt of previousmea-
sures, and now it was up to transport to become cleaner. The Government, however,
would keep in mind that a part of the transport sector was internationally competitive
(VROM 2004, p. 13). This turn of phrase indicated that, if possible, the important trans-
port sector would be spared tough measures, as it had been in the past.
The document recommended a strategy combining green technology and tax-based
solutions, together with international initiatives for a more stringent source policy.
National measures were only to be taken if they were demanded by the EU:
‘National measures for polluting substances and greenhouse gasses will be taken if they are necessary to
fulfil international agreements, or if international agreements are no longer possible’ (VROM2004, p. 7).
It became clear from the Memorandum that waiting for Europe to act and to
influence decisionmaking at that level would remain important components of Dutch
30. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 28 663 nr. 8.
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air-quality policy. The Netherlands did not consider any infrastructure or volume
measures. Instead, though not reducing mobility per se, it chose to implement taxes
and subsidies to motivate people to opt for cleaner cars. The Government did not
consider any measures that could hurt financially. For example, a modest stimula-
tion package aimed at encouraging a choice for cleaner lorries in the Netherlands
was considered, but only if the necessary money (23 million Euro) could be found
within the VROM budget. In hindsight, a sum of 23 million Euros was a small
amount compared to what would be spent on air quality later on. The fitting of cars
with soot filters was to be encouraged via a budget-neutral change in taxation. In
order to alleviate local bottlenecks, speed limits were to be lowered, and municipal-
ities would be informed about possibilities to designate areas where only clean cars
and lorries were allowed.
The same strategy of waiting for solutions to come out of Europe and for cautious
budget-neutral policies was proposed in the National Air Quality Plan 2004 (Natio-
naal Luchtkwaliteitsplan 2004), which was submitted in February 2005. It outlined
further policy in order to reach the air-quality standards imposed by the EUAir Qual-
ity Directives. This plan resulted from an EU obligation, because the Netherlands had
failed to meet the NO2 and PM10 targets, and in that case the Directive obliged the
Government to draft a plan detailing reduction policies. Therefore, it was just asmuch
a plan to prescribe policies in the Netherlands, as it was a document intended to con-
vince the EU of the validity of the Dutch strategy (VROM 2005, p. 5).
It did not bring much new to the table, but offered a number of arguments aimed at
convincing the EU that the Netherlands needed more time to comply with the stan-
dards. The main argument was that the effective reduction policies for PM10 were far
too expensive, as well as being unfeasible (VROM 2005, p. 8). The plan conveyed the
message that it would not be reasonable to demand that the Netherlands meet the
standards on time.
This ‘reasonability criterion’ appeared numerous times in the document (VROM2005,
pp. 10, 21, 39, 41), and the appeal to a shared idea of what was reasonable could be
heard often in Dutch discussions about environmental policy. However, at that time
there was no indication from the European Commission that the Netherlands would
be granted a postponement or a relaxation of the standards.
In the European arena, the Dutch Government continued its export of ecological
modernistic ideas and it made use of the familiar storyline presenting win-win sce-
narios and ‘the environment as an opportunity’. The Dutch Government tried to
push the notion of ‘sustainable mobility’ on the EU agenda (VROM 2004, p. 27).
When the Netherlands became President of the European Council in 2004, the
Government organised an informal Environmental Council meeting in Maastricht
from 16 to 18 July 2004, and it unveiled the Dutch initiative ‘Clean, Clever, and
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Competitive’, a measure to highlight the importance of technological innovation to
counter environmental problems and to becomemore competitive on theworld stage.31
6.3.2 Three seminal verdicts in 2004
The political situation around air quality changed drastically in September 2004,
when environmental and health interests switched from being a minor issue to a
major problem for the realisation of the Balkenende Cabinet’s ambitious road expan-
sion programme. The reason for this turn of events was a string of verdicts given by
the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division.
Before 2004, the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division was asked to
judge in cases that related to air quality standards and to Dutch compliance with
them. However, the verdicts up until May 2004 had not demonstrated a clear and con-
sistent line of reasoning,32 and so they attracted little attention. For instance, air qual-
ity was not evenmentioned in the Council of State’s annual report in 2003. In 2004, the
Council of State formulated a consistent and strict guideline regarding interpretation
of the AQO 2001. In its yearly report in 2004, the Council predominantly discussed
three verdicts: one regarding a decision to expand a road between the Dutch towns
of Barneveld and Hoevelaken on 12 May 2004;33 one regarding another road expan-
sion on the trajectory Vught Ekkerswijer on 15 September;34 and one on the decision
to halt development of a commercial zone in Hendrik-IdoAmbacht, also on 22 Sep-
tember.35 The Council mentioned the three verdicts in its yearly report in 2005 as well,
and reported that they constituted the approach the Council had taken on air quality.
Therefore, we will examine in more detail these verdicts and their impact.
12 May 2004, Road expansion Hoevelaken - Barneveld
According to Loes Schutte Postma, air quality became a topic of discussion after 12
May 2004 (Schutte Postma 2006, p. 11), the day the Council of State Administrative
Jurisdiction Division passed its judgement regarding the complaints of residents in
the small village of Ter Schuren in the east of the Netherlands. Residents protested
against a planned road expansion between the towns of Hoevelaken and Barneveld,
invoking a number of arguments, including the increase in noise nuisance and the
additional burden on air quality in the vicinity. The administration argued that air-
quality standards would not be exceeded near people’s houses, and concluded that
31. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 21 501-08 nr. 187, p. 5.
32. Van der Feltz mentions ABRvS 12 Nov. 2003 LJN AN7847 200202139 (Overslag Europoort) and ABRvS
17 Dec. 2003, 200301366/1 (Zwijndrecht) as verdicts in which the Council seems to accept the policy of
the Government to observe only the norms in places where people live – referred to as ‘sensitive des-
tinations’ (Van der Feltz 2006, p. 28).
33. ABRvS 200308160. Barneveld Hoevelaken.
34. ABRvS 200401178/1. Vught Ekkerswijer.
35. ABRvS 200307780/1. Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht.
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therefore the air quality standards had been observed. The Council agreedwith the res-
idents, and judged that the standards needed to be observed everywhere in the country.
The verdict was a setback for the Dutch administration, because it meant that the admin-
istrative practice of observing the air-quality standards strictly only in places where peo-
ple lived – the sensitive destinations – was considered a faulty interpretation (De Hoop
2006, p. 63). The Council did not intend to terminate the expansion altogether, however.
Instead, it judged that the road could be expanded if the speed limit on the road were
lowered to 80 km/h. It is interesting to note that the Council chose sides in the debates
on the speed limit, because it would allow this road expansion if the limit were lowered.
September 2004, Road expansion Vught - Ekkerswijer
In September of the same year, the Council reached two more crucial verdicts. The
first was passed on 15 September in another road expansion case, this time involving
the junction between Vught and Ekkerswijer. A number of different residents’ asso-
ciations and interest groups appealed against the expansion, and again the plaintiffs
claimed that the administration had not taken sufficiently into account the impact of
road expansion on air quality.
This case is a highly interesting one, as PM10 concentrations near the junction exceeded
the standards, and the administration therefore needed to take measures to reduce pol-
lution concentrations at that location. The data presented showed that the expansion
actually had benefits for air quality in the area, because it alleviated traffic on other
roads. The Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Section did not contradict those
arguments, but stated that the municipal administration was responsible for reducing
the concentrations as much as possible. It took this responsibility to mean that the most
adequate measure for reducing air quality had to be taken. However, the administra-
tion could not prove that in terms of air quality this specific measure was the best solu-
tion, and as a result, its decision was not sufficiently motivated. The Council therefore
annulled the decision to allow expansion of the road.
This decision placed a virtual bomb under the whole road expansion programme and
the Emergency Law. Throughout the country, air quality standards were being excee-
ded near roads, so it would be very difficult to show that expanding a road anywhere
would be the most effective solution to meet the standards. According to the Ministry
of V&W the Vught Ekkerswijer decision ‘was the reason for all the efforts the Cabinet has
made to reduce the air-quality problem, international efforts, financial efforts, policy efforts, as
well as an amendment of regulations’.36
September 2004, Commercial zone Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht
The third crucial verdict was reached one week later, on 22 September 2004. In this
case, residents challenged a provincial decision to approve a plan to allow the
36. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 646 nr. 2, p. 2.
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realisation of an industrial and commercial zone near Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht, a town
in the South of Holland. Again they argued that the provincial Government had not
sufficiently observed the air-quality standards. Construction of the industrial zone led
to an increase in traffic in the region, and hence to an increase in pollution concentra-
tions. The provincial administration put forward a number of counter arguments.
Firstly, it stated that air quality had not worsened in the area where residents lived,
the by now familiar argument of sensitive destinations. Secondly, the administration
argued that in the case of PM10, the responsibility lay with the Central and not the
Provincial Government, an argument based on the ExplanatoryMemorandum as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. Thirdly, the provincial Government contended that
the increase in air-quality concentrations was insignificant, and did not need to be
taken into consideration.
The Council of State judged all three of those arguments to be invalid. Firstly, the
administration was wrong to presume that the standards only needed to be observed
in residential areas. Secondly, even though theCentral Governmentwas responsible for
PM10 policies, it was the responsibility of lower administrative bodies to show that
their policieswould lead to a reduction in pollution aswell. Thirdly, theCouncil of State
concluded that neither the Air Quality Order nor the ExplanatoryMemorandummade
a distinction between significant or insignificant increases in concentrations. That last
part of the verdict meant that every increase, however minimal, could be a reason to
terminate a decision in a situation in which air-quality norms were exceeded.
The Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht decision was in line with the earlier decisions relating to
road expansion. The verdict implied that not only were expansions possible targets of
termination, but other construction projects ran the risk of annulment as well. More-
over, lower administrations were also considered responsible for air-quality policy,
and the sensitive destination doctrine was proven twice in a row to be untenable.
Road expansion and spatial development were now under threat of being halted
because of the air-quality standards.
Those last two verdicts attracted large scale attention. Newspapers ran headlines
like ‘Highway expansion in danger’ and ‘Stuck between car and health’ (de Volks-
krant 25-09, 2004). After Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht, Secretary of State Pieter van Geel
warned that those verdicts would cause the Netherlands to become ‘blocked’37 from
further infrastructure-related developments (Volkskrant 01-10 2004). The image of the
37. The Dutch phrase is ‘Nederland op slot’, which translates to ‘The Netherlands locked down’. I use the
phrase ‘blocked’, which I think is a faithful translation of the Dutch phrase. Priemus and Schutte Postma
use the translation ‘off limits’, but I feel it captures the meaning less well than’ blocked’. The translation
is important because ‘Nederland op slot’ was a phrase heard frequently in the PM10 discourse. It is an
important turn of phrase, because it would become emblematic of the damage that air-quality standards
could do, according to some political parties who opposed the strict regulation.
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Netherlands being blocked in this manner would later become an emblem in a story-
line arguing for relaxation of environmental standards.
The May verdict was the first to deal with the Emergency Law on Road Expansion.
Termination of the administrative decision on the basis of the AQO 2001 was unex-
pected.38 The court’s order to lower the speed limit was also considered conspicuous,
because speed reductions in the context of the Emergency Law would fall within the
competency of the Minister of V&W.39 In regard to the speed limit, the Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division positioned itself on the side of the pro-
health camp with this verdict.
The September verdict on road expansion near the Vught Ekkerswijer junction made
clear that additional demands were to be made on administrative bodies to motivate
their decisions. They had to take into account the impacts a decision had on air quality
in an area beyond the junction in question.40 The Council also demanded this integral
approach to air-quality research in its Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht decision.41
VROM Secretary of State Pieter van Geel was asked to remedy the situation immedi-
ately, as parties on both the right and the left of the political spectrum called for a solu-
tion.42 The Government first reacted in disbelief, and reiterated that mobility itself
was not a problematic issue. The Ministry of V&W in fact intended to go ahead with
the planned road expansions, since, according to the Minister, it was impossible to
legally bar the Netherlands from pursuing further development of the infrastructure
based on the EU Directive.43
At the end of 2005, projects that should have come to fruition under the Emergency
Law on Road Expansion were hit especially hard. Road expansions incurred hefty
delays because of the Council of State’s strict interpretation of the AQO 2001, and
some projects were cancelled.
The judgements implied that a great deal of additional research had to be done when
it came to air quality, but Parliamentary documents mentioned that there was only
one research institute in the Netherlands capable of handling those kinds of detailed
investigations.44 As Struiksma noted in his annotation of the Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht
case, the Government had to adapt the AQO 2001, but then it remained to be seen
38. ABRvS 200308160, Annotation A.G.A. Nijmeijer.
39. ABRvS 200308160, Annotation A.G.A. Nijmeijer.
40. ABRvS 200401178/1, Annotation J.M.H.F. Teunissen, J.W.A. Fleuren.
41. ABRvS 200307780/1, Annotation J. Struiksma.
42. Handelingen II aanhangsel 2004-2005 nr. 148, pp. 313, 314.
43. Idem p. 313.
44. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 28 679 nr. 50, p. 2.
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whether it would remain in compliance with the European Directives.45 For the Gov-
ernment, this represented a conundrum.
For environmentally inclined parties, the verdicts were proof that the Emergency Law
on Road Expansion needed to be shelved. The Council effectively put a halt to road
expansion because of the possible harm regarding air quality, and as a result, the ver-
dicts provided the perfect opportunity to launch an offensive againstmobility from an
environmental perspective.
6.3.3 The letter of 30 September: Van Geel’s struggle with the Council of State
The Government was well aware of possible consequences of the September verdicts.
The Secretary of State tried to remedy the situation quickly by sending a letter on 30
September to provincial and municipal administrations, in which he defended his
interpretation of the Air Quality Order 2001. He defended explicitly the distinction
between sensitive destinations where people spend time and non-sensitive destina-
tions where they do not (Van Geel 2004). In this ‘30 September letter’, Van Geel res-
tated the opinion that when applying the air-quality standards, priority should be
given to sensitive destinations, such as houses, schools, hospitals, and sports fields.
Lower administrative bodies should see to it that projects designated as sensitive des-
tinations would not be planned in areas in which the quality of air was bad.
In this letter, Van Geel still claimed that the judgements by the Council of State dis-
played a mixed pattern. In some instances, the Council of State condoned the distinc-
tion, and only opposed it in two judgements regarding the Emergency Law on Road
Expansion. Van Geel claimed that in Europe the idea of making a distinction between
sensitive and non-sensitive locations was gaining ground. The Secretary of State reit-
erated that the Central Government was responsible for PM10, because breaches of
the PM10 standards were widespread. Lower administrative bodies should only
see to it that the best options in terms of air quality is chosen, and that the best avail-
able techniques be prescribed when granting permits. He claimed that the Council of
State’s verdicts on the issue were mixed as well.
According to Van Geel, all administrative bodies should do everything possible to
reach the standards, but non-compliance with the NO2 and PM10 standards would
still occur. TheGovernment did still not opt for expensive infrastructuremeasures like
vaulting roads, but for lowering the speed limit or restructuring traffic, as well as for
making changes in European regulation. Van Geel ended his letter with the hope that
he had granted lower administrative bodies the necessary clarity and tools for the
appropriate application of the Air Quality Order.
45. ABRvS 200307780/1, Annotation J. Struiksma.
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With his letter of 30 September, Van Geel went against the line taken by the Council of
State in its recent verdicts. This is a crucial episode because all through the air quality
clash Van Geel would keep struggling with the Advisory Section. In two follow-
up letters to Parliament, dated 28 October46 and 26 November 2004,47 Van Geel elab-
orated upon his position, basically reiterating the policy plans already mentioned in
the Memorandum on Traffic Emissions. His aim was to meet the standards in 2015,
instead of in 2005 and 2010. However, he now promised that extra money would be
reserved for air quality. In the forthcoming Memorandum on Mobility, 300 million
Euro would become available to remedy bottlenecks in the period 2011-2014, and
the use of soot filters would be encouraged byway of a package totalling 100million
Euros. This package was a first success for the pro-health camp, because in the stra-
tegic accord of 2001, the subsidies on cleaner cars had been scrapped.
VanGeel’s letter of 26Novemberwas less elaborate butmore interesting, because in it he
set course for a direct confrontation with the Council of State. He considered that the
Council was blocking necessary projects, against the intentions of the European Direc-
tives.48 Van Geel insisted that giving priority to sensitive destinations was defendable,
and he announced that aMinisterial Decree49would be drafted thatwould closelymatch
the wording of the Directive. According to Van Geel, this meant that a distinction would
be made between norms that protected public health and norms to protect eco-systems.
The concept version of the Ministerial Decree was ready in January 2005, and was far
more lenient than the current AQO 2001. Article 2 of the concept version of the Decree
contained the stipulation that those limit values that protected public health were only
valid at the places mentioned in the letter of 30 September, such as schools, houses, and
sports fields.50 With regard to PM10, a separate article was inserted, stipulating that
lower administrative bodiesmust try tominimise exceedances (Art. 3 sub 4)whenmak-
ing decisions, unless this were to have unreasonable financial consequences (Art. 3 sub
5).Moreover, article 3 sub 1 stated thatwhen using their competencies, theMinistries of
Transport and VROMwould strive to comply asmuch as possible with the limit values
for PM10. Those articles would take the sting out of the standards, because now it
would be enough if the administration did everything reasonably possible to comply.
In this proposal, the result-oriented character of the limit valueswas dropped. This arti-
cle reduced the PM10 limit values in practice to target values, because it took away their
obligatory character. The pro-health camp objected that the decree was tailor-made for
the Emergency Law on Road Expansion and for other infrastructure projects.
46. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 27.
47. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 30.
48. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 30, p. 1.
49. AMinisterial Decree is a piece of legislation that can be enacted without the approval of the two Cham-
bers of Parliament. It is quicker to enact, but is lower in rank than a General Administrative Order.
50. Concept Ministerial Decree Art. 2, sub 1, 2.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
Before issuing the Decree, VanGeel asked the advice of the Council of State in its capac-
ity as advisory council. The Council submitted its recommendation on 30 March 2005
(Council of State 2005a), in which it did not approve Van Geel’s intentions at all. It rea-
soned that although some standards aimed to protect human health, it did not mean
they should not be observed in places where people generally did not spend time.
According to the wording of the Directive, the standards needed to be observed every-
where in the Netherlands. The Council advised negatively as well with regard to the
weakening of obligations following from the limit value for PM10.
According to the Council, the Government as well as the lower administrative bodies
should refrain from taking decisions that jeopardised obligations following from Euro-
pean law, especially in situations when those obligations were already being breached.
The Council advised the Ministries of VROM and V&W to confer with their colleagues
in Brussels as to whether compliance was impossible, and demonstrate that they had
done everything possible to comply with the obligations (Council of State 2005a, p. 7).
The Council’s final remark contained certain cautionary words that read like a threat:
‘Trying to find a solution on the basis of one’s own interpretation is risky, because it may elicit lit-
igation that leads to prejudicial questions that will have to be answered by the European Court of
Justice. Experience teaches that this results in a delay of a number of years with an uncertain out-
come’ (Council of State 2005a, p. 8).
According to the Council, the Government should provide a plan illustrating that all
possible measures had been taken.
The Council of State acted in this case in an advisory capacity, but the same organi-
sation also housed the highest administrative court. With advice like this, it is hard to
conceive of the administrative court accepting the Decree, especially because the
Advisory Division warned that prejudicial questions needed to be posed to the Euro-
pean Court. There was nothing left for Van Geel to do but come up with a new plan
and revoke his earlier letter of 30 September, since in view of the Council’s advice, the
letter would be unworkable.
. MOBIL ISATION OF THE PRO-HEALTH CAMP INS IDE AND OUTS IDE
OF PARLIAMENT
In this section, the further mobilisation of the pro-health camp in and outside of Par-
liament takes centre stage. After Van Geel’s letter of 30 September, opposition became
more forceful. The period between September 2004 and March 2005 saw a great deal
of Parliamentary discussion on the issue. In previous years, a camp of left progressive
parties that favoured lowering the speed limits had already been formed. That camp
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was now bolstered by the Council of State’s verdicts, and later on by the Council’s
advice on the concept of the Ministerial Decree, and it saw a political opportunity
to attack the Government’s policy on mobility and the environment.
Outside of Parliament, environmental groups began to intensify their campaigns
against transport and air pollution. The campaign acquired a specific legal dimension
when the environmental movement started using the court verdicts in order to mobi-
lise public support to initiate more cases and to bring Government policy to the atten-
tion of the court.
6.4.1 Pressure by the pro-health camp in Parliament at the end of 2004
Directly after the 2004 verdicts, the pro-health camp scored further victories. In Octo-
ber 2004, The Minister of V&W decided to lower the speed limit to 80 km/h on
another four sections of highways, and on additional sections she lowered the speed
limit from 120 km/h to 100 km/h. She explained that she was in a dilemma, because
there was no support from automobile users regarding lowering the speed limit.51
The VVD’s desire to determine whether the speed limit might also be raised could not
be taken into consideration. The verdicts of the Council of State prevented this,
because raising the speed limit would cause air quality to deteriorate, and such a
measure would certainly be annulled.
After the initial test in Overschie, this was a further victory for left-leaning parties in
their struggle to lower the speed limits. As we saw in section 6.2.4, in Parliament this
pro-health camp comprised the left-wing parties in opposition, such as Groen-Links
and the PvdA, but was also supported by the governing party, D66. This camp of
political parties met Van Geel and Peijs during a general discussion on 4 November
2004,52 during which all significant recent events regarding air quality were on the
agenda, such as theMemorandumon traffic emissions, questions regarding the Emer-
gency Law on Road Expansion, speed limits, consequences of the Vught Ekkerswijer
judgement relating to road expansions, and Van Geel’s new remedial policy efforts.
Parties in the pro-health camp demanded that the speed limits be lowered on further
tracts of road, but compensation in the form of higher speed limits elsewhere, as the
VVD demanded, was out of the question. Both the left-wing SP and GroenLinks
offered the Secretary of State alternative strategies regarding air quality, consisting
of a number of taxation plans; for instance, the GL wanted to raise taxes on diesel
and diesel cars, while both the SP and the GL wanted to lower the maximum speed
to 80 km/h on significant tracts of highway and inner city roads. The GL was keen to
see the Ministry designate inner city areas where only clean cars would be allowed,
but the Ministry informed the faction that this was a municipal prerogative. The
51. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 663 nr. 26, p. 1.
52. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 8.
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Socialist Party demanded a halt to construction in places within 150 metres of a high-
way. Van Geel agreed that this was a desirable situation in principle, but declined to
name any concrete distance.53 These demands are highlighted here, because in fact
some of them would later be introduced.
At the end of the debate, Duyvendak introduced motions that were supported by a sig-
nificant number of the opposition, and in one instance by D66 as well. The motions were
eventually rejected, but by a narrowmargin,54 and thosemade by the Socialist Partywere
supported by the left-wing parties. The most broadly supported motion contained the
desire to reduce speed limits on ring roads around the large cities in the Netherlands,
and the SP asked for a minimum distance between a highway and surrounding build-
ings. This motion was also rejected, but the measures were now firmly on the agenda.
6.4.2 Mobilisation of pro-health groups outside of Parliament
The Council of State’s verdicts and its advice concerning the Ministerial Decree cre-
ated opportunities for the pro-health camp in Parliament to take the offensive, but at
the same time, extra Parliamentary opposition was organising. Campaigns for clean
air were started by different pressure groups, but the most important one was the
campaign byMilieudefensie, the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth. This campaign
involved the mobilisation of people to initiate proceedings against the Dutch state.
Milieudefensie belonged to the more radical of the environmental action groups, and it
campaigned against the mega projects, such as the expansion of Schiphol Airport, the
Betuwe rail route, and expansion of the harbour at Rotterdam. In the beginning of the
2000s, Milieudefensie decided to forego it’s up till then more cooperative strategy and
enter once more into a conflict-minded style of campaigning, taking detrimental effects
of transport as a campaigning target. As previouslymentioned, thiswas a controversial
choice, because the transport sector was – and remains – economically important, and
campaigns against auto-mobility targeted a large number of ordinary car owners.
However, road expansions and the new road-building projects triggered Milieude-
fensie to add its weight to the drive to lower the speed limit after the Overschie test.
In autumn 2002, the first posters already appeared in Voorburg, alongside the busy
A12 highway, at the time that the Emergency Law was under discussion. The cam-
paign gained momentum after the verdicts of September 2004. In October 2004, Mili-
eudefensie released a booklet called ‘Snelheid geboden, 80 de limiet op de snelweg’
(Speed is a necessity, 80 is the limit on the highway’), in which it urged lowering the
speed limit on Dutch highways. In this campaign booklet, a number of citizens, pol-
iticians, and scientists argued in favour of reducing the speed limit on important tracts
of road, mainly around the big cities.
53. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 2.
54. Handelingen II 2004-2005 nr. 34, p. 2248.
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The brochure had been compiled at an earlier date, however, and the most recent
court decisions on the Emergency Law had not been taken into account. Nevertheless,
the verdicts created an opportunity to intensify the campaign. Campaign leader Joris
Wijnhoven and others at Milieudefensie realised that ‘this could become dynamite’ (Joris
Wijnhoven, interview). The road expansion verdicts provided Milieudefensie with a
powerful argument against auto-mobility. As campaign leader JorisWijnhoven put it:
‘Residents found out that they could claim their rights. Then we thought, well, clean air is not some-
thing abstract, but it is simply a right, it is in the law. There cannot be more dirt in the air then is
stipulated in the Directive. So we thought, well we will claim this’ (Wijnhoven, interview).
At the end of 2004, Milieudefensie initiated the campaign ‘Nederland in Ademnood’
(the Netherlands gasping for breath). This campaign was aided by satellite images
that became available in October 2004, and which showed that air above the Nether-
lands contained high concentrations of NO2.
The images displayed NO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, however, and not at street
level. Moreover, NO2 is far less harmful than PM10, but those nuances were lost in the
imagery, as well as in themedia attention that began to gainmomentum. The imagewas
all over the newspapers. On 15 October, the Dutch daily newspaper Telegraaf opened
with the headline ‘Our country is the dirtiest in Europe’ (Telegraaf, 15 October 2004).
Image of satellite photo showing NO2 pollution above the Netherlands.
http://www.kennislink.nl/publicaties/satelliet-brengt-luchtvervuiling-in-kaart
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The campaignwas broad in its scope.Milieudefensie used the disturbing satellite images
as displayed in the picture below, and also drafted a list of the 50 dirtiest streets in the
Netherlands. According to Wijnhoven, the campaign became an instant media hit.
6.4.3 Milieudefensie’s legal campaign
Perhaps the most striking feature of the air-quality clash was its rapid juridification. The
clash gained decisive momentumwith the Council of State’s verdicts, and the judiciary’s
heavy involvement –provokedby the actions of the environmentalmovement, especially
Milieudefensie – was also instrumental in the social problem’s further evolution.
Milieudefensie added a legal dimension to its campaign after the road expansion ver-
dicts and the debacle involving the Ministerial Decree. The group decided to send a
letter to Minister Peijs in March 2005, in which it demanded that Peijs lower the speed
limit on roads through and around cities, totalling some 200 km of highway (Website
Milieuactueel.nl, last accessed 18-07 2014) Wijnhoven, interview). In addition,
Milieudefensie demanded that the municipality of The Hague close two notorious
air-quality bottlenecks in The Hague to traffic, the ‘Stille Veerkade’ and the ‘Amster-
damse Veerkade’. According to Milieudefensie, those two streets were among the
dirtiest in Europe. In a press release,Mileudefensie stated that its eventual goal would
be to force road pricing for lorries, to raise diesel fuel prices, to lower the speed limit,
and to curtail road expansion as well as the expansion of Rotterdam Harbour and
Schiphol Airport (Website Milieuloket, last accessed 18-07 2014).
https://www.indymedia.nl/en/2004/11/23461.shtml / Michiel Wijnbergh
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If the municipality andMinister did not comply, Milieudefensie threatened to initiate
court proceedings together with residents’ interest groups. According to an interview
in the daily BN De Stem with campaign leader Wijnhoven, Milieudefensie would
unleash an ‘avalanche’ of proceedings (BN De Stem, 07-04 2005).
Minister Peijs refused to agree to the demands made in Milieudefensie’s letter, but the
municipality itself made certain concessions, though it refused to block the roads leading
to the two streets, or to block the streets to lorry transport. Not accepting the demands
made by Milieudefensie constituted a decision in the sense of the Dutch Administrative
Code, and therefore it was open to appeal. The pressure group promptly appealed the
decision, and summoned the municipality of The Hague before the Administrative
Court, where it demanded that the municipality take a number of measures, because
the air in those parts of the city was not in accordance with the air-quality standards.
Milieudefensie lost this case, first in the court of first instance and later in appeal before
the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division.55 The judge decided that
although air quality was indeed poor, the administrative body had considerable leeway
in deciding how to achieve compliance. The court sanctioned the municipality’s defence
that these measures could lead to a worsening of air quality elsewhere in the city. How-
ever, Milieudefensie was unable to force the municipality to take certain decisions.
Nevertheless, the attention that such legal proceedings garnered was considerable.
According to Breeman and Timmermans, this strategy created a boost in media atten-
tion regarding air quality (Breeman & Timmermans 2008, p. 38). After the first court
case, more followed, with Milieudefensie losing a substantial number of them (Wijn-
hoven, interview).56 However with the aid of these court cases, Milieudefensie was
able to present itself as a champion of the struggle against air pollution and its effects
on liveability. Moreover, it was able to use its expertise to help others, and it advised
and mobilised pressure groups of residents living in ‘dirty’ areas, as well as people
living alongside roads, who subsequently acted as litigants (Wijnhoven, interview).
During the actual proceedings, Milieudefensie frequently played a role in the back-
ground. On its website, Milieudefensie published a ‘do-it-yourself’ kit detailing what
steps to take in order to bring a clean-air case before the Council of State (website
Milieudefensie). When the proceedings started to become more technical and elabo-
rate calculations were necessary, Milieudefensie assisted residents, using their own
experts who could do the necessary math (Wijnhoven, interview). According to
55. ABRvS 200604266/1, Veerkaden Den Haag.
56. The Council of State website lists 14 verdicts containing both the terms ‘air quality’ and ‘Milieudefensie’
between 01-01 2005 and 31-12 2008. In 13 of them,Milieudefensie was a party, and of those casesMilieu-
defensie lost eight and won five. The number is small because Milieudefensie was often not a direct
participant, but merely acted in a supporting role for other pressure groups. However, this gives an
indication of the success rate of appeals lodged by pressure groups.
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Wijnhoven, Milieudefensie members spent days answering phone calls from resi-
dents’ groups, and were staffed to maximum capacity.
In April 2005, those people residing on ‘dirty streets’ as assigned by Milieudefensie
received another campaign folder, entitled ‘Air alarm’, which featured all the
emblematic aspects of the air-quality problem, including the Overschie situation
and the ‘17 cigarettes’. The folder also mentioned research indicating that planning
schools close to the highwaywas a bad idea, and the populace was called to start pro-
ceedings against the administration if air quality exceeded the standards; in this
regard, the ‘do-it-yourself kit’ was also pointed out.
Milieudefensie used the court cases as a crowbar to force opportunities to influence
air-quality policy, but also added an explicitly legal storyline by discussing the issue
in legal terms. In their campaigns, the groupmade explicit references to the law and to
human rights, and proclaimed clean air to be ‘a right’ (Joris Wijnhoven, interview;
Van Klink 2005; Milieudefensie 2005). The movement urged local pressure groups
to use this argument as well (Website Leefmilieu, last accessed 25-06 2015) and it also
managed to attract media attention for it (de Volkskrant 07-05 2005) The focus of the
arguments was still on the public health aspects of PM10, but a legal storyline was
added to its repertoire. The storyline portrayed the Government as hypocritical
because it was not prepared to stick to its own laws, which argued that the Govern-
ment was in violation of citizens’ rights by exposing people to polluted air. Residents
were summoned to fight back and claim their rights to clean air. Milieudefensie took
its claim that clean air was a right to court in 2005. Although the Council of State jud-
ged in 2008 that clean air is not an enforceable right,57 the court cases granted the envi-
ronmental pressure group the opportunity to drive its point home.
6.4.4 The presentation of worrying scientific findings by the MNP/RIVM
The claims of the pro-health camp gained in credence when the MNP and RIVM
published another set of worrying scientific findings in 2005. TheMNP issued a report
indicating that the health problem posed by PM10 was worse than expected. The
MNP publishes an annual ‘state of the environment’ report, The Environmental Bal-
ance (Milieubalans), which always contains a section on air pollution. In the report of
2004, an estimate of 5000 deaths linked to PM10 was given (MNP/RIVM 2004, p. 15),
and in 2005, the RIVM arrived at a new estimation, which painted a much more seri-
ous picture. At the presentation of the report inMay 2005, Klaas van Egmond, director
of theMNP, stated that asmany as 18,000 people could die prematurely each year due
to PM10. The figures were taken from a report pending at the time (Knol & Staatsen
2005), in which it was stated that 18,000 people were estimated to die 10 years earlier
than might have been expected (Knol & Staatsen, 2005, p. 56). The estimate was also
mentioned in a report on PM10, ‘Fijnstof nader bekeken’ (MNP 2005a, p. 56). This
57. ABRvS 200704973/1, 80 Kilometre.
6 The rise of the pro-health camp in the Netherlands 2001 – 2005
meant that, at a stroke, PM10 became themost serious environmental problem in theNeth-
erlands, far worse even than traffic accidents (Knol & Staatsen 2005, p. 72), see figure 4.
At the presentation of The Environmental Balance in May, the media seized upon the
issue, and discussion about the figures mounted. The Dutch national daily newspa-
pers Volkskrant, Telegraaf, and Trouw reported on the large number of expected
deaths resulting from high levels of PM10 (de Volkskrant, 11-5 2005; Telegraaf, 11-
05 2005). Media attention for PM10 was high in 2005 in general. During the spring
of 2005, a television programme called Zembla, which dealt in investigative journal-
ism, turned its attention to the deleterious effects of air pollution, and to the role of
mobility in this regard. It contained the emblematic issue of Overschie and noted epi-
demiologist Bert Brunekreef revealed their finding about the harmful effects of air pol-
lution on children. In addition, the debate in Parliament in April concerning air
quality was a prominent item on a political news show called Den Haag Vandaag
(Website Den Haag Vandaag, last accessed 25-06 2015).
The large increase in the number of prospective PM10-related deaths inMay 2005was
remarkable, especially considering that the two American studies upon which the
data were based dated from the 1990s. These were the Harvard Six Cities Study
and the ACS Study discussed in chapter 2. All the information was already present
in 2004, when 5000 premature deaths were considered to be plausible, as indicated
in The Environmental Balance. The scientists Leendert van Bree and Erik Lebret
defended their findings in the newspaper Trouw of 10 June 2005, but also pointed
to uncertainties and assumptions in the numbers. These uncertainties were recounted
in a later RIVM report that mentioned numerous doubts regarding every aspect of
PM10 (Mathijssen & Visser 2006, p. 2).
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In the media, the figure of 18,000 premature deaths was reported often to indicate the
harm done by PM10, but it is striking that this large increase did not greatly influence
the political debates. As far as I could determine, in 2005 only GroenLinks leaderHals-
ema mentioned that specific number of deaths,58 and in the documents, we generally
encounter the number 5000, also in debates as late as 2006 and 2007.59 Although pub-
lic health was referred to by the environmentally conscious factions, apparently the
exact number of deaths was of secondary importance in the debates. In an interview,
Joris Wijnhoven, campaign leader for Milieudefensie, put it as follows: ‘They are all
epidemiological studies; well, whether it is 100,000 deaths in Europe, or 300,000, or perhaps
50,000, it is simply crystal clear that breathing polluted air is bad for you’.
However, the media-attention strengthened the case of the pro-health camp. The
claims of the political parties belonging to this camp, the environmental movement
and these scientific institutes overlap; bad air quality due to air pollution is a signif-
icant health threat and should be mitigated as much as possible. Therefore the scien-
tific institutes are situated within the pro-health camp.
6.4.5 The Council of State caught in the middle
Milieudefensie tried to provoke the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Divi-
sion into demanding concrete measures from administrative bodies, In general
though the Council did not go as far as to directly condemn Government policy. Mili-
eudefensie lost the proceedings it had started against The Hague municipality, in
which it demanded that the court order the administration to take concrete measures.
The Council of State itself documented its role as advisory body and administrative
judge in this period in two yearly reports: 2004 and 2005. In its annual report for 2004,
the Council pointed to the mismatch between the national system of environmental
law and the European Directives. European regulation had its own logic and was not
automatically compatible with national legislation. In this regard it was up to the
national legislator to weld European and national law into a coherent whole, espe-
cially because the national legislator was also co-legislator at the European level
(Council of State 2005b, p. 25).
That line of reasoning was also present in the 2005 annual report. The Council of
State devoted considerable space to the air-quality clash, reiterating that the imple-
mentation of measures had been guided too much by national concepts and consid-
erations. The national legal ramifications of the air-quality Directives had been
underestimated. Van Geel’s letter of 30 September as well as the Ministerial Decree
had been rejected by the Council of State, because they were based on mistaken
assumptions regarding obligations stemming from the Directives. The proposal
58. Handelingen II 2004-2005 nr. 82, p. 4918; Handelingen II 2004-2005 nr. 103, p. 6264.
59. For instance, Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 and 28 663 nr. 18; Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 30 175
nr. 46, p. 5.
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by the Secretary of State would take away the result-oriented nature of the air-qual-
ity standards. In the yearly report, the Council of State offered two recommenda-
tions: firstly, the Government should redress the situation where it had begun –
in the European arena, and it would have to seek a solution together with other
Member States and the European Commission; secondly, the Government would
need to take all possible measures to meet its obligations at home (Council of State
2006a, p. 134).
As to the court cases, the Council of State indicated that the three seminal verdicts
discussed above displayed the Council’s line. The report stated that non-compliance
with the standards directly was a reason for the Court to annul administrative deci-
sions, but more often thorough research was lacking and this lack of research was the
primary ground from annulment. Administrative bodies should make a credible case
that their decisions would not lead to deterioration in air quality in situations where
the standards were exceeded. The brunt of the annulments occurred because admin-
istrative bodies did not comply with the courts’more rigorous demands for research.
6.4.6 Further victories for the pro-health camp in the spring of 2005
In the spring of 2005,Milieudefensie waswaging its legal and societal campaigns, and
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State kept terminating pro-
jects, some of themwith a very high profile. Between September 2004 and April 2005,
a number of prestigious projects were annulled, such as development of the ‘Southern
Axis’ in Amsterdam, an ambitious commercial zone,60 development of a football sta-
dium for ADO Den Haag,61 development of Amsterdam Central Station, and expan-
sion of the A27 highway.62 Hugo Priemus mentioned in an article in 2006 (Priemus
2006a) that further expansions of the A27, A1, and A2 were under threat. Residential
areas were also not immune, and Priemus listed residential areas such as IJburg,
Ypenburg, Almere Poort, Haarlemmermeer, and Leidsche Rijn, which had also been
mentioned by Van Geel in April 2005. In that same month, the clash reached a pre-
liminary climax when Minister Peijs (V&W) lamented: ‘Money is not my biggest worry;
air quality is my biggest worry! I have money enough, but I cannot get one spade to dig into the
ground’ (Laverman 2005, p. 7).
In this unenviable position, Secretary of State Van Geel drafted another letter dated 20
April 2005 to outline his next moves.63 He still aimed at obtaining a postponement
from Europe, and he also sought to implement a distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive destinations into a future EU regulation. He also promised that 300
60. ABRvS 200406190/2, 22 November 2004.
61. ABRvS 200400465/1, 26 January 2005.
62. ABRvS 200407748/1, 13 April 2005.
63. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 12.
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million Euros would be designated for air quality after 2010, in addition to which he
pledged an extra package on top of that. He proposed additional measures, such as
encouraging the use of soot filters and raising taxes for diesel fuels. Van Geel insisted
that those measures would make the Netherlands a forerunner in Europe, and he
hoped that they would lead the European Commission to view the Dutch situation
in a favourable light. Van Geel felt that with this package, the Dutch Government
was doing everything that was reasonably possible. He also outlined his intention
to attempt to amend the Air Quality Order once again.
The letter was under discussion on 26 April 2005, together with the other air-quality
policies.64 In the April 2005 debate, Van Geel defended the package as the maximum
that could reasonably be undertaken, but he came under heavy fire fromPvdAMPDie-
derik Samsom for that statement. Samsom insisted that it was unclear what ‘doing all
that is reasonable’meant in the context of the threat to public health. The Government,
he insisted, was too focused onmeeting the standards, and disregarded the people that
needed to be protected. The Secretary of State was seen as having lost valuable time by
trying to ‘wiggle out’ of the standards by way of a Ministerial Decree.65
Together with Wijnand Duyvendak, Samsom came up with more measures, such as
extra speed reductions, banning old cars from using the ring roads around Amsterdam
and Rotterdam, and encouraging the use of soot filters on all diesel cars. Together with
D66 MP Van der Ham, Duyvendak insisted on the need to look at road pricing.
Samsom’s thrust that Van Geel was not doing all that reasonably could be done, and
his challenge to make explicit what ‘reasonable’ meant in this context, were a partic-
ularly venomous, because the pragmatic notion of reasonableness was a central fea-
ture of the tacit Dutch consensus on environmental issues. Policies had to make sense
from an economic and an environmental point of view, and should not demand the
impossible either way. However, Samsom now forced Van Geel to explain for whom
those measures were reasonable, and to what extent the Government was doing all
that could reasonably be required.66
VanGeel had obvious difficultymeeting this charge in the debate. He repeated that he
was doing everything that could be considered reasonable, without being able to
answer the question as to why he was not doing more. Van Geel accused the PvdA
and GroenLinks of ‘cheap rhetoric’,67 and insisted that air quality had improved con-
sistently over the years. The PM standards could not be met ‘with all reasonable mea-
sures’, and he alluded to the considerable scientific uncertainty that existed when the
64. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18.
65. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 2.
66. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18.
67. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 11.
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standards had first been agreed upon. He promised that the Government would look
into more far-reaching measures, and that he would try to find funds for extra meas-
ures within the budgets for 2006.
At the end of the debate, Duyvendak stated that he was pleased. A general speed
reduction was not in the cards, but all the measures GroenLinks had been demanding
were back on the political agenda. In this debate, the environment-friendly opposition
scored important victories. Van Geel was given the green light to draft a new law to
come up with a solution regarding the deadlock on infrastructure development, but
he and Minister Peijs were forced to consider environment-friendly measures to
appease the opposition, ‘Europe’, and the Council of State.
The debate in April 2005 proved to be a turning point. The pro-infrastructure parties
that had hitherto been put firmly on the defensive began to organise their counter
arguments, and to claim forcefully that the air-quality rules were misguided and
would lead to economic ruin. InApril 2005, however, the country’s infrastructure pro-
jects appeared to have been brought effectively to a halt.
6.4.7 The pro-health camp and its discursive strategies
The pro-health camp and especially GroenLinks and the PvdA saw air quality stan-
dards as an opportunity to oppose the policies of the Balkenende Cabinet. A number
of arguments weremade that illustrated the storylines the pro-health campwas using
to criticise the Government. GroenLinks politician Duyvendak was one of the most
critical of the Parliamentarians, and in general he was supported by members of
the PvdA and the SP. Duyvendak used the large mortality rate foreseen by epidemi-
ologists to convey his criticism of Van Geel’s policies. For instance, he criticised the
Ministerial Decree that Van Geel planned to issue as ‘merely a stop gap, while in the
meantime 5000 people die yearly because of bad air.68
Another politician who opposed Pieter van Geel vehemently in Parliament was Diede-
rik Samsom,who, likeDuyvendak, had a background in the environmentalmovement.
A former campaign leader for Greenpeace, Samsom applied pressure to Van Geel as
well by referring to the damage to people’s health that his policies would cause:
‘No actual measures to make cars drive slower, no policy to reduce the number of cars on the roads or
to keep off the most polluting lorries, no, the Secretary of State drops all these options and makes his
most talented lawyers devise a trick! As a kind of Cato I repeat: every year 5000 people die of the
consequences of air pollution by transport. That is more than 13 a day! How many human lives will
the Secretary of State save with his Ministerial Decree full of legal tricks? Is he prepared to answer
that? Under the mantra that the country cannot be blocked, human lives are put at risk.’69
68. Handelingen II 2004-2005 nr. 27, p. 1756.
69. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 800 XI nr. 93, p. 6.
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Samsomwas critical of thewayVanGeelwas handling the classical ecologicalmodernistic
assumption that economy and ecology could progress side by side. He appreciated Van
Geel when he argued for environmental protection as a possible economic opportunity
in Europe, but felt that on the national front, too few of these opinions resulted in policy.
All through 2004 and 2005, the environmental camp attacked the measures taken
by the Government as insufficient. Discursively, Duyvendak took the strongest
pro-environmental position. In a debate with the Minister of Transport, he criticised
the Government’s policies as being a ‘sickening recipe’ of more asphalt and less atten-
tion to public transport. He called the politicians belonging to the Governmental
parties a ‘bunch of ostriches’.70 Duyvendak’s intentions went beyond PM10 abate-
ment and towards limiting auto-mobility per se, which became even clearer in an
argument he presented late in 2005, at the high point of the crisis:
‘This new generation of environmental problems, the difficult problems can only be solved by setting
strict standards and observing strict compliance. There are too many ostriches in Parliament, the
Cabinet and in society, who stick their head in the sand instead of facing this reality. We hear it echo-
ing around that further development in the Netherlands has been blocked, but the question is in what
way we intend to unblock it.’71
Other parties in the pro-health camp generally did not go as far. Instead, they presented
other packages ofmeasures, and criticised the Secretary of State. The death toll resulting
from concentrations of PM10 was a leading argument, as well as the charge that the
Secretary of State was trying to ‘wiggle out’ of implementing European standards.
Diederik Samsom, for instance, stated in one of the last debates of 2004 on the issue:
‘Parliament and Government should consider the health of these people and the tens of thousands of
other people who live in areas polluted by exhaust fumes as leading. They should do everything possible
to reduce air pollution. With this attitude, the Secretary of State would not have lost valuable time with
an attempt to wiggle himself out of implementing European standards by Ministerial Decree’.72
And:
‘If people were truly central in the debate and not just the standards, then the Government would
have presented a package of measures with everything that is reasonably possible to solve the problem
of air pollution, apart from the question of whether the standards are being met’.73
This charge undermined the tacit Dutch environmental consensus based around the
tacit agreement about ‘doing what is reasonable’. The PvdA, however, did not
70. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 800 A nr. 43, p. 20.
71. Handelingen II 2005-2006 nr. 19, p. 1162.
72. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 2.
73. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 2.
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question the reigning eco-modernist approach of relying on clean technology and rec-
onciling the interests of mobility and environment.
The political party D66 was in a difficult position. It was known as being pro-envi-
ronmental, but from 2003 to 2006 it was in a Government with the right-wing
VVD and CDA, both of which were not very environmental friendly during those
years. As such, D66 was responsible for Government policy, even though it was
the junior partner in the coalition. During debates, the party operated cautiously,
but often sided with the pro-health camp. It especially urged the introduction of road
pricing in order to combat both congestion and emissions.74 For obvious political rea-
sons, it could not be persuaded to support fully the pro-health camp on breaking-
point issues (Wijnand Duyvendak, interview).
The last party belonging to the pro-health campwas the socialist SP, and it did not have a
truly independent profile, as its objections conformed to those of GroenLinks and the
PvdA. There were differences, however. The SP was not in favour of a road pricing, for
instance, but intended to make motorists pay to use the roads by raising the prices of fuel.
The pro-health camp organised itself first around the speed limit and later around the
issue of air quality. These parties opposed the reigning mobility policies of the Balken-
ende Cabinet, and the air-quality issue provided an ideal public issue from which to
launch their criticism. In 2005, this strategy led to policy changes in a pro-health direction.
6.4.8 Pro-health policies at the end of 2005
Combined with the strict interpretation of the Council of State and the findings of the
environment and health institutes, the efforts of the pro-health camp in 2004 and 2005
brought about a number of pro-health policy developments. Some of these involved
concrete measures, while others consisted of reformulations of policy.
The most conspicuous development was the publication of a package of measures to
encourage cleaner transportation. Thesemeasureswere backed up financially to a sig-
nificant extent, and the package was presented in September 2005 when the Govern-
ment revealed its budget for 2006.75 Hence, it became known as the ‘Prinsjesdag
package’, because on ‘Prinsjesdag’76 the Government traditionally presents the bud-
get for the coming Parliamentary year.
74. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 8, p. 8, Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 800 A nr. 43, p. 20; Kamer-
stukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18.
75. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 10.
76. Prinsjesdag refers to the third Tuesday in September, when the Dutch budget is released. The budget for
2006 contained a significant financially supported package, the goal of which was to reduce concentra-
tions of air pollution.
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Among other things, the package included – by way of a fiscal deduction – the incen-
tive to produce and to drive cleaner lorries and trucks: for instance, subsidies for die-
sel taxis and delivery vans that contained soot filters; subsidies for retro-fitted soot
filters; tax differentiation favouring low-sulphur diesel; campaigns to encourage driv-
ing in ways that saved fuel, lowering the speed limit in a number of trajectories; push-
ing for the use of air scrubbers in intensive cattle farming; and concluding covenants
with the industry to reduce PM emission from production processes.77
This package aimed to ‘improve public health and to prevent the Netherlands from becom-
ing “barred” from further economic development’.78
This package was supported financially by the budgets of VROM, the Ministry of
Transport and Water Management, and the Fund for Strengthening the Economic
Structure (FES). An amount of 900 million Euros was reserved for air quality, which
was a significant development, because the measures outlined in the Memorandum
on Traffic Emissions, for instance, lacked financial back up. Moreover, 900 million
Euro was a considerable sum if one considers that – as late as 2004 – budget cuts
had been foreseen in the field of the environment.
However, The Prinsjesdag package would not significantly reduce those areas where
air- quality standards were being exceeded; it would reduce total emissions by only
1%. (Hammingh et al. 2005, p. 9). It was still considered cost-effective, however,
because it would reduce by 10% the most health-relevant emissions – those of traffic
and transport. The RIVM noted that the packagewould have beenmore cost-effective
if a kilometre tariff had been included.
The package was amajor success for the pro-health camp (Wijnhoven interview), as it
meant that the Government had to let go of its tactic of waiting until 2015 before
implementing any measures. However, the omission of a kilometre tariff also indi-
cated that this success had its limits, as the inclusion of such a tariff was politically
too unsavoury for the governing parties.
However, the Prinsjesdag package was not the only significant policy change. Policy
plans in general becamemore sensitive to environmental and health concerns as well.
In a number of documents, concerns for environmental aspects of mobility, especially
for air quality, came prominently and more often to the fore. During the period of the
air-quality clash, the new transport plan – named Memorandum on Mobility – was
under discussion. Thismemorandumwould replace the old SVV2, and had to dowith
the future of mobility in the Netherlands. The first draft was published in September
2004, and a second onewas published in August 2005. In comparison to the first draft,
77. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 10, pp. 5/6.
78. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 10, p. 1.
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the sections on air quality, public transport, and innovation, were worded more
strongly in the second one.79
Sustainable mobility became a priority for the Ministries of VROM and V&W.80 In the
ExplanatoryMemorandum for the VROM 2006 budget, considerable attention was paid
to a transition to sustainable mobility, brought about because of air quality and climate
concerns. In the budget of theMinistry for Transport andWaterManagement, a separate
paragraph was devoted to the theme ‘Mobility and Society’. Air- quality improvement
was noted as a top priority because of health concerns and the legal blocking of further
activities relating to the country’s infrastructure. Innovative strategies were considered
necessary because ‘More of the same no longer works’.81 The blockade of infrastructural
development apparently forced the admission that newdirections needed to be explored.
In Europe, theNetherlands increased its efforts to push the subject of sustainablemobil-
ity onto the EU agenda. This effort resulted in strengthened cooperation at home and
abroad and the Netherlands considered itself a front-runner in many transport files.82
A further development of note is the reappearance of road pricing on the political
agenda. The Platform ‘Paying Differently for Mobility’ (Anders Betalen voor Mobili-
teit 2005) issued a report at the end of 2005 that endorsed road pricing. This Commis-
sionwas instituted to investigate some form of road pricing, though the topic was still
met with little enthusiasm by two out of three the political parties in Cabinet at the
time. The CDA and especially the VVD had never warmed to the idea, but the third
coalition partner, D66 was keen on it.
The Commission to investigate road pricing was chaired by Paul Nouwen, former
front man for the Dutch Association of Motorists (ANWB). The ANWB had always
opposed road pricing, but the Nouwen Commission presented a report indicating
that such pricing was a laudable idea, with positive environmental effects being cited
as one good reason. In its advice, the Nouwen Commission used the same storyline as
the pro-health camp; it referred to the hazards that highways presented to children
living or going to school near them, and to the air quality in Overschie (Platform
Anders Betalen voor Mobiliteit 2005, p. 26). The Nouwen Commission’s recommen-
dations were embraced in the Mobility Memorandum.
Even the Council of State made cautious remarks that indicate it felt that a shift in
policy from economy to environment and health was necessary. In its advice on
79. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 29 644 nr. 12.
80. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 XI nr. 2, p. 13 and Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 XII, nr. 2, p. 10;
Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XI nr. 1.
81. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 XII nr. 2, p. 10.
82. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XI nr. 1, p. 108.
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the budget for 2006, we may find some markedly environmental concerns, espe-
cially regarding air quality. The Council of State Advisory Division remarked that
both the Dutch Government and the EU had a one-sided focus on economic well-
being, and in addition, it considered that Western European economies, including
the Dutch one, presupposed high economic growth as a given; it also noted that
structural weaknesses could make it necessary to forego these growth ambitions.
One of those factors was environmental:
‘There is pressure on the physical living environment, space is scarce and there is a need for a sus-
tainable economic growth in which there is no cutting back on a healthy living environment, but on
the contrary improvements are necessary, such as regarding CO2 and particulate emissions’83
(Council of State 2005c).
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By April 2005, air quality and PM10 in particular had become a social problem in the
Netherlands, and it became the subject of political debates, media attention, public con-
cern, and campaigns by pressure groups. In the following sections, I will analyse key
issues in the construction process from 2000 up to 2005: firstly, the emergence of a pro-
health camp; secondly, the rupture of the eco-modernist consensus over mobility pol-
icy; thirdly the emergence of a storyline in which clean air is portrayed as a right; and
fourthly, the Council of State’s involvement in this political discussion.
6.5.1 The emergence of a pro-health camp as a reaction to marginalisation
In Europe and in the Netherlands, the construction of a social problem gained momen-
tum as soon asmedical experts became involved. The participation of experts such as the
WHO made a European air-quality policy possible, and in the Netherlands the opposi-
tion also coalesced around a medical storyline. Political parties used numbers of prema-
ture deaths cited in reports to up-endGovernment policy, and to accuse the Government
of complacency in the face of the imminent danger posed by air pollution.
During discussions on the speed limit, political parties belonging to this camp were
already sharing similar concerns, and the deaths mentioned in reports and in epide-
miological research added ammunition. A discourse coalition was formed between
political parties, the environmental movement and the health experts of scientific
and health institutes like the RIVM and GGD. The pro-health camp, however, began
to succeed in affecting Government policy significantly only after the court cases that
blocked the Emergency Law on Road Expansion, and other infrastructural projects.
Not only could it accuse the Government of complacency, it could also argue that it
83. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 nr. 3, p. 3.
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was incompetent, because it had failed on both fronts: air quality and infrastructural
development. In the table below, political parties belonging to the pro-health camp
are summarised, together with their storylines and political position.
It is not coincidental that a broad pro-health camp included political parties, but also
the environmental movement. The camp emerged against the threatened marginali-
sation of environmental interests. After the assassination of Pim Fortuyn the tide was
not with the environmentalists, or other groups that were associated with ‘the left’.
When, in this climate, the conservative parties took over they did awaywith the tight-
rope walking exercise between environmental and economic interests. Construction
and mobility would be the interests catered to and environmental targets were shel-
ved or postponed. Subsidies for clean cars for instance were abolished by this first
Balkenende 1 Cabinet.
Table 7
Party Main
spokesperson
Position Storyline
GroenLinks W. Duyvendak Against further growth of auto-mobility Health problems display the ongoing
environmental degradation caused by road
transport. The health effects associated
with air quality are a symptom of
misguided emphasis on development.
PvdA D. Samsom In favour of more environmental/health
measures and adherence to EU standards,
speed reductions, road pricing, tax
measures.
The disregard for health problem displays
the complacency of the current
Government.
SP A. Gerkens In favour of more environmental/health
measures and adherence to standards,
speed reductions, raising fuel prices, tax
measures; building should take place away
from roads.
Public health should have precedence over
infrastructure development.
D66 B. van der Ham No restriction of mobility per se. In favour of
speed reductions and a kilometre tariff to
make motorists pay for use of the road.
Sound infrastructure and good air quality
can both be realised. The current impasse
should be resolved by structural solutions
that reduce PM10 and NO2, such as road
pricing.
Milieudefensie J. Wijnhoven In favour of speed reductions and arguing
for closing off roads in polluted residential
areas. In general against road expansion.
The people have a right to clean air, the
Government is not caring for the health of
its citizens.
Scientific
institutes
(RIVM /
MNP /
GGD)
RIVM / MNP
scientists and
prominent
epidemiologists
Bad air quality due to high concentrations of
PM is a health threat
Scientific findings indicate 18,000 people
may die prematurely because of bad air
quality.
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The emergence of air quality concerns in Overschie as a minor environmental issue
was an opportunity to at least take a stand against the impending road expansions.
There was no way to stop the Emergency Law, but at least the pro-health camp could
control the damage done from an environmental perspective by making sure pledges
weremade regarding the air quality standards. In a sense VanGeel’s cornered himself
with his comments during the Emergency Law debates that the air quality standards
would be applicable in full. In this regard it is understandable why the road expan-
sions were terminated. The Council of State was not positive about the Emergency
Law and Van Geel himself had admitted that the Dutch Government had legally
bound itself to the European air quality standards.
After the annulments of the road expansions, air quality was no minor issue any-
more and the hitherto marginal pro-health camp could take the offensive. In the
already polarised environment it did so and forced the Government to take many
costly air quality measures that the Balkenende 1 Cabinet had been very unwilling
to take.
6.5.2 Cracks in the eco-modernist consensus
The threatened marginalisation of environmental interests led to cracks in the hith-
erto rather firm ecological modernistic consensus. The strain in this discourse cau-
sed by the relinquishment of the ideals of ecological modernisation is illustrated by
the debates over the speed limits. The speed limits became the locus of a fierce battle
between the pro-health camp and parties that favoured auto-mobility. The issue
was highly symbolic, because although the lower speed limits led to only a marginal
loss of time formotorists, – and did not resolve the air-quality situation – they remai-
ned a thorny issue. In a nutshell, the speed limit symbolised what was at stake in the
air quality clash: namely, freedom for motorists or protection for residents along
highways, and there seemed to be no middle ground. Lowering of the speed limit
came down to a recognition that the expansion of mobility could not continue indef-
initely, and such a curtailment on development ran counter to the core assumptions
of the Dutch eco-modernist environmental policy. According to this discourse,
development and protection needed to flourish together, and even to reinforce each
other.
After the verdicts the pro-health camp hardened its stance and demanded measures,
but Van Geel continued the administrative practice of demanding compliance with
air-quality standards only in places where people spent time. Moreover, he did not
treat the standards as strictly result-oriented obligations, but contended that lower
administrative bodies should apply theALARAprinciple, whichmeant that exposure
to PM10 should be as low as could reasonably be achieved. Van Geel stuck to this
interpretation of the air-quality standards, even when it became clear he was not only
opposed by the pro-health camp, but also by the Council of State.
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Those practices compliedwith the pragmatic policy outlook of ecological modernisation:
namely, one should not be ordered to do the impossible, and solutions should be ‘smart’,
meaning geared optimally to serve the environment as well as the economy. However,
something fundamental had changed; the verdicts made short work of this pragmatic
solution, and triggered accusations of incompetence and complacency. Initially the Gov-
ernment tried to patch things up by reiterating its interpretation of the AQO in a letter of
30 September 2004 and subsequently by proposing a new Ministerial Decree. Both
approaches were turned down by the Council of State Advisory Section as contrary to
the Government’s legal obligations stemming from European Law. After this debacle
it gave in to a number of pro-health demands by putting aside extra funds for air quality,
by lowering speed limits at a number of locations, by promising to encourage the use of
soot filters, and by raising the tax on diesel fuels. Van Geel stated that with these mea-
sures, the Netherlands had done all that could reasonably be expected.
Van Geel implicitly invoked the Dutch eco-modernist consensus of not asking for the
unreasonable, but the spokespersons for the pro-health camp, Duyvendak and Sam-
som rejected this appeal. In fact, the definition of what could be considered reasonable
in light of the potential damage to health was now up for grabs. The pro-health camp
managed to present the air-quality clash as an either/or choice between mobility and
public health, with members accusing the Government of trying to circumvent Euro-
pean obligations by means of a Ministerial Decree that – from a legal perspective –was
shoddy, implicitly portraying the Government as sacrificing public health on the altar
of unbridled mobility. At the same time, they argued that if they were in power, they
would take new and speedy measures to protect the public.
D66 was the only party in the pro-health camp to argue that both efficient mobility
and health protection could be possible. The other parties however, portrayed the
issue as a clash of interests, and the Government pro-mobility parties had no convinc-
ing solution. They argued that they would look for intelligent solutions, but in prac-
tice those turned out to be the taking of piecemeal measures and trying to get road
expansion back on track. Such one-sided solutions were incompatible with ecological
modernisation, and if such choices needed to be made, the eco-modernist dream of
win-win solutions would turn out to be a pipe dream.
6.5.3 Emergence of the ‘clean air is a right’ storyline
The political battle raging inside Parliament intensified in the spring of 2005, but the
cause of the clash lay in the courtroom. After the Council of State had annulled three
infrastructural projects, and it became clear that it would stick to its line of reasoning,
the Government was in political trouble.
Outside Parliament, however, the verdicts inspired the environmental movement to
innovate its strategy. It added a legal dimension to its clean air campaigns, and
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demanded measures be taken by the municipality of The Hague and by the Ministry
of Transport andWater Management. Milieudefensie lost those cases, but was able to
profile itself as a champion in the fight for clean air, and it urged groups of residents to
take their complaints to court as well.
The courts ruled that one could appeal against administrative decisions, but could not
force administrative bodies to take specific measures. Nonetheless, the court cases
attracted considerable attention, and the media was quick to pick up on it. Subse-
quently, residential groups turned to Milieudefensie for advice on how to undertake
such a procedure against the administration.
Involving the courts was in fact a clever move, both practically and discursively. The
Council of State annulled many high-profile projects, and due to this pressure the
Government was forced to take extra measures to clean the air. Moreover, the legal
battle kept air quality firmly in the public eye. The court cases led the environmental
movement to argue that clean air was a right that was legally protected by the air-
quality standards, and Milieudefensie interpreted the involvement of the courts as
a sign that fundamental rights were at stake.
The campaign of legal mobilisation waged by Milieudefensie confirmed findings by
Lisa Vanhala, who had concluded that NGOs used the court to demonstrate the fail-
ings of the existing system (Vanhala 2012). In this case, the legal campaign revealed
the shortcomings of the Dutch policy on air quality and raised environmental aware-
ness with the citizenry.
Discursively, the storyline that clean air is a right was an innovative one, though the
idea of environmental human rights, or a ‘right to clean air’was not new (Hiskes 2012,
p. 399) – it had been used in human rights treaties and discussed by scholars in the
1990s. However, Milieudefensie’s approach in the case, and the Council of State’s ver-
dicts, gave the notion a new dimension. Milieudefensie used the storyline in order to
mobilise the public to initiate court cases. The environmental movements’ actions tur-
ned the debate on environmental rights from a theoretical issue into concrete social
action involving the courts of law. The storyline ceased to be an academic exercise,
and entered the legal practice. I consider it to be one of the most important discursive
innovations to come out of the air quality clash.
6.5.4 The Council of State: its politicisation and its storyline
The Council of State itself did not discuss the issue of air quality in terms of it being a
problem regarding enforceable rights. In fact, in 2008 it would specifically rule out
such a view. During 2004 and 2005, it developed its own storyline, based on the pri-
macy of European law vis a vis national regulation. The Council of State noted that the
implementation of air-quality standards was indeed strict, but that the Dutch
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Government itself had agreed to the standards, and had chosen to implement them in
a rigorous manner by relating them to the terminology of the law on environmental
management. The Council stated that European law could not be circumvented by the
Government own interpretation of it, but should seek support for its position in
Europe. This storyline placed European law squarely above national law and national
administrative practices. In practice, the Council of State’s line of reasoning came
down to an increased obligation to research the effects of administrative decisions
on air quality, and to display convincingly that those effects had no deleterious
consequences.
The Council of State’s arguments were legal ones, and, on the face of it, not very polit-
ical. The Council ignored the social consequences of its verdicts, and appeared con-
cerned mainly with legal implications. However, in the advice provided by the
Council on the Emergency Law on Road Expansion, and on the proposal for a Min-
isterial Decree in 2005, certain political elements could be detected. Even the seminal
court cases themselves contained certain elements that revealed a particular political
position.
As to the Emergency Law on Road Expansion, the Council of State remarked that it
seemed to be incompatible with objectives of national environmental and mobility
policy, and that it was also not consistent with international obligations, such as those
on climate change. In its advice on the Ministerial Decree, the Council not only war-
ned the Government not to interpret the standards in ways that were contrary to
European law, but it also demanded that the Government draft a plan containing
all measures that could be taken, and present it to Europe in order to renegotiate. This
advice contained a demand that the Government take earnest measures to protect the
quality of air in the Netherlands, and such a requirement exceeded a merely legal
point of view.
The Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division mostly used strictly legal
reasoning based on the approach that administrative practices were not laid down
in the Air Quality Order itself, and were not consistent with the wording of the Direc-
tive and the Air Quality Order. Such argumentation appeared legalistic as well, but
even the Court displayed occasionally amore political point of view in its decisions. In
the first road expansion case, the Court ordered that expansion could continue, but
that the speed limit on the trajectory be lowered to 80 km/h. In this instance, it took
a position in the discussion on the speed limit, and forced the Government to take a
concrete measure if it wanted road expansion to continue.
These Council of State concerns indicated that more was at stake than merely a legal
debate. Especially the Advisory Division was concerned with the way politics han-
dled its environmental obligations, and pushed through an agenda of road expan-
sions with little regard for participatory and legal procedures. The Council of State
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may well have been concerned with the way the Emergency Law on Road Expansion
curtailed the power of the judiciary. However, by taking the side of the concerned
residents, and by defending the Air Quality Order against being amended, the Coun-
cil of State came to be regarded by the pro-health camp as a champion of environmen-
tal standards. It became caught up in a highly controversial polarising political
discussion, even though it tried to appear concerned solely with a sound legal inter-
pretation of the standards.
Even though the Council of State at times endorsed position taken by the pro-health
camp, its different storyline prevents me from situating it within that camp. The posi-
tion of the Council of State is a different one. It acts as a kind of political legal con-
sciousness for policy. The Advisory Division is mainly populated by ex-politicians
of a high calibre. It makes sure theDutch political ship does not deviate from its course
too much. In that regard its advice concerning the Emergency Law on Road Expan-
sion should be read. This Emergency Law was a short cut to make road expansions
possible, without their being a solid base for them in a policy plan. Transport policy
was in principle still governed by the rather environmental SVV2. The Council frow-
ned upon such ‘rash’ swings of policy. However, because of its two pronged nature as
a high advisory body of state and the highest administrative court, the power base of
this ‘political consciousness’ is potentially very strong. In theory, the Council’s advice
does not bind the Government, but if the advice comes from the same organisation
that provides binding legal rulings as well, the situation is different. Even though
the two divisions of the Council of State are separate, policy makes such as Pieter
van Geel did not want to take the risk.
The desirability of this influence is the subject of much debate. In principle the two
divisions are strictly separate, but how insurmountable this ‘Chinese wall’ between
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division and Advisory Division is, is unknown. A
negative advice for the Advisory Division may have dire consequences if it trans-
lates directly to a negative judgement of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.
Moreover, from the point of view of political legitimacy it is questionable whether
elder politicians should be allowed to govern in this way after retiring from open
politics. On the other hand, much can be said for an institution that makes sure polit-
ical transitions transpire relatively smoothly. At the beginning of the 2000s the
Dutch political landscape was in turmoil. It befits the Dutch consensus structure
of policy to have an institution guarding against major upsets. In the end, consensus
was restored and that may partially be attributed to the tenacity of the Council of
State. I consider the consensus structures such as the Council of State to be bound
up by the Dutch political tradition. In the next chapter we will see how the Council
itself became a target of criticism though because of its position in the air quality
clash.
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TIMELINE DUTCH POLIT ICAL DEVELOPMENTS 2000 – 2005: EMERGENCE
OF AIR QUALITY CLASH
2000-2002 Gradual mobilisation of a pro-health camp around air quality and the issue of the speed limits
2001 July Air Quality Order 2001 entered into force
2002 May Test with reduction of speed limit to 80 km/h in Overschie commenced
2002 July Balkenende took over as Prime Minister, Pieter van Geel Secretary of State for the Environment
2002 Nov. Minister of V&W R. De Boer proposed Emergency Law on Road Expansion
2002 Dec. Debate on Emergency Law, Van Geel conceded Air Quality Order would be applicable in full
2003 May 2nd Balkenende Cabinet installed, Van Geel retained post, Karla Peijs took over as Minister for V&W
2003 October Emergency Law on Road Expansion entered into force
2004 May RIVM issued ‘Milieubalans 2004 and mentioned 5000 premature deaths due to PM
2004 May Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave ‘Barneveld’ verdict and annulled first road
expansion ABRvS 200308160
2004 June Government issued Memorandum on Traffic Emissions
2004 Sept. Council of State gave ‘Vught Ekkerswijer’ and ‘Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht verdicts, annulled second road
expansion and decision to construct commercial zone ABRvS200401178/1 and ABRvS 200307780/1
2004 Sept. Van Geel presented ‘Letter of 30 September’ defending the Government’s interpretation of AQO 2001
2005 Jan. Van Geel proposed new Ministerial Decree on Air Quality
2005 March Council of State Advisory Division advised negative on Decree.
2005 April Van Geel promised 300 million extra for air quality
2005 Sept. Prinsjesdag package unveiled, 900 million extra for air quality
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 THE RISE OF THE PRO-INFRASTRUCTURE CAMP
AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE CLASH 2006 – 2010
INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands was in danger of becoming ‘blocked’ with regard to infrastructure
development after the successive 2004 verdicts by the Council of State Administrative
Jurisdiction Division. Moreover, the Advisory Division’s heavy criticism of Van
Geel’s letter of 30 September and of his proposed Ministerial Decree in March of
the same year prevented any quick fix. The pro-health camp was quick to take the
initiative, and demanded more environmental and health measures.
In the spring of 2005, the resulting blockade of infrastructure development sparked a
counter reaction. Parties that favoured infrastructure development were starting to
put forward a diverging storyline, featuring a different definition of the problem
and a different solution.
The theme of this chapter concerns the emergence of the pro-health camp, along with
the subsequent redefinition of the problem of air quality and its eventual resolution.
The first section discusses the emergence of a pro-infrastructure camp of parties and
pressure groups, while their opposing scenario is the main focus of section 7.1.2.
In section 7.2, legislative initiatives occurring at the end of 2005 and in 2006 are
described. First a renewed Air Quality Order was issued, and afterwards a new
law was introduced, aimed at mitigating the air quality clash by serving both the
interests of infrastructure development as well as the demands for clean air. This
Air Quality Law contained a novel idea involving a ‘programmatic approach’ by
which the Government sought to break the legal deadlock and enlist multiple actors
to help resolve the air quality clash. During debates on this law, the pro-infrastructure
camp intensified its political offensive.
In the third section, the adoption of the new air quality law and the annulment of
another important road expansion by the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division are discussed. During these events, the pro-infrastructure camp managed to
redefine the problem in Parliament, taking it from being a public health problem to a
regulatory one.
In the fourth section, we examine the resolution of the air quality clash by way of the
programmatic approach that was made possible under the new Air Quality Law
adopted in 2007. The implications of the approach itself are under review as well
as further legal and political developments following directly from the air quality
clash. At the end of this section, an overview of the various participants in the conflict
and their positions vis-a-vis each other are presented. In the chapter’s final section, I
conclude by discussing four salient points that came to the fore: namely, the eventual
re-emergence of an ecological modernistic consensus; the discursive changes brought
about by the air quality conflict on the subject of infrastructure andmobility; the polit-
ical position of the Council of State; and the problematic relationship between scien-
tific and legal rationality.
. THE MOBIL ISATION OF THE PRO- INFRASTRUCTURE CAMP
In 2005, the topic of air quality was at the zenith of its political importance. The Coun-
cil of State continued to terminate projects, and the pressure of the pro-health camp
yielded pro-environmental regulatory results. Van Geel proposed a package of meas-
ures, a number of which the pro-health camp in Parliament had already been
demanding.
However, in opposition to the terminations and annulments, a lobby emerged from a
variety of representatives of economic sectors, demanding a solution to the problem
by adapting the Dutch regulatory structure in order to accommodate infrastructure
development. The emergence of a countervailing camp that challenged the pro-health
camp’s presentation of the situation is the main topic of this section.
7.1.1 The emergence of a new discourse coalition in 2005
In the spring of 2005, the pro-health camp had everything going for it. The Govern-
ment was under fire because of the termination of projects, and in his letter of 20 April
2005, Van Geel forced to promise newmeasures to improve air quality.1 Media atten-
tion to air quality was increasing (Breeman & Timmermans 2008), and scientific insti-
tutes were raising the alarm over the possible impact of PM10 on public health.
Nonetheless, the debate in April 2005 regarding Van Geel’s letter was one of the first
in which groups and parties that represented mobility, infrastructure development,
and other economic interests took an offensive course. Lobby groups representing
many important economic sectors in the Netherlands raised their voices as well, urg-
ing a quick solution to the problem, and this call was taken up by political parties on
the conservative side of the political spectrum.
1. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 12.
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Just before the April debate, the employers association VNO-NCW sent a letter to the
commission of Parliamentarians that discussed environmental and transport issues.2
The VNO-NCW is the largest organisation of Dutch entrepreneurs, and in its letter it
asked Parliamentarians to take into account that the Council of State had thus far ter-
minated 16 highly important construction projects such as roads and commercial
zones. The VNO-NCW also pointed out that air quality was steadily improving,
and it therefore askedmembers of Parliament to accept Van Geel’s proposal to amend
the Air Quality Order andmake it more lenient. The VNO-NCWendorsed the distinc-
tion Van Geel had made between places where people lived and places where they
did not, which, as we have seen, was contrary to the line taken by the Council of State.
In the April 2005 debate, the representative of the populist party LPF, Joost Eerdmans,
was the first in Parliament to state directly that the problem had been caused by the
Dutch system of linking administrative decisions to environmental quality standards.
He stated that this link was not required by the EU Directives, and pointed out that a
prominent professor of environmental law, Niels Koeman, had written an article in
the daily newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad, in which he argued that this link
was not necessary (Koeman, 2005a).3 The notion that the Netherlands had blocked
further development itself due to its own legally strict approach to the air quality stan-
dards would become a persistent theme in further debates.
As previously discussed, this link entailed that lower administrative bodies were obli-
ged to observe quality standards, which meant that in zones where environmental
standards were not met, further harmful activities could not be undertaken. Quality
standards led to metaphorical ‘picket lines’ (Koeman 2010) being formed around
zones that were experiencing sub-standard environmental quality, in an effort to seal
them off from further contamination. For instance, certain activities that created an
odour nuisance were forbidden within a perimeter around a waste incineration facil-
ity whose emissions already exceeded the odour limits. This inflexible system was
already unpopular with lower administrative bodies (De Roo 2003), but the air qual-
ity standards had far greater effects on spatial planning.Whole swathes of the country
became blockedwith regard to further development because the air quality standards
were being exceeded.
However, Van Geel did not intend to release the link at that time. He explained that
the Netherlands had an integral review of spatial planning decisions, and this
included testing whether they complied with air quality standards. Other countries
did not have as integral a review, and this allowed them to ‘sweep environmental
2. Letter from J.H. Schraven to the Chairman and members of the Regular Commission of VROM and the
Regular Commission of Transport andWater Management 21-04 2005. The letter was CCed to the Min-
isters of VROM and Transport and to the VROM Secretary of State Van Geel. On file with the author.
3. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 9.
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problems under the carpet’, as he phrased it.4 He reasoned that this could lead the EU
to impose fines on those European countries. He promised to look into the matter, but
warned that Koeman’s opinion was not representative of all legal specialists.
From that time onwards, however, the link became the prime target of pro-infrastruc-
ture factions and pressure groups. A new discourse coalition coalesced around the
idea that the main culprit of the air quality clash was ‘the link’. In Parliament, this
camp comprised the CDA, the VVD, and the LPF, the parties that had supported road
expansions in 2002 and 2003, and that were sceptical about lowering the speed limit.
Of the three, the CDA took the most centrist position, and supported its Secretary of
State Pieter van Geel.
7.1.2 Discursive strategies of the pro-infrastructure camp in 2005
In the course of subsequent debates, the pro-infrastructure camp strengthened into a
discourse coalition of political parties and pro-infrastructure pressure groups that
developed its own storyline, containing a definition of the problem and the favoured
solution. This happenedmost conspicuously in June 2005when a number of important
Parliamentary meetings were scheduled such as the discussion on the spring budget.
During this discussion the powerful Minister of Finance would be present. A day later,
a general discussion was planned between Secretary of State Pieter van Geel and the
Parliamentary commissions for VROM and Transport and Water Management.5
Just before the debate with theMinister of Finance, a number of interest groups repre-
senting construction, transport, and small and medium enterprises issued a joint
press release on the 28th of June 2005, in which they portrayed the air quality clash
as a regulatory problem that the Netherlands had brought upon itself. The camp
consisted of interest groups in the construction and service sectors, such as Aedes,
Bouwend Nederland, MKB-Nederland, NEPROM, NVB, NVM, VBO, and the
VNO-NCW (Bouwend Nederland et al. 2005, Press release 28-06 2005). It was
supported later by the transport organisations EVO and TLN (EVO 2005 press release
22-11 2005).6 Apart from claiming that the linkwas themain culprit in terms of restric-
tions on infrastructure development, the lobby groups announced the results of a
quick scan made by the organisation of Dutch municipalities. The scan indicated that
some 7.7 billion Euro were at stake, because construction projects were being kept on
hold throughout the country.7 Some 100,000 employees in the construction sector
4. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 18, p. 16.
5. Handelingen II 2004-2005 nr. 96, pp. 5776- 5804; Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 9, respectively.
6. For the full names of these organisations, I refer to the list of acronyms found at the end of the book.
7. Hugo Priemus, professor of spatial planning at Delft Technical University, provides the same figures in
Priemus (2006b) ‘Wat ging er mis met het fijnstofbeleid?’, Internationale Spectator nr. 60 jaargang 6, 2006.
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were in danger of losing their jobs, and half of the 80,000 houses plannedmight not be
built. In its press release, the coalition of interest groups wrote:
‘The association of Dutch municipalities has quantified the problem in a quick scan at 7.7 billion
euros. It is expected that the real costs will be even higher. For every billion euros in construction
turnover, 12,500 people may be employed for a year, according to the Economic Institute of Construc-
tion (EIB). This means that now 96,250 man years of employment are at stake. Moreover, enterprises
can only invest limited amounts in the Netherlands because the construction of some 4,500 hectares of
commercial zones is delayed. This harms our international competitive position’ (BouwendNederland
et al. Press release 28-06 2005).
CDA and VVD Parliamentarians referred to this ‘emergency call’8 during the subse-
quent debates, especially prominent spokespersons were Liesbeth Spies of the CDA
and Paul de Krom of the VVD. The alliance of interest groups did not state that literally
100,000 people were about to lose their jobs, but the distinction between man years of
labour and jobswas lost quickly in the debates. CDAParliamentarianDeNeree tot Bab-
berich stated for instance the following during the debate on the spring budget:
‘The reason I bring up this subject again is that there is a problem with the link between spatial plan-
ning and the environment in regard to air quality. The Netherlands is one of the few countries in the
European Union that has established such a link in its regulation, and we know what consequences it
has. The Netherlands is under threat of becoming blocked. Thanks to this link, municipalities and
other lower administrative bodies are in dire straits. It is said that projects totalling 7.5 billion euros,
which cannot or almost cannot be executed, are delayed’.9
Later in the debate he stated: ‘The CDA faction will not have it that thanks to this stran-
gling link between spatial planning and the environment in relation to air quality, 100,000
people will become unemployed in the construction sector’.10
The lobby of the construction and transport sectors first attracted media attention in
the financial and business daily Het Financieele Dagblad. In a series of articles, the
newspaper examined the economic problems relating to the air quality regulation
(Het Financieele Dagblad, 31 May 2005; 2 June 2005; 3 June 3 2005; 28 June 28
2005), and after the press release, the daily newspapers Parool (28 June 2005) Tele-
graaf (28 June 2005), and NRC (28 June 2005) also adopted the story of the job losses
and the foreseen financial damages.
After these two debates, the pro-infrastructure camp’s storyline unfolded as follows:
‘Brussels prescribed unworkable standards that have been implemented much too
strictly because of “the link”, a particular feature of Dutch environmental policy. This
8. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 9, p. 2.
9. Handelingen II 2004- 2005 nr. 96, p. 5781.
10. Idem p. 5781.
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legal and administrative problemwill cost 100.000 jobs and billions of euros. The solu-
tion is to separate administrative decisions from quality standards’.11 Moreover, legal
professionals such as Niels Koeman en Chris Backes lent their weight to the notion
that the Council of State interpreted the AQO too strictly, or that uncoupling the
link was a viable solution. The opinions of these two professionals have been cited
in the media outlets pressure groups such as VNO-NCW’s magazine ‘Forum’ (Van
den Broek & Smit 2006) and the pressure groups havemade use of their arguments,
especially concerning the release of the link. Therefore I include these legal profes-
sionals in the pro-infrastructure camp, the claims they make are similar to the
claims of the pressure groups: the Netherlands does not need to be blocked due
to air quality.
The definition of the problem in this storyline was different from that of the health-
based version, because it presented the air quality clash as an administrative issue
that was bad for business. The pro-infrastructure camp pushed for recognition of the
administrative economic problem posed by air quality regulation, and wanted to
uncouple the link. This was in conflict with the pro-health camp’s narrative, in
which the health aspects were emphasised. This storyline called for a defence of
the link.
The Government found itself stuck between these conflicting storylines. In 2005 Van
Geel argued that the European directives seemed to demand such a link, because spa-
tial planning projects had considerable effects on air quality, and the Government was
obliged to do everything possible to prevent exceedances. He claimed that it was
doubtful whether releasing the link was even possible under European law, and spec-
ulated that the linkwas ‘essential’ because spatial planning dealt with the weighing of
different interests that all demanded public space.12 The link ensured that this delib-
eration would take place early on in the process. Van Geel considered that the only
real solution would be an improvement in air quality,13 and in 2006 he added the
argument that dropping the link was not condoned by the Council of State.14
It is likely that fear of the Council of State’s opinion influenced Van Geel’s own posi-
tion. The Council of State Advisory Division harshly rejected both Van Geel’s Minis-
terial Decree to repair the Air Quality Order 2001 as well as his letter of 30 September
2004 on the doctrine that the standards were only valid in places where people lived.
He would not easily risk another collision with the Advisory Division.
11. This ismy condensed version of a storyline that resurfaced inmany debates, although the exactwording
differed from time to time.
12. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 30 175 nr. 2, p. 4.
13. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 30 175 nr. 2, p. 4.
14. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 12.
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. END  –  : LEGISLAT IVE INIT IAT IVES
At the end of 2005, when the Prinsjesdag package was proposed, the budgets for the
Ministry of V&W and VROM were gloomy; they warned about delays in important
projects,15 and the VROM budget mentioned that tension had become manifest
between the interests of public health and economic development.16 Projects that
would have been realised under the Emergency Law on Road Expansion were hit
especially hard. These expansions incurred hefty delays because of the strict interpre-
tation of the Air Quality Order by the Council of State. The administrative Court
demanded additional research as to whether projects conformed to air quality stan-
dards, but only one research institute in the Netherlands was equipped to handle
these detailed investigations. As a result, more delays were foreseen.17
A new lawwas needed to relieve the delays confronting infrastructure projects and to
make sure that the standards were met, but the debates only deepened and became
more heated. The regulatory initiatives and debates from 2005 and 2006 are discussed
in this section.
7.2.1 The Air Quality Order 2005
After the failure of the Ministerial Decree in March 2005, the onus was on Van Geel to
quickly repair the current Air Quality Order 2001. He needed to find a regulation that
made infrastructure development feasible again but that did not lower the standards
or entirely uncouple the link.
During the debate on 26 April, he was given the green light by Parliament to devise a
new amended Air Quality Order. Already on 10 May 2005 he offered a concept of it
(henceforth the AQO 2005) to Parliament. The AQO 2005 was basically the old Air
Quality Order 2001 but with two changes. In the first adjustment, it became possible
to deduct the sea salt element in Particulate Matter from the total. Since sea salt forms
a part of the mixture of particulates in the air above the Netherlands, this meant the
measured PM concentration could be reduced by a couple of micrograms. This would
at least help a little to reach the standards, though it was not a structural solution.
The second adjustment had more structural legal consequences, as it became possible
to balance a project’s negative effects on air quality with other possible positive
effects. For instance, the construction of a road in a certain area might create extra
exceedances on the curb side, but it could also unburden other roads in the vicinity.
15. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 A nr. 2, p. 14.
16. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 XI nr. 2, p. 6.
17. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 28 679 nr. 50, p. 2.
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The construction would be admissible if the balance on the whole were to be positive:
that is, if it were to lead ultimately to improvements in air quality.
The link between air quality standards and concrete administrative decisions was
kept, but the Government hoped the balancing approachwouldmake it more flexible.
The Council of State was sceptical, however, and indicated that balancing was
restricted in ‘time, space, and scope’ (Council of State 2005d). This restricted the pos-
sibility of balancing positive and negative effects between different projects in a dif-
ferent area. The administration had to demonstrate that a single project, independent
of other projects or other measures, would improve air quality more than damage it.
This demand was a tall order, however, considering that the projects under threat of
cancellation were generally harmful.
In its advice, the Council of State urged the Government to think beyond the tradi-
tional approach of implementing European environmental directives in Dutch law
by closely conforming to the terminology of the Law on Environmental Management.
According to the Council of State, this reflex led to unnecessarily complex regulation,
as the recommendation was basically an admonition to come up with a new legal for-
mat to integrate European directives.
Van Geel carried the Air Quality Order 2005 through Parliament though, and the reg-
ulation was adopted on 23 June (Stb. 2005, 316). It was known that the AQO 2005
would be simply a stopgap. Parliament still insisted on regulating air quality by
means of a formal law, which was a heavier regulatory instrument than a General
Administrative Order. Van Geel began to work on a new law immediately after
the AQO 2005 was adopted.
7.2.2 The programmatic approach and the role of legal experts in 2005/2006
Even during the time the AQO 2005 was being conceived, Van Geel and the VROM
Ministry were looking for ways to end the blockade on a more permanent basis. Civil
servants from VROM invited legal scholars – among whom were Niels Koeman and
Chris Backes – well known specialists on administrative law, to a brainstorm session
in an unassuming office space in the Dutch city of Utrecht.18 A couple of more of such
meetings would follow.
The main idea that emerged from the session was to use the balancing approach from
the AQO 2005, but to extend it to larger areas and to different projects and measures.
Instead of balancing on a project-by-project basis, projects would be combined and
fitted together in a broader programme. Projects that were harmful because they
worsened air quality would be listed on a kind of balance sheet, and the negative
18. Niels Koeman, interview.
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effects of these projects would then need to be balanced by a package of measures that
would improve air quality. The sum of all the projects and measures should result in
air quality thatmet the standards. In essence, the approachworked like a kind of score
sheet, and as long as the balance remained positive for air quality, new projects could
be realised. In August 2005, Van Geel informed Parliament by letter of this new strat-
egy regarding the problem of air quality. He termed it the ‘programmatic approach’.19
In addition to the balancing of projects and measures, another characteristic of the
approach was that projects that did not harm air quality ‘to a significant extent’
did not have to be listed separately. The effects of such small projects would be
included when the background concentrations of pollutants were determined. This
possibility of a programmatic approach would form the core of a forthcoming new
proposal for a formal law, which would give the Minister the competency to draft
such a comprehensive programme.
This approach amounted to a regulatory innovation. The exact way the regulation
would work was not explained in Van Geel’s short letter, but he did informmembers
of Parliament that he had sent the concept of the new law to the Council of State for
advice. If all went smoothly, the law could be adopted in spring 2006. This timetable
turned out to be overly optimistic, as wewill see in the following sections, because the
negotiation process lasted all through 2006 and was finalised as late as autumn 2007.
Following the advice of the Advisory Division, the proposal would be sent to
Parliament.
Even though the proposal was partly the work of legal professionals, the Advisory
Division was critical again in its advice of 11 November 2005 (Council of State
2005e). The Council of State Advisory Division mostly criticised the complexity
of the proposal. Firstly, it contained a ‘complicated system of programmes and plans
which seem to overlap partially’ (Council of State 2005e, p. 1/2). Secondly, the Coun-
cil was also not certain whether this programmatic approach complete with a
balancing sheet of projects and measures constituted an adequate transposition
of the European Directives. In the end, the European Court would have to judge
whether the Council of State was referring again to the possibility of asking prej-
udicial questions. Thirdly, the Council considered that the legal protection civil-
ians had against the programmatic approach itself and against individual
decisions by lower administrative bodies was unclear. The proposal allowed
plaintiffs to appeal against the whole programme of measures and projects, but
the Council considered that this was unwelcome. The programme contained gen-
eral measures that applied to the Netherlands as a whole, and such measures were
not open to appeal. The Government had intended to limit appeal to the whole
programme instead of individual projects, but the Advisory Division indicated
19. Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 29 667 nr. 21, p. 1.
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that this route was also not desirable, as projects should still be open to appeal
because the measures might not have the estimated beneficial effects. The Council
of State therefore considered that:
‘In such cases, the air quality aspect cannot be ruled out in an appeal procedure considering the obligation
the Netherlands is under in the scope of the European Directives’ (Council of State 2005e. p. 13).
The Council of State once again took up a position as the critical guardian of citizens’
access to the court, andwarned that this proposalmight not do justice to the EUDirec-
tives and to the Dutch system of decentralisation. Nonetheless, the opinions of legal
professionals played an important role in shaping the debates and outcomes of the air
quality clash. The Council of State was critical, but the direction proposed in the pro-
grammatic approach would determine the subsequent developments. It started when
the links was questioned in the articles in het Financieele Dagblad by Niels Koeman,
but also the opinions of Chris Backes featured during numerous Parliamentary
debates20. Moreover, Parliament had a plenary session with these professionals in
which they explained their ideas.21
7.2.3 A revised proposal for the Air Quality Law
In spring 2006, Van Geel submitted a revised proposal for a new Air Quality Law to
Parliament. Liesbeth Spies, prominent spokesperson of the CDA in this file, insisted
that this proposal was ‘Council of State proof’.22 The proposal consisted of a change in
the Law of Environmental Management that made the programmatic approach pos-
sible. The Minister would also gain the competency to declare that some projects
would not influence air quality to a significant extent.
In a letter of 10 March, Van Geel explained that the proposal had been accepted in the
Ministerial Council,23 and, as was customary, the proposal was sent to Parliament
together with the Explanatory Memorandum, the advice of the Council of State,
andVanGeel’s comments on the advice.24 In his elaborate discussion of the comments
made by the Council of State, Van Geel highlighted that the programmatic approach
was a co-operative one between the state and lower administrative bodies, and
together they would prepare the lists of projects and measures. Van Geel considered
that the approach was necessary to facilitate urgent housing, infrastructure, and other
spatial planning projects.25 The programme would be named the National Coopera-
tion Plan Air Quality (NSL).
20. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 7, p. 6, 9, 21, Kamerstukken II 2005–2006, 30 175 nr. 15, p. 6.
21. Lisa Vermeer, e-mail correspondence, 1-7, 2013.
22. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 17.
23. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 175 nr. 16.
24. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 2, nr. 3 and nr. 4.
25. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 4, p. 6.
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In Parliament the proposal proved to be controversial and Parliamentarianswished to
knowwhat they could expect from it, as it was a complex and new type of regulation
about which they required advice. The pro-infrastructure parties in particular feared
that this new law would fail again before the Council of State (Interview Wijnand
Duyvendak). On April 20, the Second Chamber of Parliament convened for a round-
table discussion with legal experts, health professionals, pressure groups, and lower
administrative bodies regarding the contents and implications of the Air Quality Law
and its main component, the NSL.26 Participants included, among others, the legal
scholar Chris Backes, the environmental campaigner Joris Wijnhoven, and the epide-
miologist Bert Brunekreef.
On the basis of the report drafted by the Parliamentary Commission of VROMand the
response by the Secretary of State,27 it became apparent that the general idea of the
law was considered to be viable. However, much in the exact practical application
needed to be fleshed out, as the literature indicated that legal scholars remained
divided on the issue. The solution was supported by legal scholar Niels Koeman,
who considered it was not necessary to link decisions directly to the standards, but
that it was enough to list projects in a plan or programme (Koeman 2005b, p. 504).
Chris Backes favoured a different solution to loosen the hold that the air quality stan-
dards had on infrastructure development (Backes, 2006b, 88).
With the NSL, Van Geel intended to appease critics of the link without disconnecting
it entirely, but by making it ‘flexible’.28 Projects would no longer be linked directly to
air quality norms, but would be taken up in a broad programme designed to make
sure that air quality standards were complied with everywhere.
The programmatic approach constituted a new legal feature in spatial planning policy
and law, as air quality standards would no longer directly affect lower administrative
decisions. This entailed a break with the old regime in which environmental quality
standards had direct spatial consequences: namely, polluting activities could no lon-
ger be condoned in an area where standards were exceeded.
7.2.4 The struggle over the programmatic approach in 2006
TheNSLwould have important consequences for the traditional relations between lower
administrative bodies and the central Government. It broke with the practice of linking
spatial planning directly to environmental quality, and it influenced the decision-making
procedures around infrastructure projects. These projects had previously been assessed
on a project-by-project basis, but now they would have to fit within an overarching
26. Lisa Vermeer, e-mail correspondence, 1-7, 2013.
27. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 7, and nr. 8.
28. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 8, p. 42.
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long-term plan. The plan would be drafted centrally, and therefore this new
approach would deviate from the trend towards decentralisation in the Nether-
lands. It is understandable that this change of policy led to heated discussions in
Parliament.
The policy documents indicate that the opposition between the various actors concer-
ned especially the position of the Council of State, the European Union, and the desir-
ability of the NSL. There are many debates, questions, and other Parliamentary
documents in which air quality was mentioned in 2006, but here I will concentrate
on five key documents dealing with the air quality law: the report from the regular
Commission of VROM;29 Secretary of State Van Geel’s response to this report;30 a
set of Parliamentary questions and their answers supplied by Van Geel on 14 June;31
and the minutes of two debates in September and October 2006, one with the regular
commissions of VROM and V&W;32 and a plenary session in October 2006.33
The regular Parliamentary commission of VROM debated environmental questions,
but also issued reports about legislative proposals such as the Air Quality Law. In the
report on the proposal for the Air Quality Law,34 various political parties brought
forth their considerations about the proposal. As could be expected, parties that for-
med the pro-health camp were critical. They would have preferred a more ambitious
package of measures in order to improve air quality instead of a proposal aimed at
reaching the standards by way of balancing. The pro-health camp stuck to its argu-
ment that the Government was not doing anything to improve air quality, but was
concerned only with devising tricks to ‘wiggle out’ from under the standards. The
PvdA disliked the bureaucratic character of the proposal, and feared it would be used
to show that the standards had been met simply on paper rather than that it was a
strategy to actually improve air quality.35
In the September debate, Both Duyvendak and Samsom spoke about the approach as
a ‘Bureaucratic Monster’,36 and Van Velzen (SP) called it a ‘Legislative Abomina-
tion’.37 The pro-health campwarned that this complex piece of legislation would only
make consultancy agencies happy, and urged for more measures to achieve good air
quality. They especially feared that the NSL would be used to ‘smuggle in’ dirty pro-
jects. Samsom stated in this regard:
29. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 7.
30. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 8.
31. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 12.
32. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25.
33. Handelingen II 2006-2007 nr. 14, pp. 884-897.
34. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 7.
35. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 7, p. 9.
36. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 9.
37. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 18.
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‘Let me be clear about this, the NSL is in the eyes of my faction the ultimate smuggle strategy. It is not
meant to clean the air, but to gain approval for construction projects with the given quality of the air,
approval which it would not get otherwise’.38
The CDAwas themost supportive of the new approach, but the VVDwas less so. The
CDA faction emphasised the broad consensus on which the new law could draw, and
that referred mostly to pro-development groups such as the VNO-NCW, NEPROM,
and the transport branch. Milieudefensie remained an avowed opponent of the NSL
(J. Wijnhoven, interview).
From thewritten questions put to VanGeel, it became clear that the pro-infrastructure
faction VVD was not happy, as it preferred a total release of the link.39 Before Van
Geel could answer these questions, he received further advice from the Council of
State Advisory Division (Council of State 2006b). On June the first 2006, the Council
of State Advisory Division issued another warning that even though, strictly speak-
ing, the European Directives did not prescribe such a link between projects and stan-
dards, it would still be necessary to determine whether individual projects had
negative effects. From the standpoint of ‘effective air quality management’, the Coun-
cil considered that some sort of test was unavoidable (Council of State 2006b). The link
was not considered absolutely necessary, but a complete release of the linkwas also not
justified. The Council considered it undesirable to scrap altogether the testing of pro-
jects against air quality standards.
Van Geel had to inform the Parliamentary commission, and especially the VVD fac-
tion, that he was afraid the Council of State would not accept doing away completely
with the link. In fact, he stated this opinion multiple times in his responses to ques-
tions in 2006.40 During the debates in September andOctober concerning the proposal
for the Air Quality Law, the pro-infrastructure camp complained about the bureau-
cratic nature of the proposal as well. In the words of Liesbeth Spies:
‘After an enormous number of polder negotiations, juridical procedures, and one consultation after
the other in Brussels andwith the Council of State,we have quite a complex legislative proposal […] it
all looks dirigistic and centralistic, and is not really a showcase for deregulation’.41
Spies was especially angry with the Council of State and the Europe Union, which she
blamed for the Netherlands having to swallow this solution. The Council of State
blocked attempts to ‘de-link’, and ‘Brussels’ burdened the Netherlands with unreal-
istic standards. In her opinion, therefore, there was nothing better than this ‘ugly
38. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 9.
39. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 12.
40. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 489 nr. 12, pp. 3, 4, 10, 11.
41. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 4.
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duckling’, as she called the proposal. According to the VVD, the only good thing about
the NSLwas that the connection between administrative decisions and air quality stan-
dards was made less stringent. De Krom (VVD) felt that the whole programmatic
approach with its expansive balance sheet of measures and projects would create a
‘phantom reality’ of numbers and measures. He claimed that there was a great deal
of scientific uncertainty regarding PM10, and that harsh measures were not called
for, especially because Brussels did not cooperate.42Hewould still favour the law, how-
ever, because it did provide a solution for a mess he felt was created in Brussels.
After being discussed by the Commission, the proposal was dealt with in a plenary
session,43 during which Parliamentarians proposed amendments to policy proposals;
De Krom proposed one, for instance, that would bar the Council of State from testing
projects directly against the air quality standards. This amendment contradicted
squarely the line of the Council, but for De Krom it was amatter of principle. He insis-
ted that Parliament rather than the Council of State made the laws. The introduction
of this amendment caused the debate to revolve largely around the role of the Council
of State in the air quality clash. De Krom stated that his amendment was not suppor-
ted, only because the Secretary of State feared the Council’s opinion. According to De
Krom, this influence on the part of the Council of Statewas politically undesirable and
constitutionally incorrect.
Liesbeth Spies (CDA) agreed with the proposed piece of legislation, but also felt that
the Council of State rather than the legislator seemed to be pulling the strings.
Together with De Krom, she took aim at both the Council of State and the European
Commission: ‘[...] my faction has the unnerving feeling that the European Commission and
the Council of State are pulling the strings and that the legislator seems to be offside’.44 In the
end, however, she went along with the proposal because she did not want to jeopar-
dise a solution in favour of a principled fight with the Council of State.45
7.2.5 The redefinition of the problem by the pro-infrastructure camp
The programmatic approach was seen as necessary by the Government and by the
pro-infrastructure camp, both of whom considered it the only solution albeit a poor
one. The parties accepted it partially because the interest groups with whom they
were allied also agreed that the programmatic approach had to be accepted.
The pro-health camp was put on the defensive during these debates. Its public health
storyline was not directly refuted, but began to play a more marginal role, and the
42. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 23.
43. Handelingen II 2006-2007 nr. 14, pp. 884-897.
44. Handelingen II 2006-2007 nr. 14, p. 889.
45. Handelingen II 2006-2007 nr. 14, p. 889.
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managerial problem of how to de-link air quality standards from spatial planning
decisions took centre stage. This discursive turn caused Duyvendak to lament that
the ‘true’ nature of the problem – human health – was increasingly relegated to the
background.46
The anger towards the European Union and especially the Council of State is of
importance. The issue became more profound than a simple political difference of
opinion, but concerned the institutional structure of the Netherlands itself, the role
played by environmental law in the Dutch legal system, and the relationship between
the administration and the judiciary.
The pro-infrastructure campmanaged gradually to redefine the problem by hammer-
ing on the release of the link and emphasising the economic consequences of the air
quality regulation. From a problem about public health, the issue evolved into an
administrative problem regarding changes in the national system of environmental
spatial law.
In table 8 below the positions of the actors that comprise the pro infrastructure camp
have been listed
. THE ADOPTION OF THE AIR QUALITY LAW
AND THE BURGERVEEN-LEIDEN VERDICT
In February 2007, a new Cabinet, the fourth under PM Jan Peter Balkenende, was
inaugurated. However, there was a change of parties, because instead of the VVD,
which had lost the election, the PvdA and the small Christian faction ChristenUnie
(CU) took seats in this Cabinet.
The PvdAwas amember of the pro-health camp, and this change in the Cabinet could
lead in theory to a stronger position for environmental concerns. The environment
was now also no longer represented by a Secretary of State but by a fully-fledgedMin-
ister. Jacqueline Cramer (PvdA), a noted environmentalist, took over as Minister of
VROM, and her portfolio included the environment and hence the air quality clash.
The credo of this Cabinet was ‘Work together Live together’, and in the agreement
between the three parties outlining their plans for the future, we may read that they
sought to cooperate for growth, sustainability, respect, and solidarity.
The formation of this new Cabinet led to delays in the decision-making procedure
pertaining to the Air Quality Law though. The law had been accepted in the Second
Chamber of Parliament after the plenary debate in October 2006, but not yet by the
First Chamber of Parliament, the Dutch Senate. By that time, however, the tone
46. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 4.
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regarding air quality had become far more upbeat because the RIVM and MNP had
released new figures indicating that air quality had suddenly improved. This unex-
pected turn of events is the subject of section 7.3.1.
The optimism was short-lived, however, because before the procedure to adopt the
Air Quality Law could be finalised, the Council of State – on the instigation of the
environmental groupMilieudefensie – terminated one more high-profile road expan-
sion. This was an important event because it thrust air quality back into the social and
political spotlight. In 2007, air quality was no longer making the same headlines, but
the annulment of the A4 road expansion showed that it still posed a significant threat
to infrastructure development. The verdict itself is recounted in section 7.3.2, while
the Parliamentary consequences of this verdict are under consideration in 7.3.3. In
7.3.4, the eventual adoption of the Air Quality Law is considered.
7.3.1 The MNP’s new figures: an improvement in air quality?
In the midst of the debates in 2006, word had it that an unexpected solution might be
in sight. The RIVM published new scientific figures, and stated publicly that the prob-
lem of air quality had been overestimated. After recalibrating the measuring and
Table 8
Actor Main
spokesperson
Position Storyline
CDA L. Spies In favour of the proposal for a new
air quality law because it would
make infrastructure development
possible again and the
representatives of economic sectors
endorse it.
Pressure groups have shown
worrying economic figures, the
block on infrastructure development
should be removed without entering
into open conflict with the Council of
State.
VVD P. De Krom Sceptical of the proposal for a new
law because it is unnecessarily
complicated, in favour of releasing
the link totally.
The link is causing large economic
damage and should be released as
soon as possible.
LPF J. Eerdmans Argues for a release of the link. ‘Europe’ and the Council of State
have unnecessarily blocked the
Netherlands and the way to unblock
it is to release the link.
Pressure Groups (Aedes,
Bouwend Nederland, MKB-
Nederland, NEPROM, NVB,
NVM, VBO, and the VNO-
NCW)
Various A solution needs to be found to
make infrastructure development
possible again a release of the link
would be welcome
The air quality regulation threatens
delays costing 7.7 billion Euro and
threatening 100.000 jobs. The
Netherlands has caused this
blockade itself because of linking air
quality standards and administrative
decisions.
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modelling tools, they found that the concentration levels on PM10 had been overes-
timated by 10 to 15%. Released in March 2006, these new figures caused the Govern-
ment to view the issue of air quality in a less gloomy light than it had in 2005.
Newmeasurements indicated that actual concentrations in rural areas especially had
fallen unexpectedly between 2003 and 2005, and the most likely explanation for this
fall was a change made to the measuring network (MNP 2006a, pp. 6/7). Researchers
provided amap of exceedances expected in 2010 that included the new estimates both
in a report in March and in the Environmental Balance 2006 (MNP 2006a, p. 12, MNP
2006b, p. 14). It is clear that the red spots had considerably diminished.
These new figures resulted in optimism within the Government, as many areas now
suddenly complied with the standards. In several areas, concentrations were just a
little above the standards, and with this 10 to 15% reduction, many areas passed
the test. The Ministry of VROM’s yearly report was drafted in May 2007, and in its
overview of the past year it was much more upbeat on the issue of air quality.47
The Government and governing parties like the CDA tried to gain politically from the
changing situation. On the basis of national measures and inventive solutions by
municipalities, the VROM budget announced that predictions that air quality would
Figure 4
potential exceedences of the PM standards
2010 old estimate 2010 new estimate
possibly no exceedence
possibly exceedence
47. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XI nr. 1.
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lead to a further stagnation of construction work would not materialise.48 Liesbeth
Spies complimented the Government because its measures had resulted in cleaner
air, and she hoped that citizens would notice the improvement.49 She did not men-
tion, however, that the changewas due to a recalibration of themeasuring andmodel-
ling rather than to any objective changes in the quality of the air.
The Ministry of V&W also sounded happy, and stated in its yearly report that the
impact of air quality on road construction had become ‘manageable’.50 Under the
new AQO 2005, the Ministry estimated that 80% of all the projects could now be rea-
lised,51 and it hoped to limit delays caused by verdicts of the Council of State. On the
whole, at the beginning of 2007, the Government seemed to be in far less trouble than
it had been at the beginning of 2006. This optimism lasted until July 2007, when the
Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division terminated the Leiderdorp road
expansion in the case of the A4 Burgerveen-Leiden.
7.3.2 The case of the A4 Burgerveen-Leiden
On 13 February 2006, the administration took a ‘trajectory decision’ to expand the A4
highway between Burgerveen and Leiden, a noted traffic bottleneck. It had been in the
top ten congestion-prone trajectories for years, and was also a bottleneck for air quality
because PM10 and NO2 levels around this highway were exceeded. Because under the
Air Quality Order 2005 a project could be realised if it led to an improvement in air
quality as awhole, the administration took a number of flankingmeasures tomake sure
the expansion did not worsen air quality or lead to an increase in noise pollution. The
road would be broadened from four to six lanes, but it would also be dug so that it lay
deeper than the surrounding landscape. In addition, the speed limit on the Burgerveen-
Leiden trajectory would be lowered from 120 km/h to 80 km/h, and large screens
would be planned along the side of the road to abate noise nuisance. Themeasureswere
outlined in a report drafted by the Ministry of V&W (V&W 2006).
On 19 April, the environmental pressure group Milieudefensie appealed against the
decision to broaden the trajectory. As we saw, instigating legal procedures was a key
ingredient in this environmental group’s clean air campaign. In its appeal, Milieude-
fensie listed five reasons why the Council of State should annul the decision of the
administration, with its core argument being that expanding the roadwould generate
more traffic. This extra traffic in turn would offset the improvements proposed by the
administration. There was no guarantee that the measures the Minister was propos-
ing would ensure that standards were met (Milieudefensie 2006).
48. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XI nr. 1, p. 13.
49. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25.
50. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XII nr. 1, p. 16.
51. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 31 031 XII nr. 1, p. 16.
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The Council of State considered that the Milieudefensie objections were by and large
justified, as the administration had not performed the necessary ‘integral inquiry’ into
the consequences of the road expansion for the network of secondary and provincial
roads.52 The administration had also not made sufficiently credible that with the
speed limit reduction to 80 km/h the air quality standards could be met. In addition,
the research should have taken into account the possible air quality situation exten-
ding beyond 2012, the year foreseen for the opening of the roadworks. The verdict of
the Council of State in July 200753 was a blow, especially because the Government
thought that the air quality crisis was finally becoming manageable. Again the Coun-
cil of State suspended the expansion of a road because the administration had not con-
ducted a sufficiently thorough investigation.
7.3.3 The effects of ‘Burgerveen-Leiden’ in Parliamentary discussions
The cancellation of another high-profile road expansion could be regarded as a victory
for Milieudefensie, but it turned out to be a Pyrrhic one. The A4 Burgerveen-Leiden
court case was catalytic (VROMraad 2009, p. 15, Borgers 2012, p. 24), because after
this verdict Parliamentarians started to criticise the environmental movement as well
over its strategy of using the courts to further its clean air campaign. Expansion of
the road was considered urgent in light of the Government’s efforts to combat
congestion.
In Parliament, the discussion about de-linking flared up again, but this time the environ-
mentalmovement itself drew flack aswell.54 In a letter to Parliament,Minister Jacqueline
Cramer stated that the issue of air quality standards was being used by pressure groups
to put a halt to spatial developments. I consider this statement highly significant, because
Cramer belonged to the pro-health camp;moreover, she had once been chairman ofMili-
eudefensie. Such an argument could be expected from parties in the pro infrastructure
camp, but apparently her position as Cabinet Minister made her more sensitive to infra-
structure concerns. Minister Cramer stated that the discussion of the link had been ‘reo-
pened’, thus suggesting a full uncoupling might be possible after all.
The Burgerveen-Leiden verdict was mentioned explicitly in the first important gen-
eral debate of the new Parliamentary year, the ‘General Review’ (Algemene Beschou-
wingen). During the discussion, VVD Parliamentarian Mark Rutte stated that he
sided: ‘[...]with people that claim that it is necessary to exclude pressure groups from the pos-
sibility of participation who do not have a direct interest but always oppose road expansions
such as Milieudefensie’.55
52. ABRvS 200602152/1, tracébesluit Burgerveen-Leiden R.O. 2.29.
53. ABRvS 200602152/1, tracébesluit Burgerveen-Leiden.
54. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 30 175 nr. 32, p. 3.
55. Handelingen II 2007-2008 nr. 2, p. 39.
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He called this environmental pressure group a bunch of ‘professional trouble
makers’,56 a label that would stick. It was mentioned in 2008 (Cobouw 22-03 2008)
and in Parliament a number of times again.57 As late as 2012, BernardWientjes, chair-
man of the employers association VNO-NCW,mentioned the Burgerveen-Leiden ver-
dict, and stated publicly that Milieudefensie was not a trustworthy negotiation
partner (de Volkskrant 12-11 2011).
The tone changed after the verdict, even among members of the pro-health camp. At
the end of 2007, socialist Parliamentarians complained of the deadlock in which the
country found itself. In a November 2007 discussion by the Second Chamber’s trans-
port committee, PvdA Parliamentarian Vermeij complained that decision making
was ‘running like syrup’ because of the obstacles and the consensus culture concer-
ning infrastructure projects.58 Figures of speech like syrupy decision making and put-
ting an end to the consensus culture had belonged previously to the repertoire of the
pro-infrastructure camp. This development showed that the pro-infrastructure camp
had largely succeeded in transforming the problem from a health issue into one cau-
sed by over-regulation, and that even elements of the previous pro-health camp now
adhered to the storyline of the pro-infrastructure camp, namely that environmental
policy should not get in the way of development. In the years following the air quality
clash, the subsidies paid to Milieudefensie decreased, and, according to Duyvendak,
this was done to punish them for their legal obstruction (Duyvendak, interview).
In addition to this rhetorical backlash against the environmental movement, the ver-
dict led to the installation of a commission set up to investigate the possibility of
speeding up procedures and providing answers regarding the ‘intense juridifica-
tion’59 of infrastructure projects. The new V&WMinister Camiel Eurlings60 asked for-
mer head of the DSM Company Peter Elverding to chair the Commission ‘Sneller
Besluitvorming Infrastructuur’ (Quicker Decision Making Infrastructure), (V&W
2007). I consider the institution of this Commission and its report to be one of the
results of the air quality clash; it is discussed further in section 7.4.2
7.3.4 The adoption of the Air Quality Law 2007
The Air Quality Law 2007 was adopted by Parliament on 11 October, and in Novem-
ber 2007 it appeared in the ‘Staatsblad’ as the Law of 11October amending the Law on
Environmental Management (Air Quality standards), the air quality law for short
56. Handelingen II 2007-2008 nr. 2, p. 39.
57. Handelingen II 2007-2008 nr. 74, p. 5164; Handelingen II 2009-2010, nr. 24, p. 2158.
58. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 29 385 nr. 15, p. 2.
59. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 29 385 nr. 15, p. 2.
60. Eurlings took over as Minister of Transport andWater Management from Carla Peijs in February 2007,
at the start of the new CDA PVDA and Christian Union Cabinet.
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(Stb. 2007, 414). As the title of the law indicated, it was essentially an amendment of
the Dutch Law on Environmental Management.
The Law on Environmental Management was expanded with a new title – 5.2 –
regarding standards for air quality. The new title in the Law on Environmental Man-
agement was a framework law that made establishment of the programmatic
approach possible but did not stipulate the contents of the plan itself. Article 5.12 pro-
vided the legal ground for the administration to implement the programmatic
approach known as the NSL. Under article 5.16 sub 4, the Government was also gran-
ted the power to establish that some smaller projects would not be included individ-
ually in the NSL. Harm relating to these projects was considered to be of ‘not to a
significant extent’, as they did not contribute more than 3% of the air pollution con-
centrations in certain areas.61
With the Air Quality Law, however, the problems were not resolved. Though it gave
the Government the competency to establish the programmatic approach, as yet no
such plan existed. Moreover, standards still were being exceeded the throughout the
country, and the measures foreseen in the NSL would only take effect some years
later. In the meantime, it was still possible for the administrative courts to cancel pro-
jects, as had been demonstrated by the Burgerveen verdict.
To finally put an end to the possibility of delays and annulments, the Government
needed a derogation from the EU, meaning that the European Commission would
approve giving the Netherlands extra time tomeet the standards. The Dutch attempts
to obtain this are discussed in the next chapter. After the Commission granted the der-
ogation based on the NSL, the Dutch Government would formally adopt it. This
repeal was finally granted on 8 April 2009.
The programmatic approach called NSL was the primary outcome of the PM clash in
terms of institutional legal change. Therefore it is discussed elaborately in the next
section, together with other outcomes of the clash, such as the Elverding Report
and the General Administrative Order on sensitive destinations.
. THE PERIOD AFTER THE AIR QUALITY LAW 
The Air Quality Law paved the way for an administrative solution to the air quality
clash. I call it an administrative solution, because it was not certain that the program-
matic approach would in fact clean the air. It would depend on the measures foreseen
in the NSL and on whether these measures would be implemented correctly.
61. The General Administrative Order, which stipulated the exact percentage a project should contribute to
affect air quality ‘to a significant extent’, was valid from 30 October 2007 (Stb. 2007, 440).
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Nonetheless, the NSLwas themain ingredient as regards the Air Quality Law and the
eventual solution to the air quality clash, and for this reason, it is the first item under
discussion in the present section.
The seconddevelopment consideredhere is the report of the ElverdingCommission. This
report indicated away forward to reach the goal if quicker decisionmaking in infrastruc-
tural projects. This Commission was installed as a reaction to the delays that among
others the Emergency Law on Road Expansion had encountered during the clash.
A third development was the promulgation of the General Administrative Order on
Sensitive Destinations (GAOSD),62 which was an outgrowth of discussions on the
Air Quality Law in 2006. It stipulated that the Minister would establish distances from
the highway within which schools and other areas where children and elderly persons
lived could not be built. TheGAOSD entered into force in January 2009 and is discussed
to highlight the way in which the highway had come to symbolise a dangerous place.
The Elverding Report indicated the possibility of repairing the Emergency Law on
Road Expansion. This proposal is the subject of 7.4.4. I consider it and important sym-
bolic development, indicating that by the time it entered into force in April 2009 infra-
structure development was nearly back on track.
In 7.4.5 the end of the clash and the regulatory changes brought about by the accep-
tance of the new programmatic approach are recounted.
7.4.1 The NSL
The NSL was not well received when it was presented to Parliament. Wijnand Duy-
vendak was still not convinced that it would do anything for air quality (Duyvendak,
interview), andMilieudefensiewas also still against the programmatic approach. Joris
Wijnhoven felt it was just an exercise to ‘calculate the air clean’ (Wijnhoven, inter-
view). This very description also appeared in a more recent monograph on the reso-
lution of the PM clash by Kees van Oosten, one of the founders of a pressure group
campaigning for air quality measures (Van Oosten 2012).
The NSL was indeed a complex piece of regulation. As indicated earlier, the method
used in the NSL was reminiscent of the ‘balancing’ approach introduced in the Air
Quality Order 2005. The difference was that it allowed for balancing on a muchwider
scale. To that end, the country was divided into regions and agglomerations, and for
each of these the balance sheet with projects and measures was drawn up that should
insure that the region complied with the air quality standards at a given time. The
VROMMinistry was responsible for this extended programme, and it was up to them
to change or amend the NSL if needed.
62. Besluit Gevoelige Bestemmingen (Stb. 2009, 14).
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The NSL also played a large part in persuading Brussels to be lenient with the Neth-
erlands in terms of the air quality standards. TheNetherlands intended to use theNSL
to show that it was doing everything possible to reach the standards. The NSL there-
fore served three purposes: reaching the standards; facilitating infrastructure projects;
and functioning as a proposal withwhich the Netherlands couldwin derogation from
the standards.63 This derogation had already been taken into account in the NSL, and
thus it could not be formally adopted until after the EU granted the Netherlands extra
time. After the postponement ended, air quality should be good enough to meet the
standards. In practice, this meant that the NSL had to make sure the PM10 standards
were met in 2011 and the NO2 standards in 2015.
It was clear from the start that the NSL would be a daunting project; a complete bal-
ance sheet of projects and measures that had to guarantee that air quality standards
would be met within 3 to 6 years. Local measures were introduced in the NSL, but
generic measures were also included that would have significant impacts throughout
the country.
To be able to make all the necessary calculations, a tool was developed by Goudappel
Coffeng, a professional consultancy in the realm of transport and space. In this com-
puterised application, air quality hotspots were made visible by using a map of the
Netherlands, onwhich coloured areas indicated possible hotspots. The tool shows the
situation in 2008 and the projections for 2011, 2015, and 2020.64 The NSL was a fine
exercise in calculation. To make these predictions, a number of variables had to be
included, and it had to make calculations and predictions relating to air quality con-
centrations from a countrywide scale all the way down to street level. Minister Cra-
mer stated that the calculation tool was unique in its combination of large-scale
assessment and detailed calculation.65 In order to perform these calculations and pre-
dictions, scenarios compiled by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CPB) concer-
ning economic development and climate, energy, and air pollution policy were
used.66 This detailed level of analysis lent credence to De Krom’s suggestion that it
might create a ‘paper reality’. It also made the plan impenetrable to outsiders, which
fuelled the suspicion in some quarters of the pro-health camp that it was just a strat-
egy to calculate the air clean.
The NSL contained a number of ambitious and politically salient measures, such as a
raise in diesel taxes and, most importantly, road pricing. Since the programme fell under
the responsibility of VROM, it granted this Ministry a potentially powerful weapon. The
road- pricing scheme via a charge per kilometre was particularly controversial.
63. Kamerstukken I 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. J.
64. The tool can be found on the website saneringstool, last accessed 03-11 2009.
65. Kamerstukken I 2007-2008, 30 489 nr N, p. 19.
66. Idem, p. 17.
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Perhaps the change of Cabinet from centre right to centre left made it easier to include
controversial pro-environmental measures in the NSL such as road pricing. However,
the inclusion of this measure had already been foreseen in September 2006 and was
mentioned in the debate during that month,67 so also in this case there was continuity
between the policies of Balkenende 4 and the earlier Cabinets.
Although Parliamentarians were hardly enthusiastic when this programmatic
approach was first proposed, a large majority accepted it. From the bigger parties,
only GroenLinks and D66 voted against.
7.4.2 The Elverding Report and speeding up procedures
After the Burgerveen-Leiden verdict, the environmental movement came under fire
for exploiting the law to resist politically desired infrastructure projects. The Govern-
ment instated two commissions – Verheijen and Elverding – to investigate the legal
problems surrounding infrastructure development andways to speed up procedures.
Both Commissions were fruits of the air quality clash.
The Verheijen Commissionwas asked to investigate the consequences of uncertainties
in modelling and calculating air quality for court cases.68 Air quality was tested
against limit values that were treated as absolute minimum standards by the courts,
while scientists pointed towards the considerable uncertainty to which air quality
measurement and modelling was subject. These uncertainties had significant conse-
quences, because it was difficult to guarantee whether a project would stay within the
boundaries set by the standards.
The Verheijen Commission concluded that uncertainties in the air quality file were a
‘fact of life’, and the tendency to calculate to increasingly detail would not lead to cer-
tainty. The Commission pleaded for continued review and for keeping a package of
measures in reserve for when the estimates proved to be overly optimistic. The mea-
sures could then be introduced to reach the required quality standard. Similarly, some
measures might turn out to be not necessary after all, because air quality was better
than expected. In those cases, it should be easy to scrap measures.
These conclusions were in accordance with those of the Elverding Commission, but
the Elverding Report was broader in scope and contained recommendations to speed
up decision-making procedureswith regard to infrastructure development. The Com-
mission was established to investigate ways in which decision making on this issue
could be improved. In addition, the commission was assigned to investigate the ‘link’
between spatial planning and environmental standards, and how to curb the
67. Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 489 nr. 25, p. 10.
68. Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 30 175 nr. 98.
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juridification of infrastructure development.69 The Commission was also expected to
look into the role played by the Council of State in procedures.70
The pro-infrastructure factions had high hopes that the Elverding Commissionwould
produce a favourable report from their perspective. According to the VVD, the Com-
mission had to combat ‘rule terrorism’ and ‘make sure the Netherlands was not bloc-
ked anymore’.71
The Elverding Commission did not recommend all the pro-infrastructure camp had
hoped for, but it did advise a critical rethinking of the wayDutch policy handled envi-
ronmental spatial conflicts. According to the report, the core of the problem was the
increasing complexity of society, the emerging juridification, the growth of economy
andmobility, and the tendency of empowered citizens to fight for their own interests,
such as a good living environment (Elverding Commission 2008, p. 4).
According to the Elverding Commission, we often desired to ‘reconcile the irreconcil-
able’ in the Netherlands, and this led to inertia or to the impossibility of executing a
decision that had already been taken (Elverding Commission 2008, p. 4). It was con-
sidered that our consensus culture spawned this desire, which often led to delays and
protracted procedures. Elverding proposed to let go of the broad margins of uncer-
tainty and detailed calculations with which projects had to be justified and instead
proposed to work with rules of thumb and additional flanking measures if later in
the process projects tended to have more negative effects on environmental quality
as earlier anticipated.
As regards participation, the Elverding Report proposed limiting the various access
points in which participants and pressure groups could present their point of view.
Access to the court would not disappear, but the number opportunities for taking a
decision to court during the whole process would be diminished. The conclusions of
the Elverding Report authorised the administration to limit the influence of the
administrative judge by restricting the opportunities for pressure groups to use the
courts as a political arena.
7.4.3 The General Administrative Order Sensitive Destinations
This GAOSD was important from a discursive perspective because it sanctioned the
notion that the highway was a dangerous place. In December 2008, the Government
issued this General AdministrativeOrder based on the air quality law that stipulated that
schools, kindergartens, and homes for the elderly may not be built within 300 metres of
69. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 30 504 nr. 4, p. 4.
70. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 30 175 nr. 42, p. 6.
71. Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 29 385 nr. 15, p. 1.
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the highway and not within 50 metres of provincial roads if air quality standards in the
areawere exceeded. The third article 5.16A of theDutch Lawon EnvironmentalManage-
ment stipulated that the administration should determine rules to prevent the exposure
to air pollution of people who were sensitive to it, by making sure new building projects
close to sources of air pollution were constructed some distance from the road.
This regulation was a small victory for the pro-health camp, because Jan Pronk, res-
ponding to the problem inOverschie, had already proposed increasing the distance of
schools and other buildings from roads. I include this discussion of it here, however,
because it is an odd type of regulation in the context of the programmatic approach. It
is reminiscent of the older type of regulation on environmental standards, viewing
them as absolute limits. I consider the GAOSD important because of its symbolic sig-
nificance. It portrayed highways as dangerous places, and sanctioned the ideas put
forward by epidemiologists that living and working near highways was unhealthy.
In contrast to the programmatic approach, it was an example of the notion that devel-
opment and environmental wellbeing excluded each other.
7.4.4 The repair of the Emergency Law on Road Expansion
One of the recommendations from the Elverding Commissionwas to repair the Emer-
gency Law onRoad Expansion. To that end the Cabinet adopted a proposal fromMin-
isters Eurlings and Cramer to change the Emergency Law on Road Expansion on the
11th of July 2008. By changing the Emergency Law of 2003 in ways that Elverding had
recommended and by anticipating on the acceptance of the NSL in Parliament the
Cabinet hoped to start work on the road expansions as soon as possible.
The Council of State voiced criticism against this proposal as well. It feared that the
wording of the proposal could be interpreted as limiting the judge in choosing what
kind of research data on air quality he or she would base her judgment in appeals
against road expansions. In his cometary on the advice Minister Eurlings tried to
assuage this concern by insisting that appeal remained open. In Parliament the pro-
posal was supported by a broadmajority and accepted by the second chamber of Par-
liament on the 13th of January 2009.
The emergence of the repaired Emergency Law on Road Expansion was a clear vic-
tory for the pro-infrastructure camp. The Emergency Law from 2003 was the most
obvious victim of the air quality clash and the prestigious road expansions were hal-
ted for six years to the dismay of parties such as CDA and VVD. This time parties
belonging to the pro-health camp like D66 and the SP voted in favour of the Emer-
gency Law, only GroenLinks voted against. Eurlings had even intended to broaden
the scope of the Emergency Law beyond roads covered by the law from 2003, but that
attempt was thwarted by opposition from coalition partner PvdA and other parties.
After the First Chamber in Parliament approved of the law with a similarly large
majority on the 31st of March 2009 it entered into force in April 2009 as the Law of
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April 2nd 2009, on changing the Emergency Law on Road Expansion and the Trajec-
tory Law in relation to the simplification of the research requirements (Law on speed-
ier decision making road projects). The acceptance of this law with a broad majority
shows that during the later years of the clash the pro-health camp was on the defen-
sive and lost ground
7.4.5 The acceptance of the NSL and the end of the clash
The new programmatic approach laid down in the NSL had three main goals, making
sure the limit values for air quality would be met in the Netherlands, making sure spa-
tial planning could be put back on track and to persuade Brussels to give the Nether-
lands a derogation in order for it to be able to implement theNSL. By and large theNSL
delivered what it was intended to accomplish, in any case it achieved the last two aims.
TheNSLwas accepted by the European Commission as a sufficiently persuasive clean
air plan to grant a derogation based on the new CAFE Directive promulgated on 21st
of May 2008. In April 2009 the derogation was officially granted and the champagne
popped at the VROM Ministry (Interview Marjan van der Giezen).
Moreover, on the 31st of March 2010, the NSL stood the legal acid test when the Coun-
cil of State accepted the NSL as sufficient evidence that the air quality standards had
been observed by the administration.72 The Council’s judgment indicated that the
NSL will not be extensively tested in court, but only a very marginal test is applied.73
The acceptance of the NSL as justification in court took away the remaining fears
among project developers and politicians that infrastructure development could be
halted by legal procedures. With the acceptance of the NSL in court, the air quality
clash was finally laid to rest. The NSL’s political and legal effects were its most impor-
tant outcomes in regard to regulatory change.
The programmatic approach is important for two other reasons besides ending the air
quality clash: firstly, it included controversial environmental measures; secondly, the
NSL represented a departure from the usual way that spatial/environmental conflicts
(De Roo 2003) were dealt with in Dutch environmental spatial law. Apart from a
highly controversial road-pricing scheme, measures foreseen included a premium
when old cars were traded in for new ones and a tax differentiation when cars were
purchased, providing a tax benefit for buying a cleaner car. Moreover, municipalities
would be granted the power to establish zones within which polluting trucks and
lorries were not allowed to enter. In addition, an increased tax on diesel fuel prices
– generally opposed by pro-infrastructure parties and their allies – was included.
These measures were substantial, and many had been on the wish lists of the pro-
health camp. They can be listed as political gains for this camp, even though the mea-
sures themselves still had to be introduced.
72. ABRvS 200900883/1, 24 Oktoberplein, 31 March 2010.
73. Website STAB, last accessed 27-09 2015.
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Institutionally, the NSL led to three important changes on spatial/environmental pol-
icy and law. Firstly, infrastructure development became possible when it fitted within
a prospective programme. Projects were no longer judged as solitary events, but were
considered within the context of other projects within an integral plan. The Dutch tra-
dition to test projects on a project-by-project basis (WRR 1998, p. 112) had been left
behind. The programmatic approach was much more integral, long-term oriented
and forward looking. Such an approach was normal in environmental policy making,
the NMP being the most obvious example, but now it was imported into infrastruc-
ture development, traditionally the responsibility of other Ministries. For instance, it
forced the Ministries of VROM and V&W to closely coordinate their policies, since
VROM was responsible for the NSL.74
The NSL precipitated further legal change as well. Traditionally, environmental quality
standards led to picket lines being formed around certain areas. If quality standardswere
transgressed in an area, it became barred from further polluting activities. An area was
considered to have a certain ‘environmental space for use’ (‘Milieugebruiksruimte’). If the
environmental space was being used, it could not be used by other polluting activities.
With the NSL, these consequences were avoided. Projects could be continued in places
where standards were exceeded, provided that in the end the standards would be met,
because their harmful effects were counter-balanced by beneficial measures.
According to Niels Koeman, this new programmatic approach provided the necessary
flexibility while making sure the quality of the environment remained intact, and would
play a role in future environmental/spatial policy and law. TheVROMraad, the advisory
council of theMinistry of VROM, voiced similar opinions in a recommendation provided
in 2009 when it proposed introducing the ‘environmental spatial plan’ as an addition to
ordinary land use plans (VROMraad 2009). This forward-looking programmatic
approach was reminiscent of the NSL. The lower administrative body drew up a score
sheet and set environmental and spatial targets that it would like to realise in the future.
The polluting activities of projects, industry, and transport were placed on one side of the
balance and environmental improvements on the other. In this way, it was clear how
much ‘environmental space’ there was left before the standards were exceeded. An envi-
ronmental spatial plan couldmake further demands on companies to use cleaner produc-
tion processes, for instance, or environmental space could be gained by constructing
tangential thoroughfares and thereby unburdening roads leading through the area.
Many of these recommendations were indeed adopted in newer environmental/spa-
tial legislation. The first of these regulations was the ‘crisis and recovery law’ (Crisis
en Herstelwet) in March 2010 (Stb. 2010, 135). Moreover, elements of it were also
incorporated into the Nature Protection Law (Niels Koeman, interview).
74. The twoMinistries have been merged in a newMinistry for Infrastructure and Environment (2010), but
the question of whether the NSL and further laws based on the same concept played a part in the deci-
sion to merge these policy fields lies outside the scope of this study.
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While not embraced initially, theNSL opened up newways of thinking about the rela-
tionship between spatial planning and environmental law. This new relationship was
one of balancing interests and flexible decision making as well as of long-term plan-
ning and comprehensive regulation. It was itself an outgrowth of a legal battle, the
struggle between the Council of State and the Government regarding the possibilities
of repairing the AQO 2001.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter the emergence of a counter-claims maker in the form of the pro-infra-
structure camp in April 2005 has been discussed. The clash between these camps was
resolved in 2010 by the acceptance of the programmatic approach and by the
Table 9
Pro-health camp Pro-infrastructure
camp
Government Council of State
Actors GL PvdA SP, D66,
Milieudefensie, Scientific
institutes and health
professionals
CDA (partially), VVD, LPF,
pro-infrastructure
interest groups
(Bouwend Nederland,
NEPROM, VNO-NCW,
etc.)
Ministry of VROM/
Ministry of V&W
Advisory Division /
Administrative
Jurisdiction Division
Spokespersons W. Duyvendak (GL)
D. Samsom (PvdA),
J. Wijnhoven,
Milieudefensie, RIVM /
GGD
P. De Krom (VVD),
L. Spies (CDA) J.
Eerdmans (LPF). E.
Brinkman (Bouwend
Nederland) C. Oudshoorn
(VNO-NCW)
P. van Geel (CDA) N.A.
Interest Maintaining public
health.
Maintaining adequate
infrastructure for
mobility; jobs.
Finding a solution to the
infrastructure blockade
that would pass the
Council of State.
Keeping policy in line
with legal requirements.
Storyline With its irresponsible
policies, the Government
endangered the health of
its citizens and skirted
the limits of European
rules. It is violating the
rights of its citizens.
The EU standards and
the Dutch interpretation
of them are unworkable
and bad for business.
They are a heavy
economic burden and
threaten 100,000 jobs.
The Netherlands is doing
all that it reasonably can
to keep the air clean. The
European standards are
difficult to work with and
should not be interpreted
overly strict.
The Govt. is not above
the law. It has bound
itself to strict European
standards and therefore
the European arena is
the place to renegotiate.
It should better examine
whether the
implementation of EU
law fits within the
national system.
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acceptance of the NSL by the Council of State. Now it is time to make a comparison
between the four main actors in the air quality clash, the pro-health camp, the pro-
infrastructure camp, the Council of State and the Government. This comparison is
valid for the years of the air quality clash. This caveat is made because an actor like
the Government is present throughout this study and the position of the Government
of the late 1980s for example markedly differed from its position in the air quality
clash.
Table 9 abovemakes clear that not one but two conflicts are present in the air quality
clash. The first conflict is the one between health interests versus those of infrastruc-
ture development. The second struggle is between policy institutions and legal ones.
The Council of State was pitted against the Government over the question to what
extent Council of State as Advisory Division and as Administrative Jurisdiction
Division could influence the course of policy making. In this final section both these
conflicts will be analysed further. In 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 the conflict of health interests
versus infrastructure development takes central stage. The result of the clash is
interpreted as a return to a weak form of ecological modernisation, a compromise
between these two traditionally opposing interests. Moreover, perceptions regard-
ing auto-mobility and the use of space have altered because of the air quality clash.
In 7.5.3 and 7.5.4 we will discuss the conflict of law versus policy. The role of legal
professionals is elaborated on in 7.5.3 and the position of the Council of State is
reviewed. In 7.5.4 the position of the Council of State is analysed in relation to
the legality of precaution.
7.5.1 Weak ecological modernisation as a compromise strategy
The air quality clash was characterised different terms by the pro-health and the
pro- infrastructure camp. The pro-health camp put forward the storyline that
poor air quality was causing health problems. The more extreme factions in this
camp argued that the issue of air quality should put a stop to the further devel-
opment of auto-mobility. Environmental NGOs belonging to the camp put for-
ward a narrative in which good air quality was presented as a basic right, and
the legal verdicts as well as the text of the Air Quality Order were presented
as proof of this notion.
It is conspicuous that the parties that made up the pro-infrastructure camp did not
confront these claims head on. They did not deny the health effects of mobility. In
the beginning of the clash they had done so to a certain extent by arguing that the
problem would be solved over time and that stringent measures now were not rea-
sonable. This line was unsuccessful. It invited the charge that the Government did not
care about the health of its people. In the spring of 2005 the pro-infrastructure camp
chose a different strategy, it recast the debate from a debate about health policy to a
debate about over regulation. They started using a storyline in which air quality
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regulation was considered as an administrative economic problem that was bad for
business The pro-infrastructure camp pointed out that a stringent implementation of
the Air Quality Directives was ‘bad for business’, a storyline that took off following
the press release generated by lobby groups of the construction and service sectors.
The ‘bad for business’ storyline managed to wrest the terms of the debate away
from the pro-health camp by presenting the air quality clash principally as an issue
of bad regulation: namely, infrastructure development in the country was blocked,
owing to rules drafted in Europe without regard for the national situation. It was
felt that constraints could be lifted by releasing the link between standards and
administrative decisions. This storyline started gradually to dominate, and it shifted
the emphasis from the health effects, thus blunting the thrust of the pro-health
narrative.
The storylines used by the two camps were both not amenable to ecological modern-
isation. The pro-health version argued for a strongly precautionary approach, and
favoured limits on pollution for reasons of public health. The human rights storyline
claimed that environmental quality concerns should supersede all other interests
because a fundamental right was at stake. The ‘bad for business' storyline meanwhile
argued that environmental regulation was costly, and its impacts should be minimi-
sed. This line too rejected the idea that environmental protection and economic devel-
opment could coincide. Only the Government used more reconciliatory narratives.
Nonetheless, both camps had to accept a compromise that was framed in eco-mod-
ernistic terms and that bore the hallmarks of eco-modernistic policy. The program-
matic approach was presented by the Government as a showcase of the notion of
smart solutions. It argued that both environmental interests as well as those related
to infrastructure could be accommodated byway of balancing projects andmeasures-
based scientific calculation.
The air quality clash showed the necessity of maintaining the balancing act between
environmental and economic interests. An eco-modernistic discourse was still the
most credible candidate to reconcile these interests. When the Balkenende Cabinets
did away with ecological modernisation all but in name, the environmental move-
ment and progressive political parties rallied against the plans and started to use
air quality as a crowbar to force more environmental measures. However, when
the verdicts of the Council of State made infrastructure development highly problem-
atic, conservative parties together with the construction and transport sectors began
to pile pressure on the Government. The eventual compromise conformed to weak
ecological modernisation again, because it assumed the possibility of co-development
of infrastructure and environmental protection within one and the same plan. More-
over, the plan was drafted after participation and consultation took place involving
stakeholders, and the plan was heavily based on science, management, and an inte-
gral approach, all of which are eco-modernistic characteristics. In fact, the direction
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taken by environmental/spatial law after the programmatic approach was more in
conformity with ecological modernisation than the old system that inked quality stan-
dards directly to administrative decisions was.
Apparently neither the interests of environment and health nor infrastructure devel-
opment and economy could lay claim to a position of dominance – both mustered
powerful discursive and political resources. By framing clean air as a right, the
pro-health camp managed to establish a discourse coalition between itself and the
Council of State. However, the economic figures presented by the pro-infrastructure
camp exerted a powerful influence on the Government. In the current Dutch political
constellation it is necessary to cater to both interests at the same time. When the econ-
omy appears in jeopardy the public and politicians become anxious and wish to lift
economic barriers as soon as possible, but when health claims are made, they cannot
be brushed aside either and appearing not to take them seriously is a very risky polit-
ical strategy. The two interests hold each other in a kind of headlock and therefore a
solution along eco-modernist lines is still a necessary one.
The eco-modernist plan re-established consensus, but not a wholehearted one. The
NSL resembles exactly the sort of plan that Elverding warned against; an attempt
to reconcile the irreconcilable by relying on very detailed calculations and consensus.
The environmental movement and Government policy makers retained their wary
attitude towards each other, and this ‘new’ consensus did not convey the same pro-
gressive enthusiasm that had characterised ecological modernisation under Winse-
mius. The weak variation currently holding sway lacks the kind of optimism that
characterised ecological modernisation earlier on. It depends on a very meticulous
form of book keeping, constantly making sure the balance will not tip the wrong
way. In that sense it fits the fearful ‘moderate’ forms of policy currently in vogue
(Arnoldussen 2009). Risks should not be taken and we have to be constantly weary
not to miss a threat to either our health or the economy.
7.5.2 Discursive positions and changing perceptions
The air quality clash resulted in important discursive changes. The foray intomobility
was of importance from the perspective of the broader environmental conflict
between environmental and health interests on one side and economic interests on
the other. Mobility had hitherto been shunned as a target for environmental cam-
paigns, NGOs were afraid to lose the sympathy of the public when they broached
the subject, and the many car owners in the Netherlands had considerable lobbying
power. For this reason, the attempt to modernise transport and mobility ecologically
had failed. However, the issue of air quality opened up space to attack the mobility
policy and to argue for restrictions on cars, which indeed appeared in the form of
environmental zones where lorries were not allowed, reductions of the speed limit,
and court-ordered annulments of road expansions.
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More generally, the notion took root that mobility was not only a collective good but a
collective bad as well. Highways became considered dangerous places alongside of
which it was not responsible to build schools and other facilities. Air quality itself
evolved from being an obscure subject on the mind of decision makers to an impor-
tant factor to be considered in drafting plans and permitting projects. Air quality was
now in the forefront of debates on infrastructure development, and such a prominent
position would have been unthinkable without the air quality clash.
Moreover, the idea that the Netherlands was a dirty country with high environmental
pressure became commonplace. The air quality situation in the Netherlands became
emblematic for a storyline that it was an environmentally dirty country with a Gov-
ernment that did not do enough. Such notions can be found on the GroenLinks web-
site, and even in ‘The Economist’ (GroenLinks website, The Economist Website).
Finally, sustainable mobility appeared more prominently again on the agenda, and
the legal arrangements on spatial planning were overhauled. In the sphere of mobil-
ity, policy was forced to move in a more long-term and comprehensive direction. Pro-
jects needed to be researched more thoroughly with regard to their environmental
effects. The administrative courts demanded more from the administration than a
short-term and piecemeal investigation – it called for long-term guarantees that a pro-
ject would not do damage to the environment and to public health.
These discursive changes forced policy makers to rethink the way the Netherlands
would develop structurally in the long term, and with integral consideration concer-
ning environmental as well as economic factors. In summary, the air quality clash
took environmental matters to the forefront of the political discussion in much the
sameway acid rain had done in the 1980s. In contrast to the case of acid rain, however,
health issues and mobility issues were now at the forefront of the debate. Demands
were made to curtail economic development, not because of concerns for eco-systems
but out of health concerns. During the air quality clash, the pro-health camp deman-
ded guarantees that economic development would not harm the health of citizens.
The crucial importance of public health arguments in this conflict indicate that in
the early 2000s, people were less inclined to sacrifice public health for economic gains,
while in the 1980s the eco-systems argument carried the day. Moreover, mobility was
put in the spotlight, while in previous conflicts industrialization had been considered
the prime environmental enemy.
From a sociological point of view this discursive development is interesting because it
indicates a deepening of the environmental conflict. In the 1980s it played out on the
level of the collective. The environment as a whole was pitted against industrial pro-
duction, a collective good. Health – in the end an individual good – clashed with
(auto)mobility, also an individualised way of transportation. The collective dimension
of environmental conflict is still important, consider the problem of climate change,
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but the PM case shows it also acquired an individual dimension. The air quality clash
aroused public opinion because their individual interests were at stake. People were
concerned over their own health, instead of over the more abstract issue of the health
of ecosystems. Similarly, the interests of individual car owners were on the line. They
did not like the 80 kilometre speed limit because it meant they had to drive slower. This
too is amuchmore concrete interest than industrial production of economic growth per
se. I conclude that the air quality clash is important among other things because it
brought the environmental conflict back to the behaviour and interests of individuals,
making it tangible.
From a methodological perspective, there is another noteworthy theoretical aspect of
the air quality clash regarding both discourse analysis and the actor centred perspec-
tive, the two social constructivist methodologies used throughout the study. TheGov-
ernment’s storyline did not alter markedly when the parties that made up the Cabinet
changed. The socialist PvdA had always belonged in the pro-health camp, but when
PvdA Minister Cramer took over from her Christian Democrat colleague, the tone of
the Government remained the same. Cramer even seemed to indicate that she was
willing to discuss uncoupling the link altogether. Just as the previous Cabinet had
done, she complained about interest groups using legal procedures to score political
points. This was all the more surprising because Minister Cramer had been a Milieu-
defensie chairperson in the 1980s. Apparently discursive commitments could depend
on the political position that parties held, which suggested that storylineswere at least
to some degree tied to positions, and that it did not matter much which actor held the
position in question.
Discourse theoreticians generally hold that the opinions one can form depend on the
belief systems and discursive commitments to which one is bound. More actor cen-
tred theoreticians such as Joel Best regard rhetoric as a part of the strategy that actors
used to get their interests represented in themedia and eventually in legislation. How-
ever, the findings in the air quality clash suggest that neither is the case. Actors do not
use rhetoric at will. Minister Cramer was and is a noted environmentalist, however,
when she became a Minister she had to adopt the storylines used by the Government
even from before the time she took power. However, storylines also do not shape the
position one takes. Discourse theoreticians are generally convinced that the way an
actor is positioned depends on his or her discursive commitments and these are
tied to believe systems. Instead, positions or roles shape the storylines one can
choose from.
The relevance of a shift of attention towards positions and roles is that social problem
construction would not primarily be about actors strategically putting forth their
interests, or of storylines and discourse coalitions gaining adherents. Social problem
construction would depend on the organisational set up of social practices. To give a
concrete example, the problem of crime should not be considered as the result of the
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actions of actors demanding private property to be protected, or storylines about
what behaviour is inherently malicious, but by the creation of a police force, of crim-
inologists and of prison wardens. Likewise, environmental problems will emerge on
thewings of modernmeasuring equipment, a class of environmental scientists and on
the organisation of theMinistry of the environment. To be sure, such an insight would
still fall within the bounds of discourse theory, but would downplay the importance
of narrative devices and draw attention to social practices and the material conditions
under which social problems emerge.
7.5.3 The role of legal professionals and the function of legal discussion
Even though legal professionals have played a prominent role in the search for a solu-
tion of the air quality clash, they have not been included in the table on page 175.
There are numerous reasons for not including them. The legal professionals remained
isolated individuals, Niels Koeman and Chris Backes are mainly discussed in this
chapter. Later on they were joined by others, who added to the legal discussion,
for instance Tieman et al. (2007). They did not operate as a group however or a
sub group of a larger institution. They did not agree among themselves as to what
the best solution would be, so it cannot be said that they shared a similar storyline
or subscribed to one of the storylines above. I also feel that it would be artificial to
include them in one of the two camps. It is true that they offered their advice to
the Government mostly to find a solution, but they did not represent infrastructure
or health interests as such.
Even though they did not belong in one of the camps, did not share a storyline and
had different legal perspectives on problem, the legal professionals were instrumental
in finding a solution that could be accepted by the Council of State, and appease the
pro-health and pro-infrastructure camps.
Theway inwhich these legal professionalsmanaged to offer fertile ideas for a solution
displays the fruitful function of dogmatic legal discussion. Through contradiction and
discussion a legally acceptable solution was eventually reached. In the air quality
clash the law shows itself as a tenacious, but also resilient social practice with a high
degree of self-rejuvenating power. The Council of State, itself a legal institution, cut
short the attempts of the Government to skirt the legal consequences of the implemen-
tation of the European directives in the Air Quality Order. This tenacity created much
dismay among policy makers, but it did provide space for awhole newway to handle
environmental spatial conflicts to develop.
The development of this new programmatic approach can by and large be ascribed to
the discussions between legal professionals, Government representatives and of
course the tenacity of the Council of State, both the Advisory Division and the Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Division. The law created the blockade, but also removed it and
7 The rise of the pro-infrastructure camp and the resolution of the clash 2006 – 2010
in the process created a policy instrument that was more viable than the old link. The
air quality clash shows that lawyers should not easily budge to the wishes of policy
makers. Even though it may lead to delays, the fruits of legal progress are remarkable
as well. For these fruits to mature though, a dialogic and patient approach is needed.
Law progresses by the gradual sharpening of arguments within the limits of legal dis-
course. There is much to be said for letting it progress in this way, because it ensures
legitimate solutions, limits the Government in pushing for a practical but controver-
sial solution and ensures procedural justice. Juridification is seen as an important
problem of contemporary decision making procedures and that is understandable.
However, it may be a boon as well as a poison, because, as the air quality clash shows,
the legal order has a way of reinventing itself and offering more durable solutions
than the quick fixes offered by politicians.
7.5.4 The Council of State’s position in the air quality clash
When residents and pressure groups took recourse to the law to force the administra-
tion to heed their demands, the highest administrative court became a key actor in the
air quality clash. The legal strategy of the environmental NGOs resulted in a second
conflict that played out in the shadow of the first one, and it had to do with the ques-
tion as to which institutions had the final say in matters of governance. In the shadow
of the clash between the pro-health and the pro-infrastructure camp, the Government
and the Council of State struggled over the question of whether the link between
administrative decisions and environmental quality standards should be kept. Even-
tually, the Council of State yielded partially to the wishes of the Government, but for
years it resisted the Government’s plans to weaken the standards – only after awholly
new policy instrument was drafted did the Council give up its resistance.
In terms of actor centred social constructivism, the courts are seen as social problem
workers, because they determine the influence of policy on the ground. The interpre-
tation by the courts may itself lead to further rounds of claims making. This dynamic
is visible in the air quality clash as well. The strict interpretation of the AQO 2001 led
to counter-claims by organisations belonging to the pro-infrastructure camp. How-
ever, more is at stake here. In the air quality clash the Council of State acted as a policy
maker itself. It forced the Government not only to amend the Air Quality Order, but to
come up with a wholly novel way of conducting spatial planning. The new program-
matic approach is as much the result of the tenacity of the Council of State as it is from
the initiatives of the Government and the acumen of legal experts.
This was remarkable in a country where primacy was considered to lie with politics,
andwhere the Council of State was often criticised for being tooGovernment friendly.
Two questions come into play here. The first has to dowith how the Council could put
up such strong resistance. This question can be answered by pointing towards the
characteristics of the Dutch legal system and the characteristic composition of the
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Council of State, respectively. The second question has to do with why the Council of
State resisted the wishes of the Government in this particular case. This question is
harder to answer, but a reflection on utterances by the Council of State Advisory Divi-
sion may provide an answer.
The powerbase of the Council of State
The Council of State was able to withstand political pressure to agree to a quick solu-
tion by pointing towards the European nature of the air quality standards. The origin
of the Dutch regulation lies in Europe, and European law takes precedence over
national law in the Dutch legal system. This precedence of European Law gives
the Council of State a considerable amount of leverage, because it means that the
Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division could decide to apply the Euro-
pean air quality standards directly if the Government were to amend the regulation in
a direction deemed unlawful by the Council. The Council of State did not indicate that
it would do so, but it did denote that it would need to pose prejudicial questions to the
European Court in Strasbourg. Such a procedure would take a long time and would
likely result inmore delays – a scenario the Government intended to avoid. The Coun-
cil of State maintained the storyline that the issue of the regulatory blockade of infra-
structure development in the Netherlands should be resolved in the European arena,
precisely where the problem had originated.
The second reason that the Council of State had a large powerbase was that it consis-
ted of two divisions: the Administrative Jurisdiction Division – that acts as the highest
administrative court and the Advisory Division – that acts as the Government’s hig-
hest advisory council. The Government was caught in a bind, because it feared that
negative advice could foreshadow that a proposed amendment would fail when
examined by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division in court cases. Formally, the
two divisions are strictly separated, but the extent of this separation is not clear, since
they remain different parts of the same organisation and they do share expertise.
When the Council of State advised against a release of the link, for instance, Van Geel
became very cautious because he feared that the Administrative Jurisdiction Division
would terminate his amendments before the court if the matter were brought to its
attention.
The power of the Council of State had its limits though. When the political pressure
mounted during the later years of the air quality clash it could not maintain its defiant
stance.
The Council of State and a legality of precaution
This study provides answers to the question why the Council of State would oppose
the Government in this instance, while in other cases it was considered supportive of
Government policy. Firstly, the Council intended to protect access to the courts for
citizens in environmental matters. Cutting appeal procedures also means that the
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highest administrative court would have less influence. Secondly, the Council of State
is slowly moving in a precautionary direction.
The Council already opposed the curtailment of legal procedural rights when the
Advisory Division advised on the Emergency Law on Road Expansion in 2002.
The release of the link would force the Council to relinquish a powerful tool with
which the Court could keep Government policy in check. This political explanation
is compelling, but there are indications that more was at stake.
In regard to the second point mentioned above, during the air quality clash, the Coun-
cil of State asked more from the administration than it had done previously – this
included much more thorough research into the effects on air quality before admin-
istrative decisions were given the green light. The requirements pertaining to research
subsequent to decision making were so demanding that in the early years of the air
quality clash only one research institute was able meet them. I take this heightened
burden of proof as an indication of a more precautionary approach to questions of
air quality. There are further instances in which the Council of State used precaution-
ary arguments outside of the field of air quality: for instance, the cockle fishing judg-
ment of September 2004 (Pieterman 2010).75
However, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division did not couch its decisions in pre-
cautionary terms, nor did it take recourse to the precautionary principle, or to other
typically precautionary elements. In fact, it did not have to, because it could simply
provide a strict legal interpretation of the text of the Air Quality Order. In any case, the
Administrative Jurisdiction Division did not cut the Government any slack, and it dis-
regarded the Government intentions while interpreting the Air Quality Order.
Because they contain policy advice, the convictions of the Council of State Advisory
Division are easier to assess. Within the domain of policy advice, it is less difficult to
spot precautionary elements, and in a number of places the Advisory Division took a
more precautionary line than it had done earlier.
In its advice on the 2006 budget, the Council of State remarked that both the Dutch
Government and the EU had a one-sided focus on economic wellbeing. Moreover, it
considered thatWestern European economies, including that of the Dutch, presuppo-
sed high economic growth as a given. The Council of State Advisory Division noted
that structural weaknesses could make it necessary to forego these growth ambitions,
and it named Particulate Matter as one of the weaknesses. I interpret such statements
as a signal by the Council of State, especially because the budget of 2006was treated in
late 2005, the year inwhich the air quality clashwas ragingwithout a solution in sight.
It felt that politics was one sided focussed on the economy.
75. ABRvS 200409107/2, kokkelvissers.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
In its policy advice, the Council of State also expressed the need to keep access to the
courts open, and it responded critically to proposed limits being imposed on citizens
wanting to appeal against projects that had been incorporated in the programmatic
approach. It is no surprise that an institution like the Council of State would uphold
access to court; however, it is also an indication that it was concerned about the rights
of citizens to appeal against infringements of their participatory rights, even if NGOs
used the Courts to further their own goals and if this strategy clearly stagnated eco-
nomic development. The increased demand for research into the effects of projects on
air quality, the concern over the rights of citizens to be heard in infrastructure devel-
opment, and the concern with the sustainable economic development of the Nether-
lands fit within a trend towards a legality of precaution in which the prevention of
environmental and health damage was emphasised. The precautionary concerns of
the Council of State were not very openly stated, however, and I consider it a partial
explanation of its defence of the link in addition to the institutional one of securing
access to the administrative courts. This link is an instrument that makes sure precau-
tionary considerations remain an important factor in infrastructure development,
however.
Wewill now leave the Dutch arena and return to Europe. The DutchNSL by and large
restored consensus at the national level, but in order for it to be successful the Dutch
Government needed a postponement of the air quality standards, because without it,
the threat of annulments would remain.
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TIMELINE AIR QUALITY CLASH AND ITS RESOLUTION 2005 – 2010
2005 April Mobilisation of pro-infrastructure camp in and outside Parliament. Van Geel promised work on new Air Quality
Order
2005 May RIVM published new figures; possibly 18000 people dying 10 years earlier because of PM.
2005 May AQO 2005 entered into force
2005 June Coalition of lobby groups issued press release asking for a release of the link
2005 Aug. Van Geel suggested ‘programmatic approach’ for dealing with regulatory problem of air quality
2005 Sept. Prinsjesdag package unveiled
2005 Nov. Council of State Advisory Division critical over first plans programmatic approach
2006 March RIVM issued new figures, air quality concentrations overestimated by 15%
2006 March Van Geel sends proposal Air Quality Law and Programmatic Approach to Parliament
2006 Oct Air Quality Law accepted in 2nd Chamber of Parliament, heavy criticism of EU and Council of State during
Parliamentary debates.
2007 Feb. Cabinet Balkenende 4 took over, PvdA back in Cabinet, Cramer (PvdA) Minister of VROM, Eurlings (CDA) Minister
of V&W
2007 July Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division annuls decision to expand. Road trajectory Burgerveen –
Leiden. ABRvS 200602152/1
2007 Sept. Heavy criticism of environmental movement during plenary Parliamentary debate. Institution of Elverding
Commission on decision making procedures
2007 Oct. Air Quality Law accepted in Parliament
2007 Nov. Air Quality Law entered into force
2008 April Report Elverding Commission published
2008 June Contents of the NSL offered to Parliament by way of a Letter by Minister Cramer
2009 Jan. General Administrative Order on Sensitive Destinations (GAOSD) entered into force
2009 April Emergency Law on Road Expansion repaired
2009 Aug. NSL entered into force
2010 March NSL accepted by Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division as sufficient justification for administrative
decisions ABRvS 200900883/1
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 THE CAFE PROGRAMME: A NEW AIR QUALITY
STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 2001 – 2009
INTRODUCTION
European air quality regulation was partly responsible for the Dutch air quality clash,
since without those strict European standards from the 1990s there would have been
no conflict. However, the key to resolving the issue lay with Brussels as well. The Dutch
programmatic approachwould onlywork if theDutch administrationwere to be granted
extra time to comply with the standards. Therefore, much depended on a newAir Qual-
ity Directive that had already been on the agenda since 2001. This new Directive would
be drafted within the ambit of an overarching EU programme called Clean Air For
Europe (CAFE), the aim of which was to harmonise clean air regulation. This thematic
strategy regarding air pollutionwould consist of a new integrated approach to air quality
and acidification, and within its scope the existing Directives would be reviewed.
The importance of this new harmonisation programme merits a look at the way the
Dutch Government operated in the preparatory phase of the CAFE programme and
in the negotiations on the Air Quality Directive itself. During the clash, the pro-infra-
structure camp accused the Government of being too lenient with regard to Brussels,
and not able to defend its own interests. The Government was portrayed as trying to
be ‘holier than thou’when it came to air quality (Smit 2006), and the Netherlands was
called ‘the village dunce of Europe’ (Gekke Henkie van Europa).1 However, was it
really true that the Dutch always played by the book? This research shows that this
picture needs to be nuanced.
In addition a look at the CAFE programme provides insights into the development of
air quality policy in the first decade of the new century in general. In the first decade of
the new century air quality policy reached a level of complexity and sophistication
that caused it to get mired in technicality. Moreover, the complexity of this issue cau-
sed the line between scientist and policy maker to blur. The expert committees within
the scope of CAFE became politicised and Member States and pressure groups vied
for influence within them. By relying on science the European Commission sought to
decrease politicisation, but in the case of CAFE the strategy backfired.
1. Handelingen II 2007-2008, nr. 38, p. 2997.
A third reasonwhy the CAFE process merits attention is that in this case a precaution-
ary approach was thwarted by a concerted effort of pressure groups andMember Sta-
tes that argued for flexible regulation. In CAFE environmental precaution had to give
way to economic interests, despite a cost benefit assessment showing that a more
ambitious policy was cost-effective.
In section 8.1, a global outline of the CAFE programme is presented. Knowledge of the
institutional setup of the programme and the goals that it was intended to achieve is
necessary to understand the subsequent procedure and the nature of the eventual out-
comes of the CAFE programme, the CAFE strategy, and the Air Quality Directive
from 2008, the CAFE Directive.
Section 8.2 is dedicated to the review of the Air Quality Directives from the 1990s,
especially Directive 99/30 containing limit values for NO2 and PM10. This review
was important for the Netherlands because, as stated in the explanatory Memoran-
dum for the original Dutch Air Quality Order from 2001, the Government expected
that standards would be adjusted downwards. In the context of CAFE, the Dutch
Government tried to obtain a review that would allow it to lessen the standard’s
impact on the Dutch economy.
Section 8.3 deals with the actual adoption of the CAFE strategy and the Air Quality
Directive 2008. The Dutch position in the debates in the European Council of Minis-
ters and the European Parliament are considered and contrasted with the Nether-
lands’ position on environmental issues in the 1990s. This comparison is used to
determine to what extent the Dutch position changed due to internal problems
regarding air quality regulation.
In section 8.4, the CAFE strategy goals are discussed. CAFE started as an ambitious
attempt to draft a comprehensive policy based on the input of scientific experts, policy
maker, and stakeholders, and it was to become an ambitious long-term programm
within which various air pollution policies were integrated. The question is whether
the high level of ambition and its complexity enhanced or reduced its effectiveness
in practice. First we will take a look at CAFE’s intentions and its organisational
structure. The chapter concludes with an analysis in section 8.5 in which the
above-mentioned considerations are discussed.
. AIMS AND ORGANISAT ION OF THE CAFE PROGRAMME
After adoption of the air quality Framework Directive and the subsequent Daughter
Directives, the dust did not settle around air quality policy in the EU. After the first
Daughter Directive was adopted formally in April 1999, three more followed, all
based on the same Framework Directive – 96/62/EC – on ambient air quality
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assessment and management.2 However, the European Commission was still not sat-
isfied with the integration and comprehensiveness of the air quality policy.
Even before the first Daughter Directive was adopted, the idea for a new and
comprehensive clean air strategy was floated in informal talks with Member States.
As early as October 1998, an informal discussion document was sent to various Mem-
ber States and stakeholders (Wettestad & Farmer 2001, p. 5). The new programme to
integrate all policies dealing with air pollution would bear the name CAFE: Clean
Air For Europe. After gathering information from Member States and other stake-
holders, in 2001 the Commission unveiled its new clean air strategy.
The new approach was first mentioned publicly during the ‘green week’ of 2001, the
biggest annual conference on European environmental policy making. CAFE was to
become amajor programme, with input frommany stakeholders andMember States,
and repercussions for numerous policy fields besides the environment. An impres-
sion of the aims of this programmewithin the wider context of EU environmental pol-
icy is provided in the first sub-section, where CAFE is discussed in the context of the
6th Environmental Action Programme. The overall organisation of CAFE and its var-
ious sub-committees are discussed in the second sub-section.
8.1.1 The aims of the CAFE programme and its place in EU environmental policy
The CAFE programme was proposed by the European Commission in a Communi-
cation (European Commission 2001), in which the Commission justified this new ini-
tiative by considering that there were a number of priority air pollution problems. It
mentioned ParticulateMatter (PM), ground-level ozone, acidification, eutrophication,
and the necessity of ‘keeping a watchful eye’ on pollutants not currently regulated
(European Commission 2001, p. 3). The attention to urban air pollution by PM and
Ozone was driven predominantly by health concerns, while problems relating to
acidification were prioritised because of environmental impacts.
The main aim of the CAFE programme was to develop a:
‘long term, strategic and integrated policy to protect against the effects of air pollution on human
health and the environment. As required by the Treaty, the policy will aim at a high level of envi-
ronmental protection based on the precautionary principle, taking into account the best available
2. The Framework Directive 96/62/ECwas followed by the previously mentioned Directive 2000/69/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to limit values for benzene and carbonmonoxide
in ambient air, on 16 November 2000; Directive 2002/3/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 February 2002 relating to ozone in ambient air from 12th of February 2002; and Directive
2004/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury,
nickel, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air on 5 December 2004.
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scientific and technical data and the costs of benefits of action or lack of action’ (European Commis-
sion 2001, p. 7).
In addition to this main aim, specific objectives were mentioned. These were: 1) to collect
scientific information about the effects of ambient air pollution and to developmodelling
technology and refine indicators; 2) to review and to support the implementation of exis-
ting legislation, in particular the air quality Daughter Directives; 3) to make sure the nec-
essarymeasureswould be taken at the relevant level and to develop effective structural
links with relevant areas of policy; 4) to devise an overall integral strategy to be
revised at regular intervals and that determined future air quality objectives and
cost-effective measures to reach them; and 5) to disseminate to the public the infor-
mation gathered within the scope of the programme (European Commission 2001,
p. 7). According to Commission official Peter Wicks, the CAFE programme would
eventually integrate all EU legislation and related research on air quality under one
umbrella (ENDS Europe, 26 April 2001). CAFE was intended to become an ongoing
programme that would be updated and revised every five years.
The idea of a comprehensive overhaul of EU air pollution policies dated from 1998,
but the general idea fit within the scope of the 6th Environmental Action Programme
adopted in 2001 (6th EAP). This 6th EAP was important because it determined the
direction of European environmental policy from 2002 to 2012, and the CAFE pro-
gramme was considered to be one of the seven ‘thematic strategies’ mentioned in
the plan. These strategies were a novelty, and formed the cornerstone of the 6th
EAP. They covered seven policy fields: air, waste prevention and recycling, marine
environment, soil, pesticides, natural resources, and urban environment, and were
intended to make possible a more holistic and ‘multidimensional’ approach:
‘Thematic strategies will consider the range of options and instruments required for dealing with a series
of complex issues that require a broad and multi-dimensional approach, and will propose the necessary
actions, involving where appropriate the European Parliament and the Council’ (6th EAP, sub 16).
The 6th EAP followed the principles and ideas of its predecessor, the 5th EAP,3 but
with differences in emphasis. The more ‘Dutch’ elements of the previous plan, such
as workingwith target groups andmarket parties, were given a lower profile. The EU
ventured towards a different approach, and expanded on two other tendencies
embedded in the eco-modernist policy tradition: namely, comprehensive policy mak-
ing and an emphasis on scientific input and presentation.
Whereas the 5th EAP provided a strategic roadmap as well as targets and timetables,
the targetswere largely absent from the 6th EAP. The newly introduced thematic strat-
egies were frameworks within which committees of scientists and policy makers
3. Discussed extensively in chapter 4.
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should set targets and objectives within the course of the programme. The thematic
strategies would be subject to broad consultations of stakeholders and other social
partners (6th EAP art. 4.3). Focusing on long-term and comprehensive policies, and
relying on expert committees within the EU bureaucracies to supply the scientific
underpinning, the strategies would highlight the multiple aspects of a single problem
and treat them within the same framework.
8.1.2 The organisation of CAFE
This style of policymakingwas also evident in CAFE’s organisational structure. The pro-
gramme consisted essentially of a gathering of various working groups comprised of sci-
entists and policy makers. Together they set out to formulate a coherent strategy on how
to tackle air pollution in a broad and comprehensive way, and to hammer out legislative
proposals and evaluations. CAFE’s intention was to remain a science-based programme
but involving stakeholders in order to give them a sense of ownership of the policy mak-
ing process. This structure was intended to mitigate conflict among various participants.
Together with the Communication on the CAFE programme itself, the Commission
published a staff working paper that contained the organisational structure, SEC
(2001)688. The programme’s internal organisation was highly complex, and it is nec-
essary to outline this complexity here, because the political manoeuvring in these var-
ious groups is the subject of this chapter.
The programme resided under the auspices of the Directorate General for the Envi-
ronment, within which the CAFE secretariat was formed. The secretariat consisted of
a small project management team that coordinated the programme as a whole. Two
other groups consisting solely of civil servants from the Commission coordinated the
communication between the DG Environment, other DGs and other services and
bureaus of the Commission. Since they play no part in the discussion, they will not
be mentioned further here.
The actual outcomes of the CAFE programme would be produced within groups that
were considered external because they were not staffed by Commission representa-
tives. According to the Commission StaffWorking Paper, external groups fostered rela-
tionswith stakeholders and experts to co-ordinate the technicalworkwithin CAFE, and
to obtain technical contributions and input. Participation in those groups was mixed.
Commission officials were included but so were representatives of the Member States.
Stakeholder representatives such as those of the environmental movement and indus-
trial and transport sectors were also present in some of these groups.
The most prominent external group was the Steering Group (SG), which advised the
Commission on the programme’s strategic direction. Chaired by the Secretariat, it
was composed of representatives of Member States, the European Parliament, and
stakeholder representatives, as well as of experts working within CAFE itself.
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Technical discussions did not take place within this group, but members reviewed the
data and gave policy advice. The group reported directly to the CAFE Secretariat.
The core business of most working groups within CAFE was to supply scientific
data and make recommendations on a scientific basis. The technical work concer-
ning modelling and other scientific work would be coordinated by the Technical
Analysis Group (TAG). TAG consisted of a variety of representatives of DGs and
expert bodies like the WHO, but neither industry nor the environmental movement
had access to it. It would not do all the technical analysis and research work itself,
but would be in charge of its coordination, and would make sure that the research
agendas of the various sub-groups remained relevant for policy making. TAG’s
activities were to remain fully transparent and open to input from stakeholders
via the SG and other groups within the CAFE structure. Stakeholders, however,
were excluded explicitly from TAG, a feature of the programme that would lead
to discussion, as recounted below.
The aforementioned groups comprised the organisational structure of CAFE, and
their job was to coordinate all the work that was being done. Below these aforemen-
tioned groups, working groups conducted research on several of the aspects with
which CAFE concerned itself. From the perspective of this study, these groups were
as important as those discussed above. They did all the work ‘on the ground’, and
ensured that goals outlined in sub-section 7.1.1 were achieved.
Wemay conclude from the CAFE website that five different working groups were set
up and these groups were to supply report to the SG and to TAG.4 The five groups
mentioned are:
1. The Working Group on Implementation (WG Imp): This group was set up at the
start of the process, and its goal was to assist Member States with the implemen-
tation of Air Quality Directives from the 1990s, and to help with implementation of
the National Emission Ceilings Directive, which was mostly concerned with
acidification;
2. The Working Group on Target Setting and Policy Assessment (WG TSP): This
group dealt with the development of indicators, and drafted scenarios for the inte-
grated assessment modelling5 as well as conducted a cost-benefit analysis;
3. The Working Group on Particulate Matter (WG PM): This group was set up
because PM was the pollutant of gravest concern. Its task was to examine the
attainability of the PM10 limit values by Member States, and the scientific
4. Website CAFE docs accessed 13-12 2011.
5. In integrated assessmentmodelling. Knowledge of two ormore research fields are brought together and
combined. Because integrated assessments bring together and summarise information from diverse
fields of study, they are often used as tools to help decision makers understand very complex environ-
mental problems. (website integrated assessment accessed 25-09 2015).
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information available on PM, in addition to writing a new position paper on the
substance. The group was also tasked to assist the Commission in its review of
Directive 99/30 by collecting information on the air quality situation regarding
PM and on attainability of the targets;
4. The Working Group on National Emission Ceilings and Policy Instruments: This
group concerned specifically the work on the new National Emission Ceilings
Directive. It was still active by 2008, but not within the scope of CAFE. It is con-
sidered further in this chapter;
5. The Data Exchange Group: This group is listed on the website, but no documents
are available. It does not seem to have been very active within the scope of CAFE,
and presumably it was set up to facilitate the exchange of data fromdifferentMem-
ber States. It became a part of INSPIRE, a European Union project for sharing spa-
tial and environmental data betweenMember States. Themost importantWorking
Groups for us are those on Implementation and on Particulate Matter, as the Dutch
Government needed a review of Air Quality Directive 99/30, in which their con-
cerns were presented.
Within CAFE, a number of environmental consultancy agencies were important as
well, because CAFE was to be based on a cost-benefit analysis. This assessment
was to establish the level of ambition the CAFE strategy could have, based on balan-
cing the costs and benefits of the programme, such as life years gained from better
health and the protection of ecosystems. The cost-benefit analysis was conducted
by AEA Technology (AEA T), a global sustainability consultancy firm. The scenarios
they devised may be found on the CAFE website.
Figure 5: EU Air Quality policy
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Transparency was a cornerstone of the CAFE programme, and the minutes of the
Steering Group were made public as well as those of working groups on Implemen-
tation, Particulate Matter, and Target Setting and Policy Assessment. The scenarios
developed in the context of the integrated assessment modelling and the cost-benefit
analysis was made available as well. The internal discussions of the CAFE Secretariat
and the discussions of the Technical Analysis Groupwere not made available though.
The Communication regarding the CAFE strategy contained the following flow chart
detailing the organisational structure:
It is important to note that the strategy presupposed a strict separation of policy issues
and scientific discussion. In this regard, the proposal for the CAFE strategy
considered:
‘It will be important for stakeholder involvement to be managed in such a way as to ensure that it
clarifies and strengthens the scientific basis of policy-making. This means that a clear distinction
between technical and political issues must be made, and that the quality of scientific and technical
argument remains the sole arbiter in technical discussions. It is also important that the stakeholders
themselves are transparent concerning both the technical justification and the political motivation for
their comments (CEC(2001)688, p. 8)’.
This separation is of importance in light of the subsequent politicisation that occurred
in the context of the CAFE programme
. THE REVIEW OF DIRECTIVE / AND THE POLIT IC ISAT ION
OF AN EXPERT-DRIVEN PROGRAMME
Various tasks were undertaken within the CAFE programme, one of which was the
review of the earlier Air Quality Directives. Back in 1997, The Dutch Government
had lobbied to obtain a review clause in Directive 99/30, and was confident that the
reviewpromised in 2003would lead to a relaxation of the standards. In the Explanatory
Memorandum on the Air Quality Order 2001, the Dutch Government stated that it was
convinced that the standards would be revised downwards when it became clear that
they could not be met. The promise that the standards would be reviewedwas one rea-
son the Dutch had agreed with the Directive (Blom 1998, on file with the author).
The start of the CAFE programme in fact delayed the review, which appeared neither
in 2003 or 2004. When the air quality clash started to emerge, it became even more
important for the Dutch Government to obtain a review that would take Dutch con-
cerns into account. This caused theNetherlands to become significantly involvedwith
the working groups undertaking the review.
The struggle over the review is the subject of this section. In section 1, the concept of
a review by experts in the Working Group PM is discussed. Subsequently, I recount
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how the Working Group Imp took over the procedure and produced its own con-
cept review for the European Commission. In section 3, the actual review officially
submitted by the European Commission is scrutinised. Section 4 proceeds with a
discussion of how Dutch representatives tried to influence the CAFE Steering
Group.
8.2.1 The review of PM standards by the Working Group PM
Within CAFE, two groups were of particular significance regarding evaluation of the
Air Quality Directives. These were the working groups on implementation (WG Imp)
and on Particulate Matter (WG PM).6 The WG Imp had the task of guiding Member
States through implementation of the Air Quality Directives, and helping them com-
plete the plans and programmes that the Directives demanded. It also provided guid-
ance onmonitoring and assessment withinMember States. In addition, theWG Imp’s
job was to make an inventory of the problems Member States encountered when
implementing the Directive.
The reviewof themost problematic standard, the one for ParticulateMatter,was part of the
domain of theWGPM.Within this scope, the group had the job of assessing the air quality
situationwith regard toPM limit values andof collecting information on the attainability of
limit values, considering contributions from long-range transport and local sources.
The Working Group on Particulate Matter was composed of experts from Depart-
ments of the Environment from the Member States and experts from both industry
(BP in this case) and the environmental movement, in the form of the European Envi-
ronmental Bureau (EEB). The WG PM contained representatives and expert input
from theWHO, whose data had played a pivotal role in the adoption of the Daughter
Directive, and whose role was also foreseen to be strong in CAFE. The group was
chaired by Lynne Edwards for the UK and Bernd Seifert for Germany. The Nether-
lands was represented by Klaas Krijgsheld, a toxicologist at VROM. Another Dutch-
man, Dick van denHout, was present as a consultant for the Commission. Heworked
at the Dutch research institute TNO, andwas also amember of theWorkingGroup on
Implementation as well as of the Steering Group.
While the attainability of the standards was considered to be a key question, the WG
PM focused more on the technical side of PM and on modelling, trends, and inte-
grated assessment. In a meeting on 6 and 7 September 2001, the WG PM set a
6. The terms of reference of theWorking Group on Implementation and links to its meetingsmay be found
on website Working group Imp. Last accessed 13-12 2011. The terms of reference and links to a number
of meetings of theWorking Group on Particulate Matter are located onwebsiteWorking Group PM last
accessed 13-12 2011. All the documents by the CAFE working groups referred to may be found on the
website of CAFÉ (Website CAFE docs, last accessed 22-06 2015).
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timetable that indicated it would have a document ready by the second half of 2003.
This date, however, was not met. A final draft of this document, the Second Position
Paper on Particulate Matter, was presented in April 2004. The WG PM relied heavily
on WHO data, but the WHO’s answers to additional questions of the working group
had become available only by the end of 2003.
The documentwas quite technical, with the bulk of it dealingwithmodelling, sources, and
composition of PM, health effects, and the different sizes of PM, PM10, and PM2.5. In the
section on attainability, the document emphasised extra measures that Member States
should take. Some recommendations in the positionpaperwere useful for theNetherlands:
namely, that theCommission could consider postponing the daily concentration limit of 50
mug/m3 not to be exceeded beyond 35 days per year (WGPM2004, p. 168). Thiswould be
most welcome for the Netherlands, because precisely this standard was the one causing a
number of problems regarding infrastructure development. However, the recommenda-
tion was not worked out, and it appears to have been little more than a side note.
Other recommendations that would be to the liking of the Dutch can be seen in chap-
ter 11, and included a stronger insistence on source policy. The Netherlands was in
favour of that, because it was in line with Dutch economic interests. The Dutch del-
egation insisted on source policy, because if cars and industrial processes became
cleaner the quality of the air would improve. Given the geographical position of
the Netherlands, the cleaning of cars and industries made sense, since the country
was surrounded by industrial areas and was subjected to considerable air pollution
from abroad. If these industries were forced to reduce emissions by technical means,
the Dutch would benefit. The insistence on source policy was also rational from a
Dutch competitive perspective, as the Netherlands had no automotive industry of
its own, and Dutch industrial installations were comparatively clean. This meant it
would be able to benefit from clean-up measures undertaken by other countries with-
out having to carry out a lot of adjustments itself.
The WG PM’s main recommendation, however, was to shift attention from PM10 to
PM2.5, as it considered PM2.5 to be a better indicator for health damage due to air
pollution. It advised the Commission to propose a limit value for PM2.5, and also pro-
posed leaving the PM10 standard as it was. This was somewhat good news for the
Netherlands, because in the Daughter Directive it was considered that the PM stan-
dard could be tightened to a yearly limit value of 20 mug/m3. At least that possibility
was averted, but other than that, the evaluation did not provide much solace. The
Netherlands had already failed at meeting the 2005 limit values, let alone those fore-
seen for 2010. PM2.5 standards were a different matter. The Netherlands did not see
much in new air quality standards. As could be expected, the Dutch Government and
the pro-infrastructure camp in the Dutch Parliament were against introducing a new
PM2.5 standard with binding legal consequences.7
7. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 300 XI nr. 10, p. 44; Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 21 501-08 nr. 215.
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8.2.2 The review proposal by Working Group on Implementation
Apart from theWGPM, from 2003 onwards, theWG Imp had suddenly begun to play
a role in reviewing the Daughter Directive. The task envisaged for theWG Impwas to
help Member States in drafting the required plans and programmes when air quality
norms were exceeded. The group had a composition similar to that of the Working
Group on Particulate Matter: that is, a mix of representatives from Member States,
European institutions, and stakeholders. For the Netherlands, Hans Herremans
was present, and the group was chaired initially by Austria.
At the beginning of 2003, Austria stepped down from the position and Herremans
took over the chair, a reshuffle that changed the direction the group had been taking.
During the first meeting chaired by the Netherlands, the group concluded that it
could play an important role in the review of Directive 99/30, which had originally
not been part of their workload. In other working groups this change of direction was
noted and criticised, members pointed out that the WG Imp had no business doing
policy evaluation (WG TSP 2002, November p. 2).
Within the WG Imp, however, plans were made about how to proceed. It was con-
cluded that the best way forward was for the Commission to send out questionnaires
to allMember States with detailed questions on issues that they found problematic. At
a subsequent meeting, the WG Imp would offer its advice on issues for a review
report, based on responses by theMember States. Such a questionnairewas to be draf-
ted by the Commission as soon as possible, and it was agreed that the Commission
would circulate the draft among the WG with a very short deadline for comments
(WG Imp, Jan. 2003).
At the next meeting, Commission consultant Dick van den Hout presented the ques-
tionnaire’s findings (WG Imp, March 2003), and many issues that were important for
the Dutch Government were under discussion. Some Member States, among which
no doubt the Netherlands, claimed that maintaining the air quality standards in res-
idential areas was more relevant that maintaining them in areas with only office
buildings or in fields beside motorways.
The opinion of the European Commission on these issues was crucial for the Nether-
lands, because from the time ofMinister Pronk onwards, policy practice contained the
distinction between populated and unpopulated areas. In places where people lived,
the Air Quality Order was to be strictly observed, but elsewhere the lower adminis-
trative bodies were granted more leeway to allow for some deviation. The distinction
wasmade in policy instructions from the Government to lower administrative bodies.
As we have seen, the Council of State later rejected that distinction, but Van Geel had
intended it to lessen the impact of the standards on Dutch spatial planning, just as
Minister Pronk had done. Because having the blessing of the European Commission
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would be extremely helpful for the Secretary of State, the issue was put on the Euro-
pean agenda very early in the process.
A second important point for the Netherlands was that the possibility of obtaining der-
ogationwas being discussed. The findings presented to theWG Imp concluded that the
2005 standards for PMwere unattainable in large parts of Europe. The drafters consid-
ered it necessary to come upwith proposals to postpone the attainment date in relation
to feasible EU action on reducing PMemissions. TheWG Impdrafted a letter to theWG
PM in order to suggest this possibility (WG Imp, March 2003, 3). This course of action
was in linewithDutch interests, because from early on theNetherlands had desired the
possibility of postponing the standards for PM10 and NO2.8
TheWG IMP drafted its recommendations for the evaluation based on answers given
by the Member States, and presented these recommendations in 2004 to the Commis-
sion (WG Imp 2004). This document was different in tone and style than the second
position paper of the WG PM, being shorter and focusing more on problems of the
Member States.
The document did not address the question of whether the limit values should be
revised, as this subject was left to the integrated assessment at the end of the pro-
gramme. The document reported extensively on ambiguities within the Daughter
Directive, and dealt with attainability problems. The working group clearly recom-
mended enforcing the standards only in locations where people were expected to
spend a significant amount of time. The WG Imp considered: ‘The directive should
not consider exceedances of the objectives at any location where relevant public exposure
would not be realistic’ (WG Imp, 2004, 8). This meant that the limit values would
not need to be enforced at curb side sites or at ‘any other location where public exposure
is expected to be short term’ (WG Imp, 2004, p. 8).
The WG Imp was of the opinion that there would be no possibility of changing the
standards for Particulate Matter on such short notice, as the standards would enter
into force already in 2005. However, it advised the Commission to look into the pos-
sibility of providing derogations as soon as possible. It recommended that Member
States should be granted exemptions if they showed that they had taken all reasonable
measures, and this possibility should be included in a new Directive based on the
CAFE programme. In the case of NO2, the working group concluded that the values
would be in force as late as 2010, the possibility of derogationwould be discussed, and
the present Directive might be amended.
All these recommendations by the WG IMP in June 2004 were favourable for the
Netherlands. If the Commission were to condone the distinction between sensitive
and non-sensitive destinations, the areas where standards posed problems for the
8. Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 27 793 nr. 8, p. 2.
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Netherlands would be drastically reduced. All this took place before the air quality
clash would begin in full after the Council of State verdicts from September 2004. This
data demonstrates that even before the onset of the air quality conflict, Dutch policy
makers had tried to gain a favourable position in Europe.
8.2.3 The evaluation of the Daughter Directive by the European Commission
The Commission presented its delayed review in January 2005, COM(2004)845 (Euro-
pean Commission 2005a), and it was one of the first policy documents to come out of
CAFE, preceding the actual strategy and a new Air Quality Directive that was based
on it. By that time, the Dutch problems had become acute, and the Secretary of State
had already sent his letter of 30 September 2004, defending his interpretation of the
Directive against the Council of State. The stalemate was complete when this letter
and the proposed Air Quality Decree were rejected by the Council of State.
The review issued in January 2005 could have been a breakthrough for Van Geel, but
it turned out to be disappointing. According to the Commission, however, the direc-
tive was considered a success. Under the header ‘the first rather limited experience of its
application is positive’, the Commission highlighted three reasons for this conclusion
(European Commission 2005a, p. 4): firstly, the directive raised awareness regarding
air pollution. Complaints about non-compliance of Member States found their way to
the Commission and to representatives of the European Parliament, and the Commis-
sion considered this an indication that the public was taking an interest in air pollu-
tion problems; secondly, the challenging limit values forced Member States to come
upwith effective solutions to tackle air pollution problems; thirdly, the standards also
applied to the newly acceded Eastern EuropeanMember States. Apparently the Com-
mission considered complaints to be a sign of success, as the challenging nature of the
standards succeeded in raising public awareness, and forced Member States to come
up with solutions. From a Commission perspective, this conclusion was understand-
able, a victory for the tactic of enforcing implementation by creating ‘pressure from
below’, the mobilisation of public pressure to force Member States to comply. This
tactic was a key ingredient of the European air quality policy in the 1990s.The Com-
mission had little to say about the practical problems Member States faced when try-
ing to comply with the directive. Compliance was discussed, but from the perspective
of helping theMember States to take clean-upmeasures. The Commission considered
it problematic that Member States generally failed to make plans and set up program-
mes when they observed exceedances. No mention was made of the distinction
between populated and unpopulated areas. Derogations were scarcely considered,
nor were these items incorporated into the technical ‘staff working paper’ that accom-
panied the evaluation (SEC 2004, 1713).
The fact that the limit values were significantly tighter than in previous years was
mentioned, but mostly in the context of their contribution to the successful raising
of awareness (European Commission 2005a, p. 3). Issues such as derogation and
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the harmonisation of measuring requirements were consideredmatters to be handled
within the eventual CAFE strategy itself.
The unwillingness of the Commission to be more lenient with Member States can be
explained in terms of differences in interests. The Commission was concerned mainly
with non-compliance with environmental standards, while some Member States,
especially the Netherlands, struggled with their challenging nature.
8.2.4 Politics within the steering group
Through its influence within the WG Imp, the Dutch Government managed to attract
attention to Member States’ problems with the Directives. The position paper of the
WG Imp contained a number of recommendations that pleased the Netherlands.
These subjects were not incorporated in the eventual Commission evaluation, how-
ever, but they were at least now on the agenda. Subsequently, the Dutch Government
tried to warm members of the Steering Group to the notion of derogations and
postponements.
The CAFE Steering Group (SG) was the main forum for discussion on the direction
and contents of the strategy. It was high up in the hierarchical structure of CAFE, sit-
uated just below the CAFE Secretariat, and comprised over 80 delegates, experts from
the Member States, the Commission, various industrial sectors, and the environmen-
tal lobby group EEB.
Within the Steering Group, Dutch representatives tried to persuade the different
Members to side with them. After the WG Imp had composed its report, Hans Her-
remans presented it to the Steering Group. During the discussion, the possibility of
derogations was tabled by Herremans, but he was countered by Commission official
Stefan Jacobi, who explained that this issue went beyond the support expected of the
WG Imp. Postponements and the extent of the limit values were subjects that would
be part of the thematic strategy itself. In order ‘to save time’, the matter was not dis-
cussed further (Steering Group May 2004, p. 7).
The Steering Group was composed of experts, but in practice they played a double
role. They gave expert advice about the scientific data presented, but they could also
present the views of theMember State or organisation they represented. According to
Willemijn Tuinstra, many participants had difficulty describing their role as either
policy maker or scientist (Tuinstra, 2007, p. 438). This finding is in line with the work
of Sheila Jasanoff that indicated that the demarcation between scientific advisor and
policy maker is often a thin one (Jasanoff 1990). In the case of CAFE as well, political
discussions about how much flexibility should be left to the Member States or how
much source policy the Commission should enact, crept into the Steering Group dis-
cussions, especially during the meetings in 2005.
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In the SG, the Dutch participants supported by those from Germany and the UK reit-
erated calls to make the standards mandatory only in places where people were
expected to spend time. The Commission explicitly opposed this doctrine, consider-
ing it open to abuse, and maintaining that it would create divergent approaches in
Member States. The SG considered it ‘highly undesirable’ (Steering Group Feb.
2005, p. 5), which effectively put an end to the idiosyncratic Dutch interpretation
and the Netherlands’ efforts to have it accepted in Europe. This did not prevent
the Government from trying to get it accepted in the Netherlands itself. It was part
of the proposal for a Ministerial Decree to replace the AQO 2001 discussed in Febru-
ary and March 2005.
The Dutch representatives also addressed the necessity of flexibility, and warned that
the Netherlands could not accept further limit values on PM2.5 if the Commission
could not explain how to meet the standards in practice (Steering Group April
2005, p. 5). The Netherlands found allies in Poland and Italy, who also opposed
new standards for PM2.5. In general, though, the proposal for new limit values for
PM2.5 was not strongly opposed within the Steering Group.
. THE ESTABL ISHMENT OF THE CAFE AIR QUALITY DIRECTIVE
The evaluation of existing policywas an important part of CAFE, but itsmain aimwas
to unify existing EU approaches to pollution control and air quality policy in an over-
arching strategy. Together with the strategy, a new Air Quality Directive was pro-
posed, the goal of which was also to unify the existing air quality standards into
one directive as well as to add provisions to it.
The CAFE strategy itself is of interest, because in it the future of EU air pollution pol-
icy was unveiled. This subject is under discussion in section 7.4. In the present section,
the emergence of the new Air Quality Directive is analysed. Contrary to the strategy,
the Directive contained binding standards, and was of more interest to the Nether-
lands because the Dutch Government intended to counter all extra standards that
the Commissionmight impose. This included new standards for PM2.5. The Commis-
sion was likely to impose such standards on the Member States based on the recom-
mendations of the WG PM and on new scientific insights. However, the Netherlands
also needed a newAir Quality Directive because it could offer Member States the pos-
sibility of a postponement. The mission for the Dutch representatives was clear:
namely – and as much as possible – to weaken additional obligations, and to obtain
flexibility and derogations.
Discussions in the various legislative institutions of the European Union displayed
the position of the Dutch in the debate, but they also revealed which arguments man-
aged to dominate the discussion among European law makers.
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8.3.1 The proposal for a new Air Quality Directive COM(2005)447
The proposal for Directive COM(2005)447 (European Commission 2005c) on ambient
air quality and cleaner air for Europe, was the first legislative proposal to come out of
the CAFE programme, and it was proposed together with the final CAFE strategy,
COM(2005)446, in September 2005 (European Commission 2005b). The proposal
essentially contained the wish to unify existing Air Quality Directives within one
and the same directive.
Apart from updating requirements regarding reporting on air pollution and inte-
grating the exchange of information on air quality and public information, the pro-
posal introduced a number of novelties of special interest to the Netherlands. To
begin with, a new standard for PM2.5 was indeed proposed. The Commission envi-
sioned a dual standard, and introduced a uniform yearly standard for PM2.5 of 25
mug/m3, to be achieved by 2010. The Commission decided to keep the standards for
PM10, because theWHOhad noted that this fraction of PM10 could still cause health
problems.
According to the Commission, the standard for PM2.5 should not become too burden-
some on Member States. It was foreseen that it would constitute a burden only in the
most polluted areas (European Commission 2005c, p. 3), since meeting the limit value
for PM10would almost alwaysmean that the limit value for PM2.5 had also beenmet.
The proposal also introduced the possibility of derogating the air quality standards
for certain designated areas. Under strict circumstances, and only in the presence
of an elaborate reduction plan, meeting the standards for NO2 and PM2.5 could be
postponed to 2015 (European Commission 2005c, Art. 20, sub 1). On similar condi-
tions, the obligation to meet the limit value for PM10 could be postponed to 2009
(European Commission 2005c, Art. 20, sub 1).
In September 2005, the Netherlands was in the throes of the air quality clash. The der-
ogations on offer were welcomed by the Dutch Government, of course, but it was still
questionablewhether theNetherlands couldmeet the PM10 standard as early as 2009.
Extra standards for PM2.5 were difficult for the Dutch Government to swallow,
because in Parliament the pro-infrastructure camp considered extra standards non-
negotiable, and members of these parties held seats in the Dutch Government. In
December 2005, Pieter van Geel was cautioned explicitly by way of a Parliamentary
motion not to accept extra standards,9 and was therefore politically obliged to oppose
the Commission proposal.
9. Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 22 112 & 21 501-08 nr. 454 p. 6; Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 21 501-08
nr. 215, p. 3.
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8.3.2 The Council of Ministers: proposal for a new Air Quality Directive
The Commission drafted its proposal in late 2005, and it was first discussed infor-
mally in the Council of Ministers in December. The Council of Ministers is the
EU’s highest legislative body, together with the European Parliament. Such an infor-
mal discussion gives Ministers holding an environmental portfolio a chance to gauge
the general feelings on the proposal before having to take a formal position.
The proposal was discussed under the terms of the co-decision procedure, referred to
now as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (see text box below). The European Par-
liament and the Council would both have to agree on the proposal in order for it to
become adopted.
From the summary available on the European Parliament website (EuroParliament
website a, last accessed 25-05 2013), I conclude that both the importance of public
health and the necessity of allowing flexibility for theMember States were the subjects
of debate in the Council. During a formal discussion of the draft in June 2006, the
Council reached an agreement on the merits of the Commission proposal, although
it intended to change a few things. It preferred a binding limit value for PM2.5 from
2015 onwards instead of 2010. The Council also proposed allowing for a three-year
derogation of the PM10 standard, entering into force as of the date of adoption of
the Directive. This would replace the date of 31 December 2009, the one envisioned
in the Commission proposal. All in all, however, the Council’s common position was
close to the Commission proposal.
Contrary to the situation in the 1990s, the Dutch delegation this timewas vociferous in
its criticism. After the Council meeting in June 2006, Environmental Secretary of State
Pieter van Geel told journalists that the meeting had been an exercise in hypocrisy:
‘When you set a rule, you also have to introduce the measures to comply with the rules’
(ENDS Europe, 28-06 2006). In the Dutch Parliament, he made even more undiplo-
matic comments. According to a document presented by the VROMMinistry (VROM,
2006, p. 33), van Geel publicly called theMinisterial Council a ‘ballentent’, a pejorative
term for an overrated coffeehouse or restaurant.
The Dutch delegation claimed that Poland, Greece, Hungary, and two of the three
Baltic States were supporting the Dutch in the upcoming vote against the deal (ENDS
Europe, 28-06 2006). The Dutch delegation was especially angry, because it had failed
to persuade the Council of Ministers to make the obligation to comply with the limit
values dependent on the introduction of extra source policy by the Commission. As
we have seen, source policy was attractive for the Dutch because of the Dutch depen-
dency on other countries, and because Dutch industry was already comparatively
clean. This meant the Dutch would not need to incur heavy costs, but could reap
the environmental revenues of cleaner industry and cleaner cars abroad.
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Despite Van Geel’s comments, the Council stuck to its line. It incorporated a number
of amendments made by Parliament in the first reading (discussed below), but these
did not change the Directive in any essential manner. The introduction of source pol-
icy was not proclaimed a precondition for acceptance of the proposal. During a meet-
ing in October 2006, the Netherlands – supported only by Poland – voted against the
proposal.
The counter vote of the Netherlands during the establishment of a common position
was indicative of the change of heart regarding Dutch forerunner ambitions. It had
always been seen as a leader in environmental policy, and in the 1990s the Nether-
landswas supportive of the Air Quality Directive despite doubts regarding attainabil-
ity. After the EP and the Council reached a formal agreement on the adoption of the
Directive, the Netherlands issued a statement against it, which was annexed to the
Council’s position and dated from 12 June 2007.
The Netherlands stated:
‘The common position provides no assurance of European measures that are essential to enable Mem-
ber States to achieve compliance with the standards. Therefore, Member States are legally bound to
comply with standards and thus subject to an obligation without being in a position to control the
necessary prerequisites to fulfil that obligation. Therefore, the Netherlands is compelled to withhold
its endorsement of the common position’ (Council of Ministers 2007a).
In the end, the Council decided on a new limit value for PM2.5 of 25 mug/m3, to be
achieved by 2015. It did not change any of the other limit values, and maintained
that the derogations could be granted up to 2015 for NO2 and 3 years from the adop-
tion of the Directive for PM10. The result indicated that Van Geel had not managed
to secure allies with the intention of blocking the proposal or gaining further
concessions.
Box 7: The ordinary legislative procedure or co-decision procedure
The proposal for the CAFEAir QualityDirective is discussed under the terms of the ordinary
legislative procedure, formerly known as the co-decision procedure. This legislative proce-
dure is similar to the cooperation procedure discussed in box 4 but there are important dif-
ferences. Under the terms of the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council of Ministers
shares legislative power with the European Parliament.
A Member of the European Parliament, working in the relevant Parliamentary Committee,
draws up a report on a proposal for a ‘legislative text’ presented by the European Commis-
sion. The Parliamentary committee votes on this report and – possibly – amends it. The
report and the proposal are subsequently discussed by Parliament in first reading, during
which the Parliament adopts its position and proposes amendments.
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At the same time, the proposal is sent to the Council of Ministers. The Council makes its
position known after preparatory work has taken place within working parties made up
of experts from theMember States and chaired by theMember State holding the six-monthly
Presidency of the Council. This preparatory work runs concurrently with the European Par-
liament’s activity, but the Council may only adopt a position after the European Parliament
has acted. The Council finalises its position on the basis of the Commission’s proposal,
amended where necessary, in the light of the European Parliament’s first reading and resul-
tant amendments. If the Council does not share the views expressed by Parliament, it adopts
a common position, which is forwarded to the European Parliament together with a state-
ment of reasons.
If the Council does not adopt the amendments proposed by Parliament in first reading,
the common position is referred to Parliament for a second reading. If the European
Parliament endorses the common position as it stands, or fails to adopt amendments
as a result of not obtaining an absolute majority of its Members, or does not take a deci-
sion within the stipulated time limit, the President of Parliament will declare that the
common position is approved and the act is adopted in accordance with the common
position.
If the EP does propose amendments, the proposal is discussed in the Council for a sec-
ond reading. If the Council agrees to accept all the amendments of the European Par-
liament, the act will be deemed to have been adopted in the form of the common
position thus amended (wording corresponds to the EP second reading).
>If the Council and the European Parliament can still not agree on a final text, the pro-
posal is discussed further in a so called conciliation procedure. This procedure involves
talks between members of the EP, the Council and the European Commission. Such
three party talks begin informally and end in the conciliation Committee, which brings
together delegations from the Council, the EP and the responsible Commissioner. A
compromise is negotiated here (source: archived website European Commission code-
cision, last accessed 25-05 2013).
8.3.3 Discussions in the Environmental Committee of the European Parliament
Under the co-decision procedure, the Council did not have the final say, as the Euro-
pean Parliament had legislative powers equal to those of the Council of Ministers. In
practice, this meant that the two institutions had to agree on the proposed legislation
or negotiate with each other, and therefore the Dutch representatives would have
another chance at revising the proposal in their favour. As was common, before
the proposal was discussed in a plenary session it was discussed in the Environmental
Committee (ENVI). Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who had a seat in
the Committee dealt with environmental issues. The deliberations in the Environmen-
tal Committee in the EPwere important because the Committee informed the position
of the EP as a whole (Bomberg & Burns 1999, p. 174). Generally, the MEPs in Parlia-
ment followed the Committee’s recommendations.
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It was common for a rapporteur appointed in the ENVI Committee to draft a final report
for the EP on the proposal under discussion, and such a report contained the outcomes of
the discussions. Before the discussion in the ENVI Committee started, the rapporteur
supplied adraft to themembers. The report in this casewas to be drafted byHolgerKrah-
mer of the liberal/conservative ALDE group in Parliament as the rapporteur. He pro-
posed his draft report to the Environmental Committee (ENVI 2006a) in April 2006.
Krahmer’s draft report was critical of the proposal to begin with, arguing for more consid-
eration with Member States. It was discussed mainly among MEPs from the Low Coun-
tries, Germany, and Scandinavia. The Dutch members Jules Maaten (ALDE), Johannes
Blokland (Independent Democrats), and Ria Oomen Ruijten (from the Christian Democrat
EPP) tended to operate ‘en bloc’, and introduced amendments together. These amend-
ments dealtmainlywith the need to curb pollution at source aswell as extra time forMem-
ber States. Other MEPs were in the same camp. Anja Weisgerber, a Christian Democrat
from Germany, and others stressed the scientific uncertainty of setting binding standards
for PM2.5 (ENVI 2006b, am. 38, 58, 185, and 186). Weisgerber referred explicitly to the sit-
uation with PM10 in 1999, when standards were proclaimed without significantly certain
data (ENVI 2006b, am 88). Dutch SocialistMPDorette Corbey proposed amendments that
would make sure the Dutch approach to balancing harmful projects with beneficial mea-
sures was accepted (ENVI 2006b am. 42, 78). During the discussions, Dutch Euro-Parlia-
mentariansusedanRIVMreport producedby Jimminkand co-workers (Folkert et al. 2004)
to stress that the figures provided by the Commission were unsound.
The Dutch andGermanMEPswere opposed byNordicMEPs in the ENVI Committee
– notably Anders Wijkman and Satu Hassi, who stressed the dangers to health and
proposed sharpening the Directive.
In Holger Krahmer’s final report, the majority of amendments asking for derogations
and flexibility were included (ENVI 2006c). The references to the importance of source
policy and insufficiency of data to warrant a PM2.5 limit value were also reiterated in
numerous places (ENVI 2006c am. 1, 3, 5). It was also mentioned that the transboun-
dary charactermeant that individualMemberStates hadonly limited resources in tack-
ling pollution, and should be allowed derogations. Taken together, the derogations
proposed by the ENVI committee amounted to the possibility of a ten-year postpone-
ment for the most stressing standards such as PM10 and PM2.5 (ENVI 2006c am. 30).
Krahmer also proposed an amendment that implied that limit values would be asses-
sed only in certain places. This was an important amendment, because it implied that
exceedances would not be considered in places where air quality was not assessed.10
10. In section 8.3.5 this matter will be briefly touched upon. Germany also made the distinction between
places where people lived and places where they did not spend a significant amount of time, similar
to but not totally identical to the sensitive destinations doctrine that the Netherlands initially held
on to. The difference was that air quality in Germany was simply not assessed or measured in such pla-
ces (Backes 2006, 11).
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This report wasmore sympathetic with non-complyingMember States than the Com-
mission was; in fact, it was more sympathetic with the non-complyingMember States
than the Council of Ministers, usually an institution that is keen to represent Member
State interests. The report was eventually adopted by the Environmental Committee
on 21 June 2006, with 39 votes in favour, 11 against, and 5 abstentions.
This result was an unusual one. In the 1990s, the Environmental Committee of the EP
had been known as an ‘exporter of environmentalism’ (Judge 1993, p. 199; Bomberg &
Burns, 1999, p. 175; Burns 2005). In this case, however, the green concerns of the Envi-
ronmental Committee were side-lined by a coalition of German andDutchMEPswho
were more concerned with the complaints of Member States, with the costs of imple-
mentation, and with the need for additional source policy than with the public health
arguments put forward by the Greens and Northern MEPs. The amendments also
demonstrated that national concerns featured in discussions held by the Environmen-
tal Committee. The amendments of Corbey, Maaten, and Oomen Ruiten were tailor-
made for the Dutch situation.
8.3.4 The debate in the European Parliament
After the Environmental Committee drafted its final report, a plenary debate in
Parliament was held on 25 September 2006 (websites EuroParliament b, last accessed
19-12 2011), and would result in Parliament’s first reading. The rapporteur for the
ENVI Committee, Holger Krahmer, and Commissioner Stavros Dimas confronted
each other in the plenary debate.
During the debate, pro-health and pro-flexibility arguments were traded. Proponents
of a pro-health position were Environmental Commission member Stavros Dimas
and the Green and Nordic MEPs Rytta Myller and Saatu Hassi. A key argument of
Commissioner Dimas was that the strategy he proposed would reduce the number
of forecast premature deaths from 350,000 to 160,000 by 2020, and he added that acid-
ification and nitrogen deposition would be reduced by 50% and 30%, respectively. He
also mentioned that source policy would certainly follow.
The number of excess deaths due to air pollutionwas put forward aswell by pro-envi-
ronmental MEPs Hassi and Myller, who named figures of 360,000 to 400,000 prema-
ture deaths annually, and emphasised the WHO’s position on the issue. Hassi also
mentioned that there were stricter limit values in the US than in the EU, and she urged
standing up to the arguments of the pro-flexibility block and ‘defending the rights of our
citizens to breathe clean air’. She also accused the German Christian Democrat members
of having ties with the automotive industry.
Among the MEPS who defended flexibility for Member States were ENVI rapporteur
Holger Krahmer, Anja Weisgerber, and the Dutch members Oomen Ruijten, Blok-
land, and Maaten. All the Dutch Parliamentarians argued for strict source policy,
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because otherwise the standardswould be unattainable. Holger Krahmer summed up
his position by stating: ‘The problems cities have with compliance with the daily values are
no secret, and we abandon municipalities to a sort of organised helplessness’. In an attempt to
support the need for flexibility, Krahmer mentioned also the uncertainty of the data.
Overall, two storylines were consistently present in the debate: a pro-health narrative
on the one hand, and a flexibility account on the other. In the pro-health storyline, the
WHO’s work featured prominently, as did the numbers of premature deaths. MEPs
who subscribed to this storyline argued that the suggestion of flexibility was a poor
excuse in the face of the widespread health damage. The WHO research was men-
tioned in an effort to buttress claims of health damage. Saatu Hassi mentioned clean
air as a ‘right’ of the population. As we have seen, this legal type of reasoning was
used in the air quality clash by the environmental movement Milieudefensie, and,
in certain instances, even the Commissioner alluded to it (Websites EuroParliament b,
last accessed 19-12 2011).
Central to the flexibility storyline used in this debate was the argument that Member
States had to be able to comply with the standards, and therefore these needed to be
workable. This could only be achieved if administrative bodies were granted more
time, and if the Commission could enact source policy. In order to illustrate the neces-
sity of postponements, some Dutch members like Johannes Blokland and Ria Oomen
Ruijten cited the Netherlands as a specific example of a struggling Member State.
In Parliament, the flexibility line won out. Most of the amendments presented in the
Krahmer report were adopted, including the controversial amendments to extend the
deadline for compliance with the PM10 regulation to well beyond 2010. The Green
group called the vote a scandal, and Commissioner Dimas said that it ‘appears to con-
tradict’ the objective of protecting citizens’ health ‘by weakening the legislation we have
proposed in some key respects’ (Website Euractiv a, last accessed 24-06 2015).
8.3.5 The agreement between Council and Parliament
The amended proposal was sent back to the Council, which had reached a common
position prior to Parliament’s first reading back in June 2006. In the summer of 2007,
the Council essentially stood its ground.
According to an internal note from the Secretariat of the Council, the remaining issues
were resolved by informal contacts between the Council and Parliament before they
could result in a collision between the two legislative bodies (Council of Ministers
2007b). Twenty-seven compromise amendments on minor issues were accepted,
and on most accounts the original Council position was accepted. At the insistence
of Parliament and the Council, the Commission promised to annex a statement to
the Directive outlining the proposals it was considering for the purpose of combatting
pollution at source.
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This turn of events was of interest. Apparently the pro-flexibility storyline managed
to dominate in the European Parliament, but was not equally convincing in the Coun-
cil of Ministers, where Van Geel did not have many supporters. His argument that
connected flexibility for Member States with the lack of source policy was not
accepted. This was understandable, because for many countries source policy was
muchmore invasive than air quality standards. Only the Netherlands had a structural
problemwith the air quality standards, owing to the air quality clash. For other coun-
tries, the air quality standards simply did not result in the legal headaches they caused
in the Netherlands.
Nonetheless, pro-flexibility proponents Weisgerber and rapporteur Krahmer ulti-
mately declared themselves pleased. Weisgerber proclaimed:
‘The new Directive abolishes useless short-term action like the closing of roads. There will be more
flexibility for towns and municipalities that have done everything they can and still do not meet the
limits’ (Website Euractiv b, last accessed 24-06 2015).
In the end, both camps could claim a small victory. Flexibility was granted by the
Directive, but it also included a relatively weak PM2.5 standard. The Commission
promised source policy, but whether it could keep its promise remained to be seen.
Other countries were objecting to more measures at source.
8.3.6 Directive 2008/50/EC and the Dutch derogation
The second reading vote in Parliament became a formality due to the outcome of
informal talks. The package was accepted by a qualified majority, although the most
flexibility friendly amendments presented in Krahmer’s report did not make it. On 11
June 2008, Directive 2008/50/EC (Henceforth CAFE Directive) was adopted.
The Directive proposed a limit value of 25 mug/m3 of PM2.5 to be attained by 2015,
but no changes in the limit values for other pollutants. The directive introduced flex-
ibility for the member states in the form of a derogation possibility of five years for
NO2. For PM10, Member States could acquire derogation up to 11 June 2011, three
years from the adoption date of the Directive. To obtain the extra time, Member States
would need to demonstrate that all ‘appropriate measures have been taken at national,
regional and local level to meet the deadlines’ (CAFE Directive, Art. 22 sub 2).
The directive also included an odd-looking compromise that air quality must in prin-
ciple conform to the standards ‘in all zones and agglomerations’ (CAFEDirective, Art.
14 sub 1; Art. 16 sub 2), but it would not be assessed in places where the public had no
access or where there was no fixed habitation. This amendment was originally tabled
by Krahmer, and it conformed to the German practice of dealing with the air quality
standards. It came down to the possibility of simply not measuring air quality in
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placeswhere people were not present. In principle, however, air quality still needed to
conform to the standards throughout the territory.11
When the Directive was finalised, the Netherlands issued a statement again, but this
time it was positive in tone. The Netherlands declared that it was pleased that the
Directive would enter into force in 2008. This turn from discontent to being pleased
at an early adoption was due to the Dutch’s own solution to the air quality clash – the
programmatic approach embodied in the NSL. The timely adoption of the Directive was
essential for its own plan, because for it to work, derogation from the EU was needed.
The Netherlands was the first country to apply for derogation under article 22 of the
CAFE Directive, which meant the Netherlands could ask to obtain a postponement
until June 2011 at the latest. The country filed its application little over a month after
the Directive had been adopted (ENDS Europe 3 July 2008). The programmatic
approach laid down in the NSL functioned as its air quality programme, which
was necessary in order to indicate that the country was doing everything in its power
to improve the quality of the air. The Netherlands had its application for a derogation
approved in April 2009.
The fight over the Directive illustrated the turn the Netherlands had taken from being
a front-runner to becoming a foot dragger. It was not willing to support green Mem-
ber States, but was actively trying to engineer a coalition to block the new standards
for PM2.5 and it tabled calls for postponements and ‘flexibility’. MEPs from Member
States that took a pro-environmental and pro-health stance, such as the Scandinavian
countries and those from ecological parties, were highly suspicious of these calls for
flexibility. They saw in it an attempt to let Member States get awaywith pollution and
perceived in it a disregard for the threat of health damage.
. THE CAFE STRATEGY
The newDirectivewas of importance for theNetherlands to obtain its derogation, but for
EU environmental policy as a whole the CAFE strategy itself was more indicative.
Because of its relevance for future environmental policy, I decided to treat it later in
the chapter, even though the CAFE strategy precedes adoption of the CAFE Directive.
Dating from 2005, the CAFE strategy was released at the same time as the proposal
for the Directive by the Commission. The CAFE strategy was the overarching policy that
would outline the new air pollution policy of the European Union, and a close look at
the strategy is important in order to assess the future of EU air quality policy. The CAFE
strategy was underpinned by input from a host of stakeholders as well as by elaborate
11. For the Netherlands this created the ironic situation that in order to comply with air quality standards,
the Netherlands needed to stop measuring air pollution on highways and other areas restricted for the
public.
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cost-benefit analyses and strategic impact assessments. The question is whether this
emphasis on participation and science led to an effective air pollution policy.
In the first sub-section, the aims of the CAFE strategy are discussed. In the second
section, I look at the influence of stakeholders in the CAFE scientific working groups,
and in the third section we review the cost-benefit analysis that supported the even-
tual CAFE strategy. In the final sub-section, the outcomes of the CAFE programme in
total are examined.
8.4.1 Aims and policy implications of the CAFE strategy
In section 8.1.1, the CAFE programme’s overall objectives were discussed, one
of which was the production of a policy strategy for air pollution. The first Commu-
nication regarding the strategywas forwarded by the Commission in 2001, and a final
version based on the work in the CAFE programme was delivered in 2005 together
with the proposal for the CAFE Air Quality Directive.
The aim of the CAFE strategy was to set a number of air quality objectives to be rea-
ched by 2020. Reductions of the concentrations of PM2.5 by 75% of what was techni-
cally possible were foreseen, as well as a 60% reduction for ozone. The acidifying
pollutants were to be reduced by 55% of what was technically feasible (European
Commission 2005b, p. 5).
The Commission envisaged meeting these targets by streamlining and revising its
existing legislation, and by adding a limit value for the smaller version of PM: namely
PM2.5, as we have seen in the previous sections.
One of its other main proposals was a revision of the National Emission Ceilings
(NEC) Directive in 2006. The NECDirectives established emission ceilings for five dif-
ferent pollutants, stipulating the maximum amount of pollution that could be emitted
within a Member State. The Netherlands was in favour of this approach because
countries would have to clean up their industries and automobiles in order to meet
the limits. The characteristic approach of the NECDirective was taken over by the EU
from the UN, who used this type of pollution policy in the scope of its Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) convention.
The CAFE strategy merged two different EU environmental policies: the acidification
strategy epitomised by the NEC Directive and the air quality standards approach
characterised by the Framework and Daughter Directives extensively discussed in
chapter 4. The CAFE strategy tried to kill two birds with one stone, so to speak, by
unifying these policies under the same umbrella. Within the CAFE strategy, the inter-
dependency between various acidifying and health-threatening pollutantswas depic-
ted as follows, see figure 6 (European Commission 2005b, annex 2).
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We can conclude from the picture that all five sectors and all five pollutants were con-
sidered responsible both for acidification problems and for health threats, and that
each contributed both to local problems of bad air quality and to the transboundary
problem of acidification. This type of framing conformed to the ecological modernistic
concernwith synergistic effects and a holistic perception of the environment. The twin
considerations of health and environment had been rolled into one strategy and fra-
med as a single problem for which a variety of sectors was responsible.
The CAFE strategy was partly drawn up to involve other DGs in environmental pro-
tection and the transport and agricultural sectors in particular were considered
important. Regarding transport, the strategy would encourage proposals for cleaner
fuel for passenger cars, vans, and heavy-duty vehicles: namely, what were termed the
EUROV and EUROVI norms. The strategy would further incorporate the work done
on the auto/oil agreements12 and other policies in the sphere of product standards.
Regarding agriculture, some subsidies that had perverse environmental effects were
to be abolished. The CAFE strategy focused especially on nitrate, and priority would
be attached to measures and policies to reduce ‘excessive’ nitrogen use in agriculture
(European Commission 2005b, p. 11).
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12. For the auto-oil programme, see chapter 4.
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Thepossibilities that thisstrategyofferedforgrowthand jobswerehighlighted, theCom-
mission was of the opinion that:
‘Environmental standards can be a catalyst for business growth and innovation. The EU can gain
competitive advantages and exploit opportunities by focusing research and development on resource-
efficient and less polluting technologies that other countries will eventually need to adopt’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2005b, p. 6).
The Commission also stated that countries like China and Korea looked to the EU for
leadership. This endorsement was typical of the ecological modernistic storyline of
win-win scenarios, because it highlighted the possibilities for innovation and the
potential for business.
The policies that were proposed to reach the strategy’s goals still needed to follow the
normal EU legislative process; the most ‘innovative’ aspect of the whole strategy was
the integration of two different air pollution-related philosophies. The process con-
nected the approach to acidification and to urban air pollution, and fitted both into
a framework for an integrated, comprehensive policy.
8.4.2 The UNICE lobby and the CAFE strategy
The level of ambition of the CAFE strategy was determined to a large extent by an
elaborate impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis, and an examination of
the way the impact assessment was used within CAFE demonstrated that these sci-
entific instruments could be manipulated for political ends. The impact assessment
promised a science-based evaluation of the various options, but it turned out that
by applying political pressure, lobby groups could manipulate the eventual outcome
of the impact assessment. These events illustrated the susceptibility to capture regard-
ing such scientific committees within which environmental policy was drafted.
The goal of the impact assessmentwas to choose an appropriate level of ambition, and
to that end environmental consultancy agencies drafted three different scenarios
ranging from a very ambitious scenario C to a minimally ambitious scenario A.
The assessment also included a scenario that foresaw no policy change at all.
The strategy thatwas finally establishedwas forecast to deliver 42 billion Euros per annum
in health benefits, and in terms of ambition it fell between scenarios A and B. The Com-
mission implied that it had made a choice based on the calculation of different scenarios,
and that it had chosen an option that ‘…. is themost cost-effective level consistent with the Com-
munity’s Lisbon and sustainable development strategies’ European Commission 2005b, p. 5).
The number of excess PM-related mortalities that were prevented counted for the
bulk of the benefits. The benefits for eco-systems were also expected to be ‘significant
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in terms of reduced risks and reduced areas of ecosystems that may be damaged by acidifica-
tion, eutrophication and ozone’ (European Commission 2005b, pp. 5/6). The strategy
was foreseen to cost 7.1 billion Euros per annum in total, divided over the whole
of the EU. These costs would be incurred through the efforts Member States needed
to make to achieve the air pollution standards established in the CAFE Directive and
in the other policy plans outlined in the CAFE strategy.
In the annexed cost-benefit assessment, the choice of the Commission was further
elaborated upon. In this document it is stated:
‘However, the additional costs relative to benefits start to increase steeply at around the mid-range (Sce-
nario A/B). Furthermore, the changes in ecosystem improvements between the lower (Scenario A) and
mid-range scenario (Scenario B), balanced against costs, argue in favour of choosing a level between the
low andmid-range that delivers the lowest levels of air pollution that can be justified in terms of benefits
and costs while preventing undue health risks for the population’ (SEC(2005)1133, p. 15).
The Commission called its approach ‘ambitious yet prudent’ (SEC(2005])1133, p. 15).
However, just before the strategy was released in September 2005, the consultancy
firm AEA Technology, which had conducted the cost-benefit analysis, recommended
a very different level of ambition, by stating:
‘The cost-benefit analysis shows that the benefits of the three policy scenario levels exceed costs, sig-
nificantly so for the high estimate of benefits. These conclusions are confirmed in the macroeconomic
analysis: it is appropriate to choose an ambition level of at least Scenario B and possibly Scenario C’
(AEA T August 2005, VI).
An examination of why this level of ambition was not chosen revealed the influence
that industrial and environmental lobby groups were able to wield. The large num-
ber of uncertainties mentioned in the impact assessment gave ample reasons to
argue for a conservative policy based on the argument that the costs might rise
unexpectedly.
Cost-effectiveness was an issue within CAFE from the beginning, and stakeholders
from the industry intended to keep an eye on the programme’s scientific input. Even
before the CAFE programme started officially in 2001, discussions had arisen about
who would be part of the Technical Analysis Group (TAG). Industrial groups, for
instance, saw a role for themselves as experts within the TAG. The Commission doub-
ted that the TAG was the appropriate forum, and was supported in this conclusion
by a member of an environmental NGOs (Steering Group, 2001 January, p. 2). In the
end, and to their dismay, industrial representatives were excluded from the TAG.
Among other reasons, they felt that the CAFE programme was biased against indus-
trial interests because of a reference to ‘vested interests’ in the original CAFE proposal
from 2001.
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The industrial group UNICE wrote letters to the DG Environment to press home the
point that indicators should be robust and based on sound science (UNICE, 2002). In
the Working Group on Target Setting and Policy Assessment, UNICE disagreed with
the consultation procedures (WG TSP, 2003 January, p. 2). The group presented a
paper on the relationship between science and policy (WG TSP, 2003 September,
p. 8), complaining that it was unclear as to what was being done with its views during
the meetings (UNICE 2004).
The views of the industry as represented by UNICE and various other industrial
groups differed from those of the environmental groups, and a clash emerged over
the impact assessment and the level of environmental ambition in the Steering Group.
Both UNICE and EUROPIA, the representative organisation of the oil industry, con-
sidered that even a medium level of ambition could not be supported, owing to sci-
entific uncertainties. In contrast, the environmental movement represented by the
European Environmental Bureau (EEB) wondered why uncertainties should not lead
to the highest level of ambition (Steering Group April 2005, pp. 3/4).
In spring 2005, just before the strategy was about to be unveiled, UNICE stated in a
letter to Commission Chairman Manuel Barroso that they believed decisions about
new targets should be based on robust scientific and economic assessment (UNICE
2005). They claimed that the model used by CAFE was highly complex, and that
transparency was lacking with regard to the input assumptions and to the uncer-
tainties of the results generated. This prompted an angry response in return
from the EEB, which claimed that CAFE was ‘a model of transparency’ (Tuinstra
2007, p. 440).
The letter from UNICE had the desired effect. Commission Chairman Barroso post-
poned the thematic strategy on air pollution, and held an ‘orientation debate’ about all
the upcoming thematic strategies in July 2005. In the end, the DG environment was
able to hold on to the ambition level it had initially chosen upon the recommendation
of AEA T.
Environmental Commissioner Stavros Dimas admitted that the eventual outcome
was a compromise (website Euractiv c, last accessed 25-06 2015). In particular, the
Internal Market Commissioner Günther Verheugen was reported to be very sceptical
of the plan (Meuwese 2008). During negotiations with other Commissioners in the
presence of chairman Barroso, Dimas had to defend all seven thematic strategies
against charges that they were bad for business (Pallemaerts et al. 2006, p. 57).
In the end, the intervention from the pro-business groupsmanaged to curtail the envi-
ronmental ambitions of the strategy by using the arguments of scientific uncertainty
and possible additional costs. The Commission used the same cost-benefit assessment
to defend the lower ambitions in the document detailing the CAFE strategy itself. This
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raised the question of whether such expansive cost-benefit analyses added much if
they could so easily be brushed aside. In fact the clash of interests was obscured in
this case by a conflict over how uncertainties should be dealt with. As regards scien-
tific uncertainty, the pro-health storylinewas pitted oncemore against a narrative that
argued that tight environmental regulation was bad for business.
The pro health storyline implicitly featured a version of the precautionary principle,
arguing that scientific uncertainty should not be an argument to refrain from meas-
ures in the event of health threats. The bad for business line maintained that scientific
uncertainty should prompt cautious policies, because the costs of intervention could
not be adequately assessed. To understand this struggle, we need to look at the way
uncertainty was covered in the impact assessment.
8.4.3 The impact assessment and scientific uncertainty
The impact assessment conducted in the scope of the CAFE programmewas hailed as
a ‘model of best practice’ (Meuwese 2008, p. 212). It included an examination of five sce-
narios, including one on an uttermost technically feasible reduction and a baseline
scenario in which no extra measures were foreseen. It made use of three different
models in order to predict the behaviour and flow of pollution, the impact of eco-
nomic developments on pollution, the impacts of transport and traffic developments
on pollution, and the impact of fluctuations in the use of energy. Nevertheless, pre-
cisely this level of detail was the reason the assessment failed to resolve the disputes
between representatives of economic and environmental interests.
The detailed modelling work on such a macro scale invited scientific uncertainty. The
principal model used was the RAINS model, which had been applied in the scope of
the earlier UN convention LRTAP. This model had been reviewed and was consid-
ered to be adequate, but a number of uncertainties remained, especially concerning
Particulate Matter (The Swedish Environmental Research Institute, 2004, pp. 22-28).
The model had been developed within the scope of LRTAP and was concerned with
transboundary air pollution. PM, however, was a local problem, occurring especially
at street level. Uncertainties considering PM10 or PM2.5 were especially important,
because the calculated health gains were due mostly to lower exposure to PM. Accor-
ding to the Dutch RIVM, the RAINS model was not sufficiently qualified to serve as a
baseline for CAFE calculations (Jimmink et al. 2004).
Moreover, in order to increase legitimacy and involve other DGs in the process, the
DG Environment used DG Transport and DG Energy models. Models such as TRE-
MOVE for transport and PRIMES for energy were used in the context of CAFE,
but these models had not been reviewed within the ambit of the programme, and
contained their own assumptions and uncertainties (Mantzos 2010; Kouridis et
al. 2011). The impact assessment was based on models that had ingrained
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uncertainties and uncertainties were simply compounded by combining them in
the effort to be complete and comprehensive. This led to unpredictable outcomes.
In the CAFE impact assessment, it was stated as follows:
‘However, costs and benefits are subject to uncertainties, some of which (on both sides of the cost-
benefit equation) are significant. Knowledge of these uncertainties and the availability of information
to describe them vary. Furthermore, some uncertainties are statistical and continuous in nature,
others relate to discrete choices (e.g. selection of approaches for the valuation of air-pollution–related
mortality) whilst yet others simply stem from a lack of knowledge. It is clear from this that it will be
difficult to develop a fully consistent approach to define uncertainty across the entire CAFE analysis’
(SEC(2005)113, p. 161).
Essentially, the drafters of the impact assessment admitted here that uncertainties
could not clearly be identified. In fact, there was even doubt regarding the
uncertainties.
The use of impact assessment and other managerial and scientific frames for environ-
mental policy had done the environment a great service by showing that environmen-
tal protection could ultimately be cost-effective. However, when expansive policies
and impact assessments so vast like this one are undertaken, the instrument loses
much of its efficacy. They begin to create uncertainty instead of reducing it. In such
cases, pressure groups have the possibility of applying the ‘scientific uncertainty’
argument. Such arguments can be used to either demand pro-environmental mea-
sures, by, for instance, invoking the precautionary principle, or to stave off environ-
mental measures by pointing to cases such as PM10. In the case of CAFE, the scientific
uncertainty argument became an element of the flexibility storyline of unwillingMem-
ber States and of the ‘bad for business’ storyline used by the industry and oil lobby.
8.4.4 Stalemate as the outcome of CAFE
TheCAFEprocess took sevenyears from the first Communication in 2001 to theCAFEAir
Quality Directive in 2008, and it included more than one hundred stakeholder meetings
(European Commission 2005c, p. 3). It produced one of the most comprehensive impact
assessments in EU practice. It merged the acidification policy of the EUwith the urban air
pollution policy, and it considered the synergistic effects of all the pollutants together in
the process. Originally, the Commissions intended for CAFE to evolve into an ongoing
five-year cyclical programme, in which the 2005 Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution
was simply a first step. In 2007, however, the CAFE stakeholder consultation process
was suddenly stopped, never to be revived (Airclim website 2011, accessed 29-12 2011).
If we look at the process and its starting ambitions, the question remains as towhether
it was worth the effort. We have a Directive that set new limits on PM2.5, but PM2.5
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was a fraction of PM10. If the standards for PM10 were met, the standards for PM2.5
were often also met. Not much extra had to be done. This was obviously good news
for the Dutch Government, but the question remains as to what the whole CAFE pro-
gramme delivered.
Possibly it delivered a framework for policy integration in other sectors. Policy integra-
tion was an idea from the Fourth Environmental Action programme, but developed
especially in the Fifth Environmental Action programme, and it featured strongly in
Dutch eco- modernistic environmental policy as well. It is unclear, however, whether
the CAFE strategy accomplished much. By the mid-2000s, the process of policy inte-
gration had been proclaimed ‘effectively dead’, and was replaced by faith in impact
assessments (Jordan & Schout 2006 cited in Nilsson et al. 2007, p. 5). The insistence
on impact assessments and on simpler, less invasive regulationwas in accordancewith
the intentions of the ‘Lisbon’ agenda for growth and jobs. This emphasis on growth
and jobs was viewed by environmentalists as an imminent danger, as it meant they
would have to fight continuously for their case that environmental concern did not
necessarily hamper competitiveness and economic growth (Wilkinson et al. 2005, p. 5).
The importance attached to the impact assessments in the CAFE programme is clear,
but it did not lead to consensus between industrial interests and pro-environmental
groups. On the contrary, the expert- and science-based structure of CAFE unintenti-
onally invited quarrelling. It was a ‘frameworkwithin a framework’ (Hey 2005, p. 27),
in which other contentious policies had to be developed. It involved multiple DGs,
but that implied that those other DGs had to be granted influence over environmental
policy. In this sense, policy integration backfired, because instead of environmental
policy gaining in influence over other policy domains, other domains encroached
on environmental policy.
The elaborate ‘comitological’13 set-up of CAFE was intended for Member States to
have ownership of the process, but that did not put an end to discussions in the
EU legislative institutions. It simply hid them from the public eye. The CAFE pro-
gramme inadvertently displayed the limits of a scientific and holistic presentation that
were both hallmarks of ecological modernisation.
The proceedings within the scope of CAFE showed that EU environmental policy may
well have been ‘drowning in process’ as Pallemaerts argued (Pallemaerts et al. 2006). In
this section, only the CAFE programme is examined, but according to Pallemaerts such
13. I use the term ‘comitology’ here loosely to refer to the whole procedural set-up by which the EU uses
committees of experts and representatives to change and amend regulations quickly. In a strict sense,
comitology only refers to those committees composed of national representatives who assist the Com-
mission in the exercise of its implementing powers, and are regulated by the Comitology Decision (Vos
2009, p. 5) (website comitology, last accessed 22-06 2015).
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criticism could be levelled at all of the seven thematic strategies from the 6th EAP. Pal-
lemaerts and colleagues were of the following opinion:
‘The development of these Strategies has led to a protracted policy-making process with few immediate
outcomes, delaying the formulation of concrete policy proposals. In effect, the implementation of the 6th
EAP has become bogged down in process at the expense of results’ (Pallemaerts et al. 2006, p. 64).
The stalemate in European environmental policy making resembled the air quality
clash in the Netherlands. Groups defending environmental/health interests and
those defending economic interests were similar in strength, and their argumentative
storylines attracted powerful adherents to both sides. However, other than in the air
quality clash, science failed to be the arbiter in the European arena. Whereas a com-
plex policy instrument based on detailed scientific calculations, rife with uncertainty,
did manage to forge a compromise in the Netherlands, the thematic strategy on air
pollution could not play a similar role in Europe. Science did not manage to depoli-
ticise the issue. The efficacy of science as a depoliticisation instrument is discussed
further in the following section.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this final section of the present chapter, the position of the Dutch representative in
these European debates is further elaborated upon. However, other elements of the
CAFE process merit mention as well. Of special importance from the perspective
of ecological modernisation is the efficacy of scientific knowledge to abate and depo-
liticise environmental conflict. The CAFE programme shows there is a limit to using
science to decide policy outcomes. Eventually, the inclusion of increasingly more sci-
entific models will tend to produce complexity rather than to reduce it, thus exacer-
bating political conflict instead of solving it. For the Netherlands, such insights are
important because its own NSL is a highly detailed science-based approach.
From a perspective of the legality of precaution, the events in Europe are of interest
too. The precautionary Air Quality Directives from the 1990s lay at the root of the air
quality clash in the Netherlands, and the European Commission and other institu-
tions were considered prone to precaution. In the case of CAFE, though, we see that
the precautionary concerns of the Commission were thwarted by the efforts of Mem-
ber States and pressures groups demanding more flexibility. These three topics are
elaborated on further.
8.5.1 The Netherlands: from front runner to foot dragger
During the clash, the European air quality regulation was a frequent target of cri-
ticism by the pro-infrastructure camp. The Dutch Government was criticised for
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implementing the regulation in too strict a manner, but also for agreeing with it in the
first place. The image arose of a small European country that was trying too hard to be
‘best in the class’when it came to environmental regulation, and presenting the Neth-
erlands as Europe’s ‘Gekke Henkie’, a pejorative name for a gullible, dim-witted
person.
In light of the findings in this study, this perception of the Dutch role in the European
arena needs to be adjusted. It is true that the Netherlands supported Air Quality
Directives during the 1990s. The Netherlands even played a large part in the Direc-
tives’ inception by involving the WHO in air quality regulation and exporting its
ambitious eco-modernistic ideas. However, in the case of the CAFE Directive, the
Netherlands did not operate as Europe’s environmental do-gooder. It played the dip-
lomatic game very pragmatically and with a keen eye for its own interests, and it did
so even before the air quality clash erupted at the end of 2004. The Netherlands made
sure it had the right people in the right committees, and saw to it that its key concerns
appeared on the European agenda. It tried to water down the proposal for a new Air
Quality Directive, and reverted to a positive tone only when it became clear it could
obtain a postponement.
The investigation into the air quality clash revealed that when environmental stan-
dards started to hurt substantially, the Dutch Government changed tactics in the
European arena, with the result that the Netherlands became a foot dragger instead
of a front runner. This confirms the findings from chapter 3, namely that, for the
Dutch, environmental leadership was a matter of pragmatism. These outcomes also
confirm the findings of Liefferink & Birkel (2011) that the Netherlands desired to be a
‘cost free’ environmental leader. When it paid to be a leader, the Netherlands clamou-
red for tough policy measures; when these very measures became too costly, Dutch
representatives changed tactics and strove to manipulate European institutions and
committees as skilfully as any other. Findings in the air quality case indicated that
when economic necessity dictated, the Dutch also argued against environmentally
progressive policies.
In general, the investigation into Dutch air quality politics illustrated that the Dutch
were most successful as front runners when principles were concerned, and the Neth-
erlands exported its innovative policy principles from the NMP to the European
Union. During that period, it also pushed for more ambitious targets. From a political
perspective, this conduct was entirely rational and profitable, since in general the
Netherlands is a country that benefits more than others from strong European envi-
ronmental regulation. It is small and therefore dependent on the efforts of its neigh-
bours to pursue a clean environment. The insistence on source policy during the
CAFE debates should be seen in this light. The Netherlands is hemmed in between
industrial areas and the density of cars in its small territory is high. It does not have
an automotive industry of its own, however, and therefore cleaner cars and cleaner
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industries would benefit the Netherlands relatively more than it would cost. Quality
standards, on the other hand, are a nuisance, because the country is highly industria-
lised and densely populated. In order to achieve the same environmental quality as
other countries, Dutch industries and cars need to be comparatively cleaner than
those of other Member States.
The air quality clash taught Dutch policymakers to be sceptical of increased European
ambition in the environmental field. In the 1990s the Netherlands supported the
Daughter Directive because it did not want to lose its ecological face. After the clash
on the other hand, openly anti-environmental positions in Europe are no longer frow-
ned upon. Instead, during the Parliamentary debates, policy makers expressed the
wish that the Netherlands would look more pragmatically at its own interests.
8.5.2 Science as a depoliticisation strategy
In ecological modernisation, the use of science in the service of environmental protec-
tion plays a large part, and in the Netherlands this was no exception. The need for
science is understandable from a sociological point of view, because scientific knowl-
edge has the legitimacy to function as an arbiter and to provide closure to debates
evolving around political questions. Scientific knowledge may function as an element
of a depoliticisation strategy, pulling environmental conflicts away from complex
value-laden ethical debates to the realm of objectivity and quantifiability.
From an environmental perspective, the increased use of science paid off, especially
when it was presented in managerial and economic terms (Arnoldussen 2011). By
being able to show in numerical values the cost of environmental degradation and
pollution in terms of human lives and economic damage, pro-environmental policy
makers and pressure groups convinced a sceptical audience of the need for preven-
tative measures. The effect of this strategy was apparent, for instance, in the Air Qual-
ity Directives in the 1990s. A cost-benefit assessment was undertaken that showed
that enacting tough standards would be extremely cost-effective, and this analysis
helped the Commission to succeed in having the Daughter Directive accepted.
Perhaps science’s most important role was a discursive one, as the natural and man-
agerial sciences provided a platform upon which various interest groups were able to
come to terms with one another. A kind of hybrid ecological / economic discourse
was created by combining the discourses of economy and management, with the dis-
course of natural and environmental science. By comparing environmental degrada-
tion to the budget deficit for instance or by presenting the environment as an
indispensable pool of common resources without which the economy could not func-
tion, new storylines were created that appealed to both the environmentalists and the
hard-nosed representatives of economic interests. The sciences acted as the cement
that bound a discourse coalition between proponents of environmental and economic
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interests. This discourse coalition resulted in hybrid ecological/economic policy dis-
course laid down in an exemplary manner in the Dutch NMP and the European 5th
and 6th EAPs.
Moreover, in the Netherlands the findings of scientists and consultants were accepted
by both pro-economy and pro-environmental actor as legitimate arguments for end-
ing the debates between these representatives of various interests. The air quality
clash was successfully depoliticised by the promise of sound scientific calculation.
In the European Union the situation was different. A comparison between the air
quality clash in the Netherlands and the EU debates over CAFE, may illustrate the
promises and limitations of such a strategy.
In the Netherlands, the strongly science-oriented NSL managed to resolve the air
quality clash. It was accepted by policy makers, by the judiciary, and by most mem-
bers of the pro-health and pro-infrastructure camps. In this case, the reliance on sci-
ence succeeded in providing closure, and those groups who did not adhere to this
compromise subsequently became marginalised. In this case, a strategy of ‘depoliti-
cisation through scientisation’ still proved to be successful, despite warnings by Elver-
ding and others.
A different picture emerged from the debates about the CAFE strategy and the Air
Quality Directive 2008. From the beginning, the debates within the supposedly sci-
ence-oriented forums became sites of ‘sub-politics’, in which the line between expert
and policy maker became blurred. The eventual outcomes of the CAFE process, the
Air Quality Directive 2008, and the CAFE strategy of 2005 were underpinned by an
elaborate impact assessment drafted on the basis of various economic and environ-
mental scientific models, and on countless meetings with experts and stakeholders.
The impact assessment was hailed as a model of best practice in the field, it but failed
to provide closure to the debates. On the contrary, the impact assessment listed so
many uncertainties that its findings were easily questioned. Lobby groups for the
industry proceeded to do so, and their storyline that caution was needed because
of uncertainties regarding costs found a willing ear among more economically ori-
ented policy makers in the European Commission.
Apparently there is a limit to the capacity of scientific frames to depoliticise environ-
mental issues. The success of the natural sciences in the past led to the demand to
underpin policy by the most elaborate models and assessments possible, but there
is a point at which these models become counter-productive: namely, when impact
assessments and cost-benefit analyses start to produce complexity rather than reduce
it. A beneficial impact assessment reduces the complexity of a given environmental
problem by providing arguments based on scientifically backed but easily under-
standable numerical values. This aids policy makers in explaining their choices to
a potentially sceptical audience. However, too expansive impact assessments may
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also produce complexity, when they inadvertently highlight the volatility of a certain
problem bymentioning uncertainties on every page due to complexmodels and large
amounts of variables. If uncertainties become that obvious, pressure groups find
arguments to attack the outcomes of such an assessment, and the debates shift from
being discussions regarding policy measures to the question of how to deal with
uncertainties.
If uncertainties become the focus, the intended depoliticisation is frustrated, because
the question of what to do in situations of scientific uncertainty is highly political. Pro-
economy policy makers and groups tended to argue in such cases for conservative
policies, because they felt it was unreasonable to curb economic activity in the face
of uncertain threats or against uncertain costs. Representatives of environmental
and health interests, however, tended to invoke a version of the precautionary prin-
ciple, arguing that especially in the event of scientific uncertainty one should err on
the side of caution – in this case the environment.
With regard to CAFE, the economic interests appeared to have gained the most in
terms of concessions by voicing concerns over the uncertainty of the impact assess-
ment. This concrete outcome is of interest when discussing the hypothesised legality
of precaution in the following sub-section. Here, however, it is important to note that
there is a limit to which science may depoliticise the environmental question and fos-
ter consensus. Its limits are reached when it produces uncertainty rather than reduces
it; when politicisation starts all over again, but revolving now around the question of
whether uncertainty demands or precludes precaution.
8.5.3 The resistance against a legality of precaution in Europe
A number of parallels may be drawn between the Dutch and European debates on air
quality. Precautionary regulation was enacted in both arenas at first without much
opposition, whereas subsequently, pro-economy and pro-infrastructure pressure
groups managed to thwart more ambitious environmental regulation. In both arenas,
therefore, the conclusion is the same: the legality of precaution had not yet established
itself as the dominant type of legality.
It is argued in chapter 4 that the Air Quality Directives from the 1990s containedmany
elements of a precautionary approach. This approach was in accordance with the
times. During the 1990s, the precautionary principle was on the rise, and in the wake
of the eco-modernist turn in the early 1990s there was a strong demand for strict envi-
ronmental regulation. Under the influence of scandals such as the BSE crisis in meat,
public health gained a high profile as well. In law, these concerns were translated into
acceptance of the precautionary principle as a cornerstone of EU policy making with
the 2001 Commission Communication on the precautionary principle. In the case of
PM, uncertain scientific findings quickly led to strict policy making that lay research
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burdens and placed result-oriented obligations on Member States in order to safe-
guard public health against this newly discovered threat.
The rise of the precautionary principle in the 1990s was concomitant with a large
increase in environmental regulation, among which were ambitious holistic policies
such as the Air Quality Directives. Conspicuous in the case of the 1990s’ Air Quality
Directives is the largely absent opposition from economic interests. The legitimacy of
theWHO, combined with the concerns of the 5th EAP and the pro-environmental tide
of the times, effectively silenced dissenting opinions. Moreover, industrial represen-
tatives and pro-economyMember States did not raise their voices to any great extent.
The same pattern was revealed in the Netherlands, where implementation of the Air
Quality Order from 2001 did not encounter fierce opposition from business interests,
although VVD Parliamentarians tried to obstruct the process by demanding a formal
law. However, these opposing voices were too weak to prevent implementation of
this precautionary piece of European legislation. Even though the Dutch Government
did not intend an overly precautionary line in this file, it enacted precautionary reg-
ulation without concerted opposition.
In the 2000s, the cards lay differently. Member States – such as the Netherlands – that
felt the sting of the Air Quality Directives objected vociferously to new and tighter
standards, and industrial lobby groups and economically inclined Directorates
General disagreed as well with the precautionary concerns of the pro-health and
pro-environmental actors.
The CAFE debates provided an indication that the precautionary legality that seemed
to be dawning in the late 1990s was encountering opposition. In that sense, the fact
that the ‘bad for business’ storyline by and large managed to trump the pro-health
storyline in the debates was a sign on the wall. The argument that in the face of sci-
entific uncertainty the legislator should refrain from taking measures is a classical
argument against Government intervention on behalf of the environment. The pre-
cautionary principle had been proposed as an argument to undercut this line of rea-
soning. In CAFE, this line of reasoning was presented again, and this time it emerged
on top, demonstrating that the legality of precaution had not yet risen to a position of
dominance.
Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion that the legality of precaution was simply
a temporary distortion of the old legal order, made possible by the economic prosper-
ity and the heightened environmental concerns of the early 1990s. I consider that the
advance of a legality of precaution has only been thwarted temporarily, due to stiffer
resistance from economically powerful actors. These actors raised no objections at
first because they were put off guard by the scientific framing of these environmental
problems, and, most importantly, they did not take seriously the threat to their inter-
ests. The sleeping dogs were only awakened by the environmental regulations that
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really hurt their interests. Now awake, they were barking loudly at progressive envi-
ronmental regulation. In that sense the opposition that legality of precaution is now
encountering is a sign that traditionally strong economic interests are facing a more
dangerous opponent in pro-environmental interests. The air quality clash has dis-
played that environmental law should not be considered solely a paper tiger, but that
it can have teeth and that it can bite.
Nevertheless, any thesis claiming that the legality of precaution is already dominant
should be rejected. On the contrary, the air quality clash has illustrated that a con-
certed effort on the part of pro-economy EU Member States and pressure groups
may still bring ambitious environmental EU policy to a halt. The potency of the argu-
ments used in the storyline of flexibility indicates clearly that this legality has not yet
been firmly embraced.
TIMELINE CAFE
1998 Oct. First informal talks about new approach to air quality regulation between EU Commission and Member States
1999 April Adoption Air Quality Daughter Directive 99/30/EC
2001 May Commission proposed CAFE strategy COM(2001)245
2002 July Commission adopted 6th EAP
2003. Jan NL took over chairmanship Working Group on Implementation
2004 April Working Group on PM offered recommendations for Review of Directive 99/30/EC
2004 June Working Group on Implementation offered recommendations for review of Directive 99/30/EC
2005 Jan. Commission released Review of Directive 99/30/EC COM(204)845
2005 June UNICE offered letter to Chairman Barroso complaining about forthcoming CAFE strategy
2005 Aug. AEA T presented cost benefit analysis for CAFE and recommended a scenario between B (moderate) and C (high)
levels of ambition
2005 Sept. Commission adopted CAFE strategy, level of ambition chosen between A (low) and B. (moderate)
2005 Sept. Commission proposed new Ambient Air Quality Directive
2006 June Proposal for new Directive discussed in Council, NL opposed.
2006 Sept. European Parliament critical of proposal, demanded more flexibility
2007 June Council Reached Common position on Commission proposal for new Air Quality Directive
2007 Dec. European Parliament adopted proposal for Ambient Air Quality Directive
2008 May New Directive on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe adopted Directive 2008/50/EC
2009 April NL obtained derogation from the standards for air quality on the basis of Directive 2008/50/EC
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 CONCLUSION: ANALYSING THE AIR QUALITY CLASH
In this study I have documented the history of the air quality clash. This term is used
to designate a period of stagnation regarding infrastructure development in the
Netherlands due to an exceedance of the European standards for air quality, notably
concerning PM10 and NO2. Between September 2004 and April 2010, numerous per-
mitting decisions regarding infrastructure projects were annulled by the courts of law
because they were found to be in breach of the air quality regulation. Concerns over
the health impacts of air quality made newspaper headlines, and worrying reports
were released by renowned scientific institutions.
My central research question was how and why air quality had become such a press-
ing social problem in the Netherlands. To find the answer, I examined Dutch and
European policy documents, reports from public health institutions, and other rele-
vant literature. In order to provide for a reality check and at times in order to fill
in the gaps, interviews were conducted with specific key individuals.
Three notable developments came to the fore from an initial exploration of the lit-
erature. Firstly, it quickly became clear that in the Netherlands the conflict could
only be understood in relation to developments in the European arena. The regula-
tion on air quality that caused the annulment of infrastructure projects was Euro-
pean in origin. Hence, a number of chapters in this study have been devoted to
developments in the European Union and the role the Dutch Government played
there.
Secondly, Dutch environmental policy in the 1980s took a turn away from top-down
standard setting towards a more consensus-based style of policy making. It began to
focus more on creating a sense of shared responsibility with the various actors
involved. Known as ecological modernisation, this consensus based policy discourse
had come to dominate environmental policy discussions. In such a context, a heated
debate on environmental standards was remarkable, especially since urban air pollu-
tion had almost disappeared from the public radar for almost 15 years. Therefore I
examined the clash by specifically taking into account the influence of ecological mod-
ernisation on its emergence and its eventual resolution.
Thirdly, as a socio-legal scholar, I am interested in the air quality clash as an indi-
cator for legal transitions. In the air quality clash, the legal dimension was very
important because the conflict was precipitated by high-profile decisions made
by Dutch administrative courts. These strict judgements may be explained by
changes in the legal order that emphasise the need to prevent health and environ-
mental threats over the economic compensation of victims. I have referred to this
complex of ideas centred on the imperative of damage prevention as ‘the legality of
precaution’.
In order to examine these developments, three sub-questions have been formu-
lated: firstly, how and to what extent has the interplay between Dutch and Euro-
pean regulation and policy contributed to the emergence of the Dutch air quality
clash in 2004? Secondly, what role did the reigning Dutch policy discourse of eco-
logical modernisation play in the emergence of the conflict; and thirdly, was
the emergence of the air quality clash indicative of the advent of a legality of
precaution?
I have used a social constructivist perspective focusing on both strategic social action
and discursive practice. This combination of perspectives was chosen because they
each expose important but different aspects of the clash. The actor-centred perspec-
tive focuses on the level of interests, and is particularly useful to examine the political
manoeuvring of actors aiming to further their own interests. The air quality clash was
partly due to actors making claims in order to take the opportunity to push environ-
mental concerns on the political agenda and undermine Government policy geared to
facilitate infrastructure development. The discourse-analytic perspective on the other
hand focusses on the narratives used in the debates and reveals the hidden assump-
tions in arguments. This perspective is particularly apt for revealing the underlying
social values in political and legal conflicts.
Moreover, ecological modernisation and the legality of precaution have been consid-
ered discourses in the realm of environmental policy and law respectively and ideal
types of both have been constructed in chapter 1 in order to answer the last two sub
questions.
In section 9.1, a bird’s-eye view of the development of the air quality clash is presented
as an answer to the research question how air qualitymanaged to achieve the status of
a social problem in the Netherlands. Attention is paid to the air quality clash in the
context of the Europeanisation of Dutch environmental policy and Dutch influence
in Europe in section 9.2. The analysis of Dutch political choices that led to
the clash in the context of ecological modernisation is the subject of section 9.3.
The air quality clash is discussed from the perspective of the legality of precaution
in section 9.4.
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. HISTORY OF THE DUTCH AIR QUALITY CLASH: AN OVERVIEW
The lead-up to the air quality clash
During the 1990s, air quality was rarely discussed in this country. From 1999
onwards, the topic gradually gained public attention due to an incident near Over-
schie that became a public health issue. Health professionals from the Dutch Munic-
ipal Health Service in Rotterdam (GGD) claimed that breathing the air in the
residential zone of Overschie was equivalent to the passive smoking of 17 cigarettes
per day. Health professionals based their claim on data from investigations by
Dutch and US epidemiologists, who had demonstrated a correlation between pre-
mature mortality and living in areas facing problems air pollution. This claim rea-
ched Minister Jan Pronk of the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the
Environment (VROM). Together with the Minister of Transport andWater Manage-
ment (V&W), Pronk proposed lowering the speed limit in Overschie, as driving
more slowly was considered beneficial for air quality. The speed limit was lowered
in 2003.
Between 1999 and 2003, the topic of air quality gradually gained political salience,
and various parties on the left of the political spectrum were keen to know whether
there were more places where air pollution was present. These parties opposed
plans for road construction in the area of Overschie, proposed by the liberal
VVD. The environmental movement also responded to the situation in Overschie,
and started to campaign for more speed reductions. In the present study, this alli-
ance of political parties and the environmental movement is referred to as the pro-
health camp.
This initial mobilisation of the pro-health camp around the speed limits took place at
about the same time that two European Directives, 96/62 (Framework Directive) and
99/30 (Daughter Directive), were required to be implemented in Dutch law. These
Directives contained strict air quality standards proposed by the European Commis-
sion under the influence of the WHO guidelines, ideas laid down in the 5th Environ-
mental Action Programme (5th EAP), and the report ‘1992 The Environmental
Dimension’. Moreover, the notion that high environmental quality could yield eco-
nomic advantages caught on in the EU during the 1990s. This consideration is the cor-
nerstone of ecological modernisation. The Dutch Government didmuch to popularise
the notion in Europe that – if managed wisely – environmental protection could pro-
vide economic benefits. After the success of its own National Environmental Policy
Plan (NMP), the principles of the Dutch version of ecological modernisation were
exported to many countries and institutions, including the European Commission.
The EU’s own Fifth Environmental Action Programme (5th EAP) was influenced as
well by these Dutch ideas.
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The EU air quality policy was designed to integrate well with other EU pollution pol-
icies, and substantial information rights for the public were also incorporated. Raising
awareness among the public was considered crucial to attract the attention ofMember
States to the remaining air pollution problems. Even though the Dutch Government
predicted difficulties with the feasibility of these standards, it endorsed the Directives
because the Netherlands was keen to retain its status as an environmentally progres-
sive country.
These European air quality standards were promulgated in 1999, and were required
to be implemented by the Dutch Government in 2001; the task fell to the VROMMin-
istry under socialist (PvdA) Minister Jan Pronk. Despite pressure from the VVD in
Parliament to implement the standards by way of a separate law, the Government
chose to apply them byGeneral Administrative Order, a less formal regulatory instru-
ment for which Parliamentary permissionwas not required. The resulting Air Quality
Order 2001 (AQO 2001) was based on the Dutch Law on Environmental Management
and had far-reaching consequences, because it established a link between the air qual-
ity standards and administrative decisions. This link meant that compliance with the
air quality standards became a prerequisite in order for administrative bodies to take
lawful decisions regarding permission for infrastructure development. Administra-
tive bodies could not allow this development if air quality standards were exceeded
in the area in question. This link was a uniquely Dutch legal phenomenon, as envi-
ronmental quality standards in other countries were not that closely linked to admin-
istrative decisions. Administrations elsewhere needed to strive to achieve an air
quality that remains within the standards, but decisions were not immediately sus-
ceptible to annulment, like they were in the Netherlands.
At that time, the VROM Minister realised that compliance with the air quality stan-
dards would bewell-nigh impossible to achieve in large areas of the Netherlands, and
would entail huge costs. Minister Pronkwrote a letter to the European Environmental
Commissioner, Margo Wallström, explaining the predicament. He was convinced
that through diplomacy the European Commission could be persuaded to be lenient,
but he did not receive a satisfactory response. His successor in 2002, Pieter van Geel,
also failed to obtain leniency from the Commission in the subsequent early years.
In July 2002, the ruling Dutch Government changed political colour. Jan Peter Balken-
ende became Prime Minister of a Cabinet that included the right-wing parties CDA,
VVD, and LPF, and he inherited a polarised political landscape. Populist politician
Pim Fortuyn (LPF) had been murdered in May 2002 by an extreme environmentalist,
and values and interests considered to be left wing were viewed with suspicion by
conservatives.
The first Balkenende Cabinet chose to cut environmental spending, and embarked on
a clear pro-infrastructure and pro-economic course of development, marginalising
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environmental interests. The environment as a policy field was relegated in political
importance. A Secretary of State – a more junior position – rather than the Minister of
VROM himself became responsible for the environment. The environment belonged
to the portfolio of Secretary of State Pieter van Geel. The Government proposed an
emergency law in 2002 that made road expansion significantly easier by cutting pro-
cedural requirements of participation and environmental impact assessment. Com-
batting congestion on the roads was its main priority, since congestion was a
nuisance to car owners, and being able to resolve the congestion problem was seen
as a sign of purposiveness and of a no-nonsense attitude popular with voters at
the time.
The proposal for the Emergency Law on Road Expansion was sent in 2002 to the
Council of State. In October 2002, the Dutch Council of State Advisory Division
advised negatively on the above-mentioned proposal on the Emergency Law. It
frowned upon the scrapping of public participation procedures and the curtailing
of access to the court, and considered this policy to be contrary to the aims of envi-
ronmental policy. Air quality standards from the AQO 2001 were mentioned as one
consideration that could prevent the speedy realisation of these road expansions,
because according to the Council of State they could not be suspended. The left-
wing opposition, especially the ecological party GroenLinks, demanded guarantees
from VROM’s Secretary of State that the air quality standards would be complied
with completely, despite the provisions of the Emergency Law. Pieter Van Geel
indeed made that promise during the debates on the Emergency Law on Road
Expansion.
The air quality clash
Apart from an early conflict in 2001 over the building of a new residential area in
Ypenburg, the air quality standards themselves did not cause much administrative
and societal upheaval until the later months of 2004. In September 2004, the decision
to expand a road near the town of Vught, based on the Emergency Law on Road
Expansion was annulled by the administrative court. The highest court of appeal,
the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division, considered that the decision
did not comply with the provisions of the Air Quality Order 2001. Earlier, in May
2004, a road expansion near the town or Barneveld had already been blocked by
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. The Vught expansion was the second one
in a row to be impeded because of air quality concerns, indicating that road expan-
sions were in jeopardy. A week later, the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division annulled the development of a commercial zone in the town of Hendrik-Ido-
Ambacht, and other infrastructure development appeared to be blocked as well. The
air quality clash had started.
Despite the earlier case of Ypenburg along with the negative advice given by the
Council of State Advisory Division, the termination of road expansions and other
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infrastructural projects was unexpected. The implications were not noticed by the
Government, by conservative parties in the Government, nor by lobby groups for
the transport and construction sector. Some legal scholars had predicted problems,
and the environmental movement was aware of the strict standards, but on the whole
the important legal role that air quality would start to play was not seriously
considered.
The verdicts given by the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division pro-
ved to be a game changer, as they had a number of political effects. Firstly, the pro-
health camp became increasingly active, and in Parliament it argued successfully for
the need for speed reductions and extra taxes in order to clean the air. Secondly, the
environmental movement started campaigning vigorously, and called for public sup-
port. The environmental pressure group Milieudefensie used the legal system to
strengthen its campaign by asking people to lodge appeals against administrative
decisions that permitted infrastructure development. Between 2005 and 2010, air
quality played a part in over 1000 cases judged by the Council of State.1 The legal cam-
paign delivered some important legal successes for Milieudefensie, most notably in
2007, when it was decided to terminate the decision to expand the highway between
Burgerveen and Leiden.
In October 2004, the pro-health camp was aided by the appearance of satellite images
of the Netherlands, in which the country was depicted as one of the dirtiest in Europe.
These images made the problem visible, and constituted a point of reference for sub-
sequent campaigns by the environmental movement. Moreover, the pro-health camp
used the excess deaths mentioned in scientific reports by the RIVM to draw attention
to the problem of air pollution as a public health issue. In Parliament, the pro-health
camp was most successful during those early years. In 2005 and 2006, the budget for
quality measures was increased substantially, and even more media attention was
paid to the topic of air quality.
The involvement of the court remained the pro-health camp’s most important trump
card, and the environmental movement began to argue that clean air was in effect a
human right because it was in the law. In Parliament, the pro-health camp accused the
Government of incompetence because its policies had backfired and had proven to be
legally invalid.
For infrastructure developers, economy-oriented political parties, and the Govern-
ment, these court orders were highly problematic. The country was blocked in regard
to infrastructure development at a time that the Government intended to give a high
profile to the development of roads and other infrastructural works. The blockade of
infrastructure development led to a counter reaction. During the spring of 2005, a
1. For a review of the cases between 2005 and 2009 see Janse (2008).
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number of lobby groups primarily representing infrastructure developers united, and
were joined by the political parties CDA and VVD in calls for a quick regulatory fix to
remove the block. I have called this alliance of interest groups and pro-development
parties the pro- infrastructure camp. This camp protected the interests of construction
and mobility, and its prime concern was to weaken the legal impact of the standards.
It demanded a regulatory solution to the problem that infrastructure development
was facing. The interest groups presented worrying economic data that implied that
7.7 billion Euros could be lost because of the stagnation in infrastructure develop-
ment, and that 100,000 jobs in the construction sector were on the line. Because of
the pro-infrastructure camp’s activities, air quality became increasingly perceived
as a problem of poor regulation rather than primarily a health problem. Especially
after 2006, the pro-infrastructure camps’ framing of the problem began to dominate.
The Government tried to cater to the wish of the pro-infrastructure camp, but could
not risk totally alienating pro-health interests. Moreover, its attempts to seriously
alter the air quality legislation were thwarted by the Council of State Advisory Divi-
sion, because of doubts over the legal validity of these changes from a European
Law perspective. The Council of State Advisory Division sent the message that obli-
gations entered into on the EU level were legally binding in the Netherlands. Addi-
tionally, it gave political signals that the Government should take environmental
standards seriously. The posture of the Council of State had considerable impact
on policy making, and it was a number of years before any effective regulatory solu-
tion was found.
The regulatory solution
Already in the spring of 2005, legal scholar Niels Koeman argued that the European
Directives did not require blocking infrastructure development. The impediment had
been a result of Dutch law, because it directly linked air quality standards to admin-
istrative decisions. If air pollution existed in certain areas, any administrative decision
not leading to immediate improvements could be annulled by the courts. This provi-
sion, however, was Dutch, not European. In a well-known financial daily newspaper,
Koeman recommended disconnecting the link between quality standards and admin-
istrative decisions. This appeal was promptly taken over by the pro-infrastructure
camp, and together with other legal professionals, Koeman was invited by the Gov-
ernment together with other legal experts to lend his expertise in finding a regulatory
solution to the air quality problem. Together with civil servants from theMinistries of
VROM and V&W, they tried to resolve the impasse. A compromise was needed that
would weaken the link sufficiently but would not be rejected outright by the Council
of State.
The civil servants and legal experts came up with a complex solution that would be
fleshed out further over the years 2006 and 2007, with a proposal consisting of a pro-
grammatic approach to the air quality standards. Projects that could harm air quality
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significantly would be counterbalanced by measures that would have beneficial
effects. Over time, this balance of beneficial measures and harmful projects would
lead to air quality that would comply with the European standards. This long-term
plan was broad in scope, and necessitated detailed calculations regarding the effects
on air quality regarding projects and on the counter measures. It was met with crit-
icism from both the pro-health as well as the pro-infrastructure campwhen the gist of
the plan was revealed in Parliament. Both sides commented on its complexity. The
pro-infrastructure camp felt that simply breaking the linkwould be an easier solution.
During the debates, the pro-infrastructure camp criticised the EU and the Council of
State for obstructing this simpler solution. The pro-health camp saw in this approach
a way to ‘calculate the air clean’ without having to tackle the ‘real’ public health
problem.
The Government stuck to its approach, however, and in the course of 2006 and 2007
the proposal gained in Parliamentary support, though there was still a great deal of
scepticism. The political process was speeded up especially in July 2007 when the
Council of State’s Administrative Jurisdiction Division annulled the decision to
expand the highway between Burgerveen and Leiden. This decision displayed that
the air quality clash was far from over. In October 2007, the Law on Environmental
Management was amended with a chapter on air quality standards: namely, the Air
Quality Law, which would enable promulgation of the programmatic approach. The
plan itself became known as the National Cooperation Plan Air Quality (NSL).
The plan itself had to be drafted and presented to the European Commission for
acceptance, as the measures proposed in the NSL would take time to be effective.
A temporary postponement – a derogation – from the air quality standards was nec-
essary to bring spatial development back on track. In 2007, therewas no possibility yet
of asking for such a derogation, but it might become possible under a new Directive
that was being negotiated at the time. In Europe, the Clean Air For Europe (CAFE)
programmewas launched in 2001, with the aim of updating existing air pollution pol-
icy.Within the many sub-committees that made up CAFE, the Dutch VROMMinistry
lobbied strongly for the possibility of giving Member States extra time to meet the
standards. The EU issued a new Air Quality Directive in 2008, the CAFE Directive
that allowed such a derogation if certain conditions were fulfilled. On the basis of this
new Directive, the Netherlands would be able to obtain extra time if it submitted a
credible plan to improve air quality. The Netherlands submitted the detailed NSL
in June 2008, and was granted the desired derogation in April 2009.
The NSL was a policy plan rather than a package of proposals that could be enacted
immediately. It contained a number of controversial policy proposals, such as a tax on
diesel fuel and environmental zoning to restrict polluting lorries. It also included the
introduction of road pricing. In particular, the last proposalwas and still is highly con-
troversial. After being removed from the political agenda during Balkenende’s first
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Government, it returned because of the air quality clash. The hold that air quality had
on Dutch spatial planning for over five years was released with the emergence of the
NSL and its acceptance by the Council of State as a sufficient justification for infra-
structural projects in March 2010.
This historical outline answers the first part of the research question pertaining to the
history of the air quality clash, namely how air pollution by PM became a pressing
social problem. However, in order to understand why air quality became a pressing
matter and explain the significance of the clash for Dutch law and policy, the conflict
needs to be analysed from the perspectives of Europeanisation, ecological moderni-
sation, and the emerging legality of precaution. In section 9.2, The emergence of the
air quality clash is explained in the context of the interplay between Dutch en Euro-
pean environmental policies, while section 9.3 discusses the influence of various
Dutch policy choices analysed from the perspective of ecological modernisation. In
section 9.4, the role of the emerging legality of precaution is examined.
. THE AIR QUALITY CLASH AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
One of the main causes of the clash can be found at the European level. The European
Union issued new air quality regulation in the 1990s, and the air quality Daughter
Directive from 1999 laid down significantly stricter standards than previous Euro-
pean rules. Together with elements from Dutch and UK policies, the guidelines cre-
ated by the World Health Organisation formed the inspiration for this rigorous
regulation. Moreover, recent epidemiological research findings on the risks of air pol-
lution coupled with pressure by UK representatives provided the political sense of
urgency to develop these new Directives quickly. The Netherlands was obliged to
implement the regulation in National law, but throughout the country the standards
were exceeded. As a result of this, and on the basis of the Dutch implementation of
these European rules in the Air Quality Order, a large number of high-profile con-
struction projects were terminated.
If the strict European rules had not been in place, there would have been no air quality
clash, and the Dutch Government used this fact to blame Brussels for its occurrence.
However, the Netherlands contributed significantly to the realisation of the European
air quality policy. This interplay between Europe and the Netherlands is analysed in
section 9.2.1. In section 9.2.2, I focus on policy making in Europe. European policy has
an amalgamous character and is influenced by different ideas, Member States, and
institutional interests. This complex character makes it a difficult arena for Member
States tomanage. In section 9.2.3, wewill look at the consequences of Europeanisation
for the Dutch legal order as well as at the balance of power between Dutch policy
makers and the judiciary.
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9.2.1 Influences that shaped the 1990s Air Quality Directives
Even before the Netherlands became known as one of the EU’s environmental front
runner States, it had tried to convince other countries and institutions of its policy
ideas. This lobbying occurred out of understandable self-interest, since the small
country needed to rely on other countries to keep its environment clean. Moreover,
the Dutch administration had to make sure it did not create an overly heavy burden
on its own industries, because that would harm their competitive position.
One of such instances inwhich the Dutch Government exported its own ideas was the
involvement of theWorldHealth Organisation in air quality policy. In the early 1980s,
the Dutch Government intended to draft air quality standards for the Netherlands,
and Dutch civil servants asked the WHO to draft appropriate guidelines. By involv-
ing the WHO, the Netherlands considered it would be certain that standards would
be based on sound scientific knowledge, and that it could ascertain legitimacy for its
own regulatory proposals. Moreover, other countries might also adopt the WHO
guidelines, thereby ensuring that Dutch industries would not be at a disadvantage.
By 1987, the air quality guidelines were completed, but the Dutch Government
had lost interest in setting its own standards in this regard, and it followed those
set down by the EU instead. Within the EU, however, theWHO air quality guidelines
began to feature prominently as a benchmark for regulation. The 5th Environmental
Action Programme from 19993 (5th EAP), which determined the EU’s environmental
policy agenda for the 1990s, contained the target that air quality standards should be
based on those set by the WHO. The eventual directives from this decade, Directive
96/62/EC (Framework Directive) and Directive 99/30/EC, (Daughter Directive)2
were based on these recommendations and on other ideas contained in the 5th EAP.
I have not been able to determine any direct Dutch influence on the air quality target
contained in the 5th EAP, but on the whole it was an ambitious environmental policy
plan on which Dutch policy makers had exerted a strong influence. The 5th EAP follo-
wed the innovative market-based approaches to environmental policy pioneered by
the Dutch Environmental Ministers Pieter Winsemius and Ed Nijpels (both VVD).
Their approach of responsibilisation of target groups, and especially the notion that
strong environmental standards may be beneficial to economic growth, gained cur-
rency in EU policy-making circles.
By involving the WHO and exporting their own ambitious environmental policy,
Dutch Government paved the way for the Air Quality Directives. This explains
why the Dutch Government by and large supported the Directives, and at times even
pushed for more ambitious regulation. Only in 2001 did Minister of the Environment
2. There were three more Air Quality Directives, but only these two are of concern for the purpose of this
study.
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Jan Pronk ask to renegotiate some of the Directives’more problematic points, but he
did implement the Directives strictly in Dutch law.
In the policy-making process of Directive 99/30/EC – the Directive containing the
problematic air quality values themselves – the UK representative wielded a strong
influence. The UK assumed ownership of the air quality file by sending to the Euro-
pean Commission a representative who had worked on the UK’s national air quality
strategy. The British considered that this strategy could act as an example for that of
the EU. The UK had adopted this strategy in the wake of a nation-wide scare concer-
ning childhood asthma during the 1990s. In 1997, the Labour party had come to
power in the UK, and the young Tony Blair was keen to demonstrate his environ-
ment-related credentials. In 1998 he made the topic of the environment a spearhead
during the British EU presidency, and tried to achieve a common position on many
pieces of environmental regulation, including the Air Quality Directives.
The EU strategy was indeed modelled after that of the UK, but there were important
differences. One of the most significant was that the UK strategy allowed for a weig-
hing of interests between environmental quality and pressing economic concerns, but
the EU strategy did not. According to UK respondent Richard Mills, the main writer
of the UK strategy, the EU tried to “one up” the UK strategy by making it more rig-
orous. He referred to the desire of the European Commission to posture itself as a
strong environmental champion, daring to outperform theMember States in environ-
mental ambition.
The fourth influence of note is the presence of an elaborate economic study that
showed that the air quality standards would be highly cost-effective. However,
this evaluation had painted a far too rosy picture of the abatement measures Mem-
ber States needed to take in order to comply with the Directive. It had taken into
account projected future benefits for air quality of other EU policies and concluded
that the extra burden caused by the Directive was little. However, these future ben-
efits failed to materialise and the extra burden that the standards became steeper
very quickly.
The European Air Quality Directives were shaped by a set of diverse aspects, but
Dutch influence was present in at least two of them: the involvement of the WHO
and the ecomodernistic policy philosophy. The Dutch Government was never simply
a bystander, but was a prominent player in the European environmental policy arena.
On the face of it, the strategy to involve the WHO seemed to have been a masterful
move, as the Netherlands gained what it had intended – ambitious air quality stan-
dards. However, due to the changing nature of EU politics and to the long period of
time in which the development took place, the Netherlands did not come out ahead,
but instead finished last. To understand this development, we need to look at the
dynamic nature of EU policy making.
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9.2.2 The bricolage of European environmental policy
In order to understand how the Dutch lost control of the file; we took a closer look at
the way air quality policy is made in Europe. The European policy arena is one in
which many different pressure groups, Member States, and institutions play a part.
All these actors have their own reasons for trying to influence the course of European
environmental policy.
The institutional set up of the EU itself is complex and this allows actors to influence
the policy making process through various points of access. The two main legislative
bodies of the EU, Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament adopt legislation
by co-decision, meaning that they need to come to terms with each other. However,
these bodies do not always see eye to eye. In the Council of Ministers for instance,
various Government representatives, often Ministers of the policy field in question,
negotiate about the eventual polices to adopt. They have national interests close to
heart. The European Parliament is organised around political parties representing
dominant ideologies, such as social democracy, Christian democracy, green etc. the
Members of the EP conform to the line of their respective political party and ideology.
The European Commission is themain executive branch of the European Union, but it
also proposes regulation and therefore it has considerable agenda-setting power. The
European Commission is an institution that safeguards the interests of the European
Union, its ideals and institutions as such. It tried to give the EU a more prominent
profile on various social issues in order to display the Union’s added value to the pub-
lic and to present it as more than just an economic club. It developed ambitious long
term policies on subjects as consumer protection, women’s rights and also environ-
mental protection. The transboundary character of environmental pollution makes
it a subject on which the European Union can score points with concerned environ-
mentally aware citizens.
Often actors try to influence the Commission, but also through the Council of Minis-
ters and the European Parliament claims makers can get direct access to the EU’s leg-
islative machinery. Throughout this study, we witnessed several different Member
States trying to influence both specific regulation and the policy philosophy on which
EU environmental policy is based. The Netherlands exported elements of its own
environmental policy to the EU level in the hope that its own innovative, market-
based philosophy would also prove successful there. The UK as well as the WHO
played a strong part as drivers of the Daughter Directive that contained the limit
values for air quality. The UK did so in a variety of ways, but onewaywas by sending
a UK official to aid the European Commission to draft the proposal for the Daughter
Directive. When the CAFÉ programme was on the way in the mid-2000s, pro-econ-
omy pressure groups, Member States such as the Netherlands and other Directorates
General used their influence to obtain a more flexible policy that allowed for more
leeway in terms of the standards. The Netherlands for instance tried to wield its
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influence in the many sub committees comprising the CAFE programme and in the
European Parliament.
In the case of air quality, this complex configuration of players and interests meant
that there were many opportunities for ambitious actors to export ideas to the Euro-
pean level in the hope of shaping EU policy to their own needs. However, it also
meant that ideas exported to the European level were subject to numerous pressures
and tended to change over time.
The emergence of European air quality policy in the 1990s illustrates the complexities
of this dynamic. The EU started to play an ambitious role in environmental policy,
and used elements that conformed to Dutch policy, such as providing information
to the public, the responsibilisation of both producers and consumers, and the inte-
gration of various policy instruments. However, it also incorporated elements that
deviated from the Dutch line. Attention to air quality standards, for instance, was
fashionable in the Netherlands in the early 1980s, but by the 1990s the Dutch Govern-
ment had lost its enthusiasm. In the EU, however, environmental quality standards
were preferred because they allowed a harmonisation of standards between coun-
tries, and so it was considered that quality standards should be mandatory and valid
for the whole territory of the EU. This resulted in Directives containing provisions
about public information in order to raise awareness of the issue of air quality as well
as inflexible standards that were proclaimed for the whole of the EU.
This use of quality standards was alien to the way they were perceived in the Neth-
erlands. Dutch policy makers considered that air quality standards should be used as
flexible instruments, tailor-made for certain areas and based on sound scientific data.
Dutch pressure groups began to use the issue of air quality standards in court in order
to force the annulment of infrastructure projects with which they disagreed. For the
EU Commission on the other hand, the large number of complaints in Member States
indicated that the Directive had succeeded in raising awareness about air pollution.
For the Netherlands, it resulted in economic damage and stagnation. This is an exam-
ple of how interests of European administrative bodies and Member States may con-
flict. In the air quality clash and the run up to it, these conflicting interests became
manifest.
The European Commission and Member States had diverging interests, and even if
they promoted the same kind of policy instruments, they may have had quite differ-
ent intentions and ideas as to how to use them. The European Air Quality Directives
were a bricolage of different influences, philosophies, and opportunistic moves by
politicians and pressure groups. Dutch ideas provided some of the justifications
for the Directives, but the UK influenced the EU to create a strategy that was well
suited to the UK’s own national policy. This strategy had been drafted to combat a
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perceived surge in childhood asthma attributed to pollution frommotorized vehicles.
The UK had been concerned about urban air pollution ever since it did battle with
deadly smog in the 1950s, and it is easily conceivable that the UK public was pleased
with the EU air quality strategy. For Dutch politicians though the early activism on air
quality regulation struck like boomerang, decades later. Over the years, the original
ideas had been altered, combined with other ideas, translated and interpreted in a
way contrary to Dutch interests and intentions.
The same diffuse and often contradictory set of pressures and interests characterised the
debates on the CAFEDirective and Strategy from themiddle 2000s. The European Com-
mission intended for an ambitious long term strategic programandaDirective that upda-
ted the 1990s’ standards.Member States and pro-infrastructure pressure groupswere out
to obtain derogations and flexibility, resulting in disagreements between theCommission
and various Member States, disagreement between the various Directorates within the
European Commission and between the Council of Ministers and the European Parlia-
ment. The outcome was a compromise between these various interests that was presen-
ted as the best scientifically supported outcome, butwas in fact a similar kind of bricolage
of different philosophies and ideas as the 1990s’ Directives had been.
This research particularly focused on the construction of Air Quality Directives, but if
these findings are representative of decision making in the European arena, than the
image rises of a patchy policy arena in which it is easy for actors to influence the pro-
cess, but difficult to propose a policy or an idea without it being watered down and
changed significantly.
9.2.3 The Dutch backlash against Europeanisation
From the 1980s onwards, the Dutch Government had always seen the EU as a desir-
able arena to push for environmental policy and to voice demands for a greater envi-
ronment-related initiative. The European project was about harmonisation in the
service of the commonmarket, and it began to extend itself to the environmental field
in the 1980s when it dawned on European policy makers that such a market would
need the harmonisation of environmental quality. With its largely eco-efficient indus-
try and its open economy, the Netherlands welcomed this project, and was prepared
to transfer some of its sovereignty to Europe in exchange for a level playing field. The
thinking was that Dutch industries would not need to worry about their competitive
position if industries in other countries were subject to the same environmental laws.
This process by which more and more national legislation becomes influenced by
European law is known as Europeanisation.
The Netherlands had accepted Europeanisation willingly in the past because it saw
more opportunities than threats in such harmonisation. The air quality clash, how-
ever, illustrated the disadvantages of European regulation for Dutch policy makers.
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The level playing field suddenly became a burden, because the Netherlands was
under considerable environment-related pressure, and had to do more than other
countries tomaintain environmental quality.When the costs started to rise, the down-
sides of participating in the project and transferring sovereignty became apparent.
When the Dutch Government realised that the cost of compliance with these EU rules
would be high, it tried to get rid of them. However, the regulations proved to be far
more tenacious than the Dutch Government had originally envisioned.
The reason that the Government could not easily change the Air Quality Order had to
dowith the changing balance of power between policy makers and the judiciary. Euro-
pean law has a prominent place in the Dutch constitution: before the courts, European
laws rank higher than domestic laws, and theymay even be invoked directly if they are
not implemented in time or in the appropriate manner. The standards laid down in the
Air Quality Order were European in origin, and the highest administrative court – the
Council of StateAdministrative JurisdictionDivision – argued that itwould be forced to
ask questions of Brussels if Dutch policymakers were to come upwith a law containing
their own interpretation of the Directives, which would have incurred significant fur-
ther delays. In this fashion, the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division
would be able to block the introduction of new laws that reinterpreted the Air Quality
Order in a manner more amenable for the Dutch Government. This threat added
weight to the opinions of the Advisory Council. According to Duyvendak politicians
feared that the advice of the Advisory Division functioned as a prediction of what
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division would do.
The pro-infrastructure camp used this state of affairs to criticise Brussels and to por-
tray the European Union as an inflexible bureaucracy that ran roughshod over Dutch
interests. It also provided the ammunition to criticise the Council of State over its
stance that the law could not be amended easily because European law had prece-
dence over national law. Conservative parties played on these sentiments to urge
the Government to resist European demands for more air quality regulation.
The pro-infrastructure camp began to present the air quality regulation itself as the
real problem, and in the end the camp’s perception of the issue started to dominate
in policy-making circles. The regulation from Brussels was gradually presented as
undesirable meddling in Dutch affairs, and fuelled the resentment some politicians
already felt towards Europe. The episode caused the Dutch Government to cease lob-
bying for strong European air quality laws and instead to push for relaxation of the
rules. During the subsequent CAFE process in the 2000s, the Netherlands was one of
the prominent foot draggers: namely, those Member States that put the brakes on
environmental policy development in the EU. Apparently, it was easily forgotten that
the Netherlands bound itself to these European regulations and as a small, highly
populated and highly industrialised delta country benefitted rather more than most
from the environmental level playing field prescribed in Brussels.
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9.2.4 Conclusion: Europeanisation – from opportunity to threat
The Europeanisation of environmental policy has been of utmost importance for the
Netherlands. The Dutch themselves were major players in this process by uploading
their own policy philosophy to the EU level, as did other environmentally forward
States of the time like Germany and the Scandinavian countries. As a result, the
EU became an enthusiastic player on the environmental front. The EU overtook
the Netherlands in environmental ambition and this ambition is one of the reasons
why air quality became a sudden social problem in the Netherlands, even though
the Dutch Government fanned the flames of ambition in the first place.
EU policy making was steered by extremely diffuse sets of interests and actors. Mem-
ber States wielded significant influence, the various institutions of the EU itself made
their voices heard, the scientific community influenced EU decision making, and a
whole set of pro-business and pro-environmental pressure groups lobbied the various
institutions and even within the expert committees in which policy was developed.
This combination of factors made the EU a potentially unpredictable source of policy
and law. Its ambitions were high, but the philosophy onwhich it bases its policies and
the actors that drive certain policies was diffuse.
This constellation had never deterred Dutch policy makers from trying to use the
European political arena as a place to upload their own nationally preferred policies,
which they did successfully in the 1980s. However, the emergence of European policy
and law meant a relinquishment of national sovereignty. When no conflict existed
between European and Dutch intentions and regulation, this relinquishment caused
little concern. However, now that European environmental ambition exceeded
national environmental policy plans, the situationwas different. Once in the forefront,
the Netherlands became a foot dragger, and the air quality clash played an important
role in this transformation. The Netherlands experienced first-hand the conflicts that
could arise from a mismatch between European and national policy, and the safest
option therefore appeared to lie in limiting Europe’s ambition, which is what the
Dutch did during the CAFE programme. However, a retreat from the European arena
in the environmental field now would mean that the Netherlands will have even less
influence of the European policy outcomes than it already has.
. DEVELOPMENTS IN DUTCH POLICY AND ECOLOGICAL
MODERNISAT ION
In the following sections I investigate a number of Dutch political choices that contrib-
uted to the emergence of the air quality clash are under scrutiny. Already from the late
1970s, onward Dutch spatial planning had become legally intertwined with environ-
mental quality standards. This link meant that no new polluting activities could be
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carried out in an area where standards were exceeded, and this ruling was strict
because environmental quality standards had precedence over other administrative
plans. The eventual implementation of the European air quality rules in Dutch
national law in 2001 disregarded the inherent problems this intertwining could pose
when combined with strict environmental standards.
Moreover, Dutch policies embraced the formation of a strong and active subsidised
environmental movement during the 1980s and 1990s, with the aim of creating a
countervailing powerwith regard to economic interests. Themovement was intended
to act as a representative of environmental interests and to convince other segments of
society, notably industrial interests, of the importance of environmental protection.
During the 1980s, the Dutch Government gradually created an ambitious environ-
mental policy based around the idea of shared responsibility and consensus. These
consensus policies, however, met with both success and failure. The environmental
movement chose negotiation instead of action in the 1990s, but the activist Milieude-
fensie reverted to more conflictual tactics in the 2000s. Moreover, policy failed to ach-
ieve such a broad consensus in the field of transportation and mobility, as mobility
interests had no love for the new environmental direction. When Prime Minister Bal-
kenende openly adopted a pro-mobility policy in 2002, the environmental movement
and left-wing political parties reacted to this change. Air quality was already in the
picture due to the small upheaval regarding air pollution in Overschie, but it now
became a serious issue over which to criticise Government policy, especially after
the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division began to terminate infra-
structure projects.
9.3.1 The turn to ecological modernisation
In order to understand the choices made by Dutch politicians, it is necessary to exam-
ine them in the context of the turn to ecological modernisation in the 1980s. Ecological
modernisation is an environmental policy discourse that gained ground in the Neth-
erlands and established itself most firmly with the National Environmental Policy
Plan of 1989. The use of eco-modernistic discourse represented a move away from
earlier environmental discourse that was prevalent in the 1970s, and was characteri-
sed as ‘limits to growth’. In this ‘limits’ discourse, environmental pollution was con-
sidered to be the result of economic development and industrialisation, and therefore
it implied setting limits to economic growth as well. Economic growth should be
sacrificed for ecological wellbeing, and permits were considered the primary way
of regulating the environmental behaviour of polluters.
The policy discourse changed after modern managers and modern management the-
ories were introduced to the Ministry of the Environment (VROM) after a reorganisa-
tion of the Ministry in 1982. Minister Pieter Winsemius tried to combine effective
environmental protection with the ideals of deregulation that the ruling Cabinet at
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the time espoused. ‘Aided’ by the emergence of new transboundary environmental
problems that required a more comprehensive approach, he embarked on a policy
to foster responsibility for environmental protection in the important industrial sec-
tor, in other Ministerial departments, and among the public at large. He chose a more
horizontal approach rather than the ‘command and control’ regulatory methods
applied in the 1970s. Environmental policy became organised according to the prob-
lems that needed to be tackled instead of to the different environmental compart-
ments. Rather than regulating emissions to the air, water, and soil separately, for
instance, it was considered that regulation should target the problem of acidification,
an issue that involved both air and water pollution. Likewise, targets were set to com-
bat the spread of dangerous substances, waste control, and so on, in consultationwith
industry and other powerful economic sectors. These targets were often promulgated
in covenants – agreements between the Government and industrial sectors to meet
certain targets.
In order to make it appealing to a sceptical audience, ideas were developed to make
environmental protection economically attractive. If industries could be convinced
that environmental protection did not necessarily entail economic sacrifice, they
would then be more willing to engage in it. Part of this idea was that by preventing
environmental problems to arise in the first place, it would be possible to save clean-
up costs later. Because it was cast in these economic terms, a preventative environ-
mental policy became an attractive option to the representatives of economically
important sectors. Moreover, the possibility of technological innovation to help the
environment and to create a profit was highlighted in order to create a market for
environment-friendly technology. By applying these strategies, the Ministry tried
to achieve consensus and shared responsibility.
The notions of consensus-based policy, market-based approaches, prevention, and
the possibility of win-win trade-offs between the environment and the economy form
the bedrock of ecological modernisation. The eco-modernistic turn in the Netherlands
reached its summit with the National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP) in 1989. In
the NMP, a policy philosophy was combined with actions to improve the environ-
ment andwith a programme to change the environmental behaviour of various target
groups, such as the public, industry, transportation, and even foreign countries and
institutions like the EU. It established theNetherlands reputation as an environmental
front-runner in Europe until at least the year 2000.
Ecological modernist policy making conforms to both the idealistic leanings of Dutch
policy as well as to its pragmatic profit-oriented side. This dual nature is captured in
the Dutch expression ‘the reverend and the merchant’, which denotes both the Dutch
penchant for preaching to other countries as well as its tendency to put profit first
when push comes to shove. Ecological modernisation is appealing, as it promises that
both the reverend and the merchant may coexist peacefully and even cooperate.
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Not surprising in this light, ecological modernisation is a discoursewith two faces. On
the one hand, it may be used to argue for an ambitious far-reaching environmental
policy with the intention of restructuring the economy along sustainable lines. In
accordance with authors like Christoff (2000), I have called that branch strong ecolog-
ical modernisation. On the other hand, however, it may also be used to legitimise exis-
ting economic structures on the premise that economic growth is good for the
environment because it fosters technological innovation. In this weak form of ecolog-
ical modernisation, behavioural change is not necessary, but economy and ecology
should be managed in ways that make their coexistence possible.
The first political choice to be discussed in relation to this discourse is the implemen-
tation of the air quality standards and the incorporation of the link between quality
standards and administrative decisions. Subsequently, we discuss the failed ecolog-
ical modernisation of transport, the relationship between pressure groups and Gov-
ernment in ecological modernisation, and the return to ecological modernisation as a
result of the clash.
9.3.2 The implementation of the Air Quality Directives and the link
During the air quality clash, the connection between spatial planning and environ-
mental standards became a controversial issue. After the Council of State started to
annul decisions to permit infrastructure projects, legal scholars pointed out that the
reasons for the annulment should be sought in the Dutch legal system itself. Under
Dutch environmental/spatial law, administrative decisions should ‘observe’ the limit
values laid down in quality standards, and that meant that permits should be refused
if they were to lead to lower environmental quality. The pro-infrastructure camp
argued that this connection must be broken in order to pull spatial development back
on track.
The link itself preceded the Dutch turn to ecological modernisation. In fact, it bears the
hallmark of the limits to growth discourse from the 1970s, because it imposed clear
limits on development. It made further polluting activity impossible in areas where
the limits were being exceeded. However, the connection was kept during the turn to
ecological modernisation. One of the aims of the VROM Ministry was to integrate
environmental considerations in other areas, and the connection ensured that the
environment was taken into account where spatial planning in the Netherlands
was concerned. To that extent, the link was compatible with ecological modernistic
policy making. However, the role played by quality standards in Dutch environmen-
tal policy making was gradually transformed in the 1980s. Quality standards were
considered useful especially in ‘area specific policy making’, and could be used,
for instance, to safeguard natural areas against development. As mentioned above,
quality standards needed to be used flexibly and not create toomuch friction between
developmental interests and environmental protection. They had to be based on
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strong scientific data, and economic interests needed to be taken into account when
standards were to be imposed.
The European air quality standards, however, did not exhibit these qualities.
They were binding countrywide, without feasibility being taken into proper
account, and because of the Dutch link, they had the effect that large tracts of
the Netherlands were suddenly closed off from further development. The Min-
ister in charge of the implementation in 2001 Minister Jan Pronk, however,
had not intended such strict consequences, and he himself and later his successor
Pieter van Geel chose a pragmatic solution. They would not construct new infra-
structure in ‘sensitive destinations’, those areas where people spent a consider-
able amount of time. In non-sensitive destinations, however, areas where people
did not live and did not spend time, the reasoning was that construction could
take place. It was felt that the standards protected human health, which was
not at stake in such areas. Moreover, in the explanatory Memorandum, the
responsibility for the policy that related to the most problematic pollutant, Par-
ticulate Matter (PM10), was taken away from municipalities and lower adminis-
trative bodies, and laid down at state level. This would release the lower
administrative bodies from having to comply with the strict consequences of
the link, and only require them to apply the As Low As can Reasonably be Ach-
ieved (ALARA) principle. Such a provision came down to a permission to weigh
and balance economic and environmental interests.
Nevertheless, these pragmatic solutions were rejected by the Council of State Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Division in its three seminal verdicts, and by the Advisory Divi-
sion in answer to a letter by Pieter van Geel dated 30 September 2004. The Court’s
interpretation restored the link as a strict limit regarding the ability to pollute in con-
taminated areas. It pointed out that the European Directives mentioned the whole of
the EU territory, and that neither the Directives nor the Air Quality Order made the
distinction between inhabited or uninhabited areas.
The foregoing raises the question as to why the Dutch Government chose such a strict
implementation in 2001 and incorporated the link. The argument to exempt lower
administrative bodies from responsibility for PM10was explicated in the Explanatory
Memorandum (though not in the law itself) but the distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive destinations was not. The reasons for this implementation lay in polit-
ical decisions made by Minister Jan Pronk as well as in the pragmatic de-politicising
nature of ecological modernisation.
The Air Quality Order, drafted in 2001 by Jan Pronk as Minister of VROM, was a
lower regulatory instrument that needed to be based on a particular law: the Dutch
Law on Environmental Management. Because it was a lower regulatory instrument,
however, the Order did not need to be approved by the Dutch Parliament.
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Pronk explained that the strategy was to implement the European air quality rules
dutifully and to renegotiate them later. He felt that his hand would be much stronger
if he could show the European Commission that the Dutch had good intentions but
were not able to comply with the standards. Moreover, as Environmental Minister, he
was also trying to organise a deal on climate change measures in Europe that he con-
sidered important for the Netherlands. By showing that the Netherlands implemen-
ted European environmental law faithfully, he hoped to strengthen his position on
this file as well. He might also have been influenced by what he saw in Overschie.
He considered air quality an important subject in terms of public health, and a strong
air quality order might bring about measures to alleviate the situation in areas suffer-
ing bad air quality. These political motives explain the strict implementation to some
extent, but do not account for everything. For instance, amore careful implementation
without the explicit link could have prevented a number of problems later, since the
link as such was not required by European law.
A more structural explanation for the implementation is provided by referring to
the nature of Dutch environmental policy. From Winsemius onwards, ecological
modernisation became entrenched in it. This discourse emphasised the need to
resolve environmental problems through policy integration and through consen-
sus by shared responsibility. Firstly, the link was retained because it ensured that
air quality considerations were integrated with spatial planning. In the Dutch sys-
tem, integration was considered crucial and even Van Geel defended the link by
stating that it ensured quality considerations were taken into account early on in
the process.
Secondly, the link was retained because no one thought that such a strict rule would
be applied so rigorously. This counter-intuitive notion has its roots in ecological mod-
ernisation and in the way it was employed in Dutch policy. Characteristic of Dutch
environmental policy is that none of the parties involved should feel that unreason-
able demands are being made upon them. The silent agreement that parties should
‘do all that is reasonably possible’ is considered a prerequisite for the consensus
and for the sharing of responsibility in tackling environmental questions. In principle,
such an understanding is possible, because ecological modernisation considers that
environmental problems may be solved with adequately clever management and a
combination of economic growth and environmental innovation.
During the 1990s, many parties subscribed to this policy of gradual reform and its
promise of win- win solutions. Dutch policies met with success abroad, and domes-
tically they ushered in a kind of environmental polder-politics in which former
adversaries started to discuss their conflicts at the negotiation table rather than
through aggressive public campaigns. The consensus policies led to a depoliticisa-
tion of environmental conflict in many areas, and the consensus approach seemed
successful.
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Moreover, Dutch ecological modernisation was internationalist in outlook. It consid-
ered large-scale transboundary problems to be more urgent than the local problem of
urban air pollution caused by transport and traffic. Solutions to environmental prob-
lems could only be achieved through international cooperation – for instance, within
the EU.
Both developments caused policy makers to respond phlegmatically to new research
that indicated PM10 was possibly a far greater threat than had previously been con-
sidered. When results of this research became available in the 1990s, PM10 became a
policy priority, but concrete policy never got off the ground in the Netherlands, com-
pared to, for instance, in the UK. Policy was promised in the form of a memorandum
on air quality, but this memorandum never materialised. A cost-effective policy could
not be devised due to the uncertainties surrounding PM10, and as a consequence, suc-
cessive Dutch Cabinets chose to leave policy making to the EU. Even when the Euro-
pean rules were agreed upon, no sense of urgency was evident, and policy making
was left to the implementation of the Directives in the Air Quality Order.
The same dispassionate approach characterised the Air Quality Order 2001. A strict
implementation was not intended, but at the same time it was not prevented, the rea-
son being that no one could imagine air quality would lead to such a heated debate.
VanGeel for instance defended his policies by stating that it would be unreasonable to
demand that the Netherlands comply in full with the air quality rules. Among Dutch
policy makers, the notion prevailed that full compliance with the standards could not
be required, and therefore the standards could not fully apply. The ExplanatoryMem-
orandum asserted confidently that the standards would be revised downwards upon
evaluation. In hindsight, however, such an assertion was naïve, since the EU would
not revise standards if only the Dutch were seriously bothered by them. This illus-
trates the reigning Dutch mentality of the time, which held that such standards could
not plausibly be considered mandatory.
9.3.3 The failed ecological modernisation of transport and marginalisation
of the environment
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the prevailing consensus on environmental policy lulled
policy makers to sleep in the case of air quality policy. However, the environmental
consensus was also being gradually undermined on a terrain that would prove to be
crucial for the air quality clash: transport and traffic. In the early 1990s the Govern-
ment tried to introduce ecological modernisation in the areas of transport and traffic.
Infrastructure development to accommodate traffic growthwould be restricted, while
public transport and rail transport would be accommodated.
At the same that that the NMP was released in 1989, the Dutch Government made
public a first version of a plan in which future developments for transport and traffic
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were outlined. This plan was called the Second Structural Scheme for Traffic and
Transportation (SVV2 1989). The final version of the SVV2 saw the light of day in
1991. This plan included numerous concepts and ideas that could be traced to the
NMP. I consider it an attempt to modernise traffic and transport in an ecological man-
ner. The Government did not intend to curb the expansion of mobility per se, but con-
sidered that this expansion could be achieved by extending public transportation and
by other environmentally friendly means. The aim of the SVV2 was to solve conges-
tion problems without expanding roads but by diverting mobility towards public
transportation. One of the core ideas was to have motorists pay for the use of roads
by way of road pricing.
Road pricing was an eco-modernist idea because it used the pricing mechanism to
encourage behavioural change in an environmental direction, without limiting free-
dom of choice. However, this ideamet with fierce opposition by the ANWB and in the
1990s by the VVD. The motorist’s association vehemently opposed it, and though the
idea was mentioned in the final version of the plan, its concrete implementation was
postponed.
However, other measures to restrict auto-mobility were introduced. Road construc-
tion could only take place after a thorough process of stakeholder consultation, after
parking space became restricted, and after the use of public transportation had been
encouraged. By and large, however, the SVV2 was not a success, as motorists felt that
their interests were being neglected, and they remained wary of road- pricing sche-
mes. The SVV2 had an environmental dimension but – as behoves eco-modernistic
policy – it also had an economic aspect. While driving ought to be discouraged,
theNetherlands should nevertheless become amain hub for European transportation.
Transport should preferably be undertaken by river or rail, but it most certainly
should still grow.
During the 1990s, the environmental ideals of this new transport policy were gradu-
ally relinquished. To achieve a sustainable transport policy, the SVV2 aimed at a beha-
vioural change on the part of motorists, but this ambition was gradually dropped.
Successive Cabinets paid more attention to the rival goal of transforming the Neth-
erlands into a strong transportation country and expanding Rotterdam’s main ports
and Schiphol Airport. In 2001, the last attempt at introducing some form of road pric-
ing in the successor to the SVV2was torpedoed in Parliament by the VVD. This last act
marked the failure of ecological modernisation in the transport sector. Where other
economic sectors adapted, transport and traffic remained remarkably resilient.
When Jan Peter Balkenende took over the helm of a new conservative Cabinet in 2002,
he made an unambiguous choice in favour of auto-mobility and against road pricing:
namely, subsidies for cleaner cars were abolished, and roads were to be expanded
again. Eco-modernistic rhetoric about a sustainable transport policy remained, but
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was used primarily for an audience of foreign institutions such as the EU. The Neth-
erlands has no automotive industry, and EU regulation that made cars cleaner could
still count on the Netherlands unequivocal support. Nationally, however, having
more asphalt was the preferred solution to the social problem of congestion, an issue
that resonated strongly with the political parties in Balkenende’s Cabinet, the liberal
conservative VVD, and the populist LPF. Large scale infrastructure development
plans were announced, mostly to stimulate the Dutch transport sector and to appease
motorists who resented road congestion.
These policies upset the reigning environmental consensus based on the concern to
combine environmental and economic values. Conflict between health and environ-
mental interests and transport and traffic interests had previously never led to such a
clash, because the environmental movement never openly selected this area as a high-
profile target. The flagship of this Cabinet’s mobility policy, the 2003 Emergency Law
on Road Expansion, elicited angry responses from environmental parties that deman-
ded that the provisions of the Air Quality Order remain in full. The Council of State
Advisory Division observed as well that this policy went against the grain of tradi-
tional Dutch policy and Dutch international obligations regarding climate change.
The Council of State reiterated that the provisions of the Air Quality Order would
remain valid in full.
The clear-cut choices for mobility and budget cuts for the environment strengthened
the opposition against the Government. The situation in ‘Overschie’ had already
prompted campaigns for speed reductions, but the environmental movement now
started to campaign seriously against Balkenende’s policies.
The conflict was fuelled by the failed ecological modernisation of the transport sector
along with the subsequent choice of the first Balkenende Cabinet to relinquish eco-
modernisation in this policy domain. Auto-mobility had in the past been excluded
from heated debate, mostly because so many Dutch people owned cars. Environmen-
talists feared that if mobility were touched, they risked losing the support of the pop-
ulation. However, when the search for win-win solutions was dropped, the
environmental movement and the pro-health parties no longer had anything to gain
from the environmental consensus, besides marginalisation. They rallied against Bal-
kenende’s policies, portraying them as grossly negligent, given there were so many
victims of air pollution. After the court cases emerged in late 2004, the tide turned
in their favour, and the parties were able to accuse the Government of legal incom-
petence in addition to negligence.
Seen in this light, the air quality clash was a reaction against the marginalisation of
environmental interests and the unbridled expansion of mobility and infrastructure
development during the first decade of the new century. This study illustrates that
the air quality clash is a significant event in the history of environmental conflict,
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because it drew transport and mobility – which had managed earlier to escape
unscathed – into the ambit of this conflict. In the air quality clash, auto-mobility
did not emerge totally victorious. The public became aware that living along a busy
road could be dangerous, and this conviction was translated into policy in 2008. It
became illegal to construct schools and homes for the elderly close to highways if
the air quality standards were exceeded. Moreover, as will be discussed further,
the bar for research into the harmful effects of road construction and expansion
was raised significantly.
9.3.4 The relationship between pressure groups and the VROM Ministry
The eventual mobilisation against the Government’s policies was actually in line with
the philosophy governing eco-modernist policy. Within ecological modernisation,
consensus is sought to resolve environmental conflicts. Such a consensus that would
deal equitably with the interests of economic development and the environment
could only be achieved if representatives of those two interests reached a certain bal-
ance of power. Therefore, Dutch eco-modernist policies included the active sponsor-
ing of a countervailing power in the form of a strong environmental movement.
Through subsidies and granting environmentalist movements a seat at the table, this
power was both strengthened and co-opted within the decision-making structures of
the Dutch corporate consensus democracy. Dutch law provided ample opportunity
for NGOs to stand as representatives of environmental interests.
When the Balkenende Cabinet broke the environmental consensus by choosing
squarely formobility and infrastructure and the Council of State Administrative Juris-
diction Division started to annul infrastructure projects, this active and professiona-
lised environmental movement decided to mobilise the public and other pressure
groups to start court proceedings against infrastructural projects. Without this strat-
egy, the pro-health camp could never have garnered enough political support for its
clean-air measures. This strategy was highly successful, both in terms of having pro-
jects annulled and in securing extensive media coverage of the clean-air problem and
the environmental campaigns against it.
Policy makers, however, were not amused. After a significant legal defeat regarding a
road expansion project near Leiderdorp in 2007, politicians complained strongly
about what they saw as an unfair strategy. The pro-health interests could not win
in Parliament, and so they sought a second opportunity in the courtroom. The envi-
ronmental movement earned the reputation of being ‘professional trouble makers’,
and was considered the culprit as regards the sluggish decision making around
infrastructure.
When the clash drew to a close in 2008, political parties on the right (CDA and VVD)
demanded a cut in subsidies for environmental movements, one of the main reasons
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being their protests against road construction. In particular Milieudefensie – the
environmental organisation that had pushed the legal strategy hardest – was
targeted.
These events demonstrate problemswith the eco-modernist line of cultivating a coun-
ter movement. On the one hand, this line was facetious because the environmental
movement was supported as long as it remained on the VROM Ministry’s leash.
The countervailing power was created precisely to give environmental interests a
voice, but when it did speak out it was silenced. This called into question the Mini-
stry’s intentions of financing these pressure groups. On the other hand, it took away
the independence of pressure groups because they became ‘addicted’ to subsidies,
which might have influenced their choice of campaign topics. The idea of raising a
strong environmental group actually reduced their independent capacity for action,
because they became dependent on the interests that it should have been combating.
The strategy for funding environmental pressure groups turned out to be that of
divide and conquer rather than allowing for the emergence of a true representative
of environmental interests. Environmental responsibilisation was cultivated within
the context of ecological modernisation, but only to the extent that it did not bite
the hand that fed it.
Open access to the courts for environmental movements was similarly criticised. The
pro-infra parties hoped that the Elverding Commission, set up during the clash to
investigate decision making, would lead to a reduction in points of access at which
environmental movements could initiate legal proceedings. The outcry following
the actions of the environmental movement in this case shows the catch-22 character
of such policies. A critical pressure movement is funded as long as it is not critical and
does not begin to apply actual pressure. This is reminiscent of a classic scene from the
book Catch-22, where privileges to question policy were granted only to the people
who never asked any questions. Apparently, open access to the courts and the crea-
tion of a countervailing force was seen as beneficial, but only until it was actually used
to resist Government policy.
9.3.5 The resolution of the clash and the return of ecological modernisation
Even though the environmental consensus was shattered, the eventual resolution
consisted of a return to eco-modernistic consensus policy. From 2005 onwards,
the Government sought a regulatory solution to the problem, but it would only
be able to celebrate this in 2009. After four long years of stalemate, the National
Cooperation Plan Air Quality (NSL) was submitted to the EU in June 2008, and
the Commission accepted it a year later as a sufficiently sound policy plan. This
acceptance was necessary to be eligible for a Commission sanctioned postponement
of the obligation to comply with the standards. Postponement was granted the fol-
lowing April.
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The NSL quite literally balanced the interests of infrastructure development with
improvements in air quality. In this long-term plan, projects considered harmful
would be offset by measures that had beneficial effects. This move would result in
meeting the standards for NO2 in 2015 and for Particulate Matter in 2011. The NSL
approach was not popular when it was originally proposed and discussed in 2006,
but gradually it became seen as the only viable solution.
In terms of ecological modernisation, the plan contained many features that confor-
med to this philosophy. It delivered flexibility to administrative bodies because they
would no longer be confrontedwith areas inwhich construction remained impossible
due to air quality exceedances. It also conformed to the assumption that good envi-
ronmental quality could be achieved without making development impossible, and –
if correctly managed – beneficial measures could compensate for the harm done by
development. The desire for a pre-emptive approach to environmental policy was
met by the NSL as well, because before development could take place, it needed to
be determined by which measure the project would be compensated.
From the perspective of environmental protection, the NSL represented a retreat from
the earlier, less flexible legal consequences of air quality standards. Before the pro-
grammatic approach was introduced, construction projects in areas where air quality
was poor were simply annulled by the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division. Environmental quality standards were considered to represent absolute
limits below which no further deteriorating was allowed under any circumstances.
However, in the face of the annulments caused by the air quality standards, these
legal consequences became untenable. TheNSLmay therefore be interpreted as a plan
aimed primarily atmaking infrastructure development possible again, and that is pre-
cisely how the environmental movement saw it.
However, an interpretation that considers the outcome of the clash a complete victory
for construction and mobility interests, does not take into account the strong shift in
air quality policy during the clash. Before the conflict, no funds were available,
because the Ministry of VROM was facing budget cuts. Environmental protection
was treated with animosity by the first Balkenende Cabinet of 2003, and its interests
were marginalised. Only after 2005 did concerns regarding clean air and sustainabil-
ity issues return to the top of the political agenda. Large amounts of funds for air qual-
ity protection were made available and the sustainability chapter of important policy
documents such as themobilitymemorandumwas strengthened. Even the controver-
sial issue of road pricing was debated again as a possible solution and this policy pro-
posal was even included in the NSL.3
3. Though as we now know, it was not implemented with the NSL, again due to severe opposition from
motorists and pro-mobility parties and the VVD.
9 Conclusion: analysing the air quality clash
The NSL represented an important policy change. It was essentially a more compre-
hensive way of dealing with clashes between economic development and environ-
mental wellbeing, because the harmful effects of projects had to be considered not
in a piecemeal fashion but in light of the comprehensive pattern of development.
Environmental considerations needed to be taken into account when thewhole devel-
opmental agenda of the Netherlands was devised, instead of only on a project-by-
project basis.
Ultimately, the emergence of the NSL was a victory for the pro-infrastructure camp,
but in the years preceding it environmental considerations had trumped economic
considerations. This balance of power was unprecedented in the Netherlands, and
could not last in the end. Socially and politically, there was no support for such a
sweeping environmental turnaround. Moreover, it was a victory with strings
attached, because when the Government nowadays decides to develop infrastructure
it must ensure that it has a place in the overarching plan.
9.3.6 Conclusion: ecological modernisation as cause and resolution of the clash
When viewed over a long period, the trend in Dutch environmental policy is aptly
characterised by the pendulum metaphor. During its inception period in the 1970s,
Dutch discourse on the topic was starkly antagonistic and eco-centric, and it contai-
ned apocalyptic ideas of environmental ruin if economic growthwas not limited. Eco-
logical modernisation weakened the rhetorical apocalyptic edges, and by allowing
room for economic considerations, managed to provide a more amenable and argu-
ably more effective policy discourse. Ecological modernisation was a successful envi-
ronmental discourse, and it gradually picked up in ambition again to reach a peak
lasting from 1989 until 1992. Ecological modernistic arguments were now employed
to challenge seriously the existing economic structures. Not only could economic pro-
gress and environmental protection coexist but economic growth also became concep-
tualised as being dependent on environmental wellbeing. This resulted in large-scale
policy plans on numerous terrains including industrial development as well as trans-
port, mobility, and spatial planning. In the field of mobility, for instance, attempts
were made to collectivise transport to a large degree, and to persuade motorists to
leave their cars behind and commute by train.
During the 1990s, the ecological modernisation of the transport sector was put to
the test and gradually the intention to change the behaviour of motorists was relin-
quished. Economic considerations became more important and congestion became
perceived as a nuisance but also as a threat to economic prosperity. Under Balkenen-
de’s first Cabinet, environmental intentions were by and large forfeited, and only lip
service was paid to ecological modernistic concerns. In practice, this policy had been
abandoned, and the Government introduced an ambitious programme of road
expansion and infrastructure development.
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The air quality clash was a backlash against the forfeit of environmental ambitions in
the Netherlands. Pressure groups, pro-environmental parties, and to some extent the
Council of State as well rallied against their relinquishment. This backlash could only
be solved by a return to ecological modernistic storylines that emphasised consensus
and the possibility to reconcile economic and ecological concerns.
The return of a weak form of ecological modernisation was a step forwards again
from an environmental point of view. In 2010 it apparently still had the potential
to reconcile competing interests in environmental conflicts. However, debates during
the air quality clash illustrated that weak ecological modernisation was embraced
owing to the lack of anything better. Many actors complained of the triteness of eco-
logical modernistic win-win storylines, such as those regarding environmental pro-
tection as an opportunity for growth, or improving competitiveness by setting
high environmental standards. The programmatic approach was a legal novelty,
but was not popular initially with either the pro-infrastructure camp or the pro-health
camp. Politicians from the pro-infra camp complained about the detailed calculations
that became necessary, and the pro-health camp considered the NSL an ‘ultimate
smuggling tactic’ in order to ‘calculate the country clean’. Though necessary, the
NSL’s compromise was not wholeheartedly embraced. It was a different kind of con-
sensus than the one ecological modernisation had managed to forge in the 1980s
between environmental and economic interests and it lacked its earlier beguiling
vision.
. THE AIR QUALITY CLASH AND TRANSIT IONS IN THE LEGAL ORDER
A final crucial development in the emergence of the clash was the legal interpretation
that the Council of State gave to the Dutch Air Quality Order. This interpretation was
strict, and focused on the letter of the law, ignoring the intentions of the Government
that had drafted the AQO. The termination of high-profile infrastructure projects,
notably road expansion and commercial and residential zones resulted in air quality
becoming an important topic in policy making circles and among economically
important sectors of Dutch society.
In addition, the Advisory Division of the Council of State thwarted attempts by the
Balkenende Cabinets tomake quick amendments to the AQO. It blocked the easyway
out, and necessitated an altogether new approach to air quality standards. This pro-
grammatic approach served to restore the consensus, and functioned as the official
application to the European Commission to grant the Netherlands the required post-
ponement so that it could get its infrastructure development back on track.
The judgements of the Council of State fit within a pattern of increasingly strict draf-
ting, implementation, and interpretation of air quality rules. The European Union
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issued strict air quality regulation, the regulation was implemented by the Dutch
national Government even more rigorously, and, finally, the regulation was inter-
preted strictly by the Council of State. This pattern raised the question of whether
the air quality clash could be viewed as signs of an emerging trend in the legal order
to prioritise precaution when dealing with environmental and health hazards.
I have called this putative new legal way of handling pollution and other hazards
the legality of precaution. This term signifies a discourse within the legal order in
which damage prevention is deemed so important that preventative measures
should go even beyond cost-effectiveness. In this type of legality, considerable
attention is paid to the potential victims of environmental and health threats, as
they are seen as victims of mismanagement by the authorities, and are considered
having a right not to be exposed to damage. A typology has been made of the legal-
ity of precaution, and to make comparison possible it is contrasted with an earlier
legal discourse – that of risk and compensation. These typologies may be found in
table 2, in chapter 1.
In order to answer the question of whether the demand for precaution is increasing
within the legal order, we need to assess where we find precautionary elements in
the acts, verdicts, and policies of the institutions that make up the legal order: in
other words, where did this legality become visible before, during, and after the
air quality clash? Below, I will discuss the emergence of a legality of precaution
in the EU, the Dutch Government, the pro-health camp, and finally the Council
of State.
9.4.1 Precaution in the EU air quality policy
In a discussion regarding precaution in the EU air quality policy, two policies merit
consideration: the Framework andDaughter Directives of the 1990s, and theDirective
proposed in the context of the CAFÉ strategy. In regard to the first Air Quality Direc-
tives, the findings indicate that many elements of a precautionary legality were pre-
sent in these policies and the way they were drafted. The precautionary principle was
never mentioned as such, but the standards were based on science that was uncertain
at the time. The knowledge concerning particulate pollution came from epidemiolog-
ical studies that showed a correlation between air pollution and premature mortality.
This means that premature mortality and high level of pollution were often found to
occur together in the same population. However, this connection did not in itself dis-
play a causal relationship, but the correlation became quickly regarded as causative.
Science at the time was – and actually in many regards still is – in the dark about the
exact mechanism through which PM10 harms the body and which of its components
are most harmful. The UK pollution watchdog COMEAP used precautionary consid-
erations to argue for a rigorous standard, and its judgement that it would be impru-
dent not to treat the correlation as a causative relation was swiftly embraced in the EU
as well.
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The standard for PM10 was actually a compromise, as there were indications that
PM2.5, a smaller fraction of PM, was more harmful than PM10, but there was even
less information regarding it. This quick regulation of a pollutant about which so little
was known, but which was feared for the damage it might do, is consistent with a
legality of precaution: namely, threats must be thwarted before there is scientific cer-
tainty of their exact nature.
The Directives were defended by pointing to the long-term effects of exposure to air
pollution and to the insidious effects it might have in the long run. Short-term damage
was determined to be negligible, but the prevention of long-term damage was con-
sidered. In order to argue for the Directive, the Euro-Parliamentarians drafting the
report for the European Parliament invoked the image of the European citizen left
to breath poor-quality air. The responsibility of European institutions to put an
end to this situation was highlighted, and the situation was considered shameful.4
The Directives relied on the insights of the 5th Environmental Action Programme,
which called for a more holistic approach to policy making as well as for the raising
of public awareness. The policy constituted by the 1996 Framework Directive, and
fleshed out in subsequent Daughter Directives, took into account more pollutants
than had previously been considered. Instead of only setting minimum standards,
it also stipulated strategic requirements, among which was the provision of informa-
tion. The raising of public awareness was a key element of this policy, as citizens
should be knowledgeable regarding the remaining air pollution problems.
As far as I know, citizen’s groups were not represented at the negotiation table or in
the consultation phase of the Directive, but environmental groups were present in
force. Together with representatives of environmental Ministries, they formed a block
of actors speaking on behalf of environmental interests. Accordingly, even the envi-
ronmental lobby group EEB conceded that environmental interests were strongly
represented, in excess of economic ones.
The air quality policy was not the only one in which precautionary concerns were
taken seriously. In the late 1990s, new and ambitious holistic approaches were esta-
blished as well as policies intended to raise awareness among various actors. More-
over, in 2000 the Commission released its milestone communication regarding
the precautionary principle (European Commission 2000b). I consider that the eco-
modernist ideas that gained a firm foothold within the 5th EAP made it possible
for such policies to appear.
4. Incidentally, the Parliamentarian drafting the report was from London, the city most discussed during
the asthma scare that hit the UK at the beginning of the 1990s. For a complete description of this process,
see chapter 3.
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Even thoughmany precautionary elementsmay be pointed out, a number of elements
in the Directives fit better in the legality of risk and solidarity. Public participationwas
encouraged, but the Directives themselves relied on expert knowledge. Moreover,
Directive 99/30/ECwas defended by a cost-benefit assessment. Conducting this type
of analysis to determine policy was paradigmatic of a risk and solidarity approach, in
which cost-effectiveness was a major consideration. In this instance, a number of
things went wrong with the analysis, and it provided much too rosy a picture of
the possibility for reduction; nevertheless, it was still an element better suited to risk
and solidarity than precaution.
On thewhole, a legality of precaution was clearly gaining ground in the EU’s air qual-
ity policy from the 1990s; however, an opposite trend is detected when we review the
CAFÉ strategy of 2005 and the concomitant policies. The proposal for CAFE from
2001 still spoke of the precautionary principle, but it could not be found in the final
text from 2005. Instead, the cost-benefit element was much more prominent and
important than in the establishment of the Directives in the 1990s. Outcomes of the
cost-benefit analysis were used here by groups representing economic interests as
arguments for postponing the process and adjusting the level of ambition down-
wards. The role of scientific expertisewas reinforced in CAFE by an intricate and com-
plex set-up of committees dominated by experts and policy makers. Political concerns
began to dominate eventually, but expert science was considered to be decisive. Pub-
lic participation was encouraged, but only to provide the programme with extended
legitimacy.
All in all, in the case of CAFE, scepticalMember States such as the Netherlands as well
as industrial and business groups managed to prevent further precautionary policies.
One of the arguments brought forward by actors arguing for less environmental
ambitionwas that the uncertainty of the data should dissuade the Commission to take
far-reaching measures. This squarely contradicted the precautionary argument that
uncertainty should not be a reason not to take measures. The storyline that flexibility
was needed in order to avert high costs managed to carry the day eventually, a clear
sign that the precautionary legality is struggling nowadays in Europe.
9.4.2 Precaution in the Dutch air quality policy
On the basis of findings in this study, a number of interesting conclusions on the
Dutch Government’s political and discursive commitments regarding precaution
may be drawn. In the field of air quality policy, successive Dutch Cabinets have
not demonstrated a clear propensity towards precaution – on the contrary. On the
national level, the Dutch Government dealt with the issue in pragmatic ways. For
instance, ambitious policies were proposed in the early 1980s, but when the EU
became involved the Dutch Government trailed the EU developments. More ambi-
tious standards were sometimes proposed, but always to an extent that they could
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be easily met. It is notable that when the new scientific findings regarding PM reached
the Netherlands, the Government did not revise its policies immediately. It proclai-
med PM10 a priority, but when no cost-effective policy could be found it decided
to wait for Europe. The Dutch Government tended to save precautionary rhetoric
for the international arena. The Dutch strategy had been one of enlightened self-inter-
est from the start, and by and large it remained that way. TheNetherlands displayed a
‘merchant and reverend’ kind of approach, preaching for strong environmental
protection, but always making sure it did not harm economic interests. A legality
of precaution demands more, because it argues for prevention against all – or almost
all – costs.
The Netherlands did support the 1990s Directives, because it did not want to lose face
in terms of its ecological interests. However, when problems began to loom on the
horizon, the Dutch Government turned quickly to favour renegotiation and post-
ponement of the standards. Even Jan Pronk, a noted proponent of the precautionary
principle, advocated postponing implementation of the standards due to his concern
regarding the cost-effectiveness of the policies.
In general, the Dutch Government showed few signs of a precautionary legality in its
air quality policy. The closest to precaution the Government came was with the pro-
mulgation of the Air Quality Order 2001, and Jan Pronk chose an implementation of
the EU Directives that was more strict than necessary. This line was chosen partly
because the Minister himself became involved in the Overschie situation, and
believed that lowering the speed limit and halting the expansion of roads was a good
idea, in addition to his other strategic considerations.
These considerations notwithstanding, it is clear that the Air Quality Order was de
facto a precautionary piece of regulation, because it was based on the precautionary
European standards and added the forceful link between air quality standards and
administrative decisions. The link was precautionary because it prevented further
activities in polluted regions, regardless of economic costs. The Air Quality Order
mentioned this link explicitly, and placed an onerous burden on lower administrative
bodies. These precautionary aspects, however, were not intended as such. They were
unintended effects of stringent EU regulation, hastily implemented without taking
into account the particularly Dutch legal regime in this area, and with too much con-
fidence that dire legal consequences would not emerge.
Whenwe look at the level of discourse, strong ecological modernisation has overt pre-
cautionary tendencies. Weak ecological modernisation has precautionary elements as
well, but to a lesser degree, and it is compatible with pragmatic, less ambitious envi-
ronmental policy. The National Environmental Policy Plan and the Second Structural
Scheme Traffic and Transport (SVV2) were examples of strong eco-modernist dis-
course, and they included precautionary elements. The strong eco-modernist
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elements of behaviour changes recommended by the NMP were not taken very far,
however, and the SVV2 failed to achieve the ecological modernisation of transport
and mobility.
The Dutch Government returned gradually from the more participatory, communal,
and holistic policies unveiled in those early documents to a more pragmatic and cal-
culative way of policy making in the 1990s and 2000s. The resolution of the air quality
clash was a case in point. The balancing exercise that was the NSL fitted much better
in the legality of risk and compensation than in that of precaution. It had elements of
both, but the calculative framework stood out, and that was the most characteristic
feature of the legality of risk and solidarity.
Furthermore, it is conspicuous that on the level of rhetoric, but also on the level of
legal and regulatory practice, the limits to growth discourse was more precautionary
than the ecological modernisation approach. The limits to growth discourse did not
lead to ambitious environmental results, because the actual standards proposed were
not overly stringent, due to sustained opposition from economic interests. The rhe-
toric, however, and even the specific character of Dutch environmental spatial policy,
was more precautionary than the more flexible practices currently favoured. On the
whole, the Dutch Government did not embrace a precautionary legality, either on the
level of air quality policy or on the level of policy discourse. It preferred solutions that
fit in the legality of risk and solidarity.
9.4.3 Precautionary legality and the pro-health camp: the case for a right to clean air
It is no surprise that precautionary arguments are most forcefully used by actors
belonging to the pro-health camp, since they serve its partisan interests; their impact,
however, should not be underestimated.
In 1999 municipal health services had already framed the issue of air quality in Over-
schie in a precautionary manner. The metaphor it used was that living in Overschie
was equal to the passive smoking of 17 cigarettes a day. A small risk was made imme-
diately tangible and threatening, by associating air quality with smoking. This met-
aphor infused the situation in Overschie with the sense of danger and harm that the
presentation of numerical values could not have done.
During the air quality conflict itself, the pro-health camp used a variety of arguments
against the Government, accusing them of harming the health of the citizens, having
no eye for the plight of residents living near highways, pursuing ‘sickening’ policies of
road expansion, and of not doing everything possible to minimise damage. This mes-
sage contained precautionary elements such as the idea that the occurrence of damage
was a disgrace, that citizens were being treated with indifference, and that the Gov-
ernment should prove it was doing everything possible to protect Dutch citizens.
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These elements were all to be expected in a political struggle over an environmental
issue, but the pro-health camp also used specific legal argumentation to drive its point
home. According to the environmental movement, citizens had a right to clean air,
and the Air Quality Order as well as the verdicts of the Council of State proved as
much. Using this storyline, the environmental movement mobilised residents and
other pressure groups to start proceedings against administrative decisions that allo-
wed infrastructural development. The Council of State never framed its annulments
in such a fashion, but the law and the verdicts could be seen to lend credence to such
an argument. It was a precautionary argument, because framing clean air as a legal
right promoted health concerns over others. From legal scholar Ronald Dworkin we
know that rights act as trump cards, and this argument suggests that clean air would
eclipse other concerns. This storyline is not new, as it had been proposed by human
rights activists and environmental activists, but here we find it being used outside of
academia. In the context of the Euro-Parliament debates on CAFE, the notionwas also
reiterated by left-wing MEPS and even by environmental Commissioner Stavros
Dimas.
The mobilisation of people behind the storyline that a clean environment is a right
represented a step in the formation of a precautionary legality, even if it was not
yet recognised as such in court. If this argument were to enter the mainstream and
become embedded in policy documents or in law, it would come down to the accep-
tance of the precautionary assumption that ecological harmony should trump eco-
nomic development.
9.4.4 Precautionary legality and the Council of State
The air quality clash occurred in part because of the Council of State’s termination of
infrastructure projects. The Council justified its annulments of the administrative
decisions by pointing out that too little research had been conducted into the effects
on air quality. In situations in which the standards were exceeded, administrative
bodies should show that its solution of the problem would not further deteriorate
air quality. It followed from the 2004 Vught Ekkerswijer decision that administrative
bodieswere required to show that their decisions conformed to the need to redress the
air quality situation as quickly as possible.
The main question is whether we should view these decisions of the Administrative
Jurisdiction Division and the opposition of the Council of State Advisory Division
against Balkenende’s mobility policies as heralds of a precautionary legality. The
question carries extra weight because the different Divisions of the Council of State
act as the highest political advisory council as well as the highest administrative
judge. Both the acts of the Council of State Advisory Council and the Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division have a profound influence on shaping the legal
order.
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In regard to the verdicts of the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division, it
is difficult to select overtly precautionary arguments: the Court did not state that pre-
venting damage was the paramount principle of the legal order; it did not indicate that
the citizenwas victimised by the administration on account of its decisions; and it never
conceded to the ‘right to clean air’ storyline presented by the environmentalmovement.
In its verdicts, and in the yearly reports in which it commented on its decisions, the
Council of State pointed to theway theNetherlands had chosen to implement theDirec-
tives. It also remarked that the practices by which the Dutch Government had tried to
soften the impact of the Air Quality Order did not conform to thewording and intent of
theDirectives or thewording of theAirQualityOrder. TheAirQualityOrder entailed a
strict implementation of the Directives, but did constitute a faithful interpretation of
them. If the Government needed more leeway it should negotiate with the European
Commission. This storyline line amounts to the acknowledgement of the primacy of
European law and that the administrative court ‘merely’ applied the law as it should,
and that it did not consider its task to include taking into account the social conse-
quences of the regulation. If the Council’s verdicts could be determined as precaution-
ary, that would then be a consequence of the precautionary nature of the regulation.
There are, however, also indications that the Council did take a more precautionary
line in excess of the Directives’ demands. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division
asked formuchmore thorough research into the effects on air quality than it had done
previously with regard to administrative decisions. The requirements on research
subsequent to decision making were so difficult to fulfil that in the early years of
the air quality clash only one research institute was able to meet them.
I take this heighted burden of proof as an indication of a more precautionary
approach to questions of air quality, but it is hard to judge. The Administrative Court
could couch its verdicts in legalistic argumentation and did not need to expose its con-
victions. I conclude that the Court intended to draw a line in the sand and to indicate
that the administration could not run roughshod over the laws that protect people,
and especially not over European obligations.
The convictions of the Council of State Advisory Division are easier to assess, because
they are worded in publically available policy advice. Without the veil of legalistic argu-
mentation, precautionary elements stand outmore clearly. In a number of placeswemay
find that theAdvisoryDivision takes amore precautionary line. It acted as a champion of
the Air Quality Order when the Emergency Law on Road Expansion was forwarded to
the Council of State, by stating that these provisions would remain valid in full. More-
over, in that same advice it stated that the Emergency Law on Road Expansion ran coun-
ter to the grain of Dutch sustainability policies and international obligations.
In its advice on the 2006 budget, the Advisory Division commented that both the
Dutch Government and the EU had a one-sided focus on economic wellbeing.
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Moreover, it considered that Western European economies, including the Dutch one,
presupposed high economic growth as a given. The Council of State noted that struc-
tural weaknesses could make it necessary to forego these growth ambitions, and it
named particulate emissions as one of the environmental weaknesses. I interpret such
statements as signals from the Council of State, especially because the budget of 2006
was treated in late 2005, the year in which the air quality conflict was raging with no
solution yet in sight.
In its policy advice, the Council of State also expressed the need to keep access to the
courts open. It responded critically to proposed limits on starting appeal proceedings
laid down in the Emergency Law on Road Expansion, and also maintained the rights
of citizens to appeal against projects that had been incorporated into the NSL. It is no
surprise that an institution like the Council of State would uphold access to court, but
it is also an indication that it was concerned about the rights of citizens to appeal
against any infringement of their participatory rights, even if use of the Courts resul-
ted in the stagnation of economic development. The Council of State, for instance,
withstood considerable political pressure levelled against it to be more restrictive
towards environmental organisations.
A further reason I consider that a precautionary approach is visible in the consider-
ations of the Advisory Division involves the tenacity with which it held on to the
interdependence between spatial planning and quality standards. The Council of
State did not intend to release this link, and argued that it was not at all clear whether
it was even allowed by European law to release it, even though other countries did not
have such a strict connection. Despite thorough opposition from politicians belonging
to the pro-infrastructure camp, the Council defended the strict applicability of envi-
ronmental standards in spatial decision making. I consider this relationship between
standards and decisions to be precautionary because it gave absolute priority to envi-
ronmental standards over economic feasibility. Noweighing of interests was allowed.
Combined with strict standards, as was the case for air quality, this link set limits to
growth, and fits with the most precautionary of discourses considered in this study.
Nevertheless, the later year of the clash from the year 2008 and onwards illustrated that
there was a limit to how strongly this precautionary legality could take root. After the
air quality law, and especially when the NSL was promulgated in 2009, it became very
difficult to win an appeal using air quality arguments. The Council of State Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Division accepted theNSL, which itself is no example of precaution-
ary regulation, but remained firmly rooted in the legality of risk and solidarity.
9.4.5 The Council of State as policy maker
The air quality clash was a confrontation between environmental and economic inter-
ests, but also a battle between institutions claiming over the demarcation if their
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domains. The Council of State is comprised of two sections that have different and
strictly delineated competencies. Because of the constitutional demand of the separa-
tion of powers, its political function is separated from its judiciary function, evenmore
since the changes made to the Act on The Council of State in 2010. However, the air
quality clash showed that the Council of State wielded significant power because of its
dual role as policy advisor and administrative judge. Advice given by the Advisory
Division was taken very seriously indeed, probably largely because if the Govern-
ment did not heed the advice, it felt that it would lose its case in the Administrative
Jurisdiction Division. This fearful attitude on the part of the Government, and espe-
cially Secretary of State Pieter van Geel, was reproached by Parliamentarians from
the pro-infrastructure camp, while the Council of State was praised by the pro-
health camp.
The Council of State received vehement criticism from Parliamentarians from the pro-
infrastructure camp during the debates on the account of the role it played. This crit-
icism is understandable because in this case the Council of State assumed the role of
fellow policy maker, - as understood in terms of Joel Best - rather than resigning to its
roles as advisory council and highest administrative court. This is problematic from
the point of view of democratic legitimacy. However, there is much to be said for the
Council of State assuming such a role in the air quality clash.
One of the tasks of the Council of State Advisory Division should guard the conti-
nuity of Dutch policy. In a polarised political constellation such as the Netherlands
experienced at the beginning of the 2000s, the Advisory Division should make sure
the Dutch political ship stays on course. The remarks made by the Council concer-
ning the pro-infrastructure policies of the conservative Balkenende 1 Cabinet and
the Emergency Law on Road Expansion should be read in this light. The tenacity
of the Council of State forced the Government to come up with a more sustainable
solution to such environmental spatial conflicts.
As regards the Council of State, I conclude that in order for it to fulfil the role of ‘legal
conscience’, it should truly be independent of the administration. During the air qual-
ity clash it refused to be a mouthpiece for the Government. Often the Council of State
is criticised for exactly the opposite reason, for being too environmental friendly.
I find this kind of criticism much more scathing than the reproach that it hinders
speedy decision making. The air quality clash is a good example as to why the pri-
macy of politics need to be kept in check by the rule of law. Speedier decision making
all too often translates to limiting the access of civilians to courts and increasing the
power of the administration over the judiciary. I consider it valuable that citizens who
lost out in the political arena are granted their second chance in front of the courts of
law, even though that may take time. An institution like the Council of State manages
to guard long term interest, exactly because it is removed from the hustle of day to day
policy making and vying for the favour of the voters.
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However, the double function of the Council of State, being both the leading policy
advisor as well as the highest court, is non-transparent and causes resentment. In the
air quality clash, the Government found itself caught in a vise. The Administrative
Jurisdiction Division anulled projects while the Advisory Division advised negatively
on Government proposals to patch up the regulation. The recommendations of the
Advisory Division were non-binding, but the Government could not know whether
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division would accept such a patched up regulation
in court. Early on in the clash VanGeel decided to ignore the Council’s advice andwas
promptly put in his place by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.
I consider this institutional double role not problematic per se, because an advisory
council that considers questions of the legality of policy proposals should be in touch
with themood prevalent in the highest administrative court. This role should bemade
as transparent as possible though, because now politicians cannot knowwhether dis-
agreement with the Advisory Division of the Council of State might have legal con-
sequences before the Administrative Court or not. In short I support having an
advisory Council with a considerable degree of power. It may guard over the long
term interests of the country and environmental interests are long term interests.
However its connection to the administrative courts should be made abundantly
transparent. It should be as clear as possible whether a certain policy runs the risk
of being scuttled by the administrative court when it goes against the advice of the
Council.
9.4.6 Conclusion: the struggling emergence of a legality of precaution
The question of whether the air quality clash was indicative of the emergence of a
legality of precaution can be answered only in a qualified form: only if we ask where
in the air quality clash actors used arguments, promulgated regulation, or passed
judgements that indicate the rise of such legality, can an answer be given. The stron-
gest indications of a precautionary legality were found in European institutions
before and during the drafting of Air Quality Directives in the 1990s. The policy phi-
losophy outlined in the 5th EAP created space for holistic, ambitious, and preventative
regulation, in which the raising of public awareness was a core component. Through
strict standards and the provision of information, the European Commission urged a
change in behaviour on the part of Member States and their inhabitants. Science
played a strong role in decisionmaking aswell, but especially in order to signal poten-
tially disastrous health threats.
However, the precautionary legality that supported the Directives waned in the 2000s
when cost-benefit assessment became more important, and decision making was left
to scientific experts and policymakers without a strong say from environmental orga-
nisations. These changes led to lower ambitions regarding air quality and to more
flexibility for Member States that were having problems meeting the standards.
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The forceful precautionary approach gave way to a cautious calculative approach of
risk assessment and flexibility.
In Dutch air quality policy, precaution was never truly dominant. Rhetorically, the
early Memorandums of the 1970s discussing environmental policy in general were
quite precautionary. Certain legal aspects of environmental policy, notably the link
between environmental standards and administrative decisions, would fit well
within precautionary legality. The interconnection did not create many legal prob-
lems, however, because the actual standards were usually quite lenient. This discrep-
ancy can be explained by pointing to the weak position of the EnvironmentalMinistry
at the time. Although it could propose precautionary principles, the actual standards
were lenient because of feasibility concerns.
The move to ecological modernisation amounted to a pragmatic turnaround for envi-
ronmental policy. The cautious variant explored byWinsemius in the early 1980s was
marked by cool-headed calculation and prioritisation, elements that fitted better with
the legality of risk and solidarity than with precaution. The strong eco-modernistic
regime that evolved from it in the latter 1980s and early 1990s, however, was amena-
ble to a precautionary legality, though actual policy apart from principles remained
pragmatic. It is noteworthy that within this less precautionary discourse, environ-
mental protection became more mainstream and arguably more effective as well.
Too much ecological ambition apparently does not work for the pennywise Dutch.
When environmental protection is framed as a profitable business it attracts much
more attention.
Nevertheless, elements of a precautionary legality were present in Dutch air pollution
policy. Through the implementation of the precautionary European air quality poli-
cies in 2001, they entered Dutch air quality law, and – despite its pragmatism – the
Dutch Government found itself stuck with precautionary regulation, even reinforced
by uniquely Dutch arrangements in environmental spatial law.
The most vociferous proponent of a legality of precaution was the pro-health camp,
which succeeded in directing the political trend in favour of environmental protec-
tion. Through its pressure, sustainability concerns were placed higher on the agenda,
and the chapters on sustainable development or air quality in relevant policy docu-
ments were either added or reinforced. That meant that these concerns would find
their way into policy and into the legal order. The most conspicuous legal develop-
ment was that the use of the courts in this environmental conflict was so successful.
This success spawned the storyline that people had a right to clean air – a storyline
that was heard often in academic discourse but was now applied ‘in action’.
Elements belonging to the precautionary legality have certainly played a part in the
emergence of the Dutch air quality clash. Civilians were prepared to take a stand for
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environmental and health matters. The courts demanded more research into delete-
rious effects and the large amounts of deaths attributed to PM10 made headlines in
newspapers and were used in heated political discussion. In the Netherlands the
hatchet appears to have been buried on the topic of air quality. It is still a concern
for people living in the cities and along highways, but it does not stir emotions in
the same way it did around 2005. However, new precautionary concerns might
quickly arise in the shape of infectious diseases, danger from nuclear power plants,
or some other potential threat. Precautionary concerns are now visible in other files
such as the exploitation of shale gas reserves or drilling for gas in the Dutch province
of Groningen.
These issues may well prove to be future legal battle grounds. The Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division andAdvisory Divisionweremore open towards
precautionary arguments than the Dutch Government. This indicates that if a legality
of precaution is to establish itself, it is through European law together with a judiciary
that is open towards it. Dutch Government policies remained firmly in the realm of
pragmatism, but European policies together with a judiciary that is prepared to inter-
pret and enforce them strictly could bring about further changes in the legal order.
The air quality clash provided an indication that such developments do indeed take
place. The backlash against these policies in the EU and in the Netherlands, however,
suggests that the legality of precaution is still struggling.
The above does not indicate that the advance of the legality of precaution has halted,
as elements of precautionary legality have gained significantly in strength in different
domains. Moreover, the clash has illustrated the potency of taking a political fight
over air quality to court. The conflict put environmental concerns squarely back on
the agenda from which they had almost disappeared: for instance, issues like speed
limit, environmental zoning, and even road pricing. During the clash, however, the
fledgling legality was forced to give way again to the more traditional legality of risk
and precaution. The history of the clash reminds of Echternach’s procession, with
developments taking three steps forward and two steps back. Was the legality of pre-
caution on the rise at the time of the clash? Yes it was, but its time had not yet come.
Countervailing powers still held sway.
. SUMMARIS ING CONCLUS ION: A SHORT CHARACTERISATION
OF THE AIR QUALITY CLASH
How and why did air quality emerge suddenly as a problematic issue in the Nether-
lands? This study shows that firstly EU air quality regulation strongly contributed to
the outbreak and continuation of the Dutch air quality clash. It also shows that the
interplay between the EU regulation and Dutch attempts to influence it are highly
important. From a long term historical perspective we may even say that the Dutch
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air quality clash is the result of Dutch influence at the EU level at an early stage. The
strict EU norms would not have come about if the Dutch had not involved the WHO
in order to promote scientifically underpinned norms. That the norms are as strict as
they are cannot be solely attributed to Dutch influence. It is also the result of the influ-
ence exerted by another member state, the United Kingdom.
Another characteristic of Dutch environmental law played a crucial role as well. This
is ‘the link’ between environmental law and permits for infrastructure development.
Because of this link infrastructure could not be developed in situations where envi-
ronmental norms are already exceeded. Because the EU standards were strict, they
were transgressed in large parts of the Netherlands. Hence, the development of infra-
structure came to a halt in major parts of the country. The fact that the Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division operated in quite a formalistic way meant that
there was no room to consider the social impact of cancelling permits. However the
Directives and the link did not give it much discretionary room to consider other
options than to cancel permits because of noncompliance with the air quality
regulation.
Seondly, the clash can be understood as an episode in Dutch politics where the con-
sensus of weak ecological modernisation was dissolved. This happened first because
the Balkenende cabinets from 2001 broke away from the consensus by prioritising
infrastructure development. This political change infuriated the environmentalmove-
ment, which then made the strategic move to turn to the judiciary and requested a
stop to the one-sided developmental policies. As stated above, the legal conditions
favoured their attempts and during the clash they found an ally in the Council of
State. This even led to the storyline of clean air as a human right.
The fact that the pro-health camp found an ally in the Council of State prevented the
Dutch Government from quickly finding an administrative solution to the situation
where infrastructure permits were cancelled on an unprecedented scale. It was forced
to propose a new air quality law to Parliament which contained a novel regulatory
instrument, the programmatic approach.
In Parliament the pro-health camp initially had everything going for it. The Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division kept annulling projects, the Government
was forced to make ever more funds available for air quality and the Council of State
Advisory Division issued strongly negative opinions on the Governments’ attempts
to quickly patch up the Dutch air quality regulation. However, the pro health camp
became confrontedwith an increasingly strong pro-infrastructure camp thatmade the
counter-claim that the real problem with air quality was not its effects on public
health, but that the regulation of it had blocked the country to further development.
The storyline that it put forward was that the regulation itself was to blame and that
billions of dollars and as much as 100.000 jobs were at stake.
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The clash could only come to an end in the political arena by rekindling the eco-mod-
ernist consensus in the Air quality law of 2007. The consensual, managerial, technical
and bureaucratic instrument that was developed out of this law, the NSL, first led the
EU Commission to extend the Dutch some postponement of the standards. Second, it
was accepted by the Council of State as an instrument that facilitated both air quality
improvement and infrastructure development.
This research shows – to my knowledge for the first time – a case in which the Council
of State as a two pronged institute was able to keep policy formation deadlocked for
several years. One prong – the Administrative Jurisdiction Division – kept annulling
permits with reference to EU air quality standards while the other prong – the Advi-
sory Division – kept reminding the government that policy adaptation would have to
be in line with EU regulation. In the air quality clash the Council of State acted as a
fellow policy maker.
A third way to understand the clash is to look at the level to which the legality of risk
and compensation and the legality of precaution can be found in the handling of the
air quality clash in the legal and the political arena. During the clash strict standards
based on uncertain scientific knowledge blocked important developments in the
Netherlands. Only by balancing the health and environment interests with the inter-
ests of development and mobility could the clash be ended.
The swift promulgation of standards in the European Union, the quality of the clean-
air-is-a-right storyline as a mobilisation device and the attachment of the Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division to the link are indications that a precau-
tionary legality was cautiously on the rise. However, the strong backlash against this
temporary legal preference of environmental interests over economic ones, in the
Netherlands as well as in Europe, pointed out that the legality of precaution had a
long way to go still before it could be considered to reach a dominant position within
the Dutch legal order.
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MAIN EVENTS OF THE EMERGENCE AND RESOLUTION AIR QUALITY CLASH
IN THE NETHERLANDS
1970 Establishment Ministry of VOMIL
1972 Report for the Club of Rome, Limits to growth issued, VOMIL issued Urgent Memorandum on
Environmental Hygiene
1982 Establishment of Ministry of VROM Pieter Winsemius first Minister of VROM
1983-1992 Embrace of ecological modernisation in the Netherlands
1983 Dutch civil servants approach WHO requesting air quality guidelines
1988-1990 Take Care for Tomorrow, SVV2 and NMP strong ecological modernisation in the Netherlands
1990-1998 Ecological modernisation of transport failing in the Netherlands
1993, 1995 Harvard Six Cities and ACS studies published
1994-1994 Asthma scare in the UK
1996, 1999 Promulgation of Directive 96/62/EC and Directive 99/30/EC establishing new air quality standards
1997 UK established national air quality strategy
1999 GGD report claimed breathing the air in residential area of Overschie equalled the passive smoking of 17
cigarettes
2001 June Air Quality Order 2001 adopted in the Netherlands, containing European air quality standards
2002 May Speed limit near Overschie lowered because of air quality concerns
2002 July Cabinet Balkenende 1 installed, established a strong pro-mobility and pro infrastructure agenda
2004, May, Sept. Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division annuls road expansions and a commercial zone,
established strict interpretation of AQO 2001
2004 Sept., 2005
June
Government Interpretation of AQO in letter of 30 September rejected by Council of State, proposal for new
Ministerial Decree rejected as well. Pro-infrastructure camp mobilised in April 2005 and June 2005 to
demand release of the link
2005 Jan. EU Commission review of Directive 99/30/EC unfavourable for the Netherlands
2005 Sept. Government promised 900 million for air quality in ‘Prinsjesdag package
2006 March Van Geel sent proposal for new Air Quality Law containing new programmatic approach to Parliament
2006 Oct. Proposal for Air Quality Law accepted by Second Chamber
2007 July Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division annuls trajectory decision Burgerveen Leiden
2007 Nov. Air Quality Law entered into force
2008 May New Air Quality Directive adopted
2008 June Contents of the NSL offered to Parliament by way of a Letter by Minister Cramer
2009 April NL received derogation of air quality standards
2009 Aug. NSL entered into force
2010 March NSL accepted by Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division as sufficient justification for
administrative decisions ABRvS 200900883/1
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SAMENVATTING: DE SOCIALE CONSTRUCTIE
VAN DE FIJNSTOFSTRIJD IN NEDERLAND
In 2007 keerde ik terug naar Nederland, na een verblijf van zes jaar in Istanbul, Tur-
kije. Ik leerde toen al snel een nieuw woord: ‘fijnstof’. Wat dat precies was, kon nie-
mand mij vertellen, maar wel dat het een vorm van luchtvervuiling was, dat het
gevaarlijk was en dat het vooral werd uitgestoten door auto’s. Het hoopte zich op
in drukke straten en vormde daar een gevaar voor de volksgezondheid. Deze nieuwe
vorm van luchtvervuiling intrigeerde mij omdat ik had gewoond in een metropool
metmeer dan tienmiljoen inwoners, dichtslibbende verkeersaders en rokende stoom-
boten. In tegenstelling tot Amsterdam echter was de luchtkwaliteit daar echter geen
onderwerp van gesprek. In Nederlandwas luchtvervuiling toch ook al een tijd van de
publieke radar verdwenen?
In dit proefschrift is slechte luchtkwaliteit als sociaal en juridisch probleem nader
onderzocht en is de vraag beantwoord waarom de luchtkwaliteit in Nederland plot-
seling een groot maatschappelijk probleem is geworden dat speelde tussen september
2004 en april 2010. In 2004 zorgde uitspraken van de Nederlandse bestuursrechter
ervoor dat de uitbreiding van infrastructuur geen doorgang kon vinden in gebieden
waar de luchtkwaliteit niet voldeed aan de geldende normen. In april 2009 gaf de
Europese Commissie Nederland uitstel van de normen om de zogenaamde program-
matische aanpak te kunnen implementeren. Deze aanpak maakte een bestuurlijke
oplossing mogelijk voor de stagnerende ontwikkeling van infrastructuur. De aanpak
is eindmaart 2010 uiteindelijk door de hoogste bestuursrechter, deAfdeling Bestuurs-
rechtspraak van de Raad van State, gesanctioneerd. Gedurende deze jaren ontston-
den twee Seenswijzen op het probleem van slechte luchtkwaliteit. Aan de ene kant
werd vanuit het perspectief van de volksgezondheid gewezen op de risico’s op vroeg-
tijdige sterfte en verhoogde Seektelast onder de bevolking. Aan de andere kant werd
gewezen op de economische ontwrichting die de regulering van fijnstof tot gevolg
had voor belangrijke economische sectoren zoals de bouw en transport.
Deze twee Seenswijzen streden in die jaren omde voorrang in het de publieke en poli-
tieke arena. Vandaar dat ik spreek van de ‘fijnstofstrijd’. In essentie ging het hier om
een belangenstrijd: moeten milieu- en gezondheidsbelangen zwaarder wegen, of
moet prioriteit gegeven worden aan economische ontwikkeling? Gaandeweg heeft
het debat zich verbreed en rezen er ook vragen over de toenemende Europeanisering
van de Nederlandse rechtsorde en de invloed die de Raad van State als adviesorgaan
en bestuursrechter mag uitoefenen op de politieke besluitvorming.
Een aantal aspecten van de fijnstofstrijd is in dit proefschrift verder uitgediept. In de
eerste plaats ga ik in op de rol die de Europeanisering van het milieubeleid heeft
gespeeld bij het ontstaan van de problemen. Strenge Europese regulering was in
Nederlandse wetgeving omgezet waardoor de luchtkwaliteitsnormen significant
strenger waren geworden dan tevoren. Op basis van deze normen werden presti-
gieuze infrastructuurprojecten tegengehouden door de Raad van State.
Ten tweede analiseer ik het Nederlandse milieubeleid. De strengere normen alléén
kunnen het ontstaan van de clash niet verklaren, aangeSeen die ook in andere Euro-
pese landen golden en daar speelde een dergelijke problematiek niet. Zowel de ach-
terliggende beleidsfilosofie als de concrete beleidskeuzes hebben het ontstaan van de
strijd in de hand gewerkt.
Ten derde wordt het ontstaan van de fijnstofstrijd geanalyseerd in relatie tot de
opkomst van de zo genaamde ‘voorzorglegaliteit’, een rechtssociologische notie die
duidt op een verschuiving in de rechtsorde waarbij niet langer compensatie van
slachtoffers van schade het leidend beginsel is, maar het voorkomen van schade,
ook als de kosten zeer hoog zijn.
METHODOLOGIE
In dit proefschrift is gekozen voor een sociaal constructivisme methodologie. In dat per-
spectief worden sociale problemen niet geSeen als objectieve gegevens, maar als resulta-
ten van een intersubjectief proces van betekenisgeving. Bepaalde maatschappelijk
situaties ‘zijn’ geen probleem in objectieve zin, maar worden door mensen als probleem
ervaren. Als vervolgens meerdere andere groepen mensen ervan overtuigd raken dat de
situatie inderdaadonwenselijk is, sprekenwe inde (rechts)sociologie van een ‘sociaal pro-
bleem’. Sociale problemen zijn het product van sociaal handelen door verschillende
actoren.
Het begrippenapparaat uit dit proefschrift is geënt op twee typen van sociaal con-
structivisme. Het eerste type noem ik actor-gecentreerd sociaal constructivisme, en
het tweede type noem ik discours-analytisch sociaal constructivisme.
Het eerste type gaat ervan uit dat bepaalde groepen van mensen er belang bij hebben
om een situatie als probleem te definiëren en hun best ervoor zullen doen om anderen
daarvan te overtuigen. Deze actoren worden ‘claims makers’ genoemd. Zij zullen via
verschillende kanalen de publieke opinie en beleidsmakers proberen te beïnvloeden
om ervoor te zorgen dat hun probleemdefinitie – hun claim – algemeen geaccepteerd
wordt. De claims zelf kunnen ook weer oppositie van andere actoren oproepen.
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Claimsmakers en counter-claims makers wisselen hun argumenten uit in geschrift en
voor de camera’s van nieuwsprogramma’s, op manifestaties en bijeenkomsten, in het
parlementair debat en soms ook voor de rechter. Al die plaatsen waar argumenten
worden uitgewisseld worden ‘arena’s’ genoemd. Mocht de claim inderdaad
weerklank vinden bij invloedrijke groepen uit de samenleving, dan kan de probleem-
definitie leiden tot regelgeving. Beleidsmakers zullen voorstellen indienen om iets aan
het sociale probleem te doen en dan ligt regulering voor de hand.
Beleidsmakers kunnenmet regelgeving reageren op claims, maar die regelgeving kan
bij andere groepen weer weerstand oproepen. Is dat het geval, dan zullen er nieuwe
claims makers komen die betogen dat de regelgeving zelf tot problemen leidt en
begint het spel van voor en af aan.
De laatste twintig jaar doet een tweede sociaal constructivistische methode opgeld die
de argumentatie die groepen hanteren om hun claims te ondersteunen als uitgangs-
punt neemt, de zg. . ‘discursive turn’. Discours-analytici wijzen er namelijk op dat
claims alleen zullen worden omarmd als zij passen binnen het geheel van heersende
opvattingen en overtuigingen. Argumenten voor een bepaalde claimmoeten plausibel
zijn in het licht van de heersende mening. De manier waarop de heersende Seenswijze
op een bepaald gebied naar voren gebracht wordt en demanier waarop die Seenswijze
geïnstitutionaliseerd is in maatschappelijke praktijken wordt ‘discours’ genoemd.
Een claim wordt nooit neutraal naar voren gebracht maar past altijd binnen een
bepaald verhaal. Een problematische situatie wordt gepresenteerd als een toestand
met een bepaalde oorzaak, met bepaalde gevolgen die op een specifieke wijze verhol-
pen moeten worden. Binnen het kader van dit proefschrift wordt een dergelijk ver-
haal een verhaallijn (storyline) genoemd. Verhaallijnen kunnen ook door andere
actoren overgenomen worden. In het geval verschillende actoren eenzelfde verhaal-
lijn omarmen wordt gesproken van een discourscoalitie. Verhaallijnen moeten aan-
sluiten op het heersende discours, maar het discours verandert ook onder invloed
van verhaallijnen. Dat maakt dezemethode geschikt om het stelsel van overtuigingen
te onderzoeken dat leeft onder verschillende groepen binnen een samenleving.
IDEAALTYPEN
De fijnstofstrijd wordt in deze studie in verband gebracht met veranderingen in het
Nederlands milieupolitieke discours en het juridische discours. Daartoe wordt hij
gerelateerd aan twee ideaaltypen, te weten een ideaaltype van ecologische moderni-
sering en een ideaaltype van de voorzorglegaliteit. Het eerste ideaaltype dient ertoe
om veranderingen in het milieupolitiek discours in kaart te brengen. Het tweede type
plaatst de fijnstofstrijd in het kader van veranderingen in de rechtsorde.
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Het begrip ecologische modernisering wordt in deze studie opgevat als een discours
op het gebied van het milieubeleid dat in de jaren 80 ingang heeft gevonden in het
Nederlandse en later Europese beleid en vanaf de jaren 90 dominant is geworden
tot en met de eerste jaren van het nieuwe millennium. In tabel 10 hieronder wordt
een ideaaltypische weergave van ecologische modernisering gepresenteerd zoals
het wordt gehanteerd in de studie. Het discours wordt gecontrasteerd met het domi-
nante vertoog uit de jaren 70, dat ik ‘Grenzen aan de groei’ heb genoemd. Dit discours
ontleent zijn kernelementen aan het rapport voor de club van Romemet dezelfde titel.
Daarnaast is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen sterke en zwakke ecologische moder-
nisering. Sterke ecologische modernisering vergt vergaande structurele economische
veranderingen in de productiestructuur en gedragsverandering bij de consument.
Zwakke ecologische modernisering daarentegen is goed verenigbaar met de be-
staande kapitalistische economische verhoudingen.
Met de term voorzorglegaliteit wordt een verandering in het juridische vertoog aan-
geduid. Het begrip ‘Legaliteit’ wordt door de Nederlandse rechtssociologen André
Hoekema enNiels vanManen gedefinieerd als ‘het geheel van in demaatschappelijke
praktijk van de rechtsorde uitgedrukte en in sociale instituties werkzame overtuigin-
gen omtrent de juiste opbouw van de samenleving en onderdelen ervan’ (Hoekema&
VanManen 2000). Voor de rechtssocioloog behelst de rechtsorde geen vast stelsel aan
overtuigingen, maar wisselen dominante opvattingen over de taak van het recht en
zijn maatschappelijke rol elkaar af, zonder overigens eerdere overtuigingen volstrekt
te overvleugelen.
In deze studie wordt het door Weber geïnspireerde begrip legaliteit gebruikt om een
dominant discours binnen de rechtsorde mee aan te duiden. Twee sets overtuigingen
worden met elkaar vergeleken, de legaliteit van risico en compensatie en de legaliteit
van voorzorg. Onderzocht wordt of de rechtsorde heden ten dage wordt gedomineerd
door een legaliteit van risico en compensatie, maar ook of dit type van legaliteit lang-
zamerhand zijn dominante positie zou kunnen verliezen aan een type van legaliteit
gericht op het voorkómen van schade überhaupt, ook al gaat dit gepaardmet zeer hoge
kosten. De opkomst van deze ‘voorzorglegaliteit’ is ieder geval duidelijk zichtbaar op
het terrein van het milieurecht. Kernelement van dit type van legaliteit is de toepassing
van het voorzorgbeginsel dat stelt onzekerheid over de aard en omvang van dreigende
schade geen excuus mag zijn voor het niet nemen van beschermende maatregelen.
Een vraag die in deze studie wordt gesteld is of het optreden van de fijnstofstrijd een
indicatie is van de verdere voortschrijding van dit type legaliteit. In tabel 11 is een
ideaaltypische weergave gegeven van de legaliteit van voorzorg gecontrasteerd
met de legaliteit van risico en compensatie.
ONDERZOEKSMATERIAAL EN ONDERZOEKSOPZET
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
Tabel 10
Beleidsdiscours Grenzen aan de Groei Zwakke ecologische
modernisering
Sterke ecologische
modernisering
Relatie tussen
economie en
ecologie
Gespannen: Economische groei
wordt geSeen als bedreiging
van het milieu
Vreedzame co-existentie:
Zowel ecologische als
economische doelstellingen
kunnen worden gecombineerd
en gehaald
Positief met elkaar verweven:
Een betere kwaliteit van het
milieu is noodzakelijk voor het
behoud van economische groei
en zal die groei versterken.
Rol van de wetenschap Natuur en
milieuwetenschappen zouden
het milieubeleid moeten
dicteren.
Verschillende wetenschappen
leveren expertise aan om
milieubeleid op te baseren,
natuur en milieuwetenschap,
maar ook economie en
management
De wetenschap wordt ingezet
om mogelijke
milieubedreigingen in kaart te
brengen wijdverbreide inzet
van milieu-indicatoren op het
gebied van het verbruik van
grondstoffen en vervuiling.
Dergelijke indicatoren worden
een essentieel onderdeel van
economische politiek.
Consensus-streven Conflictmodel: Marktpartijen
zouden zich gedwongen
moeten aanpassen aan het
milieubeleid door middel van
regulering
Consensusmodel: Het
milieubeleid komt tot stand op
basis van Onderhandelingen
tussen de overheid en
marktpartijen
Brede en
geïnstitutionaliseerde-
participatie in totstandkoming
van beleid met de
milieubeweging als volwaardig
tegenwicht tegen economische
belangen
Preventieve aanpak De last voor het milieu moet tot
een minimum worden beperk.
Dit impliceert beperking van de
economische activiteit en
wantrouwen tegenover
wetenschappelijke
vooruitgang.
Vervuiling moet worden
voorkomen door schonere en
efficiëntere productie en zo
nodig het toepassen van het
voorzorgbeginsel bij dreigende
schade.
Het milieubeleid richt zich
direct tot vervuilers, zowel de
industrie als de consument.
Een brede toepassing van het
voorzorgbeginsel en
verinnerlijking van het
milieubeleid door doelgroepen.
Verinnerlijking van de
doelstellingen van
milieubeleid
Zowel onderwijs als wetgeving
moeten worden ingezet om de
juiste milieumentaliteit aan te
kweken.
Het bevorderen van bewustzijn
via mediacampagnes, en het
verschaffen van informatie,
alsmede subsidiering van de
milieubeweging.
Actieve betrokkenheid van
burgers door middel van
educatie, voorlichting en het
recht op inzage van
vervuilingsregisters van
bedrijven. Brede juridische
mogelijkheden voor burgers om
in het geweer te komen tegen
milieubederf.
Integraal beleid De aarde wordt geSeen als één
complex ecosysteem. Idealiter
is het beleid integraal
geformuleerd. Als dit echter
niet mogelijk blijkt wordt het
beleid sectoraal vastgesteld.
Verschillende vormen van
milieuvervuiling moeten via
hetzelfde beleid aangepakt
worden, dus geen sectorale
benadering.
Verschillende vormen van
milieuvervuiling moeten via
hetzelfde beleid aangepakt
worden, gecombineerd met
economische prikkels tot
gedragsverandering.
Samenvatting: de sociale constructie van de fijnstofstrijd in Nederland
Deze geschiedenis van de fijnstofstrijd is uitgevoerd doormiddel van een analyse van
de Nederlandse parlementaire stukken waarin de term luchtkwaliteit naar voren is
gekomen. Vooral de stukken vanaf september 2004 tot december 2007 – de hoogtij-
dagen van de clash – zijn bekeken, maar ook documenten van voorgaande en van
latere jaren zijn geanalyseerd. Ik heb gekozen voor die periode omdat de fijnstofclash
zich in die jaren heeft afgespeeld. De voorgeschiedenis van de fijnstofclash begint ech-
ter in 1972. Om die reden is ook het milieubeleid in de jaren 70, 80 en 90 onderzocht
Tabel 11
Legaliteit van risico en compensatie Legaliteit van voorzorg
Kernaspect van de rechtsorde Compensatie van schade door spreiding
van risico’s wordt van het grootste belang
geacht. Daarom zijn verzekeringen en
risicoaansprakelijkheid essentieel.
Voorkomen van schade wordt van het
grootste belang geacht. Daarom is
toepassing van het voorzorgbeginsel
essentieel.
Type schade dat van het grootste
belang wordt geacht
Schade moet worden voorkomen als het
kosteneffectief is om dat te doen. Schade
optredend op de korte en middellange
termijn, met een relatief zekere omvang.
Lange termijnschade die potentieel
catastrofaal is, maar waarvan de omvang
en het daadwerkelijk optreden nog
onzeker zijn.
Morele kijk op het optreden van
schade
Schade kan niet altijd voorkomen worden
en wanneer die optreedt is compensatie
aan de orde.
Schade is schande en een indicatie dat
men nalatig is geweest in het voorkomen
ervan.
Perceptie van het slachtoffer Drager van rechten uit hoofde van zijn
lidmaatschap van een risicocollectief.
Burger die schade heeft ondervonden als
gevolg van falend optreden van de
overheid of andere toezichthouders
Veiligheidsgaranties en bewijslast
die noodzakelijk worden geacht
ter onderbouwing van
besluitvorming
Besluitvorming moet gebaseerd zijn op
wetenschappelijke kennis en kosten-
batenanalyses om optimale oplossingen
te kunnen inventariseren.
Besluitvorming moet gebaseerd zijn op
wetenschappelijk bewijs dat het besluit
geen schade tot gevolg zal hebben. De
bewijslast rust op de schouders van
diegene die het potentieel riskante besluit
neemt.
Wijze waarop recht en beleid
functioneren als instrument van
maatschappelijke sturing
De samenleving kan worden verbeterd
door op maat gemaakt beleid en een
instrumenteel gebruik van wetgeving. .
De samenleving kan worden verbeterd
door integraal en planmatig beleid, het
geven van informatie aan het publiek en
verhogen van maatschappelijk
bewustzijn.
Rol van publieke participatie Klein, want burgers worden geSeen als
leken zonder veel kennis van risico’s of
complexe systemen. Beleid dient door
experts te worden gemaakt.
Groot, want de burger wordt geSeen als
ervaringsdeskundige. Het beleid dient
burgers de kans te geven hun Seenswijze
naar voren te brengen en daar ook naar te
handelen.
Kernwaarde die het meest
beschermd moet worden
Economische ontwikkeling: Groei en
uitbreiding van de productie van
goederen, mobiliteit, kennis en innovatie.
Ecologische harmonie: De balans tussen
ecosystemen, volksgezondheid en
externe veiligheid.
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door middel van literatuurstudie en bestudering van de ‘grote’ nota’s zoals bij voor-
beeld het Nationaal Milieu Beleidsplan.
De regulering van de luchtkwaliteitsproblematiek heeft uiteraard een grote Europese
component. Dit maakt het noodzakelijk om ook EUdocumenten te onderzoeken. Ver-
der geeft het onderzoek van alleen parlementaire stukken een onvolledig beeld. Zij
zijn weliswaar cruciaal omdat elk sociaal probleem uiteindelijk door de politiek zal
worden besproken, maar zij bestrijken slechts een klein deel van de maatschappelijke
werkelijkheid. Naast parlementaire stukken is daarom een groot aantal wetenschap-
pelijke rapporten, krantenberichten en zogenaamde ‘grijze’ literatuur bestudeerd.
Daarnaast zijn interviews afgenomenmet een aantal experts, politici en actievoerders.
Deze interviews hebben geholpen om het beeld dat oprees uit parlementaire stukken
in een breder perspectief te plaatsen.
Zoals gezegd besloeg het onderzoek een lange periode. Voor wat betreft de jaren van
de fijnstofstrijd zelf, 2004-2010, zijn vooral de Nederlandse parlementaire stukken
belangrijk geweest. Voor wat betreft de jaren 90 zijn de Europese stukken cruciaal.
De jaren daarvoor zijn vooral onderzocht via secundaire literatuur, alsmede de
belangrijkste parlementaire Nederlandse stukken op het gebied van milieubeleid.
KORTE GESCHIEDENIS VAN DE F I JNSTOFSTR I JD
De fijnstofstrijd begon op het moment dat de hoogste bestuursrechter in Nederland,
de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, vergunningen voor weguit-
breidingen en andere bouwprojecten consequent ging afkeuren op grond van strijd
met de standaarden uit het Besluit Luchtkwaliteit. Vooral het programma om op
grote schaal wegen uit te breiden werd hierdoor zwaar getroffen. Woordvoerders
van het Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat klaagden dat ze geen spade meer de
grond in kregen. Aan de andere kant zagen actiegroepen deze rechtspraak als een
overwinning.
De risico’s van slechte luchtkwaliteit vanwege fijnstof werden in Nederland in eerste
instantie onder de aandacht gebracht door epidemiologen en de Rotterdamse GGGD.
Amerikaans epidemiologisch onderzoek had begin jaren 90 uitgewezen dat ver-
vroegde sterfte meer voor kwam in gebieden met slechte luchtkwaliteit. Uit Neder-
lands onderzoek bleek dat kinderen die naast de snelweg woonden, last hadden
van verschillende kwalen, in het bijzonder aan de luchtwegen.
Hierover ontstond commotie in de Rotterdamse wijk Overschie in 1999. De wijk is
dichtbevolkt en wordt doorkruist door de drukke A10. In een alarmerend rapport
werd de luchtkwaliteit vergeleken met het passief roken van 17 sigaretten per dag.
De risico’s van passief roken zijn erg klein maar deze claim bleek sterk genoeg om
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de aandacht van de politiek te trekken. De toenmalige minister Pronk besloot een
proef te doen met snelheidsverlaging op de A10 bij Overschie. Langzaam rijdende
auto’s stoten namelijk minder fijnstof uit. Deze claim werd overgenomen door
politieke partijen aan de linkerkant van het politieke spectrum en er ontstond een
verhaallijn rond de nadelige effecten van automobiliteit en snelwegen op de
volksgezondheid.
In 2001 verscheen het Besluit Luchtkwaliteit waarin de standaarden voor schone lucht
sterk werden aangescherpt. De (Europese) standaarden voor fijnstof zouden vanaf
2005 moeten gaan gelden. Drie jaar later, in 2004, vestigde de Raad van State in drie
uitspraken een consistente lijn in de jurisprudentie voor de standaarden voor fijnstof
en Stikstofdioxide. Onvoldoende onderzoek naar de luchtkwaliteit leidde voortaan
tot het vernietigen van besluiten van bestuursorganen, of er numensen daadwerkelijk
aan de vervuiling werden blootgesteld of niet.
Toen de RvS beslissingen bleef vernietigen ontstonden er twee kampen van actoren
rond luchtkwaliteit. Met ‘kamp’ wordt hier bedoeld een verband van actoren dat
dezelfde claims naar voren brengt en die met gelijkluidende argumenten staaft. Der-
halve kanmen ook van discourscoalities spreken. Het eerste kamp bestond uit weten-
schappelijke instituten, actiegroepen en politieke partijen die de slechte luchtkwaliteit
zagen als een gevaar voor de volksgezondheid en die structurele maatregelen ter ver-
betering eisten. Ik noem dit kamp het volksgezondheidskamp. Het eerste jaar na de
uitspraken van de RvS had dit kamp de wind in de zeilen. Zij eisten meer geld voor
luchtkwaliteit, minder wegen en Milieudefensie eiste een algehele verlaging van de
maximum snelheid.
In reactie op de uitspraken kwam er eveneens een belangrijke counter-claim op gang.
De luchtkwaliteitswetgeving werd gepercipieerd als het probleem volgens een allian-
tie van verschillende belangengroepen uit de bouw en de transportsector en politieke
partijen, te weten CDA, VVD en de LPF. Dit kamp stelde dat de standaarden onhaal-
baar waren voor Nederland en zouden leiden tot forse economische schade. De lucht-
kwaliteitswetgeving gecombineerd met de veel te strenge interpretatie ervan door de
RvS had Nederland ‘op slot’ gegooid.
Volgens dit ‘infrastructuurkamp’was het loslaten van de typischNederlandse koppe-
ling van milieustandaarden aan besluiten van bestuursorganen die gevolgen hebben
voor de ruimtelijke ordening geboden. Voor de fijnstofclash gold, dat als een besluit
van een bestuursorgaan ertoe zou kunnen leiden dat milieustandaarden in een
bepaald gebied niet werden gehaald, de bestuursrechter het besluit moest vernieti-
gen. In andere landen werkten die standaarden over het algemeen niet zo direct door.
Een serie aan debatten en nieuwewetgeving volgde in de jaren na 2005, en het zou een
aantal jaar duren voor er een structurele oplossing voor de clash werd gevonden. Die
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oplossing kwam er eind 2007 door de systematiek van de koppeling gedeeltelijk los te
laten en over te gaan op een zogeheten programmatische aanpak. Alle ruimtelijke
projecten die significante gevolgen hadden voor de luchtkwaliteit zouden in een plan
moeten worden opgenomen dat naast deze projecten ook positieve maatregelen voor
de luchtkwaliteit bevatte. Uiteindelijk zou de som van positievemaatregelen de nega-
tieve gevolgen moeten overtreffen waardoor de luchtkwaliteit structureel zou verbe-
teren en op termijn de standaarden gehaald konden worden. Een wet die een
dergelijk programmatische aanpak mogelijk maakte werd eind 2007 aangekondigd,
maar het duurde tot 2008 voordat het uiteindelijke plan er lag en groen licht kreeg van
Brussel.
Bovendien bood het plan niet onmiddellijk soelaas, maar voorzag het in een structu-
rele verbetering op de lange termijn. Het was de vraag of de Europese Commissie en
de Nederlandse bestuursrechter deze oplossing zouden aanvaarden. De luchtkwali-
teitsregulering was het resultaat geweest van Europese wetgeving en Nederland had
door de EU gesanctioneerde uitstel van de inwerkingtreding van de standaarden
nodig. Uitstel was mogelijk geworden dankzij een nieuwe Europese richtlijn op het
gebied van de luchtkwaliteit, afgekondigd in 2008. De Europese Commissie accep-
teerde het Nederlandse plan in 2009. In 2010 accepteerde ook de Nederlandse
bestuursrechter het als voldoende onderbouwing van projecten met potentieel nega-
tieve gevolgen voor de luchtkwaliteit.
Niet iedereen bleek tevreden met de uiteindelijke uitkomst, de milieubeweging en
sommige parlementariërs zagen in de programmatische aanpak nog een truc om
bouwprojecten ondanks de standaarden mogelijk te maken. In het Nederlandse
omgevingsrecht bleek deze nieuwe aanpak echter wel degelijk toekomst te hebben,
ook buiten het beperkte gebied van de luchtkwaliteit. Verschillende omgevingswet-
ten werden op de leest van de programmatische aanpak geschoeid.
DE F I JNSTOFSTR I JD IN HET L ICHT VAN EUROPEANISER ING, ECOLOGISCHE
MODERNISERING EN VOORZORG
Het onderzoek rond de gebeurtenissen rond luchtkwaliteit in Nederland en Europa
bevat voor de rechtssociologie interessante uitkomsten op drie terreinen te weten
europeanisering, ecologische modernisering en de legaliteit van voorzorg. Hieronder
zullen per terrein de belangrijkste conclusies worden weergegeven.
EUROPEANISER ING EN GEBRICOLEERDE WETGEVING
Over het fenomeen Europeanisering is in kringen van Nederlandse rechtssociologen
nog niet zoveel geschreven. Europeanisering wil zeggen dat steeds grotere delen van
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de Nederlandse rechtsorde beheerst worden door regulering die van Europese oor-
sprong is. Inzicht in de wijze waarop die regulering tot stand komt en de gevolgen
ervan, zijn rechtssociologisch van belang.
In het geval van luchtkwaliteit waren het inderdaad Europese standaarden die
in Nederland voor bestuurlijke problemen hebben gezorgd omdat ze hier niet
haalbaar bleken te zijn. In 1999 werd er een Europese richtlijn afgekondigd waarin
standaarden voor luchtkwaliteit werden vastgesteld. Die standaarden zijn vervol-
gens één op één overgenomen in Nederlandse wetgeving door middel van het
bovengenoemde Besluit Luchtkwaliteit. Omdat het hier normen betrof van Euro-
pese origine hanteerde de Nederlandse regering graag het excuus dat het was over-
vallen door Europa. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt echter dat Nederland al in een zeer
vroeg stadium een medespeler was in de Europese arena die niet afkerig was van
strenge luchtkwaliteitsnormen.
In 1994 werden plannen onthuld waarover al werd gesproken in het Vijfde Europese
Milieu Actieprogamma (5e MAP) van 1993, namelijk het opzetten van een integraal
stelsel van luchtkwaliteitsnormen voor de gehele EU. Het strategisch kader werd in
een eerste richtlijn neergelegd (de zogenoemde moederrichtlijn luchtkwaliteit) en de
standaarden zelf werden afgekondigd in een vervolgrichtlijn, een dochterrichtlijn. De
standaarden waren gebaseerd op de normen die de WHO hanteerde. De WHOwerd
een sleutelrol toebedacht omdat dit een onafhankelijke organisatie was die de weten-
schappelijke legitimiteit bezat om de lidstaten op één lijn te krijgen. De normstelling
werd gecombineerd met een tactiek om het milieubewustzijn onder de burgers te ver-
hogen door het publiceren van informatie over luchtkwaliteit. De normen moesten
streng genoeg zijn om lidstaten te dwingen tot innovatieve strategieën.
Nederland droeg zelf echter ook bij aan de totstandkoming van de luchtkwaliteitsregule-
ring. Op instigatie vanNederlandse ambtenaren in de vroege jaren 80 is deWHObetrok-
ken geraakt bij luchtkwaliteitsregulering. Nederland wilde zelf een stelsel van
kwaliteitsnormen opzetten, maar had daar een wetenschappelijke basis voor nodig.
Net als de EU zocht het een instantie die de juiste wetenschappelijk legitimiteit bezat
om zowel de oppositie in Nederland te kunnen overtuigen alsook het buitenland aan
te sporen eenzelfde stelsel op te zetten. Dit laatste punt had te maken met concurrentie-
overwegingen.AlsNederland zijn industrie aan strengewetgeving bloot zou stellen, dan
zoude industrie uit andere landen eenvoordeel hebben.Datzelfde idee lag ten grondslag
aan het EU voorstel om te komen tot een uniform stelsel van luchtkwaliteitseisen. De
bedoeling was om een gelijk speelveld te creëren op het gebied van milieubelasting.
De Nederlandse inspanningen vonden een gewillig oor bij de WHO en Nederland
bekostigde het onderzoek naar de WHO luchtkwaliteitsrichtlijnen. Toen die in
1987 het licht zagen, was het enthousiasme in Nederland inmiddels gedoofd. In de
EU echter in het geheel niet en de WHO normen gingen als benchmark fungeren.
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
De doelstelling dat de lucht aan deWHOnormenmoest voldoen,werd opgenomen in
het 5e MAP en dat plan fungeerde als basis voor de uiteindelijke regulering. Op het
moment dat die regulering in de jaren 90 werd beklonken, bleef Nederland een voor-
stander van strenge normen.
In de jaren 80 bekeerde het Nederlandse beleid zich tot het discours van de ecologische
modernisering. Informatieverstrekking aan het publiek, het stimuleren van milieu-
innovaties en hetmobiliseren van het publiek voormilieudoeleindenwaren belangrijke
speerpunten. Nederlandse politici in Europa drukten een stempel op de Europese mili-
eupolitiek van die jaren. Het 5e MAP was sterk beïnvloed door het Nationaal Milieu-
beleidsplan en name de sterke eco-modernistische toonzetting ervan.
Nederland slaagde er al in een vroeg stadium in omhet Europesemilieubeleid te beïn-
vloeden en lobbyde voor strenge regels op het gebied van luchtkwaliteit. Dat was ook
in het Nederlandse belang. Nederland had een sterke milieubeweging en als klein
land was het erg afhankelijk van beperkingen van uitstoot in andere landen.
De fijnstofstrijd leert echter dat die beïnvloeding heel anders uit kan pakken dan een
lidstaat op het eerste gezicht op het oog heeft. Dat kwamdoordat dit dossier een lange
doorlooptijd had op EU niveau en de nationale politiek intussen een andere richting
was ingeslagen. De betrokkenheid van deWHOwas een kernaspect van de Europese
regulering, net zoals de eco-modernistische beleidsfilosofie. De bedoeling was dat dit
voor Nederland positief zou uitpakken, maar de normen bleken te streng. Nederland
heeft dan ook in een later stadium gewaarschuwd voor de haalbaarheid, maar toen
was het zijn greep op het dossier al kwijt.
Andere actoren hadden andere belangen. De Europese instellingen wilden een
strenge norm die gold voor de hele EU om het gelijke speelveld te garanderen. Daar-
naast heeft een Engelse ambtenaar de regulering vormgegeven op een wijze die in
Engeland gebruikelijk was. Engeland zelf had net een paar jaar eerder een luchtkwali-
teitsstrategie opgezet in antwoord op het nationale probleem van astma bij kinderen.
Het autoverkeer werd daarvoor verantwoordelijk gehouden en nog voordat de EU
haar strategie ontvouwde in 1999 had Engeland in 1997 de eerste integrale luchtkwali-
teitsstrategie van Europa al ingevoerd. Daarnaast bleek uit een kostenbatenanalyse dat
strenge normen bij uitstek kosteneffectief waren. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat foutieve
aannames over de effectiviteit van andere wetgeving deze analyse hebben ondergra-
ven, waardoor de standaarden vele malen duurder uitvielen dan de bedoeling was.
Al met al kwam Europese regulering tot stand in een arena die gevoelig was voor
druk vanuit veel verschillende actoren. Het bespelen van de Europese arena bleek
verleidelijk voor lidstaten. Als het Europese beleid aans zou sluiten bij het nationale
beleid, dan zouden er geen kosten gemaakt hoevem te worden om het nationale
beleid aan te passen. Bovendien leek het rationeel om ambitieuze milieuwetgeving
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op bepaalde terreinen ook in Europa gerealiseerd te krijgen, anders zit een lidstaat zelf
met strengere wetgeving dan de buurlanden, wat uit concurrentieoverwegingen
onvoordelig is. Dit leidde tot een situatie waarbij lidstaten elk afzonderlijk probeer-
den hun favoriete elementen in de EU wetgeving opgenomen te krijgen. Daarnaast
hadden de Europese Commissie en het Europees parlement ook hun redenen om zich
actief met milieuwetgeving te bemoeien. De Commissie bijvoorbeeld wilde dat
Europa zich profileerde als hoeder van de belangen van EU burgers en daarommoest
een hoog beschermingsniveau worden nagestreefd.
De veelheid aan stakeholders, de verscheidenheid van belangen die zij nastreefden en
de verschillende beleidsfilosofieën waarmee zij probeerden het luchtbeleid te beïn-
vloeden leidden ertoe dat de uiteindelijke wetgeving niet meer leek op wat er oor-
spronkelijk was voorgesteld. De luchtkwaliteitsregulering bleek een lappendeken
geworden te zijn, een ‘bricolage’ van elementen uit verschillende stelsels, met ver-
schillende doelen en allerhande onbedoelde effecten.
Deze bevindingen hebben implicaties voor ons begrip van Europeanisering, want er
blijkt van een wisselwerking sprake te zijn. Europese regulering is inderdaad de
Nederlandse rechtsorde gaan beheersen, maar omgekeerd probeert Nederland ook
een voor het land zo gunstig mogelijke Europese regulering af te dwingen. Daartoe
worden Nederlandse beleidsconcepten en denkbeelden “geëxporteerd” naar Europa.
Lidstaten, waaronder Nederland, zorgen ervoor dat zij mensen hebben op posities in
Europese comités en andere overlegorganen die nationale concepten proberen in te
steken bij de relevante Europese beleidsbepalers. Europeanisering is geen eenrich-
tingsverkeer, maar een wederkerig proces van beïnvloeding. Wél blijkt er sprake te
zijn van de nodige ruis op de lijn waardoor lidstaten de eigen beleidsvoorstellen ver-
vat in Europesewetgeving terug krijgen die in nietsmeer lijken opwat zij er oorspron-
kelijk mee hadden beoogd.
NEDERLANDSE BELE IDSKEUZES EN ECOLOGISCHE MODERNISER ING
In de jaren 70 werd het Nederlandse milieudiscours nog sterk bepaald door de pes-
simistische vergezichten uit het rapport voor de Club van Rome, Grenzen aan de
Groei. Het devies was in de eerste jaren van het milieubeleid om de noodzakelijke
grenzen te stellen door middel van wetgeving. Het milieuministerie was echter in
die jaren bij lange na niet sterk genoeg om die wetgeving ook daadwerkelijk door
te voeren en milieu als beleidsterrein verzandde in een complex stelsel van vergun-
ningen. Op het gebied van ruimtelijke ordening realiseerde het departement een
instrument dat grenzen stelde aan de hoeveelheid vervuiling. De koppeling van
RO besluiten aan kwaliteitseisen betekende dat als ergens de milieukwaliteit onvol-
doende was, het niet was toegestaan om verdere vervuilende activiteiten te
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
vergunnen. Hierdoor gingen kwaliteitseisen rechtstreeks doorwerken in de indivi-
duele besluiten van bestuursorganen.
Met de komst van het ministerie van VROM in 1983, waarbij milieu werd gevoegd bij
ruimtelijke ordening en volkshuisvesting, deden moderne managementideeën hun
intrede. De eerste minister van VROMwas PieterWinsemius van de VVD.Hij moder-
niseerde het ministerie en ruilde het pessimistische vertoog van grenzen aan de groei
in voor het optimistische discours van ecologische modernisering. Volgens ecologi-
sche modernisering kon aan milieuproblemen het hoofd worden geboden door juist
verder te moderniseren, in een milieuvriendelijke richting. Winsemius begon een
campagne om zogenaamde ‘doelgroepen’ mee te krijgen in de bescherming van
het milieu. Hij werd daarbij geholpen door de toenmalige grootschalige aandacht
voor zure regen. Een schoon milieu werd voorgesteld als noodzakelijke grondstof
voor verdere productie, milieuvriendelijke alternatieven werden voorgesteld als
winstgevend, vervuiling werd een voorbeeld van inefficiëntie en milieubederf werd
vergeleken met een financieringstekort die door volgende generaties terugbetaald
zou moeten worden. Het milieudiscours werd kortom sterk ‘geëconomiseerd’.
Winsemius legde taken op aan het bedrijfsleven maar betrok het ook bij het milieu-
beleid en in ruil voor inspraakwerden convenanten gesloten. Deze op consensus, pre-
ventie en management gerichte milieupolitiek kende zijn hoogtepunt in het integrale
Nationaal Milieu Beleidsplan uit 1989. In de jaren 90 werd het succesvol geëxporteerd
naar andere landen en naar de EU.
Dit beleid kende echter een keerzijde. Het beloofde een positieve wisselwerking
tussen economie en milieubeleid en dat betekende dat al te grote offers van de eco-
nomische sectoren niet gevraagd konden worden. Belangrijke sectoren als de petro-
chemische industrie en het transport werden dan ook uit de wind gehouden.
Bovendien streefde het een internationale aanpak van milieuproblematiek na, waar-
door nationale maatregelen impliciet van minder betekenis werden geacht. Het
betrekken van de milieubeweging bij de geijkte overlegstructuren verliep niet altijd
voorspoedig en de beoogde consensus begon scheuren te vertonen in de jaren 90.
Op het gebied van luchtkwaliteit leidde dit discours na de jaren 80 tot weinig nieuwe
initiatieven, ook niet toen er berichten kwamen dat fijnstof schadelijker kon zijn dan
gedacht. Er werd gewacht totdat ‘Europa’ zou handelen. Op het moment dat Neder-
landwel gedwongenwas tot handelen, realiseerde de regering zich niet wat voor con-
sequenties de normen zouden kunnen hebben. Achteraf is dat naïef gebleken. Het
werd echter ingegeven door de in Nederland breed gedeelde overtuiging dat normen
die geen rekening hielden met economische haalbaarheid geen juridische consequen-
ties konden hebben. De Nederlandse regering was er van overtuigd dat de normen in
Europa herSeen zouden worden en dat ze alleen toegepast hoefden te worden op
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plekken waar mensen woonden. Als het maximaal haalbare gedaan werd, kon men
eenvoudigweg niet meer verlangen, zo was de aanname.
De Nederlandse regering heeft zich in de jaren 90 wel sterk gemaakt op het punt van
ecologische beginselen en een strategische lange termijnaanpak, maar bleek huiverig
voor het nemen van maatregelen die daadwerkelijk veel geld zouden kosten. Econo-
mische overwegingen hebben hun leidende positie in het milieubeleid versterkt.
Waar ecologische modernisering in zijn sterke variant rond 1990 een activistische dis-
cours bleek, is de zwakke variant vooral behoudend en gericht op het voeren vanmili-
eubeleid door vooral in te zetten op technologische vooruitgang. Gedurende de jaren
90 verzwakte ecologische modernisering steeds verder. Bovendien bleken niet alle
sectoren even vatbaar voor ecologische modernisering. De pogingen om dit discours
ingang te laten vinden op het punt vanmobiliteit en transport strandden in de jaren 90
op het verzet van de automobilist die niets voelde voor het beprijzen van het gebruik
van de weg via een kilometerheffing. Het parkeerbeleid werd eveneens gehekeld en
de campagnes om de automobilist te laten overstappen op schonere vervoermiddelen
bleken niet succesvol. De mislukte poging tot ecologische modernisering van verkeer
en vervoer betekende een substantiële verzwakking van dit discours.
Op het gebied van automobiliteit voltrok zich in de jaren 2002 en 2003 een fundamen-
tele omwenteling van het beleid. De politiek van de kabinetten Balkenende, met name
Balkenende 1, was erop gericht de automobilist ruim baan te geven. Subsidies voor
schonere auto’s werden teruggedraaid en de automobiliteit werd gefaciliteerd, onder
andere door de invoering van een spoedwet wegverbreding. Milieubelangen op het
gebied van verkeer en vervoer werden gemarginaliseerd.
De fijnstofstrijd moet begrepen worden als reactie op de marginalisering van milieu-
belangen die op haar hoogtepunt was in de politiek van het eerste kabinet Balke-
nende. In de Europese arena beleed Nederland nog het ideaal van ecologische
modernisering, maar binnenlands werd vol ingezet op het stimuleren van groei.
De oppositie begon sterker te hameren op het gevaar van slechte luchtkwaliteit en dat
bleek een goed middel om terug te vechten, vooral nadat de Raad van State in 2004
was begonnen met het vernietigen van bouwprojecten. De brede consensus over een
aanpak die zowel economische vooruitgang als ecologische bescherming zou bieden,
was verdwenen. Het volksgezondheidskamp hield de regering voor dat ze blind was
voor de gezondheidseffecten vanmeer asfalt en het infrastructuurkamp betoogde dat
dergelijke normen schadelijk waren voor de economische vooruitgang. De regering
meende ondertussen dat zij het ‘maximaal haalbare’ deed. Dit is een impliciet appèl
op de eco-modernistische consensus waarin men moet kiezen voor milieubescher-
ming als dat economisch haalbaar en redelijk is. Dit appèl vond echter geen gehoor
meer.
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Uiteindelijk verschafte ecologische modernisering toch de sleutel om tot een oplos-
sing te komen, maar pas jaren later. De programmatische aanpak uit de Wet lucht-
kwaliteit van 2007 had veel kenmerken van een zwakke variant van ecologische
modernisering. Infrastructuur en milieu worden in dit discours geacht naast elkaar
te kunnen bestaan als het geheel goed gemanaged werd en werd, ondersteund door
berekeningen en via een integraal lange termijnplan. De programmatische aanpak
voorzag expliciet in betrokkenheid van lagere bestuursorganen, wetenschappelijke
instituten en stakeholders. Het betrof een preventieve aanpak maar niet zodanig
dat infrastructuurontwikkeling een halt wordt toegeroepen.
Met de programmatische aanpak keerde Nederland terug naar een zwakke variant
van ecologische modernisering. Een zwakke variant van ecologische modernisering
bleek het meest aantrekkelijk beleidsdiscours want blijkbaar kon het Nederlandse
publiek niet zonder ecologische principes, maar was het ook niet bereid daar grote
offers voor te brengen, in ieder geval niet op het punt vanmobiliteit. Dit vertoog bleek
in de fijnstofstrijd een geschikt lapmiddel, maar het had niet meer de ambitie of de
vernieuwende kracht die het had in de jaren 80. Destijds introduceerde het een
nieuwe kijk op het milieuconflict en waarmee oude tegenstellingen doorbroken kon-
den worden. De hedendaagse variant met haar precieze balans tussen vervuiling en
sanering leek eerder behoudend dan visionair.
Het gehele domein van luchtvervuilingspolitiek en ecologische modernisering over-
Seend valt op hoe conservatief het Nederlandse vertoog in wezen is. Principes wor-
den weliswaar sterk aangemoedigd maar in de praktijk worden er stelselmatig
compromissen gesloten en geldt het adagium dat niemand overvraagd mag worden.
Deze kloof leidt tot problemen wanneer actiegroepen zich op die principes gaan
beroepen en zich verzetten tegen de behoudende milieupolitiek. In de fijnstofstrijd
is de politiek door de rechter op de vingers getikt, omdat de rechter de regering eraan
herinnerde dat zij in Europa bindende afspraken had gemaakt. De overheid rea-
geerde door de subsidies voor groepen als Milieudefensie te verminderen. Deze wen-
ding maakte eens te meer duidelijk dat ecologische modernisering in Nederland
voornamelijk een inkapselingsvertoog was, in plaats van een ambitieus milieudis-
cours. De opkomende rol van de Europese Unie en de bestuursrechter maakte dat
de Nederlandse regering uit onverwachte hoek geconfronteerd werd met de princi-
pes die zij eerder had beleden. Maar politiek geSeen bleek ecologische modernisering
geen duurzaam discours.
DE F I JNSTOFSTR I JD EN VOORZORG
Aan het begin van de studiewerd de hypothese geformuleerd dat het optreden van de
fijnstofstrijd als indicatie kon worden geSeen dat de voorzorglegaliteit in opkomst is.
Uit deze studie blijkt enige steun voor de hypothese, maar er kan zeker niet zonder
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meer worden gesproken van een opmars van de voorzorglegaliteit binnen de rechts-
orde. De casus heeft namelijk laten Seen dat als een voorzorgbenadering een groot
stempel op recht en beleid gaat drukken, tegenkrachten opkomen die het juist weer
ondergraven.
Uit deze studie is gebleken dat Nederlandse regeringen bij dit beleidsprobleem niet
erg geneigd waren om de voorzorglegaliteit te omarmen. Ondanks of misschien beter
dankzij het beleidsdiscours van ecologische modernisering bleef de legaliteit van
risico en compensatie dominant. De reden is dat de Nederlandse regering altijd
oog bleef houden voor de kosteneffectiviteit van milieumaatregelen, geheel in lijn
met de zwakke variant van ecologische modernisering. Het voorzorgbeginsel werd
op dit terrein niet expliciet beleden en gebleken is dat als de kosten te hoog waren,
de Nederlandse regering niet van plan was om strikte voorzorg te implementeren.
Op het moment dat de luchtkwaliteitsrichtlijnen omgezet moesten worden naar
Nederlands recht bij voorbeeld, schreef minister Jan Pronk een brief aan de Europese
commissarisMargotWallström dat het uitvoeren van de richtlijn voor Nederland niet
kosteneffectief zou zijn. Pronk stond en staat bekend als een voorstander van het
voorzorgbeginsel, maar zelfs hij ging ervan uit dat een scheve kostenbatenverhou-
ding een goede reden was om de richtlijn niet integraal uit te voeren.
Het Europese beleid was tot in de jaren 2000 meer gericht op voorzorg. De Europese
richtlijnen luchtkwaliteit uit de jaren 90 vertoonden tekenen van een voorzorglegali-
teit. Zo waren zij zonder veel wetenschappelijke kennis verordonneerd, kenden zij
een breed bereik en werd de burger expliciet bij de handhaving van de richtlijn
betrokken. De informatievoorSeening diende het doel om ‘druk van onderop’ op lid-
staten te creëren om de richtlijn goed uit te voeren. Dat laatste bleek ondubbelzinnig
uit de evaluatie van de richtlijn uit 2005.
De Raad van State zelf bleek ook geporteerd voor een voorzorggerichte benadering.
Hoewel omfloerst, zijn er aanwijzingen dat een voorzorglegaliteit een rol speelde in
de beslissingen van de hoogste bestuursrechter op het terrein van luchtkwaliteit. Zo
legde de Raad van State de lat voor het benodigde onderzoek een stuk hoger dan
voorheen. Daarnaast stelde de Raad zich op als hoeder van de strenge ‘koppeling’
tussen bestuurlijke besluiten en kwaliteitsnormen. De Raad is niet alleen de hoogste
bestuursrechter, maar ook de belangrijkste adviseur op het terrein van de wetgeving.
De Raad liet zich in beide hoedanigheden kritisch uit over beleid dat milieurechtelijke
waarborgen op de helling zette, zoals de Spoedwet wegverbreding. Daarnaast bekri-
tiseerde de Raad van State verwijzend naar luchtkwaliteit de regering: zij zou beleid
voeren dat teveel was gericht op economische groei en te weinig op duurzaamheid.
De RvS bleek op dit dossier een geduchte tegenstander van de regering te zijn. Het feit
dat de normen van Europeesrechtelijke aard waren en direct konden doorwerken in
de Nederlandse rechtsorde, maakte de positie van RvS sterk. Zij kon het argument
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hanteren dat ‘Den Haag’ de wetgeving wel kon wijzigen, maar dat de normen uit de
Europese richtlijnen direct door burgers ingeroepen konden worden. De Raad han-
teerde een verhaallijn waarin het stelde dat de Nederlandse regering zichzelf had
gebonden aan Europese wetgeving en dat het beleid daarom in Den Haag niet gewij-
zigd zou kunnen worden, maar alleen in Europa. Hiermee legitimeerde het zijn blok-
kade van een snelle wetgevingsoperatie om het effect van de normen te versoepelen.
Deze nieuwe lijn was belangrijk want daarmee maakte de Raad van State duidelijk
dat hij het Nederlandse beleid daadwerkelijk zou gaan toetsen aan Europees beleid.
Via deze rechterlijke weg vond een voorzorgbenadering alsnog ingang, tegen de
wens van de regering in.
Zoals te verwachten viel, gebruikte het gezondheidskamp zeer vaak op voorzorg
gerichte argumenten. Het meest belangwekkend is de genese van een expliciet juri-
dische verhaallijn aangaande luchtkwaliteit. Met name Milieudefensie speelde sterk
in op het uitspraken van de Raad van State en ging op campagne met het verhaal dat
de rechten van de Nederlandse burger waren geschonden omdat de regering niets
aan de luchtkwaliteit in vieze straten wilde doen. Zij eisten voor de rechter dat de
regering maatregelen zou nemen zoals een snelheidsverlaging op de ringen en het
sluiten van de meest vieze straten voor verkeer. Die procedures verloor milieudefen-
sie, maar het punt was gemaakt: een schone lucht is een (burger)recht. Met dit motto
werden ook burgers gemobiliseerd om zelf naar de rechter te stappen. In veel gevallen
speelde milieudefensie een rol op de achtergrond terwijl burgers betoogden dat de
luchtkwaliteit door een bepaald project gevaar zou lopen. Daartoe hadmilieudefensie
een ‘doe het zelf pakket’ ontwikkeld waarin stap voor stap werd uitgelegd hoe een
procedure bij de RvS gevoerd moest worden.
Het succes van deze expliciet juridische campagnestrategie is een van de meest in het
oog springende rechtssociologische conclusies. Het idee dat een schoon milieu een
mensenrecht zou zijn werd wel verkondigd in academia, maar tijdens de fijnstofstrijd
werd het ook ingezet in een daadwerkelijk milieuconflict. Rechters bleken er gevoelig
voor en de regering werd geconfronteerd met een groot aantal juridische procedures.
Het kan niet verbazen dat het infrastructuurkamp een consequente tegenstander was
van een voorzorgbenadering. Zij zette het standaardargument in dat de wetgeving
negatieve gevolgen voor de economie zou hebben en dat Nederland niet ‘op slot’
gezet kon worden vanwege luchtkwaliteit. De harde interpretatie van de RvS dreigde
het milieubelang inderdaad te laten prevaleren. De verhaallijn van het infrastructuur-
kamp sloeg meer aan naarmate de clash zich voortsleepte. Na verloop van tijd kwam
de regering ook op die lijn en het luchtkwaliteitsprobleem werd steeds meer geSeen
als een probleem van inflexibele regulering. De programmatische aanpak was inder-
daad flexibeler dan de oude koppeling en in zoverre kreeg het infrastructuurkamp
zijn zin. Het plan behelsde echter ookmaatregelen voor schone lucht die eerdere kabi-
netten nooit van plan waren geweest te nemen en in zoverre was het een compromis.
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In termen van voorzorglegaliteit kan de programmatische aanpak eerder geschaard
worden onder de legaliteit van risico en compensatie, met zijn gedetailleerde balans
tussen maatregelen en schadelijke projecten.
Opvallend is dat ook in Europa de voorzorglegaliteit voor wat betreft milieubeleid
een halt lijkt te zijn toegeroepen. Ook in deze arena hebben lobbygroepen van project-
ontwikkelaars en andere economisch belangrijke actoren gelobbyd voor flexibiliteit.
Uiteindelijk is daar inderdaad aan toegegeven. De standaarden werden in 2008 wel-
iswaar iets verscherpt, maar er kwamen ook uitstelmogelijkheden, waar Nederland
van gebruik heeft gemaakt. Hier leidde druk van lidstaten, waaronder niet in de laat-
ste plaats van Nederland, en lobbygroepen tot een relatief milde nieuwe luchtkwali-
teitspolitiek. De conclusie moet dus zijn dat hoewel de luchtkwaliteitsregulering
inderdaad een product is geweest van een opkomende voorzorglegaliteit, deze lega-
liteit echter nog niet de overhand heeft gekregen. De opkomst is er een van horten en
stoten en de nationale en Europese tegenkrachten die het oproept zijn aanSeenlijk.
Het Nederlandse milieubeleid is in ieder geval op het gebied van luchtkwaliteit in
wezen behoudend van aard en geworteld in de legaliteit van risico en compensatie.
De Nederlandse regering echter heeft echter ook de neiging te sterk te hameren op
milieurechtelijke beginselen en principes, zeker in zijn betrekkingen met de Neder-
landse burger, het buitenland en de EU. Dat leidt ertoe dat zij soms door rechter
en Europese Commissie pijnlijk aan de principes gehouden wordt.
DE F I JNSTOFSTR I JD SAMENGEVAT
Hoe en waarom is luchtkwaliteit plotseling een probleem geworden in Nederland?
Deze studie laat Seen dat Europese luchtkwaliteitsregulering sterk heeft bijgedragen
aan het uitbreken van de fijnstofstrijd. Het laat ook het belang Seen van de wisselwer-
king tussen Europese regulering en Nederlandse pogingen om deze te beïnvloeden.
GeSeen vanuit de lange termijn kunnen we zelfs stellen dat de fijnstofstrijd het resul-
taat is van vroege Nederlandse bemoeienis op het Europese niveau. De strenge lucht-
kwaliteitsrichtlijnen zouden er niet geweest zijn als Nederland de WHO niet bij het
luchtbeleid had betrokken om zo wetenschappelijk goed onderbouwde luchtkwali-
teitsnormen te promoten. De strikte normering kan echter niet op het conto van
Nederlandse bemoeienis of de WHO alleen worden geschreven. Ook het Verenigd
Koninkrijk heeft zich sterk gemaakt voor een ambitieus Europees luchtbeleid.
Een ander element karakteristiek voor het Nederlandse milieubeleid en milieurecht
heeft eveneens een rol gespeeld. De koppeling tussen milieukwaliteitseisen en beslui-
ten van bestuursorganen zorgde ervoor dat infrastructuur niet kon worden ontwik-
keld in situaties waar de normen werden overschreden. Vanwege de strikte EU
standaarden was dat op veel plaatsen in het land het geval. De ontwikkeling van
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met name wegaanpassingen kwam daardoor in grote delen van het land in de knel.
Het legalistische optreden van de Afdeling Bestuursrecht van de Raad van State
verkleinde de ruimte om de sociale gevolgen van de uitspraken mee te laten wegen.
De bewoordingen van het Besluit Luchtkwaliteit liet daar ook weinig ruimte voor.
De fijnstofstrijd kan verder worden begrepen als een episode in de Nederlandse poli-
tiek waarin de consensus omtrent een milde variant van ecologische modernisering
werd gebroken. De kabinetten Balkenende, in het zadel vanaf 2002, braken met de
consensus door absolute prioriteit te geven aan de ontwikkeling van infrastructuur.
Deze beleidswending verontrustte de milieubeweging die in antwoord daarop haar
heil ging zoeken bij de rechter omdeze eenzijdigewending naar economische ontwik-
keling te keren. Zij werd daarbij geholpen door de hierboven beschreven juridische
mogelijkheden en vond een bondgenoot in de Raad van State. De milieubeweging
betoogde onder andere dat schone lucht een recht was, omdat die standaarden nu
eenmaal bij wet waren vastgelegd.
Het hardnekkige verzet van de Raad van State betekende dat de Nederlandse rege-
ring er niet in slaagde snel een bestuurlijke oplossing te vinden voor de vernietiging
van vergunningen. De regering zag zich genoodzaakt een wet aan te nemen waarin
de mogelijkheid werd geboden om een nieuw reguleringsinstrument in het leven te
roepen, de zogenaamde ‘programmatische aanpak’.
In het parlement had het volksgezondheidskamp het eerste jaar de wind in de zeilen.
Projecten werden regelmatig getorpedeerd door de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak
van de Raad van State, de Afdeling Advisering waarschuwde de regering tegen
het gebruik van bestuurlijk lapmiddelen en de regering werd gedwongen veel meer
geld uit te trekken voor de verbetering van luchtkwaliteit. Het volksgezondheids-
kamp echter kreeg een steeds geduchtere tegenstander in het infrastructuurkamp,
een discourscoalitie van lobbygroepen en politieke partijen die wezen op het belang
van economische ontwikkeling. Het kamp lanceerde de counter-claim dat het echte
probleem met luchtkwaliteit niet lag in de sfeer van de volksgezondheid maar in
de regulering dit het land op slot had gegooid voor verdere ontwikkeling. Zij brachten
een verhaallijn naar voren dat wees op miljarden euro’s aan schade en het op de tocht
staan van wellicht 100.000 banen.
De fijnstofstrijd kon in de politieke arena alleen tot een eindeworden gebracht door de
consensus rond zwakke ecologische modernisering nieuw leven in te blazen. Het
instrument van de programmatische aanpak was gebaseerd op consensus, sterk tech-
nisch van aard en leunde op een managementaanpak. Met deze aanpak vervat in het
zogeheten Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit slaagde de regering
er ten eerste in om bij de Europese Commissie enige uitstel voor het voldoen aan de
normen te verkrijgen. Ten tweede werd het door de Raad van State uiteindelijk
Samenvatting: de sociale constructie van de fijnstofstrijd in Nederland
geaccepteerd als een instrument dat zowel ontwikkeling mogelijk maakte als de
luchtkwaliteit veilig stelde.
Deze studie laat, voor zover ik weet voor de eerste maal, een zaak Seen waarin de
Raad van State de regering jaren van twee kanten in de greep kon houden, daarbij
gebruik makend van zijn dubbele positie als bestuursrechter enerzijds en adviesor-
gaan anderzijds. De Afdeling Rechtspraak bleef besluiten vernietigen terwijl de Afde-
ling Advisering de regering eraan bleef herinneren dat elke aanpassing van de
wetgeving conform de Europese regels moest zijn.
Een derde manier om de fijnstofstrijd te analyseren is door te kijken naar de mate
waarin een legaliteit gebaseerd op risico en compensatie en een legaliteit gebaseerd
op voorzorg aanwezig waren in de politieke en juridische afhandeling van de
strijd. Gedurende de strijd blokkeerden strikte standaarden gebaseerd op onzekere
wetenschappelijke kennis belangrijke economische projecten in Nederland. Alleen
door een balans te vinden tussen milieubelangen en economische belangen kon de
strijd worden beslecht. De snelle afkondiging van de Europese normen, het succes
van de verhaallijn rond de status van luchtkwaliteit als recht en de gehechtheid
aan de koppeling die de Raad van State liet Seen, zijn indicaties dat een voorzorgle-
galiteit inderdaad een rol heeft gespeeld. Echter, de sterke reactie tegen de kortston-
dige juridische prioritering van milieubelangen in Nederland, maar ook in Europa
laat Seen dat de voorzorglegaliteit nog een lange weg te gaan heeft voordat kan wor-
den gesteld dat zij zich een dominante positie heeft verworven in de Nederlandse
rechtsorde.
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SUMMARY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF THE DUTCH AIR QUALITY CLASH
In April 2007, a short time before I started this dissertation, I returned to the Nether-
lands after having spent six years in Istanbul, Turkey. After my return, I quickly
picked up a new word that was being used daily in Dutch: ‘fijnstof’, meaning ‘par-
ticulate matter’ in English. The precise nature of particulate matter remained unclear,
but some things were certain: it was a form of air pollution, it was dangerous, and it
was emitted primarily by cars. Mostly present in busy streets, it was the number one
public health hazard. This ‘new’ form of air pollution intriguedme, because I had just
come back from a metropolis that was home to over 10 million people, featuring per-
petually congested motorways and coal-fired steam boats. In Istanbul, however, air
pollution was rarely discussed, whereas in Amsterdam it was a topic of fierce debate.
In this dissertation, the social problem of air pollution by particulate matter (PM10) is
under scrutiny. The question concerns why air quality became a major public issue in
the Netherlands in the period between September 2004 and April 2010. Those years
have been researched extensively, because in 2004 the highest Dutch administrative
Court, the Council of State,1 started to terminate the development of high profile
infrastructure projects due to exceedance of the standards for particulate matter. In
2009 the European Commission granted the Netherlands postponement from the
European air quality standards in order to implement its ‘programmatic approach’.
This approach was a Dutch Governments’ proposed solution to solve the impasse.
Finally, on the 31st of March 2010 the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division approved of the Government’s solution to the impasse, the so called pro-
grammatic approach.
During these years two camps of actors emerged that each proposed a different def-
inition of the problem and a different solution. From the perspective of public health,
various institutions pointed out the risks posed by particulate matter. It was argued
that people living close to highways were particularly susceptible to cardiovascular
and respiratory disease, and that particulate matter was a significant factor in the
occurrence of prematuremortality found inmany urban areas. Other actors, however,
1. The Council of State is an organisation that functions as both the highest Dutch administrative court and
as an important policy adviser that must be consulted before legislation is enacted.
pointed out that the legislation by which air quality was regulated was an unjustifia-
ble economic burden,with severe consequences for employment in terms of theDutch
competitive position. Especially in 2005, 2006 and 2007 these two points of view col-
lided and fought for dominance in the political arena. Therefore, I refer to this situa-
tion as the ‘air quality clash’. In essence, the clash is one of interests: namely, which
should prevail – public health or the economy? Over the years, however, the clash
became more complex, and questions have arisen about the increasing influence of
the European Union on national law and policy, the influence that the Dutch Council
of State may wield in the political arena, and to what extent the population should be
expected to tolerate health risks.
A number of aspects have been examined further in this socio-legal study. Firstly, the
role of ‘Europeanisation’ in the emergence of the air quality clash is under investigation.
Strict European rules have found their way into Dutch national legislation, and these
rules have caused the air quality standards to be significantly tightened. On the basis of
these standards, the Council of State has annulled a number of prestigious high-profile
construction projects. Secondly, choices made by the Dutch Government are under
scrutiny. These choices have been important in the emergence of the air quality clash
and I argue that they are informed to a large extent by the philosophy underlyingDutch
environmental policy. Thirdly, the air quality clash has been related to a supposed tran-
sition within the Dutch legal order. The question is whether the legal order is in tran-
sition from what is termed a legality of risk and compensation to a legality of
precaution. The hypothesis is that whereas compensation of victims because of dam-
ages was considered previously to be imperative, the current prevention of damages
altogether is considered crucial, even if prevention were to lead to very high costs.
METHODOLOGY
A social constructivist methodologywas chosen for this investigation. In this perspec-
tive, social problems are not assumed to be objectively given states, but are the result
of an intersubjective process of signification by which certain conditions become
labelled as social problems. Certain people experience these conditions as problematic
and if these people convince a large enough number of others that a particular state of
affairs is indeed undesirable, the situation is then considered to be a ‘social problem’.
Social constructivism has proven to be an effective methodological perspective for
studying the social problems, as it shifts from the question of how people respond
to the emergence of problems to the process by which certain situations come to be
defined as problematic. In the social sciences, it is now one of the most widely used
frames of reference for the purpose of analysing the emergence of social problems.
In this dissertation, I have used social constructivist concepts employed in two differ-
ent types of social constructivism. I refer to the first type as being actor-centred and to
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the second type as being discourse analytic. Actor-centred social constructivism
assumes that certain groups of people have a particular interest in defining a situation
as problematic. The unemployed, for instance, are keen to have unemployment
accepted as a major social issue. Minority groups, for example, will benefit if society
begins to view racism as a troubling social condition. These actors, referred to as
‘claims makers’, will attempt to convince others of their definition of the problem.
Through various channels, theywill try to persuade the public to accept the claim that
a certain situation is problematic. But of course claims themselves tend to elicit coun-
ter-claims. The representation of the situation by claims makers will not be shared
immediately by everybody, and groups that have an interest inmaintaining the status
quo might oppose it. The claim that abortion should be legalised, for instance, imme-
diately met with the counter-claim that abortion in fact amounted to murder. When
claims and counter-claims come into conflict, heated societal discussions erupt.
Claims makers and counter-claims makers exchange their arguments in writing and
in front of cameras in talk shows, at public rallies, in Parliament, and sometimes in
court. All these locations in which arguments are exchanged are referred to as
‘arenas’. If a claimmeets with broad popular support, policy makers may start to pro-
pose laws aimed at resolving the specific social problem, and these proposals could
lead eventually to new regulation. Nevertheless, some may consider these new rules
to be problematic, in which case the game begins anew.
The social constructivist sees the social order as the outcome of a continuous struggle
between social groups making their claims. If these groups manage to have their
assertions accepted by a substantial number of people, these claims will become insti-
tutionalised and often lead to new regulation. Actors are seen as players in a far-rea-
ching game in which their claims-making moves are directed towards obtaining a
favourable position from which to defend their interests.
In the last 20 years, a new social constructivist strategy has come to the fore, and
focuses on the arguments on which actors make and defend their claims. In the
social sciences, this shift in focus from actors towards arguments and discursive
strategies is referred to as the ‘discursive turn’. Discourse analysts point out that
a claim can only be accepted if it fits within the framework of current public atti-
tudes and opinions. Arguments for certain claims have to be plausible in light of
other beliefs and opinions held among groups in society. The term ‘discourse’ refers
to the way in which the dominant point view in a certain field of social interaction
manifests itself in language and argumentation, and in the practices by which it is
institutionalised.
Claims must be compatible with the discourse; therefore, they will never be brought
forward in a neutral and objective fashion, but will be embeddedwithin a certain nar-
rative. A problematic situation is presented as a specific undesirable condition with a
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certain history, causes, and effects, and its own specific solution. In this dissertation, I
refer to such a narrative as a storyline. These storylines are used by actors, but can also
be taken up by other actors in the course of the debates. In the event that different
actors embrace the same storylines, we speak of a discourse coalition. Storylines must
be compatible with the reigning discourse, but discussions also change shape under
the influence of newly emerging storylines. This dynamic interplay between storyli-
nes and the larger discursive context makes this social constructivist method appro-
priate to investigate the constellation of different points of view that are held within
society, or by groups within society. These societal convictions are sublimated within
storylines.
IDEAL TYPES
The clash concerning air quality is not only related to the individual behaviour of cer-
tain actors but also to the Dutch policy philosophy concerning environmental issues
and structural changes in the legal order. To that end, it is related to two ideal types:
ideal typical ecological modernisation and the ideal typical legality of precaution. In
the scope of this study, ecological modernisation is considered to be a discourse in the
field of environmental policy that made gains in the 1980s in the Netherlands and
Europe, and became the dominant discourse in the 1990s. In light of ecological mod-
ernisation, the question is posed whether the extent to which Dutch policy choices
themselves have contributed to the emergence of the air quality clash. In the table
below, an ideal typical reconstruction is presented, consisting of ecological modern-
isation and its typical characteristics. This environmental discourse is contrasted with
an earlier debate dominant in the 1970s, which I named ‘limits to growth’. It obtained
its characteristic elements from the report for the Club of Rome from 1971, with the
same name. In addition, the discourse on ecological modernisation is divided into a
strong and a weak variant. On the one hand, strong ecological modernisation
demands far-reaching changes in our economic structure and behaviour vis-à-vis
the environment. On the other hand, weak ecological modernisation is easily compat-
ible with current capitalist economic relations. The two types of ecological modern-
isation have been outlined together with the 'limits to growth' discourse in table 12.
The term legality, coined by Dutch sociologists of lawAndré Hoekema andNiels Van
Manen and inspired by the work of Max Weber, is used to define a certain set of
assumptions prevalent in the legal order in a certain time. According to sociology
of law the legal order is not a stable set of rules, but a representation of the changing
convictions held in society at a given time. Throughout legal history different sets of
convictions have dominated the legal order, without however totally replacing earlier
convictions. The legality of precaution is my identification of a new type of legality in
which the necessity of the prevention of damage is the paramount imperative. My
socio-legal hypothesis is that in environmental law and policy, this type of legality
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is replacing an older type, the legality of risk and compensation. In this type of legality
compensation of victims for damages is the prime imperative.
This shift from compensation to precaution has repercussions for different funda-
mental assumptions of the Dutch legal order. The core element of this new type
Table 12
Policy discourse Limits to growth Weak ecological
modernisation
Strong ecological
modernisation
Relationship
between
economy and
ecology
Inimical: economic growth
threatens the environment.
Peaceful coexistence: Economy
and ecology may progress side
by side.
Positively intertwined: Ecological
progress will lead to economic
growth.
Role of science Natural science and ecological
science are used to assess the
state of environmental
degradation. Natural scientific
considerations should steer
policy.
Science provides the data to
discuss ecological problems in
economic, natural scientific and
managerial terms.
Science is applied to take stock of
environmental threats, and
economic problems are discussed
by including indicators of
environmental performance.
Resource use, depletion, and
pollution become an important
concern in economicmanagement.
Consensus
building
Market parties should be forced
to commit to the goals of
environmental policy through
top-down regulation.
Negotiations between the
Government, environmental
pressure groups and industry on
the topic of environmental
regulation.
Broad mechanisms of
participation for industry and the
environmental movement in
policy making.
Preventative
approach
Ecological disturbance should be
reduced to a minimum. This
implies rigid application of the
precautionary principle and an
antagonistic view towards
economic growth.
Pollution should be prevented by
cleaner processes of production
and if necessary application of
the precautionary principle.
Targeting the polluting
individual, enterprise and
consumer him or herself. Broad
application of the precautionary
principle and internalization of it
by addressees.
Responsibilisation Education and legislation should
be combined to raise the right
environmental mentality.
Awareness raising through
media campaigns, supplying
information and subsidising
environmental pressure groups.
Active involvement of citizens
througheducation,grantingrights
to review corporate registries and
access to justice, alliance
between environmentalists and
Government.
Comprehensive
policies
The earth is considered one
interdependent ecosystem.
Ideally, policy is integrated and
formulated holistically. In practice
though, only piecemeal regulation
could be realised in the 1970s.
Targeting multiple forms of
pollution in multiple
environmental media with the
same policy.
Targeting multiple forms of
pollution as well as establishing
behaviour change with regard to
polluters within the same policy.
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of legality is the application of the precautionary principle, which holds that uncer-
tainty as to the scope and nature of environmental damage cannot be used as an
excuse not to take protective measures. In table 13, we may find an equally ideal
typical representation of the legality of precaution, contrasted with the legality of
risk and compensation.
RESEARCH DES IGN AND RESEARCH MATERIAL
This research was conducted by analysing parliamentary documents that contained
the phrase ‘air quality’. In particular, the parliamentary material between May 2004
and December 2007 has been investigated, but documents from earlier and later
periods have also been examined. I have chosen to focus on the aforementioned
period because that is when the air quality clash took place in the Dutch parliamen-
tary arena. However, because the historical roots of the clash lay earlier, a longer
period had to be investigated. Dutch environmental policy came of age in the
Table 13
Legality of risk and compensation Legality of precaution
Core aspect of the legal
order
Compensation of damage by spreading of risk is
the prime imperative; hence, strict liability and
public and private insurance schemes are
essential. Prevention of damage if it is cost-
effective to do so.
Prevention of damage is the prime imperative;
hence, application of the Precautionary Principle
is essential. Prevention extends to possible
threats of an uncertain magnitude.
Category of damage
considered of most
concern
Short- to medium-term damage of a relatively
certain magnitude and probability.
Long-term damage of the potentially
catastrophic kind but of an uncertain probability.
Moral reaction to damage Damage cannot be prevented totally, but
compensation is in order when it occurs.
Damage is disgrace and should have been
prevented.
Perception of the victim Rights-bearing member of a risk collective. Civilian damaged by negligence of responsible
authority, agency, or enterprise.
Level of proof and safety
guarantees required
in decision making
Decision making procedures should rely on
scientific knowledge and cost benefit
assessment to determine optimal solutions.
Decision making procedures should be based on
proof that the chance of harm is negligible, and
proof is required from the actor undertaking the
risky activity.
Stance on the possibility
of social engineering
by law
Society may be improved by piecemeal policies
and an instrumental use of legislation.
Society may be improved by comprehensive
policy making (i.e. long-term holistic planning)
and societal awareness raising.
View on public
participation
Civilians are seen as laypersons with little
knowledge of risks or expert systems. Policy
needs to be determined by experts.
Imperative because the citizen is an ‘experiential
expert’, and policy and law need to provide
opportunities for citizens to present their views.
Value most worthy of
protection
Economic development: growth and expansion
of construction, mobility, and innovation.
Ecological harmony: balance of eco-systems,
public health, and safety from possible threats.
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1980s and 1990s and in order to understand the context of the clash, the whole period
from 1972 to 2010, has been investigated, by examining the literature andmajor policy
documents such as the National Environmental Policy Plan.
The problem of air quality obviously had a significant ‘European’ component, since the
air quality regulation was of European origin. This made it necessary to investigate EU
documents as well. Moreover, parliamentary documents do not provide a sufficiently
complete account. Though a crucial source, because every social problem is eventually
discussed in Parliament, they provide only limited information about a more encom-
passing social reality. Therefore, a large number of scientific reports and newspaper
articles, as well as extensive ‘grey literature’, has been examined in addition to parlia-
mentary documents. Interviews with experts, politicians, and campaigners have also
been conducted, and have helped considerably to assess the information gained from
the documents in a broader context.
Asmentioned, the investigation concerned an extensive period of time. As regards the
years of the clash, Dutch parliamentary documents have been crucial, while European
documents relating to the 1990s have been most important. I studied the preceding
years by reviewing the literature as well as the most significant Dutch parliamentary
memorandums in the sphere of air quality.
SHORT HISTORY OF THE AIR QUALITY CLASH
The air quality clash began when the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction
Division, began to reject permits granted for road expansions and other infrastruc-
tural works due to a conflict with the standards laid down in the Air Quality Order
2001. These court orders created an economic setback, because a great many projects
could not be completed. In particular, the programme to expand roads on a large scale
was hit heavily. Spokespersons of the Ministry of Transport and Water Management
(V&W) complained that they ‘could not put a single spade in the ground’ because of
the air quality issue. However, the verdicts were considered to be a victory for the
pressure groups and political parties that had pointed out the public health risks asso-
ciated with poor air quality.
These risks were first brought to the public attention in the Netherlands by the GGD,
the municipal health service of the Rotterdam area. American epidemiological inves-
tigations in the 1990s had already indicated the prevalence of premature mortality in
areas affected by bad air quality, and Dutch studies revealed that children living
along busy motorways were more susceptible to ailments involving the respiratory
system. In 1999, these findings led to unrest in the area of Overschie, a densely pop-
ulated residential area close to Rotterdam, which was divided into two by the busy
A10 thoroughfare. In an alarming report, the GGD compared the air quality in
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Overschie to the passive smoking of 17 cigarettes a day. The risks of passive smoking
are in fact comparatively very small, but the claim proved strong enough to attract
political attention. Jan Pronk, Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environ-
ment (VROM) at the time, decided to conduct a test involving a reduction of the speed
limit on the A10 near Overschie, because it was known that cars driving at a slower
speed emitted less PM10. The GGD’s claim of bad air quality near Overschie was
taken up further by parties on the left of the political spectrum, and a storyline evol-
ved around the harmful effects that an increase in automobility and the construction
of highways had on public health. Epidemiological research was cited as evidence for
the claim, and in 2001 the Air Quality Order appeared, containing the European stan-
dards for clean air. The standards for particulate matter would become valid from
2005 onwards.
In 2004, the Council of State Administrative Jurisdiction Division established a con-
sistent line of precedents regarding the standards for PM10 and nitrogen dioxide.
However, insufficient research into the effects of the decision on air quality would
lead to the annulment of the administrative decisions, irrespective of whether people
would be exposed to pollution. During the air quality clash, the Council of State con-
tinued to terminate projects, and two camps of actors emerged in 2005, each with its
own typical perspective regarding air quality. The term ‘camp’ denotes a set of actors
that put forward the same claims and use the same storyline to support them. There-
fore, we may also speak of discourse coalitions. The first camp consisted of scientific
institutes, pressure groups, and political parties that claimed poor air quality was
harmful to public health, and demanded that structural measures be taken to improve
it. I call this discourse coalition the pro-health camp. This camp took the offensive
especially during the first year after the Council of State started to terminate infra-
structure projects, and it demanded fewer roads as well as more funds for air quality
measures. The pressure group ‘Milieudefensie’ in particular demanded a general
reduction of the speed limit.
In response to the termination of projects, an important counter-claim emerged. Air
quality legislation itself was a problem, according to an alliance of various pressure
groups representing mostly the construction sector and a group of political parties,
among which were the CDA, the VVD, and the LPF. The CDA and the VVD also held
themost seats in theDutch coalition government. This camp argued that the standards
were unfeasible for the Netherlands, and that their economic consequences were not
acceptable. According to this camp, air quality regulation and its interpretation by the
Dutch judiciary had unjustifiably ‘blocked’ the Netherlands. The pro-infrastructure
campoffered a different solution: namely, the release of the typical Dutch link between
environmental quality standards and administrative decisions in the field of spatial
planning. In the Netherlands, it was possible for the court to terminate administrative
decisions that might lead to pollution in excess of the standards in a certain area. In
other countries, however, these legal repercussions were not as severe.
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A series of debates and new legislation followed in and after 2005, although a struc-
tural solution to the clash was not found until the end of 2007. Ultimately, it was
decided to release the link gradually, and to transfer to a system now known as
the ‘programmatic approach’. All spatial projects that had significant consequences
for air quality were required to be part of a plan that included those projects as well
as a list of beneficial measures that needed to be adopted. Ultimately, the sum of the
positive measures needed to top the negative consequences of the projects, and air
quality would have to improve structurally, ensuring that the standards would be
reached at a certain point in the future. The law that made this approach possible
was drafted at the end of 2007, but it was not until 2009 that this elaborate plan involv-
ing projects and measures would see the light of day.
The plan, however, could not bring immediate relief, as it was aimed at long-term
structural improvement, and it was still undecided whether the Dutch administrative
judge and especially the European Commission would accept this solution. The air
quality regulation was European in origin, and the Netherlands needed a postpone-
ment of the standards for its own plan to be effective. It was possible to obtain such a
postponement, because the possibility of appealing for it had been included in a new
European Air Quality Directive enacted in 2008. Ultimately, in 2009 the European
Commission indeed accepted the Dutch plan as a ground for postponement. InMarch
2010, the Dutch Council of State also accepted the plan as a sufficient guarantee for
projects having possible negative consequences for air quality.
Nevertheless, not everyone was happy with the eventual solution, and the environ-
mental movement and certain ecological political parties in particular considered the
air quality order to be a trick to rescue the infrastructural projects, despite their pos-
sible harmful consequences. In Dutch environmental spatial law, however, this new
programmatic approach led to new legal innovations. Several new laws in the field of
spatial planning now contain elements of the programmatic approach.
THE AIR QUALITY CLASH IN LIGHT OF EUROPEANISATION, ECOLOGICAL
MODERNISAT ION, AND PRECAUTION
The political history of air quality in the Netherlands and Europe yielded interesting
socio-legal insights in three different fields: Europeanisation, ecological modernisa-
tion, and the legality of precaution. The most important conclusions in all three fields
will be discussed below in more detail.
EUROPEANISATION
Europeanisation has not been a widely debated topic among Dutch sociologists of
law, but for environmental law in particular it is a most significant tendency.
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Europeanisation is a term describing the growing influence of European law and reg-
ulation on the national law and policy of Member States. Insight into and knowledge
of the way this regulation is formed is therefore highly important, but the interplay
between national and European regulation turns out to be extremely complex.
In the case of air quality, European standards have caused national administrative
problems because they turned out to be unfeasible for the Netherlands. In 1999, the
standards were decreed in the European air quality Daughter Directive, and were sub-
sequently incorporated into Dutch law by way of the Air Quality Order 2001. Since
these standards were of European origin, the Dutch government liked to hide behind
the excuse that it was taken by surprise, and that ‘Europe’ had promulgated poor stan-
dards. However, this study made clear that the Netherlands had been involved in air
quality regulation from very early onwards, and it was not averse to strict standards.
Plans for a new set of Air Quality Directives were revealed in 1994, with this new inte-
gral approach to air qualitymanagement being based on the 5th EuropeanAction Pro-
gramme. The strategic framework would be laid down in the first of what were called
Framework Directives, while the standards themselves would be set out in a subse-
quent Directive, referred to as the Daughter Directive. The standards would be based
on those recommended by the WHO in its air quality guideline of 1987, and which
would be revised in the 1990s. The WHO was considered to play a key role, because
as an independent organisation it would be able to supply the scientific legitimacy to
compel all Member States to accept the new regulatory proposals. Strategically, the
standards would be combined with provisions on the necessity of providing informa-
tion in order to heighten environmental awareness, and the standards needed to be
strict enough to force Member States to develop innovative strategies to meet them.
The Dutch contributed to the involvement of the WHO as well as to the strategic angle
of the European air quality policy. In regard to the involvement of the WHO, Dutch
civil servants had contacted this organisation early in the 1980s to ask it to draft air
quality guidelines. TheNetherlands intended to set up a systemof air quality standards
itself, but did not have sufficient scientific expertise. In addition, it was looking for an
institution with the appropriate credentials to convince the opposition in the Nether-
lands of the necessity of such standards, as well as to persuade neighbouring countries
to adopt a similar strategy. This last point has to dowith considerations of competition.
If the Netherlands were to force stricter measures on its own industry, other countries
would then have a competitive advantage. The same idea formed the basis of the EU
proposal to adopt a uniform set of air quality standards. It would ensure the emergence
of an ‘equal environmental playing field’. Strict standards were considered crucial in
order to dissuade other countries from adopting even more rigid ones.
The Dutch efforts found awilling audience in theWHO, and the Netherlands paid for
research into air quality recommendations. By the time results became available in
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1987, however, Dutch enthusiasm regarding air quality standards had waned,
although In the EU they had started to become a benchmark. The target that European
air should meet the WHO standards was taken up in the previously mentioned 5th
EAP. When the eventual regulation was under negotiation in Europe, the Nether-
lands did not relinquish its progressive attitude, and supported strict regulation.
As regards the strategic angle of the proposal, the Netherlands contributed as well,
and the switch to ecological modernisation in the 1980s was a significant factor. Dutch
politicians made their mark on European environmental policy in the early 1990s, as
the 5th EAP was influenced by the then innovative Dutch National Environmental
Policy Plan, and was strongly eco-modernist in character. Key considerations of eco-
logical modernisation involved supplying information, stimulating environmental
innovations, and mobilising the public to support environmental goals. The air qual-
ity regulation was a result of the plans laid down in the 5th EAP because this plan
included the target that the air quality in the EU would match WHO recommenda-
tions. Like 5th EAP the Air Quality Directives contained the typical eco-modernist
goals of involving the public, stimulating innovative policies and informing the pub-
lic about remaining air quality problems.
Even during the time of the negotiations on the Air Quality Directives, the Dutch gen-
erally adopted an ambitious pro-environment stance. Strict rules were in Dutch inter-
ests in general, as the Netherlands had a strong environmental movement and, as a
small country, was dependent on the environmental policy of other nations. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Netherlands lobbied for an international regime for air
quality.
The Netherlands however ended up getting a lot more than it had bargained for. The
standards were too strict and the ‘Dutch’ characteristics like the rights to information,
the stimulation of innovations and public mobilisation exacerbated the problematic
character of the new European regulation. The question is why a Directive initially
favourable to Dutch interests ended up becoming a thorn in the side. In the European
arena files have a very long lead time, and during the time it takes for such an initia-
tive to yield results, national policy may already have taken a different turn. Another
reason is that in the European arena many actors and ideas became involved. In order
to guarantee a level playing field, European institutions aimed for strict standards
that were valid on the territory of the whole of the EU. The Dutch approachwas based
on the idea that the standards should only be valid in places where people might be
exposed. In addition, the process of drafting the air quality strategy was steered by a
UK civil servant, and the eventual European plan of action contained many elements
that were present in the UK strategy. In the preceding years, the UK had unveiled an
air quality action plan in response to a national social problem that had made head-
lines: namely, childhood asthma. Automobility was held responsible, and the UK
developed its strategy in 1997, a year before a common position was reached on
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the European strategy. This strategy began to function as a benchmark for the EU as
well. Moreover, the idea of buttressing a regulatory proposal with a cost-benefit anal-
ysis became fashionable, and the assessment supporting the air quality strategy pre-
dicted that the benefits would significantly outweigh the costs. The study at hand
reveals that assumptions underpinning the cost-benefit analysis were faulty, and
severely undercut this analysis. The costs of implementing this new policy proved
to be far higher than expected. By then the Dutch Government started to raise objec-
tions regarding the feasibility of the proposed standards, but by then it could not
influence the process anymore and a policy proposal was adopted that included
Dutch ideas but applied them in a way that proved to be problematic.
It turns out to be tempting forMember States to play in the European arena, because if
European policy closely matches national policy, few costs need to be incurred in
adjusting national policy to European rules. In addition, when aMember State enacts
an ambitious environmental regulation, it is rational to make ‘Europe’ propose a sim-
ilar regulation as well, in order not to burden one’s own industry with a competitive
disadvantage. This leads to a situation in which eachMember State will try to have its
own favourite regulatory strategies adopted by the EU. Moreover, European institu-
tions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament have their own
reasons for becoming actively involved in European environmental policy.
The Commission, for instance, would like the EU to profile itself as the safe keeper of
its citizens’ environmental interests, and demands that the EU strives for a high level
of protection. In this manner, the Commission is able to defend the ‘raison d’etre’ of
this supranational body politic.
The air quality regulation became a patchwork of different elements from diverse reg-
ulatory systems and philosophies. The notion of ‘bricolage’ aptly describes European
policy, as it is a gathering of different ideas and parts of various national regulatory
systems. In the field of air quality, it had numerous diverse effects, many unintended
by the Netherlands. This bricolage nature makes Europeanisation an ultimately
unpredictable process.
The bricolage nature of European policy has consequences for our assessment of the
phenomenon of Europeanisation. This research demonstrates that Europeanisation is
in fact a two-way street. Indeed, European law is significant for the national legal
order, but Member States such as the Netherlands also try to influence the European
legal order by ‘exporting’ their own policy measure and concepts to the European
arena. Member States make sure that they have people in crucial positions in Euro-
pean committees, other discussion forums, and European regulatory institutions.
These representatives suggest the policy solutions and philosophies of the Member
States that they represent. However, because manyMember States, European institu-
tions and lobby groups have a stake in this arena the member states that exported
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proposals to the European arena get them fed back in away that they had never inten-
ded. Europeanisation has the character of a constant feedback loop from the EU arena
back to the member states and vice versa in which the ideas and proposals get man-
gled, reconfigured and translated beyond recognition.
DUTCH POLICY CHOICES AND ECOLOGICAL MODERNISAT ION
Ecological modernisation was embraced at the beginning of the 1980s by the Dutch
Government as the reigning discourse involving environmental problems. This
entailed a discursive change in regard to the discussion dominant in the 1970s –
the limits-to-growth discourse. In this pessimistic debate, the Government had the
onus of setting strict limits to the emission of pollution by enacting legislation. The
Ministry of the Environment, however, did not have nearly enough power to realise
this restrictive regulation, and environmental regulation became bogged down in a
bureaucratically complex system of permits. Nevertheless, in the field of spatial plan-
ning, the Government did accept a system that limited the extent of the pollution. The
link between spatial administrative decisions and quality standards meant that if
environmental quality was not sufficient in a certain area, the administration could
not permit further polluting activities. This arrangement resulted in quality standards
having a direct influence on individual decisions made by administrative bodies.
When the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment (VROM) was
founded, the environmental department was merged with those of housing and spa-
tial planning, andmodernmanagerial ideas began to permeate this newMinistry. The
first VROMMinister was Pieter Winsemius of the VVD. He modernised the Ministry
and exchanged the pessimistic limits-to-growth discourse for the optimistic dialogue
on ecological modernisation, according to which, environmental problems could be
dealt with by further modernisation in an environmentally friendly direction.
Winsemius initiated a campaign to bring the ‘target groups’ on board, and to sway
them with his approach to shared environmental responsibility. He was helped to
a great extent by the considerable amount of social attention being paid to the
problem of acid rain. A clean environment was presented as a necessary resource
for further production, environmental alternatives were positioned as profitable,
and pollution was framed as a by-product of inefficiency. Environmental degra-
dation was compared to a budget deficit that would have to be repaid by future
generations, and this new discourse resulted in a strong ‘economisation’ of envi-
ronmental thought.
Winsemius demanded that Dutch industry and enterprises do their part, but he
would also make them stakeholders in the drafting of environmental policy. He con-
cluded covenants with industrial sectors, in which they had a large say in environ-
mental policy in exchange for their commitment. Aimed at consensus, prevention,
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and management, this policy reached its summit with the integral National Environ-
mental Policy Plan (NEPP) issued in 1989. In subsequent years, this planwas exported
successfully to other countries and to the European Union.
This policy proved to be a double-edged sword, however, because it promised a pos-
itive interdependency between the economy and environmental policy. This meant
that far-reaching sacrifices could not be demanded from the economically powerful
target groups, and important sectors like the petrochemical industry and transport
were spared.Moreover, the Government aimed for an international approach to envi-
ronmental problems that implicitly relegated domestic measures in importance. In
addition, the incorporation of the environmental movement in the traditional consen-
sus building structures of the Dutch corporate democracy was not always successful.
As regards air quality, this discourse brought little that was new to the table after the
1980s. Even when reports started to come in that particulate matter might be more
harmful than expected, the Government waited for Europe to act. When the Dutch
Government was eventually forced to take steps, it did not realise what legal conse-
quences the air quality standards might have. In hindsight, it can be seen that the atti-
tude of the Dutch administration was naïve, and was a consequence of an implicit
conviction that standards that did not take economic feasibility sufficiently into
account could be considered legally binding. The Dutch Government was firmly con-
vinced that after evaluation the standards would be adjusted downwards by the
European Commission. The implicit assumption was that if one did all that was rea-
sonable, one could not be asked to do more.
The Dutch Government made a strong case for ecological principles and a strategic
long-term approach to environmental problems, but was reluctant to take costly mea-
sures. During the 1990s, ecological modernisation weakened gradually, and more
standard economic considerations became increasingly dominant. Whereas the
strong variation that was leading for a short time in the early 1990s called for a deter-
mined rearrangement of the Dutch economy and consumer behaviour, the weak var-
iation was essentially a conservative strategy.
The discourse suffered itsmost significant setback in the area of transport andmobility.
In the early 1990s an attempt was made at the ecological modernisation of transport,
but here determined opposition from motorists caused the attempt to fail. The eco-
modernistic Second Structural Scheme for Transport and Traffic contained proposals
for road pricing, stimulation of public transport, a strict parking policy and called
on motorists to make the switch from using the car to environmental friendly modes
of transportation. However, the motorist had no intention of leaving his or her car in
order to use cleaner methods of transportation, and certainly did not intend to pay for
use of the road. The policy became seen as inimical to the interests of ordinary car users
and gradually the eco-modernist ambitions were released in the course of the 1990s.
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The end of ecological modernisation in this domain arrived with the inauguration of
the first Cabinet led by Prime Minister Balkenende in 2002. The policy of the Balken-
ende Cabinets, especially the first from 2002 to 2003, was geared at stimulation of eco-
nomic activity including the facilitation of transport and mobility. Subsidies for
cleaner cars were abolished, and motorists were accommodated, by, among other
things, the adoption of an Emergency Law on Road Expansion. Environmental inter-
ests became thoroughly marginalised by the Balkenende Cabinets.
Air quality though proved to be a good topic on which to fight back. Already the sit-
uation in Overschie had attracted some attention, but the breakthrough came when
the Council of State started to annul the infrastructural projects cherished by the Gov-
ernment. Suddenly the opposition and other proponents of environmental interests
had a powerful weapon at their disposal. After 2005 air quality became a divisive sub-
ject in Dutch environmental discourse, and protagonists soon returned to their old
positions. The broad consensus concerning an approach that would bring about eco-
logical protection and economic welfare broke down, with the pro-health camp argu-
ing that the Government was blind to the effects of its pro-asphalt policies for public
health, and the pro-infrastructure camp claiming that environmental standards halted
economic progress. The Government, meanwhile, pleaded that it was doing ‘every-
thing feasible’. This was an implicit appeal to the weak ecological modernistic consen-
sus inwhich one chooses environmental protection to the extent that it is economically
feasible and reasonable. Nevertheless, the appeal failed to bring the parties together.
Ultimately, ecological modernisation though still proved to be the key to a solution.
The programmatic approach which eventually ended the deadlock bore the hall-
marks of weak ecological modernisation, since it considered infrastructure and envi-
ronment interests to be able to coexist peacefully if managed correctly. The
programmatic approach stimulated scientific research, and the involvement of stake-
holders and lower administrative bodies. It amounted to a preventative approach, but
not one that would halt infrastructure development.
With this approach, the Netherlands returned to a weak variation of ecological mod-
ernisation, a discourse in which difficult choices are avoided. Apparently, the Dutch
cannot do awaywith environmental principles, but at the same time are not willing to
make concrete sacrifices for them, at least not when mobility is concerned. The dis-
course of ecological modernisation successfully defused the seemingly insurmount-
able dichotomy between ecology and economy in the air quality case but it did not
have the rejuvenating ambition anymore it had in the 1980s, and currently resembles
a forced marriage between ecology and economy.
Whenwe review the domain of air quality and ecological modernisation, the extent to
which the Dutch eco-modernist discourse is essentially conservative becomes obvi-
ous. Principles are strongly espoused, but, in practice, compromises are made, and
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the adage that no one should be asked to do too much is adhered to. This chasm
between principles and practical policy leads to problems when pressure groups
begin to resist the Government’s conservative policies on the basis of these idealistic
principles. In the air quality clash, the Government was reprimanded by the judiciary,
it pointed out that the Government had made binding agreements in Europe. The
Government’s response to the environmental movement was to rescind subsidies
for groups like Milieudefensie. This indicates that Dutch ecological modernisation
is mostly a discourse concerning accommodation and incorporation rather than an
ambitious environmental dialogue. However, the rise of the European Commission
and the judiciary as active players in the environmental arena means that the Dutch
Government may be confronted unexpectedly with the principles it has preached. As
the air quality clash has shown, thismay result in environmental considerations repla-
cing economic ones, albeit temporarily.
THE AIR QUALITY CLASH AND PRECAUTION
The hypothesis formulated at the start of this inquiry was that the air quality clash
was an indication of change within the legal order, making it less concerned with
compensation andmorewith the prevention of damage. The analysis of the air quality
clash indicated some support for this hypothesis, but one could not state unequivo-
cally that a precautionary approach is rising in this part of the legal order. The case
also demonstrated that when precaution tended to become dominant, countervailing
forces arose that undercut precaution as the new fundament of the legal order. Dif-
ferent actors propagated or argued against precaution, and the question as to whether
it is gaining ground can only be answered by examining the attitudes of different
actors towards this approach.
The Dutch Government was generally not susceptible to embracing a precautionary
legality. The policy discourse on ecological modernisation actually ensured that the
legality of risk and compensation remained dominant. The reason is that the Dutch
Government always prioritised cost-effectiveness in its environmental policy, and
this is a crucial prerequisite within the weak ecological modernistic discourse. The
precautionary principle is highlighted, but if costs became too high, the Dutch Gov-
ernment did not implement a strictly precautionary approach. When the Air Quality
Directives had to be implemented in Dutch law, Dutch Minister Jan Pronk wrote a
letter to European Commissioner Margot Wallström, arguing that strict implementa-
tion would not be cost-effective. Pronk was and is known as a supporter of the pre-
cautionary principle, but even he assumed that an unequal cost-benefit ratio would be
a good reason not to fully implement the Directive.
Up to the year 2000, European policy makers were more inclined to take a precaution-
ary stance, and the European Air Quality Directives from the 1990s displayed signs of
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the legality of precaution. They were implemented with limited scientific support,
they were broad in scope, and they involved the citizens explicitly for the purpose
of maintaining pressure on the Member States to reach and adhere to the required
standards. The provision of information was aimed especially at creating ‘pressure
from below’ on Member States to make sure that they implemented the provisions
correctly.
The Council of State was also more amenable to a precautionary approach than the
Dutch Government. Even though indications often remained implicit, there were
signs that a precautionary legality gained ground. The Council of State demanded
much more research into the consequences of air quality-related decisions than it
had in the past. In addition, the Council of State acted as a champion of the strict link
between air quality standards and administrative decisions.
The Council of State is not only the highest administrative judge but is also the highest
advisory council of the State. In both capacities, it was critical of any policy that would
jeopardise environmental legal guarantees: such as the Urgent Law on Road Expan-
sion. Moreover, the Council of State Advisory Section criticised the Government, clai-
ming that policy was one-sided in the orientation of economic growth to the expense
of sustainability.
In this file, the Council of State proved to be a tenacious opponent of the Government.
The position of the Council of State was reinforced because the standards were Euro-
pean in origin. European law is directly applicable in Dutch law, and the Council
made the argument that laws may be changed in ‘The Hague’, but that did not mean
that European standards could be set aside in litigation if they were appealed to by
citizens. The Council of State pointed out that the Dutch Government had bound itself
to agreements made in Brussels. The storyline that the Government had bound itself
to international legal rules and that therefore it cannot solve the situation by changing
national policy is very important when it comes to precaution. It indicated that the
judiciary would not hesitate to overrule national policy when it did not conform to
European agreements. Since ‘Europe’ tended to be more precautionary than the
Dutch Government this legal route became an avenue through which precautionary
considerations entered the Dutch legal order.
As can be expected, the pro-health camp used the most precaution-based arguments,
themost innovative of whichwas the use of an explicitly legal storyline in the air qual-
ity clash. Milieudefensie in particular used the verdicts of the Council of State, and
began to campaign using the narrative that the rights of Dutch citizens were being
violated, because the administration refused to act in relation to the poor quality of
air in dirty streets. In court, Milieudefensie demanded that the speed limit be lowered
on tangential roads, and that the dirtiest streets be closed to traffic. Milieudefensie lost
those court cases, but managed to make its point: clean air is a human right. With this
Summary: the social construction of the Dutch air quality clash
argument, Milieudefensie also urged citizens to take the administration to court. It
played a background role itself, while local pressure groups argued that air quality
was being jeopardised by a certain project. In order to facilitate the litigants, Milieu-
defensie developed a ‘do it yourself’ package that detailed step by step the way to
initiate proceedings.
The success of this legal strategywas one of themost stimulating socio-legal conclusions,
because before the onset of the air quality clash, the argument that a clean environment is
a human right was made in academia, but never by actors in a concrete environmental
conflict. During the air quality clash it managed tomobilise a significant amount of peo-
ple, at least significant enough to cause a surge in environmental litigation.
It is not surprising that the pro-infrastructure camp was a staunch opponent of a pre-
cautionary approach. This camp used the standard argument that legislation had neg-
ative economic consequences, and that the issue of air quality should not block the
Netherlands in terms of economic development. Indeed, the strict interpretation by
the Council of State threatened the prevalence of environmental interests. The story-
line presented by the pro-infrastructure camp gained more adherence as the air qual-
ity clash dragged on. In general, the Government adopted a similar stance, and air
quality gradually became seen as a problem of inflexible regulation. The program-
matic approach was indeed more flexible than the old link, and in that sense the
pro-infrastructure camp obtained what it had demanded. However, the program-
matic approach also contained measures for clean air that earlier Cabinets had never
intended to take, and in this sense it was a compromise. In terms of the legality of
precaution, however, the plan should be seen as belonging to the legality of risk
and compensation, with its detailed balance between measures and harmful projects.
It is remarkable that the rise of a precautionary legality was also halted in Europe. In
this arena, lobby groups comprising project developers and other economically
important sectors successfully petitioned for flexibility. Indeed, the Air Quality Direc-
tive of 2008 granted more flexibility, as it foresaw the possibility of postponing the
standards, and the Netherlands was quick to make use of these provisions.
The conclusion, therefore, is that although air quality regulationwas indeed a product
of a developing legality of precaution, this legality did not yet gained the upper hand.
It had not emerged without friction, and the countervailing powers that were mobi-
lised against it were powerful on a national as well as a European level.
THE AIR QUALITY CLASH: SUMMARY CONCLUS IONS
How and why did air quality emerge suddenly as a problematic issue in the Nether-
lands? This study shows that EU air quality regulation strongly contributed to the
 The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash
outbreak and continuation of the Dutch air quality clash. It also shows that the inter-
play between the EU regulation and Dutch attempts to influence it are highly impor-
tant. From a long term historical perspective we may even say that the Dutch air
quality clash is the result of Dutch influence at the EU level at an early stage. The strict
EU norms would not have come about if the Dutch had not involved the WHO in
order to promote scientifically underpinned norms. That the norms are as strict as
they are cannot be solely attributed to Dutch influence. It is also the result of the influ-
ence exerted by another member state, the United Kingdom.
Another characteristic of Dutch environmental law played a crucial role as well. This
is ‘the link’ between environmental law and permits for infrastructure development.
Because of this link infrastructure could not be developed in situations where envi-
ronmental norms are already exceeded. Because the EU standards were strict, they
were transgressed in large parts of the Netherlands. Hence, the development of infra-
structure came to a halt in major parts of the country. The fact that the Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division operated in quite a formalistic way meant that
there was no room to consider the social impact of cancelling permits. However the
Directives and the link did not give it much discretionary room to consider other
options than to cancel permits because of noncompliance with the air quality
regulation.
The clash can be further understood as an episode in Dutch politics where the con-
sensus of weak ecological modernisation was dissolved. This happened first because
the Balkenende cabinets from 2001 broke away from the consensus by prioritising
infrastructure development. This political change infuriated the environmental move-
ment, which then made the strategic move to turn to the judiciary and requested a
stop to the one-sided developmental policies. As stated above, the legal conditions
favoured their attempts and during the clash they found an ally in the Council of
State. This even led to the storyline of clean air as a human right.
The fact that the pro-health camp found an ally in the Council of State prevented the
Dutch Government from quickly finding an administrative solution to the situation
where infrastructure permits were cancelled on an unprecedented scale. It was forced
to propose a new air quality law to Parliament which contained a novel regulatory
instrument, the programmatic approach.
In Parliament the pro-health camp initially had everything going for it. The Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division kept annulling projects, the Government
was forced to make ever more funds available for air quality and the Council of State
Advisory Division issued strongly negative opinions on the Governments’ attempts
to quickly patch up the Dutch air quality regulation. However, the pro health camp
became confrontedwith an increasingly strong pro-infrastructure camp thatmade the
counter-claim that the real problem with air quality was not its effects on public
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health, but that the regulation of it had blocked the country to further development.
The storyline that it put forward was that the regulation itself was to blame and that
billions of dollars and as much as 100.000 jobs were at stake.
The clash could only come to an end in the political arena by rekindling the eco-mod-
ernist consensus in the Air quality law of 2007. The consensual, managerial, technical
and bureaucratic instrument that was developed out of this law, the NSL, first led the
EU Commission to extend the Dutch some postponement of the standards. Second, it
was accepted by the Council of State as an instrument that facilitated both air quality
improvement and infrastructure development. This research shows – to my knowl-
edge for the first time – a case in which the Council of State as a two pronged institute
was able to keep policy formation deadlocked for several years. One prong – the
Administrative Jurisdiction Division – kept annulling permits with reference to EU
air quality standards while the other prong – the Advisory Division – kept reminding
the government that policy adaptationwould have to be in line with EU regulation. In
the air quality clash, the Council of State acted as a fellow policy maker.
A third way to understand the clash is to look at the level to which the legality of risk
and compensation and the legality of precaution can be found in the handling of the
air quality clash in the legal and the political arena. During the clash strict standards
based on uncertain scientific knowledge blocked important developments in the
Netherlands. Only by balancing the health and environment interests with the inter-
ests of development and mobility could the clash be ended.
The swift promulgation of standards in the European Union, the quality of the clean-
air-is-a-right storyline as a mobilisation device and the attachment of the Council of
State Administrative Jurisdiction Division to the link are indications that a precau-
tionary legality was cautiously on the rise. However, the strong backlash against this
temporary legal preference of environmental interests over economic ones, in the
Netherlands as well as in Europe, pointed out that the legality of precaution had a
long way to go still before it could be considered to reach a dominant position within
the Dutch legal order.
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CABINETS AND MINISTERS
Cabinet Cabinet
factions
Prime
Minister
Main Govt.
representative
responsible for
environment (VOMIL
/ VROM)
Minister of
V&W
Duration Key event relevant to the
air quality clash
Biesheuvel I KVP VVD
ARP CHU
DS’70
Barend
Biesheuvel
(ARP)
Min. Louis Stuyt (KVP) Min. Willem
Drees jr.
(DS.70)
July 1971 –
Aug. 1972
Release of the Urgent
Memorandum
Biesheuvel II KVP VVD
ARP CHU
Barend
Biesheuvel
Min. Louis Stuyt Berend Jan
Udink (CHU)
Aug. 1972 –
May 1973
none
Den Uyl PvdA,
KVP,
ARP,
PPR,
D66
Joop Den
Uyl (PvdA)
Min. Irene Vorrink
(PvdA)
Tjerk
Westerterp
(KVP)
May 1973 –
Dec. 1977
Memorandum on Ambient
Environmental Standards
(1976)
Van Agt I CDA,
VVD
Dries Van
Agt (CDA)
Min. Leendert Ginjaar
(VVD)
Danny
Tuinman
(VVD)
Dec. 1977–
Sept. 1981
Emergence of the Noise
Abatement Act Stb. 1979, 99
Van Agt II CDA,
PvdA,
D66
Dries Van
Agt
Scrt. of State Ineke
Lambers-Hacquebard
(D66)
Min. Jaap
van der
Doef (PvdA)
Sept. 1982
– May 1982
Proposal to establish a
system of air quality
standards
Van Agt III CDA,
D66
Dries Van
Agt
Scrt. of State Ineke
Lambers-Hacquebard
Min. Henk
Zeevalking
(D66)
May 1982 –
Nov. 1982
none
Lubbers I CDA VVD Ruud
Lubbers
(CDA)
Min. Pieter Winsemius
(VVD)
Min. Neelie
Smit Kroes
(VVD)
Nov. 1982 –
July 1986
Foundation of VROM Ministry
Lubbers II CDA VVD Ruud
Lubbers
Min. Ed Nijpels (VVD) Min. Neelie
Smit Kroes
July 1986 –
Nov. 1989
Emergence of the NMP
Lubbers III CDA
PvdA
Ruud
Lubbers
Min. Hans Alders
(PvdA)
Min. Hanja
Maij
Weggen
(CDA)
Nov. 1989 –
Aug. 1994
Release of worrying PM
medical research
Continued
Cabinet Cabinet
factions
Prime
Minister
Main Govt.
representative
responsible for
environment (VOMIL
/ VROM)
Minister of
V&W
Duration Key event relevant to the
air quality clash
Kok I (Purple
Cabinet)
PvdA
VVD D66
Wim Kok
(PvdA)
Min. Margreeth de
Boer (PvdA)
Min.
Annemarie
Jorritsma
(VVD)
Aug. 1994 –
Aug. 1998
Proposal of and common
position on EU Air Quality
Directives
Kok II
(Purple
Cabinet)
PvdA
VVD D66
Wim Kok Min. Jan Pronk (PvdA) Min. Tineke
Netelenbos
(PvdA)
Aug. 1998 –
July 2002
Implementation of EU Air
Quality Directives in AQO
2001
Balkenende
I
CDA VVD
LPF
Jan Peter
Balkenende
(CDA)
Scrt. of State Pieter van
Geel (CDA)
Min. Roelf
de Boer
(LPF)
July 2002 –
May 2003
Budget cuts in VROM
Ministry Emergency Law on
Road Expansion
Balkenende
II
CDA VVD
D66
Jan Peter
Balkenende
Scrt. of State Pieter van
Geel
Min. Karla
Peijs (CDA)
May 2003 –
July 2006
Emergence of the air quality
clash in NL.
Balkenende
III
CDA VVD
D66
Jan Peter
Balkenende
Scrt. of State Pieter van
Geel
Min. Karla
Peijs
July 2006 –
Feb. 2007
Oct 2006: Air Quality Law
adopted by Second Chamber
Balkenende
IV
CDA
PvdA CU
Jan Peter
Balkende
Min. Jacqueline
Cramer (PvdA)
Min. Camiel
Eurlings
(CDA)
Feb. 2007 –
Oct. 2010
Verdict A4 Burgerveen
Leiden: Adoption of Air
Quality Law in Parliament
and release of the NSL
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APPENDIX 3
DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES (IN THE AIR QUALITY
CLASH)
CDA (Christendemocratisch Appèl), Christian Democratic appeal: the biggest con-
fessional political party in the Netherlands. The CDA is the result of a merger of var-
ious confessional political parties, namely the KVP, ARP and CHU. In the Cabinet
during the years of the air quality clash. Centrist.
CU (ChristenUnie) Smaller Christian party, slightly to the left of the CDA in eco-
nomic and environmental issues
D66 (Democraten ’66) Social liberal party founded in 1966, progressive on social
issues and the environment, leaning towards free market liberalism in economic
issues.
GL (GroenLinks) the ‘Green Left’, is a smaller, ecological party, progressive in social
economic issues and the most environmentalist minded of the Dutch political parties.
LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuijn) the ‘List Pim Fortuijn’ is a party founded by and inspired by
the ideas of its late political leader Pim Fortuijnwhowas assassinated in 2002. Its ideas
may best be described as populist. It is the least environmentally sensitive party
before and during the air quality clash.
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PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid) The Dutch labour party is the biggest social democratic
party in the Netherlands. It was the biggest party in the Government during the years
of the Kok Cabinets from 1994 to 2002. Entered the Cabinet again during the later
years of the air quality clash is 2007.
SP (Socialistische Partij) The Socialist Party is a smaller party to the left of the PvdA.
Despite its respectable size it has as of yet not participated in any Cabinet. It profiles
itself mainly on economic issues, but takes the environmental side often as well.
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VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) People’s Party for Freedom en
Democracy. The VVD is a liberal / conservative party that endorses liberal economic
policy. It was never known for its environmentalist credentials, but has delivered a
highly important Ministers of VROM such as Pieter Winsemius and Ed Nijpels. They
are responsible for the introduction of ecological modernisation is the Netherlands.
During the air quality clash it belongs to the pro-infrastructure camp. It is frequently
in Government.
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APPENDIX 4
EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) The ALDE is an alliance of
political parties advocating free markets and the protection of civil liberties. The
Dutch political parties VVD and D66 are both part of the ALDE group. Its political
position is centrist.
EPP (European People’s Party) The EPP is formed by Christian democratic political
parties in Europe. It represents the Christian democratic wing of the European Par-
liament. It is generally considered conservative. The CDA is a member of the EPP.
GUE / NGL European United Left/Nordic Green Left A group of political parties
with a socialist or (post) communist orientation. The Dutch political party SP is a
member.
S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) The block consisting of
social democratic parties in Europe. It is the second largest political party in Europe
after the EPP. The Dutch PvdA is a member of S&D.
The Greens / EFA (The Greens / European Free Alliance) An alliance of ecological
political parties, mostly on the left of the political spectrum. The Dutch political party
GroenLinks is a member.
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APPENDIX 5
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AbRVS (Afdeling Bestuursrecht Raad van State) Council of State
Administrative Jurisdiction Division
Aedes (Vereniging van Woningcorporaties) Association of Housing
Corporations
AEA T AEA Technology (global sustainability consultancy firm)
ACS American Cancer Society
ALARA As Low As can Reasonably be Achieved
ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, see annex 4
European Political Parties
AMvB (Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur) General Administrative Order
ANWB (Algemene Nederlandse Wielrijders Bond) Dutch Motorist
Association
ARP (Antirevolutionaire Partij), Anti Revolutionary Party, Dutch
Christian Political party, merged in the CDA in 1980.
AVV (Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer) Advisory Service Traffic and
Transport
AQO (Besluit Luchtkwaliteit) Air Quality Order
Bouwend
Nederland
Dutch Builders Association
BS Black Smoke
CAFE Clean Air For Europe
CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl), Christian Democratic Appeal,
Dutch Christian democratic party (see annex 3 Dutch political
parties)
CHU (Christelijk Historische Unie) Christian Historical Union, merged
in the CDA in 1980
CO Carbon Monoxide
CO2 Carbon dioxide
COMEAP Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants
CPB (Centraal Plan Bureau) Central Bureau of Statistics
CRMH (Centrale Raad voor Milieuhygiëne) Central Council for
Environmental Hygiene)
D66 (Democraten ‘66) Democrats 66, see political parties
Continued
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (UK
Ministry for the Environment and Transport)
DG Directorate General
DGMH (Directoraat Generaal Milieuhygiëne) Directorate General for
Environmental Hygiene
DOE Department of the Environment (UK Environment Ministry)
DOT Department of Transport (UK Transport Ministry)
DROM (Deregulering Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu) Deregulation
Spatial Planning and Environment
DS’70 (Democratisch Socialisten ’70) Democratic Socialists, Dutch
political party
EAP Environmental Action Programme (EU)
ECN (Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland) Dutch Energy Research
Center
ECU European Currency Unit, the precursor of the Euro
EEA European Environmental Agency
EEB European Environmental Bureau
EM Explanatory Memorandum
ENVI Environmental Committee
EP European Parliament
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (US)
EPAQS Expert Panel on Air Quality Standards
EPP European Peoples Party (see annex 3 European Political parties)
EU European Union
EUROPIA European Petroleum Industries Association
EVO (Eigen Vervoerders Organisatie) Organisation of Enterprises in
Logistics
EZ (Economische Zaken) Ministry of Economic Affairs
FES (Fonds Economische Structuurversterking) Structural Economic
Strengthening Fund
GAOSD (AMvB Gevoelige Bestemmingen) General Administrative Order
on Sensitive Destinations
GGD (Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst) Municipal Health Service
GL (GroenLinks) Green Left (see annex 3 Dutch Political parties)
GUE/NGL European United Left/Nordic Green Left (see annex 4 European
Political parties)
HEI Health Effects Institute
IMP (Indicatief Meerjarenplan) Indicative Multi-Year Plan
IMP M (Indicatief Meerjarenplan Milieubeheer) Indicative Multi-Year
Plan on Environmental Management
KEMA (Keuringsinstituut Electrische Materialen) Certification Institute
Electrical Materials
Continued
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KVP (Katholieke Volkspartij) Catholic Peoples Party, Dutch political
party mergerd in the CDA in 1980.
KWS 2000 (KoolWaterStoffen 2000 convenant) Hydrocarbons 2000 covenant
LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) Pim Fortuyn List. Dutch political party on the
right of the political spectrum. Named after its assassinated leader
Pim Fortuyn.
LRTAP
Convention
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
MAAPE Medical Aspects of Air Pollution Episodes
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MIT (Meerjarenplan Insfrastructuur en Transport) Multi Year
Programme Infrastructure and Transport
MKB-
Nederland
(Midden-en Klein bedrijf Nederland) Dutch association of small
and medium sized enterprises.
MNP (Milieu enNatuur Plan Bureau) Environment andNature Planning
Bureau
MP Member of Parliament
Mug/m3 Micrograms per cubic meter
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NH3 Ammonium
NMP (Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan) National Environmental Policy
Plan, in English literature known as the NEPP
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
NEPROM (Vereniging voor Nederlandse Projectontwikkelingsmaatschap-
pijen) Dutch Project Developers Association
NO2 Nitrogen dioxide
NOx Various oxides of nitrogen
NSL (Nationaal Samenwerkingsplan Luchtkwaliteit) National
Cooperation Plan Air Quality
NVB (Nederlandse Vereniging van Bouwondernemers) Dutch Builders
Association
NVM (Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars) Dutch Association of
Real Estate Agents
NVVP (Nationaal Verkeer en Vervoersplan) National Traffic and
Transport Plan
PAH PolyAromatyc Hydrocarbon.
PBL (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving) Planning Bureau for the
Living Environment
PIM (Project Integratie Milieubeleid), Project Integration
Environmental Policy
PPR (Politieke Partij Radicalen) Radical Political Party, Dutch political
party merged in GroenLinks in 1990
Continued
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OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PM10 Particulate Matter 10 micron
PM2.5 Particulate Matter 2.5 micron
PMR Project Mainport Rotterdam
PvdA (Partij van deArbeid), Labour Party, Dutch social democratic party
(see annex 3 Dutch Political parties)
QUARG Quality of Urban Air Review Group
RARO (Raad voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening) Council for Spatial Planning
RIVM (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne), National
Institute for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene
ROS Eeactive Oxygen Species
S&D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (see annex 4
European political parties)
SG Steering Group (CAFE)
SER (Sociaal Economische Raad) Social Economic Council
SNM (Stichting Natuur en Milieu) Foundation for Nature and
Environment
SO2 (Zwaveldioxide) sulfur dioxide
SP (Socialistische Partij) Socialist Party, Dutch party on the left of the
political spectrum (see annex 3 Dutch Political parties)
Stb. (Staatsblad) Law Gazette
SVV2 (Tweede Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer) Second Structural
Scheme Traffic and Transport
SWAB (Samen Werken Aan Bereikbaarheid) Memorandum on mutual
cooperation on accessibility
TAG Technical Analysis Group (CAFE)
The Greens /
EFA
The Greens / European Free Alliance (see annex 4 European
Political Parties)
TLN (Transport en Logistiek Nederland) Transport and Logistics
Netherlands, Dutch organisation of transporters.
TNO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschap-
pelijk Onderzoek) Dutch Organisation for Applied Scientific
Reseach.
TOPS (Tijdelijk Onderhandelingsplatform Schiphol) Temporary
Negotiation Platform Schiphol
TSP Total Suspended Particulates
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
US EPA US Environmental Protection Agency
V&W (Ministerie Verkeer en Waterstaat) Ministry of Transport and
Water Management
Continued
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VBO (Vereniging Bemiddelaars Onroerende zaken) Real Estate Agents’
Association
VNG (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten) Association of Dutch
Municipalities
VNO-NCW (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen – Nederlands
Christelijk Werkgeversverbond) Alliance of Dutch Enterprises –
Dutch Christian Employers Union: Dutch Employers Union.
VCRMH Voorlopige Centrale Raad voor de Milieuhygiëne) Preliminary
Central Council for Environmental Hygiene.
VINO/VINEX (Vierde Nota Ruimte Ordening, plus de Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke
Ordening Extra) Fourth Memorandum Spatial Planning, plus the
Fourth Memorandum Spatial Planning Extra
VOMIL (Volksgezondheid en Milieu) Ministry of Public Health and the
environment
VROM (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
Milieu), Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and the
Environment
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (see annex 3 Dutch
Political parties).
WG Imp Working Group on Implementation (CAFE)
WG PM Working Group on Particulate Matter (CAFE)
WG TSP Working Group on Target Setting and Policy Assessment (CAFE)
WHO World Health Organisation
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